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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to compare the
characteristics of both Western and Saudi senior management
in Saudi Arabian business organisations.
The author investigated management characteristics,
and the differences between Saudi and Western managers in
their styles and management practices. In addition, he
investigated the underlying causes of ineffective manage-
ment and ineffective organisational context and systems in
Saudi Arabia.
Some sources have claimed that Saudi managers are
ineffective in their management styles. Yet no effort was
made by these sources to compare Saudi and non-Saudi
managers. In addition, no study has been made to compare
non-government and government business corporations. Also,
little has been said elsewhere regarding the social and
organisational environments and their effects/impacts on
both management and corporations. The present study has
attempted to do this. Difficulties in developing management
and organisation have arisen because of Saudi Arabia's
rapid development from a traditional society towards
industrialisation and modernisation.
Field research was conducted in several cities of
Saudi Arabia from June 1989 to August 1991. Methods of
eliciting data included questionnaires and interviews.
Data-processing was done by Loughborough University of
Technology computer centre. The author found that most
Saudi managers lack effective skills and relevant knowl-
edge. They were autocratic, exhibiting an authoritarian
style for their personal interests, yet demonstrating
people-concern for keeping subordinates happy. By contrast
Western managers were high short term task-oriented, with
low people-concern, but were strongly influenced by the
Saudi Arabian environment. Recommendations for change or
improvement may be topics worthy for further study.
PREFACE
Saudi Arabia is undergoing intensive development
towards modernisation. Part of this is the international-
isation of the Saudi economy. Saudi Arabia has become an
open country for investment by international companies. In
addition, there are many joint-venture corporations from
all over the industrial world, i.e., Japan, USA., UK., and
several other European countries. Both Saudi and Western
executives and their corporations have a major role in
Saudi business progress.
Since 1982 the author of this research has been
involved in the training and development of Saudi managers,
supervisors, and manpower potential. His first experience
in this field between 1980 and 1984 was with a large
organisation, Saudi Arabian Airlines. Since 1984 he has
also been with another large organisation, International
Airports Projects. Prior to these training and development
experiences, he worked for three years as a project manag-
er. He has conducted training courses for management and
supervision. Furthermore, he has had several international
training courses in management, and organisation develop-
ment, and he had training in instructional skills. Also, he
has become a fellow and member of several international
training and management institutes. He had several training
courses in developing questionnaires, conducting inter-
views, and in data analysis. These experiences plus his
formal education, his MBA, publication of two books on
management development (Leadership Basic Skills, and Time
Management in Saudi Arabia; both in Arabic), and over 60
relevant articles in a well known national newspaper (OKAZ)
have contributed in this research.
Through his management training study and experience,
the author found that there is a great need to understand
the impact of Saudi management characteristics and style(s)
on both their non-Saudi counterparts and on their organisa-
tion's objectives and systems. In addition, there is a
great need to understand the Saudi Arabian cultural and
social value system as it impacts on the organisational
context and on management practice.
The author chose Western senior managers as a compari-
son sample because they may be thought to represent a
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better or more effective contribution to the management
task. This results from their advanced management knowledge
and skills, and from their home background from modern and
high technology societies. In addition, they are the
largest non-Saudi sample available at senior management
levels in most of the large Saudi business corporations.
The sample surveyed consisted mainly of senior manag-
ers, executives, and top officials because of their leader-
ship role. Leadership, of course, is seen as an essential
element in corporate success or failure.
Without understanding the destructive Saudi Arabian
business environment any management development programmes
will not be effective. This is particularly important if
these programmes are based on Western techniques and
ideology. In addition, Western managers in Saudi Arabia,
and also all other non-Arabs, may not be effective if they
try to apply Western techniques or practices without
suitable adaptation.
This research, therefore, is intended to describe the
characteristics of both Saudi and Western managers in Saudi
corporations, and to make a comparative analysis. It is
also intended to describe the effect of the local industri-
al and business corporation's context and systems, on those
managers. Furthermore, it explains the Saudi societal
impact on both management and organisations.
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I. INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH ISSUES AND PARAMETERS
A. FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH
The following presents the conceptual framework of this
research, its theses, and purpose, and the major reasons and
considerations that directed its development. It also
presents the reasons for making a comparative study between
Western and Saudi managers and for studying the Saudi
organisational context and social environment as well. In
addition, it presents effective leadership and management
definitions.
1- Purpose
The emphasis of this study is on management
characteristics in the private and government sectors, both
Saudi and Western. It also covers both the governmental and
non-governmental organisational context. However, it studies
management in corporations that are directly involved in
industry, business, marketing, services, and construction.
In addition, it studies some government organisations, such
as the Ministry of Trade that have a great effect on the
progress of business in Saudi Arabia.
The objectives of this study were to investigate
management characteristics in Saudi Arabian business in
relationship to the social, cultural, and organisational
environment, to demonstrate the effective/ineffective
characteristics of modern management; and to show in fact
Note: The term government organisations refers to both
business and industrial corporations that are
fully owned by the government, and to corporations
that are semi-government, those partially owned
by the public, but dependent on government support
and direction.
3that the application of modern management practice in Saudi
Arabia is low. It also investigates the social and
organisational context and systems effects.
The purpose of this study is to analyse and compare
characteristics of Western and Saudi senior managers working
in Saudi Arabia, in Saudi government and non-government
organisations. Its primary focus is on senior level
management work in organisations that are highly influenced
by the local social value systems.
This comparative management study of Saudi Arabia is felt
to be valid because:
1. Saudi Arabia is a nation state, and is undergoing
intensive development towards industrialisation
and modernisation.
2. Saudi Arabia's international relationships are no
longer limited to the oil industry, though the
Kingdom has a very large role in and influence on
the oil industry. Those relationships have become
greater than before 1970 because of Saudi Arabia's
leading role in the Muslim and Arab world and its
role in the United Nations.
3. Many Saudi business corporations today deal with
international companies and markets, and live in
a highly competitive world. They have developed
good business relationships with both modern
societies and underdeveloped countries.
4. In addition, business and industrial corporations
in Saudi Arabia have started to play a significant
role in the Kingdom's development. The non-
government sector is making a great contribution
in the Kingdom's gross domestic product (GDP). Its
share in the Kingdom's GDP has increased from
about ten percent (10%) in 1981/82 to thirty-five
per cent (35%) in 1991/92.
2- The Areas Covered by this Study
The purpose of this study is to cover and understand
the following areas:
2.1 What are the management characteristics of both
Saudis and Westerners in Saudi corporations?
2.2 How do those characteristics influence/affect
organisational context and systems?
2.3 What effects do Saudi organisations, context, and
systems have on management?
2.4 How does Saudi Arabian culture impact on both
management and organisations?
2.5 To what extent are Western managers
affected/influenced by the Saudi environment and
culture?
3- Reasons for Comparing Western and Saudi Managers
3.1 Western senior managers working in Saudi Arabia
represent the largest non-Saudi executive group
of all nationalities.
3.2 Western senior managers have a key role in most
large Saudi business corporations.
3.3 Western managers are from modern industrial
societies, for example, USA and UK. In addition,
they have advanced technical skills and management
knowledge. For instance, fifty-four per cent (54%)
of the Western participants in this study are from
USA, thirty per cent (30%) are from UK, eight per
cent (8%) are from Germany, and the last eight per
cent (8%) from France (see Appendix A for the
background of the participants).
While these Western managers do admittedly
come from different countries the present research
tends to treat them as a homogeneous group on the
5grounds that they have several things in common:
- they are not Saudis
- they are not Arabs
- they are not of the Islamic faith
- they are not going to make lifelong
careers in Saudi Arabia.
For all these reasons the participating Western-
ers contrast with our (larger) sample of Saudi
executives, and have a distinctive viewpoint on
Saudi management and society, a viewpoint that is
of particular value in the context of this
research.
3.4 On the other hand Saudi managers are potential
leaders in the development of their organisations,
businesses, and communities.
3.5 Saudi managers/leaders have to become effective
and expert if they are to manage their
organisations successfully. Therefore, they need
to know how their characteristics affect/influence
the progress of their corporations, and what needs
to be changed. In addition, they need to know what
organisational context and social values are
effectively contributing and/or impacting on their
business success, and what needs to be changed.
The comparison between Saudis, who are from a
traditional, underdeveloped country, and Western managers,
does show significant differences. The results highlight
effective/ineffective management beliefs/philosophy and
practices in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the results show how
Saudi managers/colleagues affect their Western counterparts
and organisation, and/or vise versa. Finally, the results
show how the Saudi social environment affects/influences
Western and Saudi managers.
6B. RESEARCH PARAMETERS, METHODOLOGY
1- Areas of Analysis
Three major areas/elements that relate to management
and organisation in Saudi Arabia were investigated.
In examining the areas the author has tried to analyse
all necessary major functions and tasks of management in many
large Saudi business organisations, both government and non-
government. He has also examined a large area of the
organisational context. For instance, he has examined
organisational boundaries , systems, and culture . In addition,
he has examined the Saudi Arabian social environment in
relation to its effects on organisations and management, for
instance, value system. The following represents the elements
that were investigated and examined/analysed.
1.1 Management characteristics
Examining, analysing, and comparing management
characteristics, for both Saudis and Westerners, in relation
to their major tasks and functions. This includes:
- The level of formality/informality (formalism) in
different situations, for example, crisis,
conflict, handlingperformance problems, planning,
and directing employees to raise output.
- Decision making; the decision making process and
style(s) in relation to the development of
planning objectives, planning, and operations,
besides the levels of delegation and consultation.
- Levels of cooperation, teamwork, and handling
conflict among management.
- Acceptance and application of confrontation,
criticism, feedback, and support of colleagues/-
subordinates' ideas or feedback.
- The level(s) of management obsolescence in
7technical and management knowledge and skills, in
addition to knowledge related to Saudi culture.
- Perception of both Saudi and Western managers
regarding their characteristics, work preferences,
work priorities, performance, and relationships.
- Perception of both Saudi and Western managers
regarding needs for management improvement in
Saudi Arabia.
1.2 Organisation's Context
Examining, analysing, and comparing organisational
context and systems in both government and non-government
business, and industry. This includes:
Organisational mission statement, objectives
goals, and planning. It focused on management's
understanding of its company's business nature,
future, mission, objectives and goals. In
addition, it examines management's participation,
commitment, and communication of planning, and its
process in relation to objectives and goals.
- Development and application of standards of
performance; appraisal systems, and job
descriptions.
- It focuses on organisational policy development,
structure effectiveness, use of power and
authority, and level(s) of centralisation.
- Organisational 	 boundaries;	 how	 effective
organisational boundaries are, and how compatible
the inter-departmental functions are in Saudi
corporations. In addition, it examines level(s)
of consistency and/or conflict among departments!-
divisions in those organisations.
- The budgeting systems efficiency and effectiveness
in relation to planning, objectives, investment,
and commitment towards developed plans.
8- Employee recruitment, promotion, rewards, and
training and their effectiveness. This is somewhat
focused on job satisfaction besides decision-
making concerning workforce capabilities.
- Punctuality and discipline of the workforce in
relation to supervision absenteeism,	 and
attendance policy.
- It also examines organisational communication
systems in relation to the cause of problems. The
focus here is on the effectiveness of in/out
company meetings and efficient time utilisation.
1.3 Societal Effects
Examining and analysing the Saudi Arabian social value
system and cultural effects on both management and
organisational systems. This includes:
- Organisational culture and values versus the
mission statement. It also examines organisational
culture effectiveness and support or contribution
in achieving objectives/mission, and the
organisational value system effects on the
companies progress. It also focuses on what the
most important value(s) are at work, how relative
those values are to productivity/business, and
what their relationship is to the social value
system.
- Social relationships effects on personnel and
organisations. This examines social effects that
include: impact on subordinates, collectivism,
socialising at work, effects/impact on time value,
and cultural impact on attendance and punctuality.
- It also questions the requirement for improving
Saudi business in relation to the areas of social,
government, management, education, training, and
organisational improvement needs.
9It examines features of the Saudi Arabian
environment that could enhance business.
2- Research Methodology and Hypotheses
The approach of this study is comparative, not with the
intention of systematically comparing two societies, but to
bring under consideration the corresponding management
situation in Saudi Arabia. This study's major comparison is
between Saudi and Western senior management' s characteristics
in Saudi Arabia. However, it was also important to compare
government and non-government Saudi organisations. In
addition, it was important to analyse Saudi Arabian culture
and the development of Saudi Arabia in connection with the
societal effects on both Saudi and Western managers and
business organisations.
The formulation of working assumptions and hypotheses
for this research was divided into six major sections. Each
section includes one statement or more. Those hypotheses are:
2.1 The Saudi Arabian social value system and culture are
not helpful in improving or maintaining the industrial
and economical development the Kingdom has so far
achieved. In addition, Saudi labour lacks adequate
attitudes and skills concerning maintaining the
development of industrialisation and modernisation.
2.2 Lack of adequate industrial values and attitudes in
Saudi Arabia has resulted in an ineffective
organisational value system and culture.
2.3 Obsolescence among Saudi managers in relation to
effective management knowledge and technical skills and
leadership is high. In addition, Western managers
working in Saudi Arabia lack knowledge of Saudi culture
although they are influenced by the Saudi social
environment. Therefore, they do not display effective
management characteristics.
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2.4 Many Saudi corporations lack effective management and
leadership. Therefore, there is a lack of understanding
of the nature, purpose, and objectives of business in
those corporations.
2.5 Most Saudi corporations lack effective organisational
boundaries, policies, structure, communications
systems, and standards of performance. In addition,
there is a lack of effective budgeting, recruitment,
promotion, and labour planning and development systems.
In addition, centralisation is high and formal
authority is over used.
2.6 Most non-government, profit-seeking organisations in
Saudi Arabia are not long-term oriented. They lack
long-term planning. In addition, their participation
in developing Saudi labour is low.
The sampling used in this research was based on random
means, for example, selecting the top one hundred business
corporations in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand selecting
the government organisations that are supporting business
and industry was not random (Appendix A). This is because
they are few in number and directly related to the progress
of business, for instance, the Ministry of Trade. The
selection of participants and managers was also by random
means, for example, sending 3 or more questionnaires to the
selected organisations and asking them to distribute them,
and make copies for additional interested senior managers
if necessary. This, of course, was done after talking to
and/or introducing the objective of this research to a top
senior manager in each company.
However, responses represented forty-four per cent (44%)
of the total organisations asked to participate in this
research. They represented eighty-eight per cent (88%) among
17 government organisations that support business and
industry. In addition, they were somehow low among 100 semi-
government and non-government business corporations only
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thirty-seven per cent (37%) (Appendix B). The author also
sent 400 questionnaires to the senior management of the
selected organisations, but received only 140 responses,
thirty-five per cent (35%). This somewhat low input from the
management side was due to one or more of the following:
a) Some of the participating or selected organi-
sations did not have more than one or two senior
level managers.
b) About one-third of the selected organisations did
not have Western managers at senior levels.
c) Upon reviewing the questionnaires, some Chief
Executive Officers or Directors General of the
selected organisations were not interested in the
study and therefore did not distribute the
questionnaires to their colleagues/senior
managers. This could be either because they were
too busy (the study was conducted just before and
during the Gulf crisis) or because they did not
want their companies to be surveyed.
However, this thirty-five per cent (35%) response has
given this author enough input and good information to carry
on his research. For instance, twelve of the participating
business corporations rated among the top 28 in 1990. In
addition, twenty-five corporations were among the second top
80 business corporations.
3- Development of the Questionnaire and Data Gathering
In order to examine both the efficiency and effective-
ness of the questionnaires the author conducted a pilot test.
This test showed that it was not practical to try to survey
the areas this research tried to cover with a large number
of open-ended questions. Most of the participants in the
pilot test (12) said that they did not have time to answer
so many open-ended questions, though those questions
12
constituted about 1/4 of the total questionnaire. They
preferred a multiple choice selection or rating scale to
having to render comprehensive answers. Yet a few open-ended
questions were necessary because they would help participants
to give some of their impressions, and/or to express their
answers in more than a statement, an advantage that most
rating scale or multiple choice questions does not provide.
The questionnaires were therefore re-developed to save
as much time for the participants without impacting on the
areas this research had to cover and without making the
participants lose their interest and enthusiasm (Appendix
C). The author used his previous MBA research training and
professional experience in developing these research
instruments. In addition, he used the questionnaire
development techniques acquired through a course attended
at the Institute of Training and Development, Marlow,
England, and the techniques he learned through a Diploma
course at Wolverhampton Polytechnic, England. He also used
several published tests for testing the validity and
reliability of his questionnaires. 1 In addition, question-
naires were developed in both Arabic and English and tested
to give exactly the same meanings, validity and reliability.
Each participating company was given copies of both Arabic
and English questionnaires, and it was left up to the
participants to choose which one to answer. Yet most of the
Saudis chose Arabic questionnaires. However, for the purpose
of analysis using software technology all Arabic responses
had to be translated into English (except for open-ended
1- Robinson, J. P. and Shaver, P. R. Measures of Social
Psychological Attitudes: Survey Research Center,
Institute for Social Research. University of Michigan,
USA., 1980.
Balian, Edward S. How to Design, Analyze, and Write
Doctoral Research. University Press of America. Lonham,
USA., 1982.
Emory, William C. Business Research Methods. Richard D.
Inc., Homewood, USA., 1980.
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the questions).
Along with an introductory page, questionnaires a, b,
and c were used and followed by an interview. Most interviews
were through direct meetings with the participants. Some
interviews, however, were done by telephone. This was either
because some participants were too busy to allocate a
specific time for meeting the author, or because it was
difficult for the author to travel 1000 miles, for instance,
to the Eastern Province several times to meet around 18
participants from several companies.
Data were naturally treated confidentially and
participants were promised that their names or titles would
not be mentioned without their advance permission.
Questionnaires therefore, incorporated code numbers to make
sure they were held in confidence.
The questionnaires were designed so that there was no
suggested or implied favoured response. The questionnaire
items led to forced choice responses using a Lickert-type
scale, with agreements to statements at the positive end,
disagreement at the negative end. In addition, there were
multiple choice questions where the highest selected
statement was the most positive response and the least
selected statement was the most negative one.
The tests used to examine the validity of the
questionnaires and measurement were:
1) A content validity test based on different
responses to statements using a Lickert-type
scale.
2) A cumulative scale was used to measure the
significant results between positive and negative
responses of the same group, such as Saudis, and
the two groups (Saudis and Westerners).
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3)	 The result of 1 and 2 served as the criterion
related validity test and measurement.
The reliability test and measurement was made to show
a correlation or consistency between a response and another
response that both had the same meaning or indicate the same
management style or characteristic but in a slightly
different situation. For instance, questionnaire C had
fourteen questions that purported to examine how much a
manager was people-oriented or task-oriented. The more
positive and/or negative responses a participant selected,
using Lickert-type scales, the more people-concern or task-
orientation he was (questions 4-10, 12-13, 15-16, 19-21,
questionnaire 2, c).
The analysis of the survey result was done through
Loughborough University of Technology (Appendix D). It was
supervised by Dr. John Wilson of the Business School, who
used SPSS-X Release 3.0 (Super Performance Statistical
System, Software). The variable tested were 393 (excluding
open-ended questions). Of course, many questions had more
than one variable, especially the multiple choice ones.
Eighty nine questions out of ninety were analysed through
the Loughborough computer center. Forty-five questions had
many multiple choice answers, and this alone raised the
variables to more than two hundred. The SPSS was a programme
produced cross tabulations and presented their results for
analysis.
4- Analytic Procedure
In order to present this study's results the following
analytical procedure was used. At the outset the procedure
required identifying the different variables which affect
management characteristics (style) in Saudi Arabian business.
These variables were identified as follows:
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1) The social value system in Saudi Arabia; for
instance, social structure, tradition, and social
development.
2) The Saudi manager, experience, knowledge, and
personal approach (style) in relation to modern
management practices.
3) Other business, external and internal environment
effects or impacts on the above variables, for
example, organisational systems and context, and
the Kingdom's rapid development.
The variables' relation to findings from data results
above were analysed, examined and presented through
tabulation and cross tabulation in Chapters V, VI, and VII.
5- Data Collection and Limitations
In addition to the questionnaires and interviews, data
were obtained from: King Abdulaziz University Library and
Data and Research Center, International Airports Projects
Library (Jeddah), the Institute of Public Administration
Library (Jeddah), Saudi government reports and statistics,
and other relevant publications. However, publications and
reports related specifically to management characteristics
and organisational context in Saudi Arabia were very limited
and/or not available in practice.
1- Although there were a few publications and reports
concerning Saudi Arabian management and organisations
through other libraries, such as that of the Institute
of Public Administration, they tended to be limited to
government corporations, and to be for Saudi management
alone without any comparisons. In addition, they did
not typically study the societal influence on
management and organisations in any depth.
2- The sample taken in the present research was not large
(about 400) because it dealt very much with the senior
16
managerial level. The response rate was 35%.
3- Although many managers showed interest in the study
before they were sent the questionnaires (through
advance telephone conversations or brief meetings), a
large number did not in fact answer the questionnaires.
4- This study is limited to Saudi Arabia. Yet, the
findings presented here may well be applicable to other
Arab nations, especially the Arab Gulf countries.
C. MANAGEMENT/LEADERSHIP AND THE RELATED TERMS
This section will introduce management and leadership
definitions, characteristics, and functions. Its major
purpose is to highlight what has been published about good
management and effective leadership.
1- Leadership Definition
According to George R. Terry, leadership is the activity
of influencing people to strive willingly for group
objectives. 2 Thus leadership is the process of influencing
the activities of an individual or a group using motivation,
communication, and power in an effort to achieve goals in
a given situation.
General characteristics of effective leadership
The average leader is an above average person in the
areas of: intelligence, educational attaintment, depend-
ability in exercising responsibilities, activity, social
participation,	 socio-economic	 status,	 sociability,
initiative,	 persistence,	 self-confidence, 	 alertness,
2- Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard. Management of
Organisational Behaviour. Prentice Hall Inc., London,
UK., 1982. pp. 82-83.
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cooperation, adaptability, and verbal facility. 3 Yet, most
managers tend to act as transactional leaders, while
effective leaders are more transformational.4
Transformational leaders increase commitment to group
goals, increase the work output of units, and have followers
who find more satisfaction in their work. The trans-
formational leader articulates a realistic vision of the
future that can be shared, stimulates subordinates intel-
lectually, and pays attention to the differences among the
subordinates (Bass, 1985).5
Transformational leaders have four strategies6
1. Attention through vision. The ability to draw others
to them, not because they have vision but because they
communicate an extraordinary focus or commitment. It
is managing attention through a compelling vision that
brings others to a place they have not been before.
2. Meaning through communication. To make dreams apparent
to others and to align people with them. Leaders commu-
nicate their vision and alignment of work together.
3. Trust through positioning. Trust is essential to all
organisations. The main determinant of trust is reli-
ability and constancy. Trust implies accountability,
predictability, reliability. It is trust of people who
are predictable, whose positions are known and who keep
at it. In addition, leaders who are trusted make them-
3- Peter Ribeaux and Stephen Poppleton. Psychology and Work,
Macmillan Business Management and Administration
Series, London, UK., 1987, p. 273.
4- Kenneth Clark and Miriam Clark. Measures of Leadership,
Leadership Library of America, Inc., New Jersey, USA.,
1990, p. 34.
5- Ibid., p. 71.
6- Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus. Leaders. Harper and Row
Publisher, New York, USA., 1987. pp.27-68.
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selves known, make their positions clear.
4.	 Development through positive self-regard. Management
of self, knowing one's skills and deploying those
skills effectively. Leaders know their strengths and
nurture them.
Transactional Leader
Process-oriented "transactional" models of leadership
developed out of asocial exchange perspective. It emphasises
the implicit social exchange or transaction that exists
between leaders and followers as a feature of effective-
ness. 7
 The leader gives benefits to followers, such as a
definition of the situation and direction, which is
reciprocated by followers in a heightened esteem for, and
responsiveness to, the leader.
Transactional model of leadership centers on the follow-
ers' perceptions of, and expectations about, the leader's
actions and motives, in accordance with attributional
analysis. Heider's (1958) earlier work on the attribution
of intentions through interpersonal perception is exemplified
in the distinction between "can" and "will." If a leader is
perceived to be able to achieve a favourable outcome, but
does not because of an apparent failure of will, this causes
a greater loss of following than the reverse, that is an
inability to achieve something desirable but with an evident
try. 8
Transactional leadership is not basically charismatic
leadership. A charismatic leader has considerable appeal to
followers and great power over them, especially in a time
of crisis when there are strong needs for direction (Weber
7- Kenneth Clark & Miriam Clark. Measures of Leadership,
1990, p. 86.
8- Ibid., p. 87.
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1921). In an update by House (1977) in line with his path-
goal theory, the leader-follower bond is seen to be based
less on an emotional appeal than on the leader's programme
of action which grips followers, that is, a goal and path
to achieve it.9
2- Management Definition, Characteristics and Effective-
ness
Management may be defined as:
Management is working with, and through, individuals
and groups to- accomplish organisational tasks and goals.10
Robert Lee and Peter Lawrence (1985) described the
manager as someone who often supervises other employees or
is in charge of important systems or tasks. But this may also
be true of employees who are not called managers.
Sometimes a manager is thought to have particular
responsibilities for 'efficiency', 'productivity' or
'profit'. He is seen as part of the company rather than a
mere employee who works for it.
In political terms a manager is simply someone with the
title. But we should note that it tends to carry with it
certain powers and privileges. Managerial job descriptions
often specify rights to spend money, recruit people, give
orders and other such useful, political possibilities.
Characteristics of Effective Management
Managers are often ambitious. This means they wish to
rise up the formal hierarchy, acquiring more power and
privileges on the way. To reach the higher levels they may
have to conform to the behaviours desired by those who are
9- Ibid., p. 88.
10- Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard. 1982, p. 3.
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there already. This may mean wearing the right clothes and
expressing the right beliefs, or achieving the right levels
of performance. On reaching the higher levels the manager
may be able to change organisational systems to influence
the behaviour of those around and below him. Until that time
he will usually wish at least to seem to be conforming to
expectations, otherwise he is unlikely to progress. 11 Ef-
fective managers are concerned with both tasks and people.
They try to build a good relationship with and among their
subordinates, develop team work, motivate the work group,
and get the goals achieved.
3- A Comparison between Leadership and Management
Successful management must have effective leadership
skills and attitudes. However, it is important to distinguish
between the concept of 'leadership' and 'management'. The
term management usually "connotes these processes that result
in other people executing prescribed formal duties for
organisational goal attainment." It deals mainly with
planning, organising, and controlling the work of others
to achieve organisational goals.12
The term Leadership "is the one aspect of managerial activity
that focuses on the interpersonal interactions between leader
and subordinates."13
4- Distinction between Leadership and Management
Management and leadership are thought of as the same
thing. We feel, however, that there is an important
distinction between the two ideas. In essence, leadership
is a broader concept than management. Management is
thought of as a special kind of leadership in which the
11- Ibid. p.14.
12- R. Bruce McAfee and Paul J. Champagne. Organisational
Behaviour. West Publishing Co. New York, USA. 1988.
p. 303.
13- Ibid.
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achievement of organisational goals is paramount. Leader-
ship occurs any time one attempts to influence the behav-
iour of an individual or group, regardless of the reason.
It may be for one's own goals or those of others, and they
may or may not be congruent with organisational goals.lz*
Tables a, b, and c present a summary of studies conduct-
ed by University Associates, San Diego 1985. They show the
differences between leaders and managers.
Because leadership studies are numerous, however, most
leadership qualities were found to be similar. 15 Yet every
investigator who studied the dimensions of leader and manager
behaviour comes up with a slightly different list.16
In a few words, managers are essential to run organisa-
tions efficiently; leaders are vital to keep organisations
running for longer periods. Managers are important to
organise work, leaders are necessary to get work done. And
managers are required to run business, leaders are needed
to make business.
5- Management Functions, Skills, and Activities
Functions of Management
1. Planning: setting goals and creating plans and programmes
Planning is a comprehensive process in which managers
formulate the specific goals of an organisation and
develop the plans for attaining them. The planning process
is critical, since the goals (or objectives) established
thereby limit the scope of an organisation's activities
as well as its plans. Effective planning is future-orient-
ed also systematic. In developing their strategies,
managers must recognise the limitations placed upon an
14- Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard, 1982. p. 3.
15- Kenneth Clark and Miriam Clark. Measures of Leadership,
1990, p. 70.
16- Ibid.
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organisation by its environment.17
Effective planning requires understanding the organi-
sation's mission, objectives, policy, and procedures. In
addition, it requires a fair amount of skill in knowing how
to develop operating plans, project management, budget
forecasting, time management, and scheduling; the manager
must then communicate these plans to colleagues and staff
effectively and get their commitment to achieve them.
2. Staffing: dividing up the work in a structured framework
Organising is the process of dividing up the work of a
business firm, not for-profit institution, or public
agency into individual tasks and groups of related tasks.
Managers specify not only the responsibilities associated
with these tasks and groups but also their relationship,
one to another. The resulting groups and their relation-
ships form the structure of an organisation. The distri-
bution - or delegation - of authority throughout an
organisation creates the most critical of these relation-
ships. Typically, such delegation follows a chain of
command from top to bottom. Authority is greatly affected,
however, by the degree of centralised control that an
organisation retains at the top. Authority within the
chain of command is further modified by the extent to
which it is extended to support and advisory staff.18
The preceding quote means that to organise the work
effectively, managers have to:
a. divide the work of an organisation so the tasks
can be performed in the most-effective manner to
accomplish the plans (goals).
b. collect similar tasks and group them into depart-
ments according to a variety of organisational
structures that indicate relationships as well as
functions.
17- 36 Hours Management Development. McGraw-Hill Co. London,
UK. 1989. p. 71.
18- Ibid., p. 97.
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c. distribute the authority for carrying out tasks
from the top to the bottom of an organisation
through a chain of command, using either central-
isation or decentralisation, whichever appropri-
ate, to control an organisations' activities.
d. extend authority to support and advisory staff (in
a large organisation) and thereby create useful
relationships with departments that are in the
direct chain of command.
e. place the right people in the right jobs, clarify
to the staff their duties, orient them, train
them, make the goals clear to them, and effec-
tively communicate to them the plans, relation-
ships, and so on.
f. appraise their subordinates performance to ensure
conformance to the organisation's standards.
3.	 Directing: providing communications, motivation, and
leadership
Directing is the managerial function that requires the
greatest interpersonal skills of its practitioners. Plans
and organisational structures staffed with people are
essentially inert. They come alive only through the powers
of communication, motivation, and leadership. These are
the powers by which managers can release the inherent
energies and talents of the organisation. Some managers
were seemingly born with these interpersonal skills. Most
managers, however, acquire them through experience and
application. 19
Directing is a major managerial task. It requires
communication skills, motivation and interpersonal skills.
Effective leaders are effective in communicating their
vision, their organisation's goals and plans, and in
motivating subordinates. Managerial leadership grows from
combining an inherent talent with learned skills.
Effective communication, as necessary for directing,
19- 36 Hours Management Development, 1989. p. 153.
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is the most important leadership ski11. 20 Such effective
communication goes both ways. It ensures subordinates
understand the goals and makes them more willing to
accomplish them. It provides a better understanding of what
drives subordinates, what will satisfy their needs, and what
will motivate them. Simply directing them to do their jobs
will not be enough to get them to achieve the results
expected from them.
4. Controlling: monitoring progress and exercising control
Controlling means developing evaluation, feedback, and
correction systems.
Controlling is the function that brings the management
cycle full circle. It is the steering mechanism that links
all the preceding functions of organising, staffing, and
directing to the goals of planning. The control process
sets standards and measures progress against them.
Corrective action is taken when the gap between what was
planned and what is actually happening becomes too large.
Controls may be exerted before, after, or at any stage
within the conversion process. Controls are most effective
when applied selectively at critical, make-or-fail points.
In practice, the major controls are concerned with (1)
operations, (2) finance, and (3) human resources.21
The major concepts of controlling could be describe as
follows:
a. Management control is the systematic effort taken
to set standards, compare progress with them, and
take corrective action when necessary to bring
performance into line with what was planned and
expected.
b. Controls are most economic and effective when
applied selectively at the crucial points most
likely to determine the success failure of an
operation or activity.
c. Financial controls focus on the accumulation of
20- Lin Bothwell. The Art of Leadership, 1983, p. 93.
21- 36 Hours Management Development, 1989. p. 179.
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funds needed to sustain an organisation and on
proper disbursement of these funds to assure its
survival and growth.
d. Operating controls monitor the progress of, and
results from, the activities associated with the
conversion processes of an organisation.
e. Human resources controls are concerned with
inducing and maintaining satisfactory performance
by an organisation's workforce.
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II. FEATURES OF SAUDI ARABIA
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part A
provides some essential data about Saudi Arabia's geograph-
ical features, location, climate, and population. Part B
contains historical data about Saudi Arabia's establishment
and political system. The third part, C, describes Saudi
Arabia's cultural value system and its effects on management.
A. GEOGRAPHICAL
1- Location
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia comprises the bulk of what
is known as the Arabian Peninsula and has a Land area of
about 2.4 million square kilometers. 1 Saudi Arabia is
bordered on the North by Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait; on the
South by North and South Yemen; on the West by the Red Sea
and Gulf of Aqaba; and on the East by Oman, Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates, and the Arabian Gulf (Figure 1).
Geographic Features
Along the Red Sea lies a narrow plain whose width varies
from one place to another (Figure 2). 2 The coastal plain,
which is characterised by extensive marshlands and lava
fields, is called 'Tihama'. East of the coastal plains, a
range of mountains runs the full length of the Arabian
1- Statistical Year Book 1987, Ministry of Finance and
National Economy, Central Department of Statistics. Ri-
yadh, Saudi Arabia, pp. 15-16.
2- Ibid.
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Peninsula. The mountains are broken by great valleys, called
"Wadis". The most important Valleys are Wadi Fatima, Wadi
Yanbu, and Wadi Bisha. The mountains make a nearly vertical
drop towards the coastal plain. Rain and flood waters wash
silt onto the coastal plains, making the land of these plains
more fertile.3
The entire central area of Saudi Arabia is the huge Najd
plateau, tilted from West to East. The average height of the
plateau is 1000 meters. The Eastern edge of the Najd is
bordered by a long, crescent shaped sand desert, the Al-
Dahna. East of the Al-Dahna the land continues to decline
until it reaches the Arabian Gulf.4
The Southern edge of the Najd plateau borders Wadi Al-
Dawaser, and the sand desert of the Rub Al-Khali, the empty
quarter. From here, the Najd extends North through the
Central area of Saudi Arabia for nearly 1400 kilometers until
it meets the borders of Iraq and Jordan.5
There are two great sand deserts in Saudi Arabia. North
of Riyadh approximately 500 kilometers is the Nufud desert.
In the South, between the Southern edge of the Najd plateau
and the borders of South Yemen and Oman, lies the Rub Al-
Khali. These two great deserts are connected by the thin
crescent shaped sand desert Al-Dahna. These deserts are
characterised by their aridity and sand. The Nufud receives
about 2 cm of rain annually. The Rub Al-Khali, also known
as the empty quarter, is the largest continuous sand desert
in the world. There have been periods where there was no
measurable rainfall for a whole decade.6
3_ Saudi Arabian Geography 7th Edition. ministry of
Education. 1984. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. pp . 16-17.
4_ Ibid.
5_ Ibid.
6_ Ibid.
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2- Water
Water resources of Saudi Arabia display great variation
in quality, quantity and location. Water resources fall into
the following categories:7
1. Confined Aquifers: ground water of this category
is stored in water bearing formations under pres-
sure (artesian wells).
2. Free Flowing Aquifers: underground water of this
category does not exist under pressure. Water from
wells in a free flowing aquifer must be pumped to
the surface.
3. Springs: there are many springs in Saudi Arabia,
specifically in the East, i.e., Al-Ahssa.
4. Dams: there are no valleys in Saudi Arabia with
a permanent flow of water. There are, however,
many valleys that fill up with rain water. Dams
in these valleys were constructed to contain this
important source of water for irrigation and other
purposes.
5. Desalination: Saudi Arabia also produces water
through desalination plants at many of its coastal
regions; specifically at big cities, i.e., Jeddah
and Dammam. Today, Saudi Arabia is the largest
producer in the world of drinking water through
desalination. It makes more than 503 million
gallons per day of desalinated water. As a spin-
off, over 3400 mega-watts of electricity is
generated through its desalination operations.
Water continues to be a major concern in the Kingdom.
Some regions have water resources, but improperly drilled
private wells hinder efficient utilisation (this is
especially true in the Northern regions of the Najd Plateau) .
35
Some seaport areas still suffer from lack of water, or from
poor quality water.
3- Temperature
Temperatures vary in Saudi Arabia depending on the
season and the location. In the Southern mountain regions
snow will occasionally fall and the temperature drop below
freezing. This, however, is exceptional. The nationwide
average in winter is warm, between 14°C and 23°C. Summers are
extremely hot, with temperatures from June to August exceed-
ing 38°C, and frequently reaching 47°C.
4- Agriculture
Before the discovery of oil Saudi Arabia was an agrarian
society. Saudis in villages and remote areas were dependent
on agriculture, and the produce constituted the greater part
of the national income.8
Since the discovery and development of the oil fields
(1934) , and the introduction of Five-Year Development Plans
in 1970, agricultural development has proceeded rapidly.
Antiquated methods of irrigation have been superseded by
modern pumps. The changes brought about a great increase in
cultivated land area. A large variety of fruits and vegeta-
bles are now familiar crops to the farmers of Saudi Arabia.
They are taking full advantage of government introduced plant
protection and pest control measures. The use of modern
mechanical farm equipment is widespread and popular .9
Agricultural production has increased so dramatically that
Saudi Arabia now exports tomatoes, potatoes, wheat, and other
staple crops to neighbouring countries.
8- Statistical Book. 1987, p. 18.
9- Ibid.
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5- Mineral and Petroleum Resources
Only after the discovery of oil in 1934 did attention
shift to geological studies to find mineral wealth other than
oil. A recent geological survey of sixty-five per cent (65%)
of the Precambrian Arabian shield (located in the Western
part of the country) has been completed. The survey has
revealed substantial deposits of other mineral assets,
including copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, iron, phosphates,
uranium, and potash (see Figure 3) . 10 There is presently
commercial development of non-metallic deposits of cement,
gypsum, lime, marble, and salt. 11 Saudi Arabia has built
a petrochemical industry to process part of its oil
production. It now has the largest petrochemical industry
in the Middle East, and exports produce to Japan, Europe,
and other countries.
6- Urban Development
Before Saudi Arabia was declared a Kingdom in 1932,
urbanisation was limited to few small cities, i.e., Mecca,
Jeddah, Taif and Medina. By 1964, large urbanised centres
had increased to about 12, including Riyadh, Tabuk, Dammam,
Dahran, Hail, Jizan, Qatif and Al-Khobar. Since 1970, with
the development of regions and the settling of nomads, the
country has experienced great urban development, and more
cities have been created or developed. Today, there are more
than 16 major cities with an average size of 600 square
kilometers each, and over 50 developed towns with an average
size of 100 square kilometer each (Figures 4, 5, and 6) .12
10_ Annual Report 1983. Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral.
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. pp. 6-9.
11_ Ibid.
12 - Report on the Fourth Development Plan 1985-1990. Ministry
of Planning (1987) Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. pp. 18-20.
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Saudi Arabia consists of five regions, or provinces as
follows: 13
The Northern Region: the Northern Region is mainly
high Plateau Desert with only two major cities, Tabuk
and Hail. A large part of this desert has grass and
scrub steppe vegetation, and is used as pasture by
nomadic and semi-nomadic herders.
The Southern region (the Aseer): the Aseer
consists mainly of mountains. There are six major
cities; Abha, Bisha, Khamis Mushayt, Jizan, Al-Baha and
Najran. Many new village and agricultural areas have
been developed in this region.
The Western region has the biggest part of the
population (3.3 of 13 million). It has nine major
cities with an average size of 600 square kilometers
each; Mecca, Medina, Taif, Jeddah, Yanbu (a new, large
industrial city), Al-Wajeh, UmmLuj, Al-Ula, and
Khaibar. In Jeddah alone, which is a coastal city and
is considered the most important trade centre in the
Kingdom, there are 1.4 million people.14
The Eastern region is the most productive region.
Agriculture is spread throughout the North of the
Eastern region. Oil is produced in this region. The
most developed and biggest industrial city, Al-Jubail,
is located in the Eastern region. There are over 2
million people in the Eastern region, mainly in the big
Cities of Dammam, Dahran, Jubail, Qatif, Hafuf, Ab-
qaiq, and Al-Ahssa.15
Riyadh, the capital, is located in the Middle region,
Najd, where about 1.6 million people live. The large
13
- Ibid.
14_ Ibid.
15 - Ibid.
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Major Mineral Deposits: Metalliferous Minerals
Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Third Development Plan,
1400 - 1405 (1980 - 1985) Chapter 4, p. 209.
S - Silver, G - Gold, C - Copper, Z - Zinc, U - Uranium,
I - Iron, P - Pyrite, N - Nickel, T - Tatalium,
Cc - Columbium
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cities are Riyadh, Buraidah, Qaseem, Aunaizah, and Al-
Zilfi. The Southern part of the middle region is
desert; however, there are areas of grass used as
pasture in other parts of the middle region.16
7- Population
Fifty five per cent (55%) of Saudi Arabia is either
rugged mountain or desert and sand, and is uninhabitable.
This is reflected in the fact that the overall population
density is 5 persons per square kilometer.17
The annual rate of growth has varied. From 9.3 million
in 1981/82, the population had grown to 12.8 million by 1991
(see Table 1-1 and 1-2). 18 Jeddah and Riyadh together have
a population of 3 million, which is twenty-three per cent
(23%) of the population. This leaves the country with small
population in other cities, towns, villages and tribal areas.
For the intensive development Saudi Arabian has under-
gone, it has required much more labour than the local market
(national manpower) could provide. The reported foreign
workforce increased from 1.54 million in 1979 to 2.66 million
in 1985 and to 3.2 million in 1991 (Tables 3-1 and 3-2), but
this is only part of the picture. There are 500,000 foreign
workers employed as domestics, such as house-maids. The
estimated total workforce was about 5.6 million in 1991 (3.7
million foreigners + 1.9 million Saudis).
The effect of this workforce on a population census is
even greater because many foreign employees brought their
16_ Ibid.
17 - Statistics Year Book. 1984. p. 15.
18_ Saudi Arabia's Population Estimate, Okaz Newspaper, 12
November, 1990, p. 5.
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families with them when they accepted work contracts in the
Kingdom. The Saudi National population is currently 7
million, and the foreign population is 5.8 million, for a
total population of 12.8 million.19
The annual population growth rate has varied. From two
per cent (2.0%) in 1960, it increased to two and nine-tenths
per cent (2.9%) in 1974, 20 and to four and one half per
cent (4.5%) p.a. in 1980 to 1984. The high of four and one
half per cent (4.5%) annual growth rate reflects the high
foreign inflows. Since 1984 the economy has slowed as oil
prices and revenue had dropped, and the annual growth rate
has decreased. Since 1984 it has averaged three and eight-
tenths per cent (3.8%). It dropped, however, to one and four-
tenths per cent (1.4%) during 1990-1991 because of the Gulf
crisis (Table 1-1 and 1-2).
There are some other contributing factors to the large
increase in foreign labour.
1) A large part of the population is young (Table 2).
Sixty-four per cent (64%) is under 25 years old (about
2.5 million in schools). Therefore a large part of the
population that will enter the workforce is still
attending schools, universities and vocational insti-
tutes.
2) Because of Saudi Arabian culture and traditions, many
Saudis prefer administrative jobs to technical or
manual jobs. This outlook or preference has recently
changed since hundreds of graduates cannot find admin-
istrative jobs, and have to study or re-train, at
vocational and technical institutes in order to occupy
technical, professional and skilled jobs, replacing
19 - Ibid.
20_ Ibid.
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some of the foreign labour.21
8- Workforce
Since 1973 Saudi Arabia has undergone an intensive,
accelerated development. The population in 1973 stood at
around 7 million. The rush towards development required
foreign labour at all levels, professional, technical,
skilled and unskilled. The educational institutes in Saudi
Arabia could not graduate enough Saudi youth to meet the
market needs for qualified manpower. The intensive develop-
ment required much more labour than the local market could
supply. The foreign workforce, therefore, increased rapidly
to 3.7 million workers (from more than 65 different
nationalities) 22 while the Saudi workforce was less more
than 2 million (Table 3-1 and 3-2).
Today with the Gulf crisis, the slow-down of economic
activities, the completion of much of the industrial infra-
structure, a more rational level of development activities,
and the increase of Saudi graduates, the foreign workforce
annual growth rate has started to decrease.
Although the development of universities, technical
colleges, and vocational institutes has resulted in an
increase in the number of graduates, the Saudi workforce
in the private sector is still only about fifteen per cent
(15%) of the tota1 23 (the private sector's total workforce
is about 4 million).
Unemployed Saudis claim that the private sector does
not encourage Saudiisation (replacing foreigner-held
positions with Saudis). As a result they try to join the
21_ Saudi Gazette, Blue Collar Jobs Are No More Shunned,
Local News. 27 August 1989. p. 3.
22_ Al-Riyadh Newspaper, 6 May 1985, p. 3.
23 - Meeting with the Minister of Industry and Electricity.
Okaz Newspaper, 3 April 1989, p. 11.
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government sector, even though there is no room for them
(ninety per cent (90%) of the government sector positions
(1.1 million) are occupied by Saudi nationals, Table 3.)
The Workforce Problem
The private sector has benefitted from intensive
development, and is provided with many incentives to aid in
the development of the economy. The vast majority of work
by the private sector has been government contracts for
construction and services. Private sector factories, shops,
and firms increased about three hundred per cent (300%) in
the 10 year period from 1970 to 1980. 24 The Saudi
government has assisted and provided support for the private
sector. The process for obtaining foreign labour, for
example, was made fast and easy. Foreign labour, especially
from the Far East, is considered inexpensive since the salary
is one-third (1/3) of that paid to Saudis. The majority of
these labourers are skilled or semi-skilled and were
considered better qualified than their Saudi counterparts.
Even if Saudi labour were better, the local market could not
provide a sufficient quantity of qualified workers.
There are many considerations on both sides of the
argument as to why there are not more Saudis in the private
sector work force. The private sector claims that they could
not recruit Saudis for the following reasons:
1. Saudi graduates do not meet the work requirements,
and do not have the experience. Also the educa-
tional and vocational institutes do not 'look
deeply' into the needs of the market and job
requirements •25
24_ Middle East Newspaper, Economy Weekly issue. 3 June
1989, p. 12.
25
- An interview with an economist, What Do We Need For 2000
Century. Okaz Newspaper, 29 May 1989, p. 7.
Table 3
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NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF LABOUR-FORCE
3-1
1967/68 1979/80 1984/85 Increased
Annual
Growth **
Saudi+ 0,632.4 1,491.2 1,786.0 294.8 3.7
Non-Saudi 0,384.7 1,534.8 2,660.0* 1,125.2 11.7
Total 1,017.1 3,026.0 4,446.0 1,420.0 9.0
* 300,000 Foreign Workers, employed as dometics,
i,e., housemaids, to be added.
** For the Period 1979 to 1985
(Includes Saudis in military jobs)
Source: Fourth Development Plan, 1985-1990, and
Statistics Year Book 1967-1968 and 1990/91.
3-2
1984/85 1990/91
Annual
Growth
Rate
Saudi+ 1,786.0 1,890.943 0.7
Non-Saudi 2,666.0 3,220.608 3.2
Total 4,446.0 5,111.551 2.1
* 500,000 Foreign workers employed as domestics,
i.e., housemaids, to be added. Total = 5,611,551
Includes Saudis, 200,000 in military jobs.
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2. The private sector used to make contracts with the
government. The cost of those contracts was based
on many factors, and manpower cost was one of the
major factors. The private sector used to get
cheaper manpower from the Far East, since the cost
of Saudi labour was higher, and was higher still
if re-training, familiarisation, and lack of
experience was included in cost estimates. If the
private sector tries to include such costs in
their estimates, then the government will not
award them contracts. The government expects
contracts to cost about the same as when cheaper
foreign labour was included.26
3. The salaries, especially for Far East and some
Middle East employees in the private sector are
less than Saudi salaries. The reason for this
lower salary is either that the foreign labour
cannot find attractive jobs in their home coun-
tries, or that they do not mind a spartan
lifestyle for a two-year contract. In this way
they can save money to take back home to invest.
4. The private sector claims that a Saudi graduate's
knowledge, qualifications, and experience are
poor. They feel they cannot use them to replace
foreigners because it will reduce productivity.27
5. Another claim is that Saudi graduates are not
punctual and tend to be unreliable.28
6. The Saudi graduates look for management jobs,
leadership positions, and administrative work.
They do not like field and technical jobs, and
26-A meeting with some businessmen. What the Private Sector
Has Got to Offer. Okaz newspaper, 29 May 1989, p.6.
27- Dr. Hashim A. Hashim. What the Private Sector has done
so far to the Graduates? Okaz Newspaper, 24 September
1988, p. 5.
28_ Ibid.
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they do not want to receive instruction or
directions from a foreign supervisor.29
7. Saudi graduates do not like to work in cities or
villages outside of those where they were born and
raised and where their families reside.3°
8. Saudi labour looks for high salaries, thinking
that the private sector should pay salaries equal
to what the government sector pays. However,
salaries in the private sector should not be
compared with the government because productivity,
competition, performance and experience are more
critical factors in the salary structure of the
private sector.31
9. Many private companies have found it necessary to
re-train the Saudi graduate, specifically those
who graduated from vocational schools. They have
found that their knowledge was basic and bore
little relation to the real work environment.32
The opposite view is that the private sector is
irresponsible and does not encourage Saudiisation. The
comments are:
1. Development of Saudi Arabia is not only the
government's responsibility, but is the responsi-
bility of the private sector as well. But the
private sector has participated so far in the
development only as a business that makes a lot
of profit and has not shared responsibility for
social development. The private sector will not
do any business unless it provides a high
29 - Ibid.
3°- Ibid.
31-Saudiisation, Dr. Omar Ba-Qaar. Okaz Newspaper, 24 March
1987, p. 8.
32- Ibid.
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percentage of profit. The private sector should
participate in training or re-training the Saudi
youth and graduates, rather than leaving this
function completely to the government and then
claiming that the government educational
institutes are not supplying good graduates.33
2. The private sector knows that sharing the respon-
sibility means giving up some of the high levels
of profit. Recruiting Saudis, for instance, means
increasing personnel costs. But does not consider
that Saudi manpower development would be a human
resource investment for both the private and
government sectors .34
3. Even if the private sector is right about Saudi
graduates lacking experience, knowledge and
qualifications, the private sector can develop a
committee or a centre that discusses and resolves
those issues with the government institutes.35
4. Graduates are no longer looking for jobs located
in the same areas where they were born. There is
much evidence to show that they now work in cities
and villages other than their home Region.35
5. The claim that foreign labour is cheaper may be
true if one calculates only the salaries the
private sector is paying them. Foreign labour also
benefits from the government subsidies on food and
medicines, and many other services that in most
cases are free, such as education and health care.
If these indirect costs that the government is
handling are added in, it would no longer be true
33 - Dr. Hashim A. Hashim. What the Private Sector has done
so far to the Graduates? Okaz Newspaper, 24 September
1988, p. 5.
34- Ibid.
35- Ibid.
36- Ibid.
51
that the foreign labour is cheaper less than Saudi
labour.37
Of course the main objective of the private sector is
to make a profit, but the profit should not be made through
hiring cheaper labour alone, or by increasing working hours
to a level that the Saudi will avoid, for instance, 54 hours
per week. Nor should the profit be made by avoiding training
personnel or by asking them to do multiple tasks and jobs
they were not hired to do. 38 The profit can be made by
attaining high performance, high productivity and good
quality, and by reducing waste and operational costs.39
Only a small percentage of Saudi females that are
capable of working actually join the Saudi workforce. Most
estimates show that about eleven per cent (11%) of the
capable Saudi females are in the workforce. This female group
is eight and seven-tenths per cent (8.7%) of the Saudi
national labour force, and only three and two-tenths per cent
(3.2%) of the total workforce. There are about 1 million
female college, university, and high school graduates who
can work, but only 176,000 are working. Most of these work
at educational institutes, hospitals, and social work
departments. There are more than 200,000 jobs occupied by
foreign female workers, for example, nurses, paramedics, lab
technicians, teachers, and administrators.
In addition, there are about 200,000 clerical and
administrative jobs occupied by foreign male workers that
could be replaced by Saudi females. The most important factor
here is Saudi culture. Saudi culture allows females to work
in jobs that do not involve free association with men. If
37- Ibid.
38- Dr. Sayd Al-Kholy. Saudiisation at the Private Sector.
Okaz Newspaper, 26 May 1989, p. 9.
39- Ibid.
52
the job requires working with men, then some restrictions
are to be made, especially in administrative jobs such as
that of secretary. Other problems are: home responsibilities
and duties, the necessity of additional leave days to take
care of babies, and the unwillingness to work in some jobs
for a very low salary. For instance, a Far East nurse's
monthly salary at a private or a government hospital is about
US $ 350, plus accommodation. The monthly salary for a Saudi
nurse for the same job at a government hospital is about US
$ 800. Private hospitals in the Kingdom, which have about
20,000 nursing jobs, refuse to pay higher than US $ 350-400.
So far, no resolution has been found for this problem of
female unemployment.
Furthermore, Dr. Ansari in 1987 criticised the Saudi
Government's Saudiisation (placing Saudis in foreign labour
positions) plans:
Based on the published Development Plans for the Kingdom, it
was concluded that the strategy of Saudiisation was not clearly
defined at the formal level. At best it appeared to refer
superficially to a policy of simply replacing foreign workers,
particularly those in managerial positions, with trained and
qualified Saudi nationals. However, we argued that taking into
account the Islamic principles outlined elsewhere in the
Development Plans, the strategy of Saudiisation was, implicitly,
a good deal more complex than merely a replacement policy. In
particular, we drew attention to the ways in which criteria of
managerial theory usually applied uncritically within the
context of Western business organisation might need to be
redefined to make them compatible with the Islamic principles
fundamental to Saudi development. Thus, we concluded, that
Saudiisation could not be conceived merely as a strategy to
obtain quantitative results (i.e., replacements) but also had
to be considered as having qualitative objectives, that is the
creation of organisational procedures and structures compatible
with Islamic teachings. This dimension was seen to be of
particular importance in relation to the most recent Development
Plan which seeks to apply Saudiisation to the private sector
of the economy, for it is here that Western-oriented business
and organisational practices are likely to be most deeply in-
grained and most difficult to control. Replacement alone might
lead to an increased showing of Saudi personnel but might do
little to bring about patterns of business practice compatible
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with the wider aspirations of Saudi Society. 40
Between 1991-2000 there will be more than 575,000 new
jobs in the Saudi Arabia. 41 Most of those jobs will be for
technical and skilled labour. For instance, there will be
107,000 jobs at the Al-Jubail Industrial Complex, 90,000 jobs
at the Yanbu Industrial Complex, and 80,000 jobs at the Al-
Yamamah Projects (see Chapter III).
Therefore, Saudiisation may be a problem for the next
two decades, causing more unemployment among national
graduates and putting pressure on the government to find jobs
for Nationals.
B. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF SAUDI ARABIA
Before 1932 the Kingdom was divided into many areas
ruled by different and conflicting tribes. At AL-Hiaz,
Mecca, Jeddah, Medina and Taif the rulers were Ashraaff, a
family whose root belongs to the Prophet Mohammed, and was
under the Othmani (Turkish empire control) . In the Southwest,
the Aseer region, the rulers were strong land-owning
families, for instance, the Al-Edreesi, and partly controlled
by the Othmani empire. The South was controlled by a strong
tribe called the Dawasser. The country in general experienced
a great deal of tribal warfare, low education, poverty,
minimum economic activities limited to small-scale farming
and small hand-crafts. The Midlands, for example, Najd and
Riyadh, were ruled by many conflicting tribes such as Saud
and Al-Rasheed. The East and North were ruled as well by many
conflicting tribes, for instance, Shammar.
Since statehood in 1932 the Kingdom has been ruled by
the house of Saud. The King is the symbol of the political
40_ Al Sharq Al-Awsat. 03 June 1989.
41
- Dr. Sayd Al-Kholy. A Survey about the Saudi Labour Needs
for the Fifth Development Plan (1990-1995). Okaz
Newspaper, The Economy Page, January 1990, p 6.
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and religious power. All Saudis are Arab Muslims; and the
majority of them are Sunaa rather than Shia. The Sunaa are
those who practice Islamic teachings as in the Holy Quraan
and as described by Prophet Mohammed and his followers. Even
though they may have some conflicts, they obey their reli-
gious leaders as long as they do not disagree with the Holy
Quraan. The Shia follows part of the Quraan and believe that
their shia religious leaders are always right even when in
conflict with the Quraan or with the Prophet Mohammed's acts
and statements. However, they believe that most of the
Sunaa's leaders are wrong or do not follow the real Islamic
teachings.
The following is a description of the political and
religious power in the political system of Saudi Arabia.
However, since it is very difficult to distinguish it
completely from the social and economic system there will
necessarily be some repetition.
1- Political Organisations
The Kingdom is ruled by the Royal family (Saud).
Leadership in Saudi Arabia can be described as a family
business. A family business that is drawn from the tribal
family where the King is the father, the Royal family
members, religious leaders and ministers are the senior
members of this family, and the public are the junior
members. The political and government system is divided into
three main units:
1. The King, together with the Royal family, is the
first political power. The Kingdom is ruled by the
Royal family, and the King is the elder son of
former King Abdulaziz.
2. Haiaat Al-Iftaa, the Islamic formal legal opinion
organisation, is the second political power and
the most influential system in Saudi Arabia.
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Haiaat Al-If taa is concerned with law and
government decisions that may conflict with the
Islamic religious instructions and teachings. It
was developed through the last century, and it is
the authority that approves or disapproves govern-
mental laws and decisions as they interface with
Islam's teachings. In addition, judges are recom-
mended by the Haiaat. The Haiaat completely rely
on religious teachings and instructions.
3. The Ministerial cabinet is the second source of
power. The King presides over the cabinet as the
chairman. The Crown Prince (his next younger
brother) is his deputy, and the second younger
brother is the second deputy. Ministers are
members of the cabinet. Some ministers are from
the Royal family (for instance, the Minister of
Defense, and the Minister of Interior Affairs),
Others are selected by the Royal family's senior
members and/or appointed by the King himself.
However, the ministers are usually from well-es-
tablished families and most have a good or fair
education. The ministerial cabinet makes policies,
and negotiates and approves plans as needed such
as regulations for government expenditures and
foreign affairs. Legal, formal laws, (for
instance, rules for charging criminals) must be
approved by the Haiaat Al-If taa "the second source
of power".
4. The executive power of the ministries is the
fourth source of power. Ministers are responsible
for recommending plans and putting the Kingdom's
plans and development into action and carrying out
its mission. Ministers can also recommend several
policies and rules. If those policies are only
administrative, then they may issue them and
approve them for applications without sending them
to the ministerial cabinet for approval; but in
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some cases the approval of the Civil Bureau is
required, for example, for the employees'
promotion policy. At other times the approval of
the ministerial cabinet is required, for example,
for ministry expenditures and for foreign policy.
In addition, anew royal decision, issued early in 1992,
approved the development of Majlis Al-Shouraa, the advisory
council. This council was established in 1943 and was
supposed to be second in political power and influence in
Saudi Arabia; however, it has had no role since 1962, and
its coming role may not be influential or even important.
The members of this council are, or will be, selected and
appointed by the King or his deputy, based on their tribal
or family's influence, and not their knowledge, experience,
and qualifications. The Advisory Council in the first two
centuries of Islam, 570-770 A.D., was the most powerful unit
in Muslim life. Governors and senior members of government
were selected or recommended by the Council, and "Fatuwa"
(formal legal opinion) was given through it.
The political and governmental system in Saudi Arabia
is centralised. There are no political parties or labour
unions in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has enjoyed political
stability since 1932. Because of its political stability and
available government revenue for development, the Kingdom
is recognised as a good place for investment and business.
2- The Royal Family of Saud
2.1 King Abdulaziz (1902-54):
In the year 1902 Abdulaziz Saud started plans for a
unified country. He unified the middle region's districts
and villages, and he became the Prince of Najd (the middle
region). In 1916 Abdulaziz took over the Eastern region, in
1921 the Northern region, and in 1925 the Western region.
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In 1927 his authority expanded from the Gulf to the Red sea
and he became the King of Hijaz and Najd. In 1932 Saudi
Arabia was declared a Kingdom.
King Abdulaziz realised the necessity of developing
international relationships with modern countries, such as
Britain and the United States of America and, therefore,
established diplomatic contacts with them. 42
 In 1932 he es-
tablished a council of ministers and appointed his son, Saud,
to head the counci1 43 . Oil was discovered in 1932, and in
1933, the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) was formed.
Because of the Second World War the oil development was very
slow in Saudi Arabia and oil revenue did not exceed US $4
million until after l944. 1948 the Kingdom's annual
revenues were about US $85 million and increased geometrical-
ly each year thereafter. This influx of capital helped the
country and the government to start some social and agricul-
tural development. 45 In early 1954 King Abdulaziz died and
his son Saud became the King of Saudi Arabia (Figure 6).
2.2 King Saud (1954-64):
King Saud followed his father's role in developing the
government, revenues, and foreign relations. By 1958 the
annual oil revenues exceeded US $300 million. 46
 In 1958
King Saud gave his brother, Faisal, powers in foreign and
internal affairs, including fiscal planning, which is very
essential in developing the country. In 1961 Faisal became
head of the Council of Ministers. 47 The government
42_ Saudi Arabia, A Country Study. p. 45.
43 - Ibid.
44_ Ibid.
45 - Ibid.
46_ Ibid.
47 - Ibid.
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organisation during King Saud's rule improved slightly and
increased to 10 ministries and 9 corporations and agencies.
2.3 King Faisal (1964-75):
King Faisal was the first King of Saudi Arabia who took
development towards modernisation seriously. 48
 He gave
more attention and support to developing education -schools,
universities, vocational and other institutes. 49 He also
started settling nomads into village and towns. King Faisal
established strong and friendly relationships with the
Kingdom's neighbours and with other Muslim and Arab coun-
tries. He also improved the Kingdom's foreign relationships.
During his rule, King Faisal developed and or created
new ministries such as-the Ministry of Petroleum and Miner-
als, Ministry of Social Affairs, and many other corporations,
i.e., Saudi Arabian Airlines. Oil prices went up almost four
fold in 1973 because of his manipulation and threats to
reduce oil production. This position was taken during the
October 1973 war between Israel and two Arab nations, and
led to an oil embargo on major oil consumers who were either
supporters or allies of Israel. 5° This oil embargo led to
increased oil prices from about US $2.0 per barrel in 1973
to about US $10.8 in the middle of 1974, and to about US $34
in 1982 (Table 4). It was the start of an oil boom era in
Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil producing countries. This
helped the Kingdom to push forward its development programmes
and move quickly towards modernisation.
The government organisation during King Faisal's rule
48- Ibid.
49- Fatina Shaker. 1974.
50-Saudi Arabia. A Country Study. The American University,
Washington D.C., USA. p. 42.
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improved and increased to 14 ministries and over 12 corpora-
tions and agencies. The men King Faisal chose eventually
carried out many of his plans after his assassination on
March 25, 1975.
2.4 King Khalid (1975-82):
Upon the assassination of King Faisal, Khalid became
the King of Saudi Arabia, and Prince Fahad became the Crown
Prince. King Khalid was liberal in terms of informing the
press and consulting his brothers and ministers in his
decision-making. He also gave more authority and autonomy
to the ministers and governors. 51 King Khalid also laid the
foundations for the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC), which
was formed in 1981. The GCC includes the six Arab states of
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and the United
Arab Emirates. These states of the Arabian Peninsula have
many similarities regarding religion, social conditions, and
political institutions. Saudi Arabia is the biggest country
among the GCC in terms of population, land, revenue and
resources.
King Khalid also reorganised the Council of Ministers
late in 1975. The Ministry of Higher Education and the
Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs were created in 1976.
During his rule, Ministries increased to 18 in addition to
the National Guard, and there were over 15 government
corporations and agencies.52
51- Ibid., pp. 43-46.
52- Ibid., 1982-1983.
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King Khalid continued to push many of the economic plans
developed under Faisal's rule. During his reign, revenues
leaped from US $6.08 billion in 1973/74 to around US $90.67
billion in 1980/81 (Table 5)• 53 In 1970, crude oil revenue
represented ninety-two per cent (92%) of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). 54 With the tremendous push for industrial,
agricultural, and investment development undertaken by the
Kingdom, crude oil revenue was only forty-six per cent (46%)
of the GDP as of August 1989. this percentage
increased between September 1989 and February 1992 to sixty-
five per cent (65%) due to the double Lnorease ta oil
production as a result of the Gulf War and the serious
reduction or cessation of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil production) .
King Khalid died in June, 1982 and his brother, Crown
Prince Fahad, was appointed King by the Royal family senior
members and the senior religious leaders (Ulama). His brother
Abdullah became the Crown Prince.
2.5 King Fahad (1982):
The first year of King Fahad's reign was one of the best
years Saudi Arabia had for generating revenue. The government
budget in 1981/82 was 90,666.6 million. This paved the way
for the Kingdom to push its development programmes faster
and more intensively. King Fahad used this opportunity to
create new government agencies and educational institutions,
53- Ibid.
54- Ibid., 1987, p. 5 and 1984, p. 6.
55-Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Annual Report. August 21,
1989.
Table 4	 62
Opec Oil Prices (U.S. $ Per Barrel)
Light Oil API 34
Period
	 Official	 Spot Market
Price	 Price
Heavy Oil API 31
Official Spot Market
Price	 Price
1970 1.35 1.21 1.30 1.15
1971 1.75 1.74 1.68 1.62
1972 1.90 1.87 1.80 1.77
1973(Late) 13.65 4.10 3.50 3.90
1974 9.52 11.65 9.37 10.6
1975 10.46 10.44 10.37 10.35
1976 11.51 11.70 11.26 11.26
1977 12.38 12.59 12.32 12.43
1978 12.70 13.08 12.27 12.42
1979 18.16 28.26 18.20 25.70
1980 29.26 37.60 29.56 35.68
1981 33.38 35.52 33.63 34.16
1982 33.51 31.37 31.41 29.84
1983 29.66 28.71 27.91 27.69
1984 28.68 27.93 26.99 27.46
1985 28.07 27.77 26.70 26.48
1986 28.00 17.96 25.00 17.38
1987 24.00 21.20 22.00 14.64
1988 22.00 18.78 19.17 14.52
*1990 Early 22.50 20.10 20.00 17.32
*1990 Late 23.10 31.50 21.00 29.40
*1991 Early 21.15 28.40 20.00 26.50
*1992 Early 19.05 24.20 17.50 22.00
Source: Statistical Book. 1991, p. 236
* Government and Public Publications. (The rapid
increase was due to the Arabian Gulf crisis when
Kuwait and Iraq's oil exports stopped.)
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such as King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology. As
a result, Saudi Arabia today has 24 Ministers, the National
Guard, and over 18 major government corporations and agen-
cies.56
King Fahad's guidance improved the Kingdom's relation-
ships with its neighbours - the GCC countries, Arab nations,
Muslim nations, and the international community. He follows
Faisal's and Khalid's steps towards modernising Saudi Arabia
and shifting the country from dependence on oil into indus-
trialisation. 57 Although the oil prices went down from US
$34 a barrel (1981/82) to US $20 (1988) crude oil revenue
in 1989 represented only forty-six per cent (46%) of the
GDP58 . In 1985/86 the Kingdom's revenue dropped
drastically, but then started increasing in August 1989
through 1991, due to both the increase in the price of crude
oil and the high increase in production because of the Gulf
crisis, when oil revenue reached sixty-five per cent (65%)
in January 1992.
King Fahad realised that developing the country towards
modernisation should not be based on utilising expatriate
expertise alone, but that Saudi Nationals must be developed
in almost all technical and professional areas. Therefore,
he gave his instructions and guidance to improve education,
vocational education and training. In addition, he has given
instructions to place Saudis in 600,000 positions occupied
by expatriates, a process which has moved very slowly since
1991.
56- Ibid.
57- Ibid.
58- Iciraa, Weekly Magazine. Report on the Kingdom National
Day. pp. 3-8, 21 November, 1990.
Table 5
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GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND APPROPRIATIONS
(MILLION SAUDI RIYALS)*
Year
Estimated
Revenue
Estimated
Appropriation
1960/61 17,786.0 17,786.0
1969/70 59,666.0 59,666.0
1973/74 22,810.0 22,810.0
1978/79 130,000.0 144,558.3
1980/81 340,000.0 298,000.0
1983/84 225,000.0 260,000.0
1984/85 214,100.0 260,000.0
1985/86 200,000.0 200,000.0
1986/87 200,000.0 200,000.0
1987/88 117,000.0 170,000.0**
1988/89 116,000.0 162,000.0**
1989/90*** 116,000.0 141,000.0**
1990/91*** 118,000.0 143,000.0**
1991/92*** 150,000.0 181,000.0**
* 3.75 Saudi Riyals equals one U.S. Dollar.
** The difference between revenue and appropriation
is to be funded from the States General Reserve,
and/or government bonds.
*** Source: Annual Report, Saudi Arabian Monetary
Agency, 21 August 1989, and Ministry of
Finance, Annual budget 1990, 31 December
1989, and Annual Budget January 1992. And
Statistical Books 1988 - 1991.
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The political system in Saudi Arabia has become very
centralised as is normal in most traditional societies.59
Centralisation in Saudi Arabia is a strong characteristic
not only in government organisation, but in the private
sector as wel160.
C. THE SOURCE OF VALUE IN SAUDI ARABIA
Introduction
Saudi Arabia has seen a noticeable development in the
government organisations and structure. The Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) since 1970 has undergone large increases,
especially in the non-oil sector. Due to these factors, the
government has set intensive and long term development plans
to influence change and development in the country in the
direction of modernisation. These plans emphasise development
of the economy, industry, education, and public services,
but also stress the importance of keeping the social values
and beliefs stable. Ragaei El Mallakh in 1982 pointed out
that:
Most of the Saudi rulers were able to accept the modernisation
which oil wealth bestowed upon the country, but without drastic
changes in the social values of the population.51
Saudi Arabia has so far exhibited an unusual ability
to maintain most of its social values and institutions. This
was very clearly outlined in the objectives of every develop-
ment plan.
59 - Abdullah Al-Karaji. Al-Tanmiah Al-Ejtimaeeh. "Social
Development". 1986. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. pp. 215-216.
60_ Ibid.
61_ El Mallakh, Ragaei. Saudi Arabia, Rush To Development.
1982, pp. 26-27.
66
Saudis share many cultural traits and practices that
are common among traditional societies (traditions are the
social and cultural life, the customs and the daily habits
that are commonly practiced between individuals and groups
for many decades ) . However, traditional societies do not lack
institutions or facilities tomodernise, while traditionalism
does. 62
 Saudi Arabian society should be studied from this
perspective. It is a different society from a modern one,
since traditions have a great impact upon it. But its
traditions are not impossible to change, nor do they resist
any serious transition efforts, although the transition might
be slow. As long as there is an ability to develop and
maintain an institutional structure capable of absorbing
change beyond its own initial premises and dealing with
continuously changing problems, while also developing quality
of liberty and rationality, Saudi Arabia can implement
modernisation63 . In Saudi Arabia people make social contact
and mingle easily. The ease of social contact derives from
the family and Islamic values found in the society. To better
identify and understand these values and their sources, we
can categorise them as follows:
A) Islamic Religion
B) Saudi Social Structure and Values
C) Saudi Family and Kin Structure and Relations
D) Saudi Culture and Value System Effects on
Management.
1- Islamic Religion
1.1 Islam and Islamic Cultural
Islam is a Religion and the first major source of values
in Saudi Arabia, which is considered the birth place of
62_ Ibid.
63 - Ibid.
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Islam. Islam is the Saudis' religion, and all Saudis that
live in Saudi Arabia are Muslims.
Saudi Arabia contains the two most important holy cities
in the Muslim world: Mecca and Medina. Mecca is the first
holy city in the Muslim world. The Holy House and the Kabbah
are located there. Medina is the second Holy City in the
Muslim world. It is where the Prophet Mohammed died and was
buried.
Islam is the source of political legitimacy, the
judicial system and the moral code for the Saudi society.
Islam is the primary political and social frame of reference.
On the one hand it is the formal religion of the state and
its principles are the supreme authority. On the other hand,
it is the social and cultural institution whose system of
social conduct and spiritual forces penetrate every aspect
of a Muslim's life. Ibrahim Al-Awaji in 1971, pointed this
out clearly:
For Saudi Arabians, it is not only the importance of Islam as
a major source of social values and norms that complete the
constitutionalisation of Islamic doctrines and teaching, but
also, its effects as the source of all legal and political acts
that perpetuates and enforces such an institutionalisation."
1.2 Islam's Vision
Islam is the religion of Muslims. They believe in God,
Mohammed 'Peace be upon him' as the prophet, and in God's
other writings too, such as the books found in Jewish and
Christian religions.
God said:
Say (0'Mohammed) we believe in God, and in the revelation given
to us, and to Abraham, Ismael, Isaac, Jacob and the Tribes. We
believe in the revelation that was sent to Moses, Jesus and all
other Prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between
them, and to Him we surrender. Holy Quraan (3:83)
64_ Dr. Ibrahim Al Awaji. 1971, pp. 67-68.
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Islam is an Arabic word and denotes submission, surren-
der and obedience. A complete obedience and submission to
Allah, "God" 65 . "Peace", is the other significant literal
meaning of the word Islam, peace of everything through
submission and obedience to Allah.
God said:
Those who believe and whose hearts find rest in remembrance of
God alone that the heart of man finds rest - those who believe
and act righteously, joy is for them and a blissful home to
return to. Holy Quraan (12:28 & 29)
1.3 Some Basic Characteristics of Islam
Simplicity, Rationality, and Practicality of Islam
Islam is a religion without any mythology. Its teachings
are simple and intelligible, it is free from superstition
and irrational belief. 66 The Oneness of God, the
Prophethood of Mohammed (peace be upon him) and the concept
of life after death are the basic articles of its faith. All
the teachings of Islam follow from these basic beliefs, and
are simple and straight forward. There are no complicated
rites and rituals. Everybody can translate from the Holy book
"Quraan" and put the teaching into practice. The basic
understanding of Allah "God" and religion is gained through
the seeking of knowledge. The Quraan advised mankind to
pray:
My Lord; advance me in knowledge. (20:114)
The Prophet Mohammed has stated that man should seek
after knowledge:
To seek knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim.67
65
- Mohammed Jamil. 1978, pp. 8-10.
66_ Kurshid Ahmed. 1977. p. 12.
67 - Tirmizi, Darimi Dar Al-Feekr. 1968, p. 118.
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This is how Islam brings man out of the world of
superstition and darkness, and initiates him into that of
knowledge and light.
Islam is also a practical religion and does not allow
indulgence in empty and futile theorising. It says that faith
is not a mere profession of belief. 68 Religion is something
to be practiced and not of mere lip-service. The Holy Quraan
says:
Those who believe and act righteously, joy is for them, and a
blissful home to return to. (13:29)
Therefore, Islam is a simple, rational and practical
religion.
Unity of Matter and Spirit
A unique feature of Islam is that it does not divide
life into materialism and asceticism. "It holds that
spiritual elevation is to be achieved by living piously in
the rough and tumble of life, not by renouncing the
world." 69 The Quraan advises us to pray as follows:
Our Lord! Give us something fine in this world as well as
something fine in the hereafter. (2:201)
God strongly censures those who refuse to benefit from
His blessings. God said:
Say: Who has forbidden God's finery which he has produced for
His servants and the whole something from (His) provision. The
Holy Quraan (7:32)
The Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) said:
A Muslim who lives in the midst of society and bears with
patience the afflictions that come to him is better than the
one who shuns society and can not bear any wrong done to
68- Khurshid Ahmed. 1977, p.13.
69- Ibid., p. 14.
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He also said:
...Your body has its rights over you, your wife has a claim upon
you, and the person who pays a visit to you has a claim upon
71you.
Thus, Islam does not admit any separation between mater-
ial and moral, mundane and spiritual life. It enjoins man
to devote all his energies to the construction of life on
healthy moral foundations. It teaches him that moral and
material power must be welded together and that spiritual
salvation can be achieved by using material resources for
the good of man in the service of just ends, and not by
living a life of criticism or by running away from the
challenges of life.72
Balance Between the Individual and Society
Another unique feature of Islam is that it establishes
a balance between individualism and collectivism. It believes
in the individual personality of man and holds everyone per-
sonally accountable to God. It guarantees the fundamental
rights of the individual and does not permit anyone to tamper
with them. 73 It does not subscribe to the view that man
must lose his individuality in society or in the state.74
God said:
Man shall have nothing but what he strive for (53:39)
He also said:
God only assigns to a soul what it can cope with: in its favour
stands whatever it has earned, while it is held responsible for
anything it has brought upon itself. (2:286)
- Ibid.
71- Ibin Majah, Termizi. 1971, p. 215 and 233.
72- Mohammed Jamil. 1978, p. 16.
73- Ibid., p. 18.
74- Ibid.
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On the other hand, it also awakens a sense of social
responsibility in man, organises human beings in a society
and enjoins the individual to subscribe to the social good.
Islam encourages and instructs for the following disciplines
and self control:
Humility, patience, endurance, courage, thankfulness,
brotherhood, greetings, helpfulness, cooperation, generosity,
hospitality, hard work and so many good behaviour and attitudes.
All of these values and good manners can not be achieved without
having good discipline and self-control and timing one's
activities (obligations). So, Muslims have to work towards
punctuality and discipline as it is essential to practice good
character and put his belief into action.75
Islam and Fatalism
It is a generally accepted fact in the West that Muslim
actions are fatalistic. Yet it is wrong to believe that this
fatalism is caused by Islamic teachings.
Many authors have thought that Islam is a fatalistic
religion where people must accept what happens to them,
because it is God's Will. Dr. Awaji said:
The average Arab is a fatalist who believes that whatever
happens to him is "God's Will" and there is very little that
he can do to change the course of events.76
In addition to Farid Mouna, many other Arab authors have
taken this view.77
Professor Sania Hamady, argued from a different stand-
point. In 1960 she said:
The impact of fatalistic philosophy on the Arabs is therefore
due not so much to religious doctrine of determination (though
it does seem to encourage a fatalistic behaviour) as to the
nefarious influence of political subjugation, economic poverty,
and social tyranny. The Arabs picked from the Quraan only the
passages that can support significantly their improvident
outlook on life and in which they can find a religious excuse
75- Ghulam Sarwar. 1980, Chapter XIII.
76- Ibrahim Al-Awaji. 1971, pp. 74-76.
77-Fatina Amin Shaker. 1972, pp. 99-100 and Farid A. Mouna.
1982. p. 93, and p. 23.
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for their inactivity and stagnation.78
The Holy Quraan points out that God controls all human
destinies, but He also wants people not to rely on this fact,
and to work hard for their lives and survival.
God said:
He it is who has made the earth easy to live upon: go about,
then, in all its regions; and partake of sustenance which He
provides: but (always bear in mind that) unto Him you shall be
resurrected. (67:15)
Islam is not the cause of any fatalistic attitude, but
it is true that many Arabs are fatalistic. This fatalism,
is mainly due to the Islamic culture that was developed
during the second century of Islam, 670-770 A.D. In time this
became the attitude of most Arabs. This Islamic culture mixed
or confused the idea of reliance on God. Arab fatalism stems
from this cultural confusion. Briefly, reliance on God for
a Muslim means that you do the best you can, work as hard
as you can, but if you do not reach your goal or fail to
achieve what you were after, do not give up. It is God's will
and do not forget to rely on God. It may be, it was not good
for you to reach that goal and only God knows what is beyond
human knowledge.
The real reliance on God was defined by the 2nd Muslim
Khalifa (Leader), Omar Ibn Al-Khattab in A.D. 615:
Oh Muslim People you misunderstood the objective behind reliance
on God. This objective will lead you to have your basic needs
accordingly. It is similar to the birds reliance on God. They
leave home in the morning with an emRty stomach and they come
back at evening with no more hunger-19
The real reliance should not be confused with "We can,
do nothing, it is God's will." It means, you have to initiate
and start doing, leaving the end results to God's will.
78- Sania Hamady. 1960, p. 76.
79- Sirat Omar Ibn Al-Khattab. 1972.
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In addition, Islam calls for hard work and God
established people on the earth with the power (physical)
and knowledge (brains) they need for achievement. He gave
them the achievement requirements and they must work and
implement the right means for human survival and development.
The Holy Quraan gives us an example of the Two-Horned One
in order to develop such an attitude within Muslims.
Behold, We established him securely on earth, and endowed him
with (the knowledge of) the right means (that he might set out
to achieve) and so he chose the right means (in whatever he
did). (18:78-81)
Furthermore, The Holy Quraan tells man to utilise the
resources that God has given us on the earth and to work
towards achievement and development of human life.
In-deed, (even afore time) did we send to earth our apostles
with all evidenced of (this) truth; and through them we bestowed
revelation from on high, and Thus gave you abalance (where with
to weight right and wrong), so that men might behave with
equity; and we bestowed (upon you) from on high (the ability
to make use of) iron, in which there is awesome power as well
as (a source of) benefits for man. (18:82-85)
2- Social Values and Saudi Society Structure and Tradition
as the Second Source of the Value System
Prior to 1932, Saudi Arabia was predominantly a tribal
society. There were some rural villages (Taif, Jizan, Hail)
and a few towns (Mecca, Medina). Only two urban centres
(Jeddah, Mecca) could be classified as cities, and they were
small (Figure 1).
2.1 The Tribal System and Value
Tribes were the basic social and political units to
which many Saudi Arabians looked for centuries for the
preservation of order and the resolution of conflict. More
than that, in pre-oil Arabia, they were the repositories of
both the means and actual process of a substantial proportion
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of what limited production occurred in the non-urban
areas. 80 Tribal nations were founded hundred of years prior
to the founding of Islam in the sixth century (570 A.D.).
2.2 Tribes and their Political Influence
In the past, tribes existed as independent political
entities. As such, they were capable of uniting for common
actions. More often than not, they acted as divisive forces
in any larger societal context.
In the early years of this century a number of tribes
proved politically decisive both to the ongoing acceptance
of Al-Saud's (the King's family) rule in the Najd, and to
the extension of the ruling family's authority to areas
previously under different administrative control. The Royal
family is from a tribe called Aneza. The importance of the
Aneza and other tribes, for instance, Qahtan, Utaybah,
Dawasir and Shammar, derived more often than not from a
combination of one or more of the following factors: size,
military power, geographic location, form of livelihood,
character and orientation of leadership, progeny and/or
religious outlook.
Tribal characteristics as much as any other attribute
were what prompted the late King Abdulaziz, the founder of
modern Saudi Arabia, to seek a number of means by which he
could integrate the various tribes into a new national
political structure. The religious content of Abdulaziz's
message as he set about knitting Arabia into a single state
proved to be the greatest source of his strength. He was able
to direct and control a strict adherence to Islamic modifica-
tion of the tribal distinctions which formerly had divided
80_ El Mallakh, Ragaei. 1982, P. 93.
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the realm.81
Tribal Sheikhs (Leaders) have traditionally played a
role that goes far beyond merely enhancing tribal identifica-
tion in the Kingdom. The influence of tribal leaders for many
years derived largely from their role as a major channel of
communication between the authorities in Riyadh City and the
country's hundreds of thousands of tribesmen. 82 Yet there
were always well defined limits to the sphere of their
influence. Whether the tribe was settled or nomadic and
whether their lands were strategically important or not,
their influence seldom extended beyond the geographic focus
of the tribe itself.
2.3 Tribes and the Impact of their Value System
The tribal system has been declining in Saudi Arabia
since 1932. It is steadily undergoing fundamental changes
and will eventually be dissolved. Due to the decline of
wildlife, most tribes drift away from the deserts to villages
and towns to seek other sources of income. The Kingdom also
created new opportunities previously unknown to the nomad.
These include employment in the service sector, army, and
the National Guard, which is mostly recruited from the
tribes83
The value system in Saudi Arabia, however, has not
changed much since 1932.
Thus, although certain segments of Saudi Arabian society may
have undergone some observable changes in their outlook as a
result of abundant wealth and new cultural exposure, and despite
the conspicuous change in both the economic conditions and the
organisational and formal environments, it is unquestionable
that the dominant social value system is still traditional. Not
only that, it has continued to dominate, but also to compel the
81- Ibid.
82- Ibrahim Al-Awaji. 1971, pp. 101-103.
83- Ibid.
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administrative institutions to adapt their behaviour to its
demands, which have resulted, in many important situations, in
the inactivation of formal mandate and rules.84
Tribal ties are still important, though declining.
People who have a tribal background still boast about it,
with some direct influence upon management behaviour. Early
tribal structural patterns, such as kinship and lineage, have
remained an essential of social relations in Saudi Arabian
society. Communal values such as mutual obligations and
interdependence, are still a basic social value in the
country. Almost twenty-four per cent (24%) of the Kingdom's
population is nomadic.85
The Arab tribal system consists of large kin groups.
Each tribe may include a number of very cohesive extended
families, whose relationships are well recognised by members
of each lineage. Mutual obligation and interdependence mainly
stem from the fact that:
1) members of a lineage rely for their protection on
their lineage group and/or the tribe at large,
and;
2) members of the lineage share common economic
interests and, therefore, they are obliged to
participate and enhance the interests of their
groups • 86
In other words, since the identity of individuals is
identical with that of his group, he is primarily responsible
for its welfare. Individualistic independence does not exist
in a tribal society apart from the demands and needs of the
84_ Ibid.
85- El Mallakh. Ragaei. Saudi Arabia, Rush To Development.
1982, p. 21.
86_ Dr. Abdullah Al-Kharaji, Elm Al-Ejtima Al-Aily. 1981,
pp. 189-220.
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particular group. Individual initiative is only encouraged
when it serves and enhances the interests of the group.
These tribal ties and characteristics are not unique
to the nomadic structure, but are also reflected in the
structure and behaviour of other social groups. Kinship and
interdependence are typical traits of the social organisation
in Saudi Arabia. This is what is implied by those who still
describe Saudi Arabian society as largely tribal.
2.4 Village Social System and Values
The Saudi village is a local territorial unit dependent
on agriculture. There are still some villages which function
as a trade market for tribes. The village is also important
in the social structure because it is a transitional stage
between tribalism and urbanisation. 87 Historically, Bedouin
" nomads" settle first in villages through which they acquire
their first experiences in a settled society.
Village kinship relations are important because in many
villages, though not all, an important segment of its popula-
tion may consider themselves related through a common male
ancestor. 88 Consequently, the social position of the indi-
vidual villager is determined by his belonging to a particu-
lar extended family and by its position within a large kin-
group or in the village as a whole. As in a tribe, the
village chief "Amir" is the spokesman for his villagers.89
2.5 Villagers
Villagers who have begun to move to larger cities
because of greater business opportunities and for government
jobs usually continue to identify themselves and maintain
87- Ibid., pp. 70-84.
88- Ibid., pp. 93 and 96.
89- Ibid.
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their ties with their village. These ties are very similar
to tribal ties. Villagers rely on their family members and
relatives for farming and agriculture.
2.6 Urban Social System and Values
Contrary to the homogeneous tribal and village
communities in Saudi Arabia, urban communities at present
are heterogeneous. This is due to the mixed historical back-
ground of the five regions. With respect to broad similari-
ties cities can be classified into two main categories:
1) Major cities in the Western region.
2) Cities in other parts of the country.
Because of the religious-historical significance of
Mecca and Medina and the important location of Jeddah as a
trade centre and old port on the Red Sea, Western region
cities' social structure, cultural orientation, and economic
and political organisations are quite different from the rest
of Saudi Arabian cities. 9° About eighty per cent (80%) of
the nomads live around the other cities. Different cultural
traits have been absorbed and assimilated into one culture
which is unique to these cities. Trades and hand-crafts were
the basic economic activities, though some small industries
were started there too. The background and the basic values
were still traditional. Social organisation is based on
occupational patterns and commercial relationships, but the
family is still the fundamental social unit.
The cities of the Najd (Middle region), Aseer (South
Western region) and the Eastern region acquired different
historical development and common characteristics. Histori-
cally, they resembled villages in their activities and social
profile. They were mainly agriculture-oriented, although
9°- Ibrahim Al-Awaji. 1971, p. 69.
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other activities such as handicrafts existed. Their social
organisation was homogeneous and centred around large kin-
groups. They were usually ruled by a few powerful fami-
lies.91
However, the discovery of oil, the growth of government
activity, and the development of new types of commercial
sectors, all have led to:
1) the expansion of old urban centres particularly
Mecca, Jeddah and Medina, and
2) the emergence of several urban centres which
fundamentally differ from their original charac-
teristics.
This was the situation with Riyadh, Burayda and Unaizah
in the Najd, and Dammam, Jubail and Al-Khobar in the Eastern
region. But on the other hand, big cities in Aseer (South
Western region) have witnessed only relatively minor
alterations •92
The result at the present is expanded cities, and a push
for industrialisation, while most of the traditions continue
to exist. The traditional cities of Mecca, Medina and Jeddah
have expanded tremendously in population size and level of
economic activity, but have at the same time preserved most
of their basic social features. The new expanding urban
centres in other provinces have experienced fundamental
changes in their social structure and outlook, but most of
the village and tribal values and institutions still exist.
Despite the oil boom the value system has not changed much
since 1932.
It is a social structure in which social and economic differen-
91- Ibid. 1971, pp. 61 and 66.
92- Ibid.
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tiation has begun, but many remain incomplete, a social
structure in which family and friendship still dominate many
spheres of life.93
In addition, the social structure is steadily approach-
ing a sharper socio-economic stratification in which the
society is divided into three distinctive clusters. The first
largely consists of the components of the power structure,
namely, the Royal Family, followed by a small group of
wealthy families (about 520 families of 900,000), mainly big
merchants and high-ranking officials. The second category
is a middle class which combines a fair number of employees
(professional and managerial) and the small business class.
Compared with the middle class the size of the upper class
is small. The two combined represent only a small fraction
of entire social system whose masses present the third
category of the socio-economic structure.94
Despite the three different structures in Saudi Arabian
society, tribal, village and urban, and despite the social
stratification, the most common and shared system of values
is tribalism. Tribal values and norms were developed and had
strong roots because of living conditions that existed for
centuries. Wild territories needed defence, and this had its
influence on the social structure and values.
The main source of restraints on selfish behaviour in
man come from cultural learning. 95 This influence is
particularly strong on individuals and families. Due to this
fact there is little or no independence, and the family ties
are strong on individuals. These ties lead the individual
to behave in a manner that expresses his family patterns and
interests.
93- Farid A. Mouna. 1980. p. 11.
94- Ibrahim Al-Awaji. 1971, p. 64.
95- Michael Argyle. 1984, p. 19.
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3- Family and Kinship System and Value in Saudi Arabia
Saudi society is a familistic society. In other words,
it is a traditional society. % It has been undergoing
continuous development which will lead to a big change in
the family value system. It is beyond the scope of this study
to analyse the development process today in Saudi Arabia and
its future effect on the family, but it is important to point
out that though the family value system is traditional, in
the future a big change will occur in this system because
of the process of mobilisation, industrialisation, and the
push for modernisation. The Saudi Arabian society has gone
through intensive mobilisation. The growth of cities
indicates this mobilisation. Most of the population now live
in cities and villages; very few remain in the old tribal
life-style. With this mobilisation, Saudi Arabia can make
solid progress into modernisation. In about three decades
with this development the urban characteristics will become
stronger than tribal ones. This will also affect the family
structure and ties, and influence of the individual.
Nonetheless, this change will take a long time because
of the historical basis of family values. The efforts to
make these changes happen must be well-planned and con-
tinuously developed.
1.1 The Family Structure and Value System
The family unit in Saudi Arabia is the basic establish-
ment of many values, goals, objectives, norms and tradi-
tions. 97 The family is the centre of all activities in
Saudi Arabia. Though this fact has been changing slowly over
the last few years (particularly since 1974), it remains
the dominant characteristic of the Saudi family. Whether in
96- S. N. Eisenstadt. 1983, p. 27.
97- Dr. Abdullah Al-Kharaji. 1981, pp. 361 and 237.
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tribes, villages, or cities, the family remains the primary
source of identification. 98
 Identification with a certain
family influences one's economic and political status. Among
the nomads, the family is largely a self-sustaining economic
unit. In the cities such as Jeddah, the family is usually
centred around a business enterprise that includes the
fathers, sons, brothers, uncles, aunts and other rela-
tives.99
The Arab family is the basic social unit and the centre
of all loyalties, obligations and status of its members. Arab
society, consequently, starts with the family rather than
with the individual, and is patterned on it. Relations extend
from the family and remain within its orbit. The individual
is responsible for the well-being of his family, and if he
fails in his role, he is regarded as a bad character, but
does not lose his membership. He carries out his acts in
terms of his family, and his behaviour in various life-
situations is therefore mainly an expression of his family
patterns. Furthermore, the individual's wider contacts come
through the family and its extensions, for example, lineages,
kin-groups and clan.100
It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to point out
that the Arab family comprises more than the direct members
of a nuclear unit. The family consisting of the parents and
children is not what we mean by the basic social unit.
Instead, we refer to the joint family, a larger or extended
family group, consisting of parents, their children, grand
parents, uncles and aunts and descendants and collective
relatives three or four times removed. 101
98- Ibid.
99- Fatina Shaker. 1972, P. 189.
100_
 Ibrahim Al-Awaji. 1971, pp. 67-70.
101
- Ibid.
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This extension of the family unit and its relationship
is expanded to group relations and formal contracts. As Farid
Mouna said:
The Arab executive lives in a society where family and friend-
ship remain important and prevalent factors even in the func-
tioning formal institutions and groups.102
At the outset, one may suspect that the role of the
family is basically similar to the role of the family in the
West. However, looking closely at the patterns of Arab
familial relationships and the extent of their effects upon
the individual's relations with other groups outside the
family circle, the distinction between the two social
settings becomes quite apparent. The degree of commitment
and the obligations of Arabs towards their families, their
responsibilities, and their association outside the family
are not typical of Western family relations.103
The primacy of the Arab family has evolved out of three
factors. These factors are:
a) the Arab tradition,
b) Islamic teachings and,
c) economic and political factors.
The Arab traditions are the main source of a family's
social legitimacy. The social structure of the Saudi family,
where descendants are traced through the paternal line, is
organised around related males. A newly born child auto-
matically carries the father's name, religion and identifi-
cation. Sex and age are the two basic determinations of one's
status in the family and for all outside decisions and
activities affecting one. The mother's attention, in turn,
102_ Farid A. Mouna. 1980. p. 12.
103_ Morroe Berger. 1957, pp. 32-70.
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is centred around the welfare of her children. Children are
expected to obey and respect their parents.
The second source is Islam, which asserts the priority
of the family and the relatives. Islam instructs the children
as they grow up to assume economic responsibility for their
aging parents and other needy relatives in the extended
family. Generally the Islamic law governs all aspects of a
Muslim family. In Saudi Arabia Islam is the legal form that
is applied to almost all aspects of life. Thus Islamic law
governs, for instance, marriage rules, divorce, and inheri-
tance relationships between children and parents.
The third source is the economic and political factors.
Saudi Arabia has been going through a very intensive develop-
ment. Tremendous change has happened to the family structure
and its interrelationships. Because of the nature of the Arab
world of handicrafts, simple trade, agricultural and a
pastoral life, the whole family continues to be relied on
as an economic organisational unit and a social unit. Dr.
Fatina Shaker declared that (1972):
The development of an industrialised economy in some parts or
areas (in Saudi Arabia) has not yet provided a major viable
substitute for the family role.10'
Without having some substitute for the extended family
very little change will affect these values and structures.
For progress and development, there must be an ability to
develop and maintain an institutional structure capable of
absorbing changes beyond industrialisation and dealing with
continuous changes.105
In spite of major economic activities, the majority of
104_ Fatina Shaker. 1972, P. 116.
105_ S. N. Eisenstadt. 1983, pp. 209-210.
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families are unchanged, and remain the centre of most social
activities, the maintenance of the family is seen as an
economic virtue. This family role has remained strong, even
in current political and organisation dealings. Thus, family
and relationships may remain for the next few decades a major
factor in Saudi political and economic systems. This was
argued also by John Anthony in 1982:
It is impossible to gain an adequate picture of their social
and political organisation without an examination of family
structure. The impact has, of course, been immense in the
formation of past and present political structure in Saudi
Arabia. Yet its paramountcy in the initial formation of the
tribes themselves has often been overlooked along with the
predominant role of one or more families in the determination
of the political function expected of the tribal Sheikh
(leader). Most important of all, perhaps, is the fact that
tribal roles were usually roles of a particular family writ
large. This certainly appears to have been the case with respect
to the Al-Saud (Royal family), which over time eclipsed the
political role of its tribal progenitors. As the core unit
within the overall system of political activity in the Kingdom,
the government knows it is on firm sociological and doctrinal
ground in emphasising, as it has repeatedly done, the ongoing
importance of familial solidarity as fundamental value. In its
view, the family far more than the tribe or other kinds of
societal groupings - remains the structural foundation on which,
ultimately, the edifice of the Saudi Arabian state will stand
or fall. Indeed, much is made of the fact that this one unit
remains at the centre of the process through which the procre-
ation and perpetuation of all the other social units in the
Kingdom is manifested. Of no less significance, it remains the
key unit through which lineages is maintained, social cohesiv-
eness is reinforced and nourished, and by extension, structural
integrity up to the highest levels of national government is
enhanced. By contrast the overall degree of influence wielded
by tribal leaders as a whole has been diminished considerably
as a result of numerous forces, change which they find increas-
ingly difficult to control or influence in their favour.106
Like other institutions in Saudi Arabia, the family is
experiencing some changes in its structure and function. The
phenomenon of having one extended family living in one
household is disappearing due to the socio -economic and
geographic mobility of the younger generation. The develop-
ment of the bureaucratic apparatus of the government, as well
106_ El Mallakh, Ragaei. 1982, Chapter 9.
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as Aramco, Saudi Airlines, and other big organisations, has
created a new, "huge" job market that was not known before.
This new market has attracted people to the cities, but many
of the extended families have changed little, at least on
the formal level. One must, of course, be cautious in
undertaking any generalisation regarding the Saudi family
at large. The changes occurring are to be viewed primarily
with regard to the socially and geographically mobile groups
of the population; a problem on which very little statistical
information exists. Another factor leading to certain changes
in the family is the increasing emphasis on education for
both men and women. This could be seen in the view of the
educated young people towards "arranged marriage", the
institution of polygyny, the size of the family and the role
of women.
1.3 Kinship and its Interrelation
Kinship ties are very pervasive and important in Saudi
Arabia. Group affiliation and group interaction still form
the most distinctive feature of Arab society. Farid A. Mouna
said in 1980.107
Small groups in Arab society are formed on the basis of
primordial ties such as family, school or neighbourhood friend-
ship, religious and regional affiliation as well as other
competing ties and loyalties such as political party, trade,
or profession. However, the strength of such ties, and the types
of them that are important, differ from person to person and
from society to society; it will be argued that it is the former
primordial ties which are generally the more pervasive and more
important.
The Saudi community consists mainly of extended family,
friends, business associates and government officials. Saudi
executives and managers are expected to carry out obligations
to each set and to reciprocate with members in each unit.
107_ Farid A. Mouna. 1980, pp. 12-13.
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As Ibrahim Al-Awaji said, 1971:108
The public bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia exists in a traditional
society whose role conception is primarily particularistic,
meaning that public employees have the obligation to serve the
interests of their special social units first. Consequently,
favouritism and corruption have become not only common-place
in the daily activities of the bureaucracy, but also a socially
accepted, and in some situations a respected form of bureaucrat-
ic behaviour.
4- Saudi Arabian Culture and Value System, Effects on
Management
We have seen in the last three sections that Islamic
religion, social structure and culture, traditions, political
and social system have their effects on the whole of Saudi
society. It is a value system that influences the Saudi
conception of work and the country's business philosophy.
These values and philosophy have their impact on management
regardless of how much management is trained and educated.
The following will describe some of these effects. This
description will be general since details and specific
analysis will be dealt with in the subsequent key chapters
of this study. The objective in the present section is to
help the reader to understand the study's empirical results
and findings, presented in later chapters.
4.1 Islam and Management
Effective and efficient management is a subject of
Islamic teachings. Muslims are enjoined to practice good
management in their work and life. This includes management
of wealth, personnel, energy, all other resources and life's
affairs. Indeed, all of Islam's religious practices are for
the development of Muslims' actions, motivations, physical
108
- Ibrahim Al-Awaji. 1971, p. 22.
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and spiritual needs. For instance, fasting during the month
Ramadan is not just to obey God's instruction of not having
food or drink from sunrise to sunset, but it is, in addition,
to develop patience, self-control, and consideration for
others. Thus, Islam calls for the practice of management not
only in religious applications, but in all aspects of life.
Muslims are also told to manage their resources well
and to plan their activities. Many other examples of this
type were given by the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him)
and his friends, for example, team decision making and
consultation. The Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him)
demonstrated implementation of the Holy Quraan' s instructions
and teachings. He put this belief into all of his actions,
and he was a symbol of high manners and of very fine
character. Managing oneself and one's time and temperament,
and planning for tomorrow are examples of faith, effective
leadership and innovation. Many other disciplines were part
of his message to Muslims on how to manage wealth and
resources, trade and economy. He also taught Muslims how to
structure and organise their work, social and religious
activities, and their military organisation during peace or
in war against disbelievers.
I will briefly introduce the Prophet Mohammed's ideas
on managing one's physical power, energy, wealth, and time
so as to achieve human welfare and progress. He said:
Take charge of five things: your youth before you get old, your
health (energy) before you get sick (or where your health no
more could help you as in the oldest days), your wealth before
you may get poor, your time resource before you get engaged (and
have not enough time left for you), your life before your
death. 109
In short the exhortation is to take advantage of
opportunities, not to waste what you already have, and to
109_ Al-Bokhari, Sahih. 1967, p. 387/2.
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utilise these five things for the benefit of yourself and
other human beings before you run out of them.
In addition, the following statements from the Holy
Quraan and/or Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) are basic
for Muslims in their relationships and application.
o Excellence
The Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) said:
God likes that when you do a job you do it thoroughly.110
o Team Work
The Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) said:
God prefers team work. --
The meaning here is that God assists team work for, He likes
people to work together as one, effective team.
o Involvement and Participation
The Holy Quraan supports consultation:
Regular prayer, for those who (conduct) their affairs by mutual
consultation. (42:38)
o Facing up and Feedback
The Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) said:
If your brother asked for your advice (consultation), advise
him. 112
110_ Ibid., p. 230/V.3.
111_ Ibid., p. 280/V.3.
112_ Ibid. p. 260/V.2.
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o Effective Communication
The Holy Quraan says:
And argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious.
(16:25)
It is addressed to Prophet M q.12uumed (Peace be upcalhim)
and Muslims that when they try to convince the disbeliever,
to do it in a gracious way.
o Morale and Cohesion
The Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) said:
Allah, the Merciful shows mercy upon the merciful people. So
show mercy upon the earthy creatures so that One who is in
Heaven should show mercy on you.113
He also said:
Do not dislike each other, indv19e in envy, turn your back upon
each other, be good brothers."'
o Initiative
The Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) said:
Show initiative. 115
o Leadership
The Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) gave many good
examples of effective leadership. He used to consult
his people in all matters, for instance, war, peace,
trade, and many other actions that effect life. He also
used to seek opinions from both men and women. He gave
113_ Ibid. p. 260/V.2.
114_ Ibid. p. 115/V.1.
115_ Ibid., p. 50/V.3.
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instruction regarding travelling, trade, and so on. The
people, where they could be two or more, must chose a
leader to follow. But leadership must not be followed
blindly. If a leader does not follow Islamic teachings
and tries to lead his people in the wrong direction,
they must discuss it with him, re-direct him, not obey
him, or even stop him.
4.2 The Political and Government System Impact on Manage-
ment
As previously mentioned, under the political system,
the government organisations in Saudi Arabia are extremely
centralised:
Centralisation of authority in the hands of the few is a common
phenomenon throughout the entire administrative system... The
relation between ministries and other central organisations and
field agencies is generally characterised by an excessive
centralisation of authority... In both personnel and financial
matters, little authority is delegated to the people at the
lower level. Consequently, by and large, decisions in minor
issues, for example, purchasing a part for a broken machine,
may usually await approval from central agencies for weeks or
.months due to the slow procedures of the central
administration. 116
Such centralisation delays an agency's activities and
creates a large amount of routine work at the central level.
This also has an impact on the official's time because it
leads to the 'top-man syndrome' where clients believe that
the top man is the only one that can get their requests
handled quickly.
This is manifested by the familiar scenes of crowds at the doors
and desks of the administrators in the central agencies,117
116_ Awaji. 1971, pp. 206-207.
117
- Ibid.
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The other form of centralisation is authority which is
concentrated at the central agency itself:
Everything has to be submitted to the man at the top, including
extraneous work. The consequences are devastating. First, top
officials spend their time discussing or signing papers of
insignificant value to their official responsibility. They have
little time left for major issues and long term development.
Second, they also spend a great deal of time receiving people
who follow up their concern to the officials' desk regardless
of the importance of the issues involved.118
Thus, centralisation causes wasted time, puts pressure
on officials' time, and helps to create the top-man syndrome.
In a recent study conducted by the Public Administration
Institute in Riyadh, 119
 it was found that twenty-two per
cent (22%) of the participants of 18 ministries and agencies
complained that they were lacking sufficient authority. In
addition, it was found 12° that ministers and top officials
created too many committees for non-major issues. These
committees waste time, delay actions and create coordination
difficulties. Such committees take too much time to achieve
the objectives of their organisation. The biggest problem
here is that members of these committees are top officials.
There is an average of 400 committee meetings for every top
official per year.121
Another form of centralisation is the passing of letters
and documents between agencies. It was found that an official
letter or request from one agency to another in the same city
takes about a week to be received by the official concerned.
Interdepartmental mail may take two or three days to be
118-Al-Awaji. 1971, p. 208.
119-Nadoat Al-Wehdat Al-Mousaeedah. 'The Supporting System
in Government Organisations; Conference' 1983, p. 97.
120-Ibid. pp. 182-183.
121-Ibid. p. 189.
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delivered even within the same building. 122
Ibrahim Al-Awaji found that ei ghty
-two per cent (82%)
of the participants in his study (271 officials) said that
there was excessive centralisation in their organisa-
tions. 123
 He also found that over-centralisation resulted
in a lack of sufficient authority at various levels of the
organisation. Fifty-two per cent (52%) of the participants
in his work confirmed this fact)-24
Centralisation appears to be the most difficult problem
and biggest time waster in government organisations. This
has affected the private sector as well, not only because
the private sector has many activities that come within the
government sector, such as construction contracts, but also
because there are many government employees and mangers who
have joined the private sector, taking with them this
attitude toward centralisation.
4.3 The Social Value System impact on Management
The social and business environment in Saudi Arabia has
considerable impact on Saudi Management attitudes and be-
haviour. Here, I will describe briefly how the Saudi Arabian
social value system impacts on management and managers.
Later, in the discussion of the research findings, this
impact will, of course, be described and presented in more
detail. As previously stated, tribal, village and family
value systems in Saudi Arabia have a great impact on
individuals. Individualism is not supported and senior family
leaders take charge of almost everything. This is a value
to which the Saudi managers and their employees were exposed
122_ Ibid. p. 25.
123_ Al-Awaji. 1971, p. 208.
124_ Al-Awaji. 1971, p. 11.
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during their formative years. The senior family role attitude
has its influence on individual managers:
The management concept is practiced in terms of the father role.
An example is that senior managers consider themselves as
fathers of their departments and their employees responsibili-
ties are defined in such terms.125
Furthermore, Arab executives live in societies where
family and friendship remain important and prevalent factors
even in the functioning of formal institutions and
groups. 126
The Saudi managers not only affect their work and
employees with their attitudes, but they are also affected
by the pressure their society put on them. This pressure
coming from the society constitutes expectations of
management, such as following the social values, norms, and
customs, and therefore management is regarded as both a
target and agent of social influence and change.127
Social values also have their effects on the Saudi
manager's interpersonal styles. For example, as described
in Part Two, the Saudi society does not support independence
on the part of individuals. This leads managers to consider
the loyalty of employees as more important than their
performance. 128 The use of rituals and customs in
conducting business is essential, and the use of personal
ties and connections is a faster and more effective way to
get things done.129
125_ Farid A. Mauna. The Arab Executives. 1982, p. 40.
126_ Ibid.
127_ Ibid. pp. 20-71.
128_ Ibid.
129_ Ibid.
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Generally, the social value system has its impact on
management and a manager's interpersonal style,
communication, decision making, planning, control, and giving
of direction.
96
SUMMARY
Saudi Arabia has many geographical features and
natural resources. It has been undergoing change from a
tribal society into a modern one. The country since 1970 has
been undergoing an intensive development in almost all
aspects. The huge revenue, mainly from oil, has helped the
achievement of the Kingdoms' development plans. Many new
cities and urban areas have been created since 1970. The
population in 1991 in Saudi Arabia was about 12.8 million,
of which forty-five per cent (45%) was foreign workers and
their families. Because of the intensive development Saudi
Arabia has undergone the foreign labour force increased from
0.38 million in 1968 to 3.8 million in 1991. However, the
government is trying to develop Saudi youth to replace these
expatriates. The youth population is about sixty-four per
cent (64%) of the total population.
The workforce in Saudi Arabia, therefore, is thirty-four
per cent (34%) Saudis and sixty-six per cent (66%)
foreigners. Of the 5.6 million workforce 1.1 million Saudis
are in the government sector and 800,000 in the private. The
private sector has 4.5 million employees but only fifteen
per cent (15%) of them are Saudis. The Saudi government wants
to increase the Saudi workforce in the private sector.
However, there are many obstacles in the face of this
objective, for instance, many Saudi nationals lack
experience, training, qualifications, and do not like to work
in the private sector, either because of the low salaries
or the working conditions. The Kingdom's government is trying
to resolve this problem through several tactics, including
the privatisation of some government corporations.
The Kingdom is ruled by the royal family (Saud). The
royal family is the most powerful unit in Saudi Arabia.
Following the royal family is the religious council, followed
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by the ministerial cabinet. The government system in Saudi
Arabia is heavily centralised.
There are three major sources of value in Saudi Arabia:
the religion of Islam, the social values, which include the
tribal and village values, and the family values and ties.
In addition to Islam, the family values are considered the
second most influential force on individuals, followed by
societal values.
The family is the basic social unit in Saudi Arabia.
The individual's loyalty and devotion is to the interests
of his family, kin and intimate group(s). Consequently, as
a member of such a communal society, the employees, when
discharging their formal duties and when attempting to secure
necessary social acceptance, are bound to adhere to its
values and modes.
CHAPTER III
BUSINESS AND DEVELOPMENT IN
SAUDI ARABIA
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III. BUSINESS AND DEVELOPMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA
This chapter describes the business and development
Saudi Arabia has undergone, mainly since 1970, and the
prospects of further development. Since business and develop-
ment in the Kingdom cannot be fully discussed in one chapter,
I will cover only the main items that relate to business,
economy, and social development.
DEVELOPMENT GOALS
Saudi Arabia's primary goal is to provide for the
economic and social well-being of its people. The Kingdom
has a great potential for fulfilling that goal through
economic diversification, development of human skills and
resources, and the maintenance of a stable society.
1- The Development Strategy of the Government
The actual centralised government system began in the
1950s while the other economic conditions were slowly
developing. Yet the development of a country into a modern
industrial society capable of sustaining a high standard of
living for its people does not depend solely on abundant
financial resources, technical know-how and management
expertise. It also needs to meet the challenge of develop-
ment.'
Through international cooperation, Saudi Arabia today
hopes to build a better future for both its people and the
world. The objectives of Saudi Arabia in seeking internation-
al cooperation are, on the one hand, to benefit from the
experience, technology and human resources of international
agencies and friendly nations in meeting its development
1- G. Mutawakil. Business and Law in Saudi Arabia. The Falcon
Press, Napoli, Italy. 1979. pp.9-10
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goals. On the other hand, it plans to assist in the recycling
of international resources to the benefit of oil consuming
nations in the interest of continued expansion of
international trade and investment.2
Saudi Arabia has determined not to restrict free
enterprise or to interfere with the personal freedoms of
people as long as they are law-abiding citizens.3
Discussions are held with developed and developing
countries about the means by which they can contribute to
the development of Saudi Arabia on terms advantageous to both
parties. Agreements have been signed or are being negotiated
with the following governments to participate and/or assist
in Saudi Arabian development and business: Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Finland, West Germany,
Holland, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Morocco,
Philippines, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.4
2- Development Plans of Saudi Arabia
Development Planning in Saudi Arabia began in 1958.
With the shortage of income, development was slow and hard
to engineer. In 1968 King Faisal looked seriously toward
setting long term developmental plans and the first five year
development plan was approved in late 1969.
The First Five-Year Development Plan (1970/75)
The outline of the Development Plan for the five years
1970/75 prepared by the Central Planning Organisation was
2- G. Mutawakil. Business and Law in Saudi Arabia. The Falcon
Press, Napoli, Italy. 1979. pp. 9-10.
3- Ibid.
4- Ibid.
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approved in September 1969. 5
 The general objectives of this
plan were to increase the productive capacity of the economy,
and to raise the standard of living and the wealth and
welfare of the people of Saudi Arabia. 8 It also aimed to
promote national security and to maintain economic and social
stability along the path of development. 7 Specific objec-
tives of this plan were:8
1) to raise the rate of growth of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP);
2) to diversify the economy and to reduce the
country's dependence on oil by increasing the
contribution of other productive sectors to the
national product;
3) to lay down the foundations for sustained economic
growth; and
4) to develop human resources so as to enable differ-
ent elements of society to contribute more effec-
tively to the growth of the economy, and to
participate more fully in the process of develop-
ment.
The Second Five-Year Development Plan (1975/80):
Unlike in the first development plan period, both the
production of oil and its price rose in 1973, and foreign
exchange and government revenue increased as well (Table 4,
Chapter II) . Government expenditure on development increased
rapidly. Financial constraint was not a serious consider-
ation, but the government wisely decided not to push its
development expenditure too far (Figures 7 and 8), especially
since it might cause social and moral value conflicts.
5- El Mallakh, Ragaei. Saudi Arabia, Rush To Development.
1982, p. 145.
6- Ibid.
7- Ibid.
8- Ibid.
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The goals of the second plan were to:9
1) maintain the religious and moral values of Islam;
2) assure the defense and internal security of the
Kingdom;
3) maintain a high rate of economic growth by devel-
oping economic resources, maximizing earnings from
oil over the long term, and conserving depletable
resources;
4) reduce economic dependency on the export of crude
oil;
5) develop human resources 'chi ough education , tm ain-
ing , and raising standards of health;
6) increase the well-being of all groups within the
society and foster social stability under circum-
stances of rapid social change; and
7) develop a physical infrastructure to support
achievement of the stated goals.
The second development plan showed substantial progress,
and gross domestic product grew at an average annual rate
of eight and four-hundredths per cent (8.04%). The non-oil
sector increased at an average rate of fifteen and thirteen-
hundredths per cent (15.13%) annually. In 1984 crude oil
revenue was reduced, but the other petrochemical and non-oil
GDP kept increasing. However in 1991/92 the crude oil price
was increased by twenty-five per cent (25%), (production
increased sixty per cent (60%) in comparison with 1987/88),
(Figures 9 and 10).
The Third Five-Year Development Plan (1980/85)
At the beginning of the Third Plan period Saudi Arabia ranked
as one of the world' s foremost financial powers, with great
international strength deriving from monetary wealth and its
role as the major oil exporter to the free world. Of course,
9- El Mallakh, Ragaei. Saudi Arabia, Rush To Development.
1982. pp. 163-164.
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with this status there were added responsibilities and
duties, not only in global finance but in political areas
as well)-0
Major physical constraints to development, while not
eliminated, had been reduced in significance at the start
of the Third Plan. While not yet fully sufficient for the
demands of planned development, the infrastructural framework
in 1980 was adequate. Absorptive capacity was improved by
the beginning of the Third Plan compared to five years
earlier as imports rose dramatically during this period. The
government's actual expenditure exceeded allocated amounts
by the end of the Second Plan.11
The Third Plan (1980/1985) was to begin in a much more
favourable situation than the previous plans with regard to
the rate of price increase. Inflation, which was particularly
severe at the end of the Second Plan, was reduced to an
average rate of increase of three per cent (3%) in 1986.
Appropriate government monetary policy, and increases in
supply capabilities were crucial in alleviating the threat
to the living standards of Saudis and to the price structure
of the Kingdom. However in 1990 the cost of living again
increased by three per cent (3%) again, mainly due to the
Gulf crisis (Figure 11) .12
With controlled inflation, most, but not all, of the
population was able to have a much higher standard of living
at the beginning of the Third Plan than at the comparable
period of the Second. Average per capita annual income from
employment increased from approximately US $ 1,297 in the
1970s to about US $ 2,187 in the 1980s (in constant 1979
10- El Mallakh, Ragaei. Saudi Arabia, Rush To Development.
1982, pp. 214-216.
11- Ibid.
12- Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, February, 1991.
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prices) . Moreover, government social-welfare programmes added
an estimated extra twenty-nine per cent (29%) to personal
income level during the period. While distribution figures
were not available, the 'average' Saudi was much better off
in the 1980s than in the 1970s. 13 However, the Saudi
government, in order to maintain a reasonable living
standard, has provided subsidies in many areas, for example,
food, farming, social and health care, electricity,
transportation, and so on. In 1970 the government subsidies
were US $ 13.3 million, rising to US $ 2.9 billion in 1982.
Due to the development achieved, the level of subsidy was
gradually reduced to US $ 1.2 billion in 1990.14
While development accomplishments were evident from the
Second Plan, so was the recognition of constraints regarding
continued development. Shortfalls in the achievement of
manpower goals indicated that this critical area would very
likely be a central issue in economic decisions for the Third
Plan. The problem consisted of a continuing imbalance between
the economy's growing manpower needs and the number of new
Saudi entrants into the workforce (see Chapter II,
Workforce).
The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1985/90):
Having carried out three successful five-year plans
(1970-85), Saudi Arabia announced its Fourth Five-Year
Development Plan in March 1985. This plan envisaged civilian
expenditure of US $ 184,000 million spread over 1985/86 to
1989/90. This is 4.3 per cent (4.3%) higher than the previous
plan's actual spending, which was estimated to have totalled
US$ 175.9 million. Allocations for the "development sector",
which includes industry, agriculture, education and training,
health, and transportation and communications, accounted for
13- Ibid., pp. 214-216.
14- Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. August 1990.  Annual Report
Al-Madina Newspaper, 24 August 1990, 10- 3-
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nearly three quarters of the five-year tota1.15
The objectives of the Fourth Plan were formulated to
ensure continuity with the strategy of the Third Plan. The
emphasis, as in the Third Plan, was on the effective use of
material resources, development of the productive sectors,
and of human resources. The objectives represented an all
encompassing framework for structural change. The objectives
were: 16
1. to safeguard Islamic values, duly observing,
disseminating and confirming Allah's Shariaa
(God' s Divine Law);
2. to defend the Faith and the Nation; and to uphold
national security and social stability;
3. to form productive citizen-workers by providing
them with education and health services, ensuring
their work;
4. to develop human resources, thus ensuring a
constant supply of manpower, and to upgrade and
improve its efficiency in order to serve all
sectors;
5. to raise cultural standards to keep pace with the
Kingdom' s development;
6. to reduce dependence on the production and export
of crude oil as the main source of national
income;
7. to continue with real structural changes in the
Kingdom' s economy to produce a diversified econom-
ic base with due emphasis on industry and agricul-
ture;
8. to develop mineral resources and to encourage the
discovery and utilisation thereof ;
9. to concentrate on qualitative development through
15- International Airports Projects. A Background On The 4th
Development Plan 1987, Department of Public Relations.
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
16-Ministry of Planning, Estimates of the Fourth Development
Plan (1985-1990).
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improving the performance of the utilities and
facilities already established during the three
previous plan periods;
10. to complete the infrastructural projects necessary
to achieve overall development; and
11. to achieve economic and social integration between
the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
NEW EMPHASIS. The Fifth Development Plan (1990/1995)
The Fifth Plan envisages considerable upgrading of
public services, especially electricity supplies, transporta-
tion and education. Training Saudis in all aspects of
business, administration, industry and social services is
a priority as the Kingdom wants to increase dependence on
its own people. The allocation of health care and social
development account for about fifteen per cent (15%) of the
Fourth Development Plan. Furthermore, education, training,
social and Human Resources development in the Fifth
Development Plan 1990/95 has increased to US $ 14.2 billion.
This increase represents about thirty-five per cent (35%)
of the 1990/95 government expenditure. Increasing of local
production and service is also one of the Plan' s important
features. To achieve this, private investment is encouraged,
through generous financial and other incentives, to boost
its share in mainstream and other industries (Figure 12) •17
However, due to the Gulf crisis in 1990/91 this government
support to the private sector was actually reduced by
seventy-five per cent (75%) compared with 1988/89. However,
in January 1992 the Kingdom announced its new budget for 1992
which somehow re-increased its support to the private sector,
bringing it almost up to 1989 level. The present five years
plan (1990-95) also accorded high priority to the enhancement
of the role of the private sector in the development process.
The manufacturing sector grew at an annual average rate of
17- International Airports Projects, A Background On The 4th
Development Plan 1987.
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fifteen and one-half per cent (15.5%). The agricultural
sector grew at six per cent (6%) a year while construction
activity declined by about three per cent (3%) a year,
reflecting the completion of major infrastructural projects
and the excess supply of residential housing. 18
Between 1985 and January 1992, gross domestic product
(GDP) was raised by five per cent (5%) a year. In the same
period a sharp drop in crude oil exports and price occurred,
and GDP decreased by thirty-five per cent (35%) in real
revenue terms (Table 6, and Figure 12). After adjusting for
this, the share of the non-oil sector in GDP has increased
by four and one-half per cent (4.5%) a year, and that of the
petrochemical industry by 6 per cent a year. Naturally, the
pace of economic activity achieved during the previous three
plans should not be expected to continue indefinitely. This
is not because the Kingdom's oil revenues have dropped 35-
40%, but because most infrastructure schemes have been
completed.19
The previous three development plans, 1975/80, 1980/85,
and 1985/90, compressed the Kingdom' s economic transformation
into only 15 years. Time, of course, had its own price;
project costs in many sectors were high by international
standards simply because time was critical. High costs were
paid because of the need to move quickly. However, market
forces are bringing local wages, business and domestic rents
and profit margins to levels that are fairly compatible with
the pace of economic activity. Consequently, projects will
cost far less now than during the previous plans.20
18- Saudi Gazette, Local News. 28 October 1989. p. 3.
19- International Airports Projects, A Background On The 4th
Development Plan 1987.
20- Ibid.
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Table 6
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)
Year
G D P
%
Government
Revenue U.S. $
Million
Crude Oil
Sector %
Other
Sector %
1969/70 70.0 30.0 100 1,590.9
1974/75 69.0 31.0 100 26,199.2
1979/80 65.0 35.0 100 42,666.6
1984/85 39.0 61.0 100 57,093.3
1985/86 31.0 69.0 100 53,333.3
1988/89* 30.0 70.0 100 27,733.3
1989/90* 40.0 60.0** 100 30,933.0
1990/91* 45.0 55•0** 100 38,666.0
1991/92 60.0 40.0** 100 40,533.0
Source: The Statistical Book, 1969/70, 1975/76,
1979/80, and 1985/86.
* Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Annual
Report, 21 August 1989, and 24 December
1990. And Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
Annual Report, April 1991.
** This does not mean that other sector's GDP
decreased, but the oil revenue increased due
to the increase in production forty-three
per cent (43%) because of the Gulf crisis.
The non-oil sector's GDP in actual term
increase at eight per cent (8%) is an annual
rate.
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Today the emphasis is shifting from infrastructure
building to production, Saudi labour development, and
Saudiisation. There are bound to be some major adjustments
in the Kingdom's labour market and costs. Despite an almost
unrestricted labour policy in the past decades, the speed
with which projects were built led to high labour costs.
Wages are now going down and, at the end of the Fifth Plan,
the number of expatriates working in Saudi Arabia should drop
by 700.000, from 3.7 million to 3 million.21
3- Investment Credit by Government Sponsored Financial
Institutions
Total investment credit disbursed by all public finan-
cial institutions recorded a steep growth from US $ 4.26
million in 1964-70 to a peak of US $ 7.54 billion in 1982-83.
In view of the reduced credit needs, disbursements were
gradually reduced in subsequent years and amounted to US $
3.04 billion in 1985_86.22 However, the grand total of
investment credit disbursed by the government institutions
between 1970 and 1990 is more than US $ 64 billion. 23 Those
investment credits covered: agricultural, industrial, estate
development, construction, health care, hotels, and public
services (Figure 12 previously).
Flexibility Factor
The present years are witnessing a "judicious" policy
toward project costs and evaluation. High government expendi-
tures are to be avoided. Unlike previous plans, the Fifth
Plan has a new element of flexibility. Development spending
21- Ibid.
22- Ministry of Planning. Achievement of the Development
Plan. 1990, p. 22.
23- Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Annual Report 1990,
p. 16.
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is categorised on the basis of coordinated programmes rather
than individual projects. The crude oil sector's contribution
to the Kingdom's gross capital formation decreased and the
other sector's capital formation rose from twenty-three per
cent (23%) in 1980/81 to thirty-five per cent (35%) in
1984/85 (Figure 13). The private sector is now set to enjoy
even greater opportunities, especially in services work in
the inner cities, maintenance work, industry, training,
marketing, farming and health services.24
Saudi Arabia has become slightly less dependent on crude
oil, and its economic structure has changed considerably in
recent years allowing non-oil sectors to grow steadily.
Besides its huge oil and gas resources, Saudi Arabia has many
other minerals, including gold, iron, magnetite, copper,
silver, zinc, phosphate, potash, bauxite, niobium, tantalum,
gypsum and limestone. Several international firms are
surveying the Kingdom's mineral wealth. Some minerals, such
as gold, are already being exploited. Saudi Arabia has about
a quarter of the world's oil exports.
Oil production reached a peak of nearly 10 million b/d
in 1980/1981, but because of weak world demand and OPEC's
policy of cutting production, output dropped to about 6.5
million b/d in 1982, 4.5 million b/d in 1983 and 3.4 million
b/d in the 1985. The Kingdom's crude oil exports averaged
3.9 million barrels a day (b/d) in 1986/87, a little less
than half of the peak in 1981. 25 Due to the international
market demand in 1989, Saudi Arabia crude oil production
increased to 4.2 million barrels (b/d) 26 , and in 1990
increased to 5.38 million (b/d).27
However, because of the Gulf crisis in August 1990
24- Ibid.
25- The statistics Book. 1987.
26- Arab News, The Local News, Jeddah. 01 January 1990,
p. 3.
27- Minister of Petrol and Mineral (H. Nazer). p. 2, Arab
News, National News. 7th January 1990.
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through 1991, Saudi Arabian crude oil production increased
to 8.4 million (b/d), and re-reduced to 7.8 million (b/d)
in February 1992.
4- Money Supply and Banking
The currency in circulation rose at an average annual
rate of 20.9% from $ 400 million in 1969-70 to $ 4.6 billion
in 1988-89 (Figure 14) .28
Demand deposits showed a more vigorous growth, rising
from $ 217 million in 1969-70 to $ 15.4 billion in 1988-89,
representing an average annual rate of growth of 26.1%
(Figure 14).29
Money supply(M1 ) registered an average annual growth
of 23.4%, rising from $ 613 million in 1969-70 to $ 25
billion in 1988-89.30
Including quasi-money, the money supply (M 3 ) rose from
$ 827 million in 1969-70 to $ 47.6 billion in 1988-89
corresponding to an average annual growth of 26.2%.
The relative composition of money supply has witnessed
considerable changes. The share of currency in circulation
has declined from 48.7% in 1969-70 to 20.1% in 1988-89
reflecting the rapid development of the banking system and
the growing popularity of cheques over currency as a mode
of payment or receipt. The steep fall in the share of
currency is attributable mainly to gains in demand deposits,
which have increased from 25.9% in 1969-70 to 32.4% in 1988-
89. Quasi money rose from 25.4% to 47.5% over the same
period, of which 22.7% represented time and saving deposits,
and 24.8% other quasi monetary deposits (Figure 14).31
28- Ministry of Planning, Achievement of the Development
Plans 1970-86, and Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, Annual
Report. August 1989.
29- Ibid.
30- Ibid.
31- Ibid.
32	
-o	 0	 (7)
I	 c	 c
1:3
o
(1)	 3
0
000
•••
W E •	 •4.4
•
I	 I
	
F	 I	 I	 I	 I	 III	 III
0	 0	 gl	 0	 In	 0	 0	 in	 0	 in	 0	 in	 01. 10	 n	 *	 n n N N
0
119
120
Commercial banks and their branches increased from 60
in 1969-70 to 955 in 1989. The capital of these banks
increased at an average annual rate of 16% from US $ 219
million in 1969-70 to US $ 9.4 billion in 1989. 32 Loans
from Commercial banks also increased from US $ 23 million
in 1969-70 to US $ 5.9 billion in 1989.33
5- Saudi Economic Development
Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s saw the most
significant economic change and improvement in Saudi Arabian
history. The oil boom between 1973 to 1982 helped the country
to push business development. It furnished a solid foundation
for the country's continuing and ongoing developmental plans
and activities. Oil was the catalyst, but with wise govern-
ment planning and direction, Saudi Arabia has become less
dependent on oil for its revenue and source of development
expenditures. In 1989, crude oil export revenue was about
half of the country's gross domestic product. The country
reduced the effects and risks of being heavily dependent on
crude oil for its economy and progress.
(Can't.)
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The Production of Oil (Figure 15):
Saudi Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO)*
The story of ARAMCO dates back to 29 May 1933 when the
Government of Saudi Arabia signed the basic concession
agreement with the Standard Oil Company of California
(SOCAL). The original concession agreement has since been
revised several times. In 1973, the Kingdom acquired a
twenty-five percent (25%) participation interest in ARAMCO, •
which increased to sixty per cent (60%) in 1974. In 1980,
the participation interest was increased to one hundred per
cent(100%) when the Kingdom bought all of ARAMCO's
assets. 34
Since the historical agreement, achievements of the Arab
American Oil Company have been spectacular. Some of ARAMCO' s
achievements in 1986 include:35
Production36
ARAMCO crude oil production totalled 1,711.8
million barrels in 1986 as compared to 1,110.0
million barrels in the previous year.
- Recovery of NGL (Natural-Gas Liquids) from
associated gases amounted to 111.0 million barrels
compared to 115.5 million barrels for the last
year.
- In 1986, the Ras Tanura refinery processed 142.4
ARAMCO, today, is considered the highest crude oil
producer in the world.
34- Ministry of Planning. Achievement of the Development
Plans. 1970-86.
35- Ibid.
36- Ministry of Planning. Achievement of the Development
Plans, 1970-86.
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million barrels of crude oil. The three NGL
(Natural-Gas Liquids) plants at Ju'aymah, Yanbu
and Ras Tanura Refinery processed 58.4 million
barrels of propane, 36.2 million barrels of butane
and 14.4 million barrels of natural gasoline.
Reserves
ARAMCO has discovered a total of 52 commercial oil
fields and one commercial gas field since it began operation
in 1933. The remaining recoverable reserves on these fields
are estimated at 167 billion barrels of crude oil and 135.8
trillion standard cubic feet of gas.
General Organisation for Petroleum and Mineral (PETROMIN)37
Set up in 1962, PETROMIN is responsible for the develop-
ment of petroleum, gas, and mineral resources of the Kingdom.
Other tasks include the installation of oil refineries for
domestic consumption and export, construction, operation and
maintenance of oil pipelines and distribution facilities for
petroleum products.
- Oil Refineries for Local Consumption
The oil refinery in Jeddah went on-stream in 1968 with
a capacity of 12,000 barrels per day. The Jeddah refinery
underwent its first expansion in 1974, bringing the total
capacity to 45,000 barrels per day. The second expansion of
the Jeddah refinery brought its total capacity to 96,000
barrels per day in 1979. The oil refinery in Riyadh went on-
stream in 1974 with a capacity of 15,000 barrels per day.
By adding a new unit in 1981, the capacity was increased to
135,000 barrels per day. PETROMIN set up and operated a
refinery in Yanbu for domestic consumption in 1983 with a
capacity of 170,000 barrels per day.
37- Ibid.
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- Export Oil Refineries
Two refineries, one at Yanbu and the other in Jubail,
with a refining capacity of 250 thousand barrels per day each
went on-stream in 1984 and 1986 respectively. The Rabigh
refinery with a capacity of 325 thousand barrels per day was
completed in 1988.
- Lubricating Oils
The Petromin Lubricating Oil Company (Petrolube) started
its activities by constructing a lubricating oil blending
plant in Jeddah, with a capacity of 50,000 barrels per year
in 1971. The capacity rose to 160,000 barrels per year in
1976 and to one million barrels per year in 1984.
A second blending facility was completed in Riyadh in
1982, with an initial capacity of 175,000 barrels per year,
which rose to 350,000 barrels per year in 1983. Its capacity
was further expanded to 500,000 barrels per year in 1986.
However, SAMAREC (Saudi Arabian Marketing and Refinery
Company under PETROMIN) was established in 1988 to play the
role of marketing the oil production and supervising the
refineries.
The Importance of Oil to Saudi Arabia
Oil is not the only source that Saudi Arabia relies on
for its revenue, but since it has been the most important
part of its GDP and the government revenues, performance of
the Saudi economy can be accurately measured by the growth
of the oil production.38
In 1969-70, government revenue was mainly from crude
38- The Statistical Book. Year 1975 and 1987.
125
oil, in fact ninety-two per cent (92%). 39 However, with the
economic and business development Saudi Arabia has undergone
the non- crude oil sector revenue increased to about sixty
per cent (60%) by 1989. Reliance on crude oil as a general
source for government revenue has become slightly less
important (Table 6) .40
In summary, the creation of a viable industrial base,
using crude oil income as a major source to develop industry
and later to reduce the Kingdom's reliance on crude oil as
the main source of income, has been the most significant
economic development strategy of Saudi Arabia. This means
that Saudi Arabia will not rely only on crude oil income,
but now has a variety of other industrial resources. Part
of this strategy is represented by the development of
petrochemical industry and export of petrochemical product.
The Kingdom does, and will continue to, play an
important role in the international petrochemical industry
besides oil production. However, although it is true that
the Kingdom has reduced its reliance on crude oil as the only
major revenue source, the petrochemical industries are still
dependent on oil.
The Petrochemical Industry in Saudi Arabia
In 1960 the Saudi government was already negotiating
with foreign oil companies concerning the development of a
petrochemical industry. Since these companies showed little
interest, other ways had to be found to attract investment.
In 1962 the General Petroleum and Mineral Organisation
(Petromin) was established to undertake hydrocarbon projects
that did not attract private investors. State support for
39- Ibid.
40- The Annual Report, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. 21
August 1989.
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industrialisation increased when King Faisal came to the
throne in 1964. The interest of the government in pressing
forward with the development of the petrochemical industry
was underlined in 1976 when the Saudi Arabian Basic Indus-
tries Corporation (SABIC) was created (page no. 130). 41
This emphasis on the petrochemical industry finds its
full expression in the third five-year plan (1980-1985),
which calls for the production of an important volume and
variety of petrochemicals as well as fertilizers. These
projects began producing in 1986, and achieved almost full
production in 1991/1992.42
The Jubail and Yanbu Infrastructure
In the early 1970s Petromin saw Jubail in the Eastern
region as a possible growth pole for petrochemical and other
industries because of the proximity of the Berri crude oil
and gas field, and a deep-water channel that makes that site
suitable for international shipping.43
In 1973 the American Bechtel Corporation was called in
to draw up a master plan for Jubail that defined
infrastructure requirements and located industries within
the site. It set forth land use and community plans,
conceptual designs of components, and environmental-control
measures. When the master plan was presented to the Saudi
government in 1975 it was decided to establish a Royal
Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, the latter town being added
as the second development pole.
In June of 1976 a management contract was signed with
Bechtel covering a 20-year period. A subsidiary of Bechtel,
the Arabian Bechtel Company Limited, was given the respon-
sibilities of mapping out the infrastructure of the in-
41- El Mallakh, Ragai and Dorothea. 1982, pp. 51-52.
42- Ibid.
43- Ibid.
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dustrial complex and the town, supervising the granting of
contracts after evaluating bids, and doing the actual
construction. The Royal Commission, however, retained the
responsibility for policy. 44
By the year 2000 this "Industrial City" plans to have
petrochemical complexes, oil refineries, a steel mill, and
over a dozen other industries as well as a port area and an
airport. The total investment will have reached some $ 40
billion.45
The other new Industrial City, Yanbu was started in
1979. Saudi Arabian Parsons Limited, which acted as project
manager for the Royal Commission, has developed vast storage
tanks facilities. An NGL (Natural-Gas Liquids) facility was
prepared for the gas that arrived by pipeline from the
Eastern Province in 1982, and a pier was built. The Yanbu
industrial complex is divided into nine areas, one being
specifically designed for petrochemicals. In 1986 this port
had the capacity to handle 400,000 tons of petrochemicals
a year. While Jubail is the centre of the petrochemical
industry, Yanbu is not far behind.46
a) Jubail Industrial Complex
The infrastructure of the industrial city of Jubail was
established on a site covering 1030 sq kms and has a current
day-time population of more than 150,000 people. It is
envisaged that by the year 2010 the city will accommodate
340,000 people.47
44- El Mallakh, Ragai and Dorothea. 1982, pp. 51-52.
45- Ibid.
46- Ministry of Planing, Achievement of the Development
Plans. 1970-86, pp. 136-144.
47- Ibid.
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Industrial Achievement48
There are currently 17 major plants in Jubail, most of
which are operating, though at time of working (January 1993)
some are in the construction phase. All of these plants are
capital intensive in nature and are estimated to cost a total
of US $ 12 billion.
By the year 2010 these industries will create in Jubail
alone 107,000 new jobs and will have utilised four billion
dollars worth of natural gas which is now being flared
without any return to the economy. The gas will be utilised
as fuel and feedstock in the steel, aluminum, plastics and
fertilizer industries.
The industries at Jubail Complex are divided into three
categories:
Basic Industries (Petrochemical)
These are undertaken by SABIC, PETROMIN and ARAMCO to
produce basic Petrochemical products. Twenty basic industry
plants are planned, of which thirteen are now operational.
Secondary Industries
These industries depend on products from basic indus-
tries (petrochemical). It is planned that the number of such
industries will be around sixty-eight (68). The products will
include such things as plastics, tyres, fertilizers, and
pipes.
Supporting and Light Industries
These plants manufacture products which are needed by
other industries or by the housing projects at the construc-
tion stage or for operations and maintenance activities.
These plants are established and operated by the private
sector. Currently there are 87 such plants in production at
48- Ministry of Planning, Achievement of the Development
Plans. 1970-86, pp. 136-144.
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Jubail.
b) Yanbu Industrial Complex
Plans for the construction of Yanbu Industrial Complex
and its modern residential estate were completed. It covers
an area of 100 sq kms and accommodates over 60,000
inhabitants. It is envisaged that by the year 2010 the city
will have a population of 200,000.
Work is proceeding to complete the Yanbu Industrial
City, which will accommodate basic and secondary industries.
Construction of residential areas and other services has been
done, and by 2010, the Yanbu industries will create 110,000
new jobs.49
Industrial Achievement50
The industries at Yanbu complex are divided into three
categories:
Basic Industries
These industries are undertaken by SABIC, PETROMIN and
ARAMCO. Six basic industry plants were constructed, and they
are operational. Total costs were estimated at US $ 7.7
billion.
Secondary Industries
These industries depend on the basic industries. The
plan is to increase the number of these industries to 34.
Supporting Industries
These plants manufacture products which are needed by
other industries or the housing sector at the construction
stage or for operations and maintenance activities. These
49- Ibid.
50- Ibid.
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plants are established and operated by the private sector.
There are currently 29 plants in operation, two under
construction.
Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC)
Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) was
established with a capital of US $ 2.7 billion. The extensive
industrialisation programme undertaken by SABIC was
considered a milestone for industrial development - the
establishment of viable basic, downstream and support
industries in Saudi Arabia which utilise the local resources
of hydrocarbons and minerals as raw materials.51
Since 1979, SABIC has completed 18 projects : seven basic
petrochemical projects with a total capacity to manufacture
5.65 million tons of ethylene and its derivatives and
methanol per year; one iron and steel plant of 800,000 tons
capacity per year; expansion of Jeddah Steel Rolling Mill
to produce 140,000 tons of steel per year; one urea plant
with a capacity of 500,000 tons per year; a plant for
producing ammonia with a capacity of 500,000 tons per year;
two other projects for down-stream products and five projects
for supporting industries. Total investment in these projects
in 1986-87 amounted to US $ 14 billion.52
Since 1986 the following 13 basic companies, downstream
and support industries have been in operation: Saudi Iron
and Steel, Jeddah Steel Rolling Mill, Saudi Methanol, Al-
Jubail Fertilizer, Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical, Al-Jubail
Petrochemical, Saudi Petrochemical, National Methanol,
Arabian Petrochemical, Eastern Petrochemical, Saudi Arabian
Fertilizer, National Plastic, and National Industrial Gases
51- Ministry of Planning, Achievement of the Development
Plans. 1970-86, pp. 136-144.
52- Ibid.
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Company. 53
In 1985-86, SABIC employed 7,904 persons, of when fifty
per cent (50%) are Saudis. 54 In the field of industrial
cooperation SABIC has a twenty per cent (20%) share in the
Aluminum Smelter and Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Co. It also
owns one third of Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company.55
Joint Ventures with American Corporations
Shortly after SABIC was established in 1976, Dr.
, Algosaibi, the former Minister of Industry, approached some
of the leading oil and chemical corporations to interest them
in establishing joint-venture petrochemical complexes. These
corporations had great misgivings. Doubts existed concerning
the adequacy of the rate of return, as to whether satisfac-
tory markets could be found for the petrochemical products
and whether or not the political risk in the Gulf area did
not preclude any massive commitment. After negotiations in
Riyadh, Houston, and other world centres, five major U.S.
corporations showed serious interest: Mobil Oil, Shell Oil,
Exxon, Dow Chemical, and Celanese-Texas Eastern. It was
tentatively agreed with the five US. corporations to produce
the petrochemicals noted in Table 7.56
Joint Ventures with Asian Corporations
Asia, rapidly becoming a major economic force in the
world, accounts for many of the most dynamic economies today:
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. With their lack of natural
resources, these countries have made outward-looking policies
53- Ibid.
54- Ibid.
55- Ibid.
56- Ibid.
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central to their overall economic strategy. While these Asian
nations are, with the exception of Indonesia, net importers
of oil and gas, they are developing an appreciable petrochem-
ical capacity.57
SABIC arranged three joint-venture agreements with
Asiatic corporations, one Taiwanese and the others Japanese.
Table 8 outlines the agreed-upon production.58
The Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (SAFC0)
The close links between Saudi Arabia and Taiwan have
found a concrete expression in an agreement signed on
December 4, 1979, between SABIC and Taiwan Fertilizer Company
Limited to establish the Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company, which
will be located in the industrial complex of Jubail. This
joint venture uses methane to produce 1,000 metric tons of
ammonia per day and 1,600 metric tons of urea per day
(500,000 tons a year) . 58 The actual construction on the
site in Jubail started in June of 1980, and the plant was
on stream in 1984.60
SABIC and the Taiwan Fertilizer Company each subscribed
fifty per cent (50%) of the shares of the Al-Jubail
Fertilizer Company, putting up $ 100 million with the balance
being lent by the Saudi Public Investment Fund.61
Some sixty per cent (60%) of the output marketed by the
Taiwan Fertilizer Company is in Taiwan and other places in
the Far East. The other forty per cent (40%) is marketed
jointly by the Taiwan Fertilizer Company and SABIC elsewhere.
57- Ibid.
58- El Mallakh, Ragaei and Dorothea. 1982, pp. 56-71.
59- Ibid.
60- Ibid.
61- Ibid.
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Table 7
JOINT-VENTURE PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTION
(IN METRIC TONS PER YEAR)
Product
SABIC-
Mobile
SABIC-
Shell
SABIC-
Exxon
SABIC-
Dow
SABIC-
Celenese
/Texas
Ethyline 450,000 656,000 - 500,000 -
Low-density
polyethylene 200,000 - 240,000 68,000 -
High-density
polyethylene 91,000 - - 105,000 -
Ethylene glycol 200,000 - - 300,000 -
Ethylene
dichloride
- 454,000 - - -
Caustic soda
- 377,000 - - -
Styrene
- 295,000 - - -
Ethanol
- 281,000 - - -
Chlorine
- 330,000 - - -
Ethyl benzene - 327,000 - - -
Methanol - - - - 730,000
Source: Saudi Arabian Energy, Development, Planning,
and Industrialization.
El Mallakh, Ragaei and Dorothea. 1982.
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Table 8
SABIC-ASIAN COMPANY JOINT-VENTURE PRODUCTION
(IN METRIC TONS PER YEAR)
Product
SABIC-
Taiwan
Fertilizer
SABIC-
Mitsubishi
Corporation
SABIC-
Mitsubishi
Gas
Ethyline - 450,000 -
Low-density
polyethylene - 250,000 -
High-density
polyethylene - 80,000 -
Ethylene glycol - 80,000 -
Methanol - - 730,000
Urea 500,000 - -
Source: El Mallakh, Ragaei and Dorothea. 1982.
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No serious difficulty was experienced in marketing the
ammonia-urea. Ammonia, being a source of nitrogen fertilizer,
is closely linked to agricultural production.62
Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company
In 1976 SAFCO (Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company) took
over management from Occidental Petroleum. Between 1979 and
1986 SAFCO showed an accumulated profit of $ 35 million. In
the first six months of 1980, 145,084 tons of urea were
produced. With the continuing upward movement in the world
price of urea and expanding international markets, future
prospects look good. SAFCO provided the backdrop for a
petrochemical industry.63
The Saudi Polymer Processing Industry
A vital part of the Saudi industrialisation policy is
to move from the production of crude oil and gas to the
manufacture of polymers and then, further downstream, to the
processing of these polymers. As one moves from the original
feedstock to the final consumer, more and more value is
added. Thus the principal thermoplastics such as high and
low-densitypolyethylene, polyvinyl chloride (PVC) , polyprop-
ylene, and polystyrene, increase in value between two and
five times. The price of these thermoplastics is around $
1,000 a ton.64
Saudi Arabian Plastic Product Company (SAPPCO)
One of the leading producers of plastics in Riyadh is
the Saudi Plastic Company (SAPPCO), established almost a
decade ago to manufacture plastic pipes and fittings. The
62- Ibid.
63- Ibid.
64- Ibid., 56-71.
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British firm Chemidus was brought in to provide the technol-
ogy and part of the equity. The output and the profitability
of SAPPCO has grown steadily. Today there are twelve
extruders and three molding machines which use 25,000 tons
of PVC a year, and 370 workers with an office staff of sixty.
In order to enter into the field of polyurethane insulation,
SAPPCO linked up with Texaco Saudi Investment Incorporated
to set up the firm SAPPCO Texaco Insulation Products
(SAPTEX), to be located in Riyadh. Polyurethane insulation
panel boards are particularly suitable for roofing insulation
on institutional, commercial, industrial, and even private
residences. This partnership is seen as providing Saudi
Arabia with manufacturing technology for products that
previously have been available only through imports.
One of the main reasons for Texaco's entering into this
venture is its profitability since benzene, readily available
in Saudi Arabia, accounts for some forty per cent (40%) of
the cost of the raw materials going into polyurethane
insulation. This plant has a capacity of 120 million square
feet of polyurethane insulation panel board. The cost of the
enterprise is estimated at $ 30 million. Sixty per cent (60%)
of the equity is held by SAPPCO and the other forty per cent
(40%) by Texaco Saudi Investments Incorporated. While SAPTEX
is only interested in the domestic market at present, exports
could eventually be considered.65
6- Merchandise Trade in Saudi Arabia
The merchandise trade balance has been in surplus over
the entire period from 1970 to 1989, although the magnitude
of the surplus has declined significantly since 1981. Between
1970 and 1981 the value of merchandise exports rose steeply
from US $ 2.9 billion to US $ 308 billion. During the same
period, the value of merchandise imports also increased from
65- Ibid., pp. 56-71.
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US $ 853 million to US $ 31.9 billion. In 1982, while the
value of merchandise exports declined to US $ 72.3 billion,
the value of merchandise imports rose to US $ 37.2 billion,
resulting in a decline in the merchandise trade balance
surplus from US $ 76.3 billion in 1981 to US $ 35.1 billion
in 1982 (Figure 16) •66
Since 1982, mainly because of the declined in exports
of oil, the value of merchandise exports has declined
rapidly, amounting to only US $ 26.9 billion in 1985.
Merchandise imports have also declined to US $ 22.8 billion
in 1985. This decline was much smaller than the drop in
exports. As a result, the merchandise trade balance surplus
further declined from US $ 35.1 billion in 1982 to only US
$ 4.2 billion in 1985. 67 In 1987-88 exports further
declined to US $ 23.2 billion because of reductions in the
oil price. However, imports in 1987-88 decreased to US $ 18.3
billion but the trade balance improved some over 1985.68
In 1988 the non-oil merchandise export increased fourteen
and fourth-tenths per cent (14.4%), and oil export revenue
increased as well, due to oil price rises. The Kingdom since
1987 has noticed an improvement in its trade balance (Figure
14).69
Balance of Payments
Until to 1984, the current account balance (the
difference between total receipts and disbursements) had been
in surplus. In fact, the current account surplus increased
66- Ministry of Planning, Achievement of the Development
Plans. 1979-86, p. 26, and Saudi Arabia Monetary
Agency, Annual Report. August 1989.
67- Ibid.
68- Ibid.
69- Ibid.
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from US $ 2.9 billion in 1970/71 to nearly US $ 98 billion
in 1980/81. In subsequent years as the pace of development
was accelerated, the surplus changed into a deficit of US
$ 10 billion in 1985/86. With the small rise in oil prices
and slight increase in oil production levels, the current
account balance showed improvement in 1989 and the deficit
was US $ 1.5 billion.70
The deficits Saudi Arabia has had since 1984 are the
result of two forces. First, the deterioration in the world
oil market, which has adversely affected export revenues from
oil, and secondly the Kingdom's commitment to safeguard the
living standards of its citizens and to continue to pursue
its development objectives in spite of the reduction in the
level of current oil revenues. 71 Since 1988 the Kingdom
has experienced some improvement in its payments balance.
This is because oil prices improved slightly and oil exports
increased, in addition to the big increases in the export
of the non-oil merchandise, which improved about 50% during
1984-87 (Figure 17).72
7- The Non-Oil and the Private Business Development
In support of the government's policies to promote the
development of non-oil production and the private sector,
both short and long term credits were given to private agen-
cies.The government credits to the private sector in 1969-70
amounted to US $ 12 million. However, since 1970 the credits
have increased to US $ 50.6 billion. This policy of providing
credits with no interest to support the development of the
private sector and non-oil production has brought the King-
dom's non-oil and petrochemical sector production to a high
70- Ibid., p. 32.
71- Ibid.
72- Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, Annual Report. August 1989. 
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position. This private sector represented three and nine-
tenths per cent (3.9%) of the GDP in 1982, and today it
contributes thirty-two per cent (32%). Table 9 is a summary
of the growth in oil and non-oil sectors.
8- Other Aspects of Saudi Arabia Development
There are many areas in Saudi Arabia which have
undergone development and change, for example, social,
education, industry, transportation, housing and civil
constructions, and health care. It is beyond the scope of
this study to present all those areas, but the ones most
relevant to both the economy and human resources development
will be presented below.
Electricity73
The private sector plays a major role in the production
of electric power in Saudi Arabia through the electric
companies. The Electricity Corporation (Electrico) undertakes
the management and operation of electric utilities in rural
areas. The Saline Water Conversion Corporation generates
electricity as a by-product of desalination. Its dual purpose
plants are located at sea coasts where the generated power
is sold to electric companies. The entire investment by
private companies since 1975 has been financed by the Saudi
Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) through interest-free long
term credits. Total credits approved and amounts disbursed
by Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) to electric
companies during the period of 1985-86 amounted US $ 10.2
billion. Beginning from 1985/86, the SIDF credit programmes
to the electricity utilities were replaced by direct
allocations in the GEC (General Electric Company) budget.
The government also subsidises small-scale companies through
financial grants, and assists in management and operations.
73- Ministry of Planning, Achievement of the Development
Plans. 1986, pp. 145-147.
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The government ensures a ten per cent (10%) return to private
sector investors on their capital share in electric compa-
nies. It also pays direct subsidies through the Ministry of
Industry and Electricity to maintain the price of electricity
at affordable levels, which stood at US $ 0.02 per kwh for
industrial consumption. Total subsidies paid by the govern-
ment to electric companies in the period 1975-86 amounted
to US $ 6.7 billion.
Ports74
The Ports Authority was established in 1976, charged
with the responsibility of modernising and upgrading the
efficiency of the Kingdom's seaports to meet the increasing
volume of imports and industrial exports and to match the
progress achieved in all fields. The Ports Authority has
successfully met these objectives through the use of newly
developed techniques in operation, increasing the number of
berths and ensuring a high standard of facilities and
equipment. The achievements realised by the Ports Authority
during this short period are considered outstanding by all
international standards. The number of operating berths at
main seaports rose from 27 in 1975 to 165 by the end of 1986.
16 of the berths at King Fahad Industrial Port at Jubail and
22 at King Fahad Industrial Port at Yanbu are specialised
for transporting industrial products. Handling capacity at
the main ports rose from 6 million tons/day in 1975 to 58
million tons/day in 1986. In 1988 Saudi Arabia had 372
passenger and cargo ships. Today there are more than 165 sea
transportation and cargo companies.75
74- Ibid., pp. 145-147.
75- Okaz News Paper, Report about Transportation and Cargo
in the Kingdom. 14 August 1989, p. 7.
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International Airports76
The International Airports Department in the Ministry
of Defence and Aviation is responsible for supervising the
implementation, operation and maintenance of international
airport projects in the Kingdom. These projects include three
international airports; King Abdulaziz Airport at Jeddah,
King Khalid Airport at Riyadh, and new King Fahad Airport
in the Eastern Region. These international airports will
cater for the rapidly growing number of air passengers,
projected to reach 27.5 million/year in 1993. In addition,
the kingdom has 25 local airports.
Airlines
The national airline, Saudi Arabian Airlines, was
established in 1945 with two small aircraft. Today Saudia
Airlines has had over 154 aircraft including 30 Jumbo 747s.
Saudia Airlines in 1989 carried about 12 million
passengers .77
Housing78
The achievements realised by the housing sector up to
1990-91 had two important aspects: the supply of housing was
increased, but rent cost increases were limited. Total
housing constructed throughout the Kingdom since 1974/75 is
estimated at 578,000 units. Of these, 414,000 were built by
the private sector with the help of the Real Estate Develop-
ment Fund, and 26,000 units by the Deputy Ministry of
Housing. Since 1970 the government has constructed more than
76- Ministry of Planning, Achievement of the Development
Plans. 1986, pp. 146-148.
77- Okaz News Paper, Report About Transportation and Cargo
In The Kingdom. 14 August 1989, p. 7.
78- Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, 14 August
1990, p. 5, Al Madina Newspaper.
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300,000 units. In addition, the Government Housing Devel-
opment Funds since 1973 has provided credits for building
for more than 500,000 private housing units.
Social Care79
The Deputy Ministry of Social Care (DMSC) provides
rehabilitation and care for families and individuals needing
assistance due to their physical or social circumstances.
It assists them in adjusting to their condition and in
overcoming some of the problems which they face. Services
are provided for disabled individuals, juvenile delinquents,
and the elderly. It seeks to maintain family relations, to
protect children and to emphasise a constructive role for
women. The subsidies provided to benevolent societies rose
from US $ 1.07 million in 1975-76 to more than US $ 13.4
million in 1985-86.
The targeted rates of growth in real non-oil GDP was
exceeded in each of the plan periods, for instance, 1980-85,
1985-90. This called for a significant adjustment in total
expenditure. 80 For instance, health and social development
expenditure by the government in 1989 was US $ 2.81 billion,
rising to US $ 3.14 billion in 1990. In addition, Human
Resources Development's expenditure in 1989 was US $ 6.0
billion and in 1990 was US $ 6.4 billion. 81 However, the
Saudi government realised the need for more investment in
human resources, health and social development, and therefore
decided to spend 1/3 of its 1990/95 expected revenue on these
areas.
79- Ministry of Planning. Achievement of the Development
Plan, 1986, pp. 147-151.
80- Saudi Gazette, Local News. 28 October 1989. p. 3.
81- Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Annual Report, 14 August
1990, Al Madina Newspaper, p. 5.
146
Transportation
Paved roads between cities were less than one thousand
kilometers in 1969-70. Today there are 37,000 kilometers of
intercity paved road and super-highways. Also, there are
73,000 kilometers of country and earth-surfaced roads.82
Railways increased from 540 kilometers in 1975 to 900
kilometers in 1989.83
The General Presidency for Youth Welfare (GPYW)84
GPYW was established in 1974 as the agency responsible
for sports, cultural and social activities. It licenses and
subsidises sports, arts clubs, specialised private organisa-
tions, and is responsible for the construction of sports
facilities for sport clubs and for the public. It is
responsible for encouraging athletic excellence at interna-
tional sports competitions.
GPYW provides sports facilities, such as sports centres,
youth camps, sports halls, public courtyards and club
buildings with full equipment. It sponsors literary and
poetry competitions, and awards the government Merit Prize
for Literature. In 1975 there were 53 sports clubs. This rose
to 154 in 1986 with a membership of 54,000.
Ministry of Information85
The Saudi radio broadcast service started its activity
from Jeddah Radio Station in 1949. Television telecast
82- Okaz News Paper, Report about Transportation and Cargo
in the Kingdom. 14 August 1989, p. 7.
83- Ibid.
84- Ministry of Planning, Achievement of the Development
Plans. 1982, pp. 108-153.
85- Ibid., pp. 108-153.
147
service started in Jeddah and Riyadh in 1965.
The Ministry of Information is responsible for all
information services including, radio, television and the
press. These services are a showcase of how information for
the intellectual and cultural development of citizens can
be disseminated while safeguarding Islamic values and
conforming to the Shariaa. Radio broadcasting services cover
three continents through directed programmes broadcast in
eight languages.
The Ministry of Information also provides information
and news to the Saudi people through a network of Radio and
Television broadcasting stations and through the publication
and distribution of books and other materials. The Ministry
of Information initiates and undertakes information campaigns
in cooperation with other government agencies covering
different fields such as health, literacy, fire risks, and
traffic instructions.
The Ministry of Information has seven local and three
foreign information offices. In addition, the Saudi Press
Agency has six foreign and three main local offices.
King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST)86
KACST was established by a Royal Decree in 1977 under
the designation "Saudi Arabian National Centre for Science
and Technology (SANCST)."
In the year 1985-86, KACST awarded 29 grants for
scientific research in its seventh annual programme of resea-
rch grants. The total value of these grants amounted US $
4.67 million. During this period, KACST also received 155
proposals for support under its eighth annual programme of
research grants. The research fields of these proposals
86- Ibid., pp. 108-153.
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include agriculture, industry, medicine, engineering, and
manpower studies. The proposals are currently being evaluated
in relation to their applicability to the Kingdom' s develop-
ment programmes. At the request of various government
agencies, KACST also supports a number of other research
projects which are national in scope and which serve the
priorities of these agencies.
In the field of applied research, KACST has adopted an
intensive programme for the development of solar energy
applications in the Kingdom. Applied research programmes in
this field have become extremely varied through international
cooperation with the United States and the Federal Republic
of Germany. KACST is engaged in various other programmes of
national importance in this field. All such programmes are
intended to assist in the general development of the solar
energy technology while at the same time facilitating its
use within the Kingdom. One aim of this programme is to
develop the skill of the Saudi national manpower in this
field.
Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organisation (GSFM0)87
The GSFMO was established in 1972 as abase for agricul-
tural industries. It makes a valuable contribution to
agricultural and live-stock development and aims to achieve
the strategic targets of food self-sufficiency. It ensures
protection against fluctuations in grain prices through its
storage and production capacity. The GSFMO exceeded the
targets set for the Third Plan. It achieved two hundred and
one per cent (201%) of the target for grain storage, one
hundred and forty per cent (140%) of the target for flour
storage/production, and one hundred and forty per cent (140%)
of the target for animal feedstock.
Flour production amounted to 737,000 tons in 1985-86,
87- Ibid., pp. 108-153.
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an increase of sixteen per cent (16%) over the previous year.
The strategic stockpile covers a year's consumption. GSFMO's
project allocations in the Second Development Plan totaled
US $ 716 million of which US $ 520 million was spent. During
the Third Plan a sum of US $ 2,699 million was allocated to
GSFMO, of which US $ 2,343 million was spent. Local wheat
purchases by GSFMO amounted to 2 million tons, costing US
$ 1.06 billion in 1986, an increase of forty-three per cent
(43%) over the previous year.
Agriculture88
The contribution of the agricultural sector to the Gross
National Product of the Kingdom increased from US $' 744
million in 1969-1970 to US $ 2,248 million in 1986-87. Since
1981-82, the share of agriculture in the Gross National
Product has been rising, from a mere three and two-tenths
per cent (3.2%) in that year to six and seventh-tenths per
cent (6.7%) in 1986-87.
The most remarkable results in the agricultural field
were obtained in the production of wheat, dates, poultry,
eggs and tomatoes. Wheat production rose from 26,000 tons
to a spectacular 2.6 million tons. Having satisfied local
demand, Saudi Arabia is now able to export a surplus of 1.4
million tons of wheat. During the last two decades the
production of dates rose form 7,000 tons to 250,000 tons,
some sixty per cent (60%) of home consumption. Self-
sufficiency was attained in egg production with an increase
from 5,000 tons to 124,000 tons. The tomato crop reached an
output of 346,000 tons, to be compared with 100,000 tons
seventeen years ago.
88- Saudi Gazette, Local News. 28 October 1989. p. 3.
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Industry89
In the field of industry the number of operational
plants rose from 199 units in 1970 to 2,050 units in 1987.
Total invested capital in this sector is now US $ 25 billion
and there are some 133,000 workers employed in the sector.
The industry is producing goods with a total value of SR 25
billion per annum.
The efforts of industrialisation are focused on basic
industries, especially oil and petrochemical products. Yet,
numerous other products, such as foodstuffs, paper and
mineral products, and electrical equipment are also manufac-
tured. Jubail and Yanbu are the country's largest industrial
centres with 108 industrial projects on stream. This will
rise to a total of 148 industries in the years to come. The
generating capacity of electricity grew during the period
1969-1987 at an annual average rate of twenty-eight per cent
(28%), from 418 Mega-watts in 1970 to 18,000 Mega-watts in
1987. Some ninety per cent (90%) of the residents now benefit
from power supplies, the number of subscribers having
increased from 216,000 to 2 million.
Water Resource Development90
During the past 15 years, water desalination stations
were set up all over the country in order to meet the rising
demand due to new economic and social conditions. The water
desalination capacity rose form 5.12 million US gallons/day
in 1979 to 500 million US gallons in 1989. Water consumption
per inhabitant increased in the same period from one gallon
to over 49 gallons. A most spectacular growth took place in
the construction sector. Growth rates reached thirty-one per
cent (31%) in 1981-82, compared with ten and nine-tenths per
89- Ibid.
90- Ibid.
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cent (10.9%) in 1969-70. In 1986-87 the growth rate of this
sector stood at sixteen and nine-tenths per cent (16.9%).
Health Care
The Ministry of Health provides free health services
to all people living in Saudi Arabia. The health care system
nowadays includes a large number of sophisticated, up-to-date
hospitals. In 1987, there were 224 hospitals in the country
and a further 2,258 health care centres. Hospital beds
numbered 35,697 (four times more than in 1970) and the number
of doctors increased fifteen fold to reach 18,048, and today
there are more than 58,000 employees in the health care
sector. 91 In 1980 the health services expenditure was US
$ 18.5 million, and in 1990 it reached US $ 31.4 million.92
Telephones93
The expansion of the telephone communication system in
the Kingdom has been a stated goal of successive Development
Plans. The expansion of this system has indeed been spectacu-
lar. In 1986 alone the exchange line capacity was expanded
by nearly 86 thousand lines. In 1970, the total exchange line
capacity in Kingdom was only 76,6000, which had increased
to nearly 1.3 million by 1986, representing an average annual
rate of growth of twenty-four and seventh-tenths per cent
(24.7%).
Educational Enrollment
The total number of students enrolled in all educational
institutions increased from 547,000 in 1969-70 about 3
91- Ibid.
92- Ibid.
93- Ministry of Planning, Achievement of the Development
Plans. 1982, pp. 106-108.
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million in 1991.
The number of students receiving elementary education
rose from 397,000 in 1969-70 to over 1.2 million in 1990.94
The number of students receiving intermediate and
secondary education expanded from 77,000 to 15 million over
the same period.95
The number of students receiving vocational education
grew from 587 in 1969-70 to 22,000 in 1990.96
The number of students receiving technical education
rose from 889 in 1969-70 to 27,000 in 1990.97
The number of students receiving university and higher
education grew from 7,000 in 1969-70 to 113,000 in 1987/
88 98
Today, there are over 1 million graduates from grammar
schools, 5,000 from vocational and technical schools, 20,000
from local universities and colleges, and 12,000 from
universities and colleges from abroad. 99
 More than 350,000
government employees have enrolled in technical upgrade,
management, and administrative courses since 1979.100
Government appropriations for education increased from
US $ 15.3 million in 1969-70 to 5.4 billion in 1991.101
This intensive care and development of education increased
both the number of students and graduates, and the
educational institutions (Figure 18).
94- Statistical Book Year. 1987-88.
95- Ibid.
96- Saudi Gazette, Local News. 28 October 1989, p. 3.
97- Ibid.
98- Ibid.
99- Statistical Year Book. Year 1987-88.
100- Ibid.
101- Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, Annual Report. August
1989.
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9- The New Plan (1990/95)*102
The new development plan was begun in 1990. The strate-
gic features of the plan are as follows:
a) A Greater role for the Private Sector
The government will no longer assume industrial
activities that might be assumed by the private sector. This
new policy aims to entrust the private sector with the
operation, administration, and maintenance of services that
are presently carried out by the government. The private
sector is supposed to bring about a reduction in cost, better
management, and improved employment prospects. It will be
made possible for private investors to purchase shares and
contribute to the management of large national companies such
as SABIC (Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation) and
Petromin (Petroleum and Minerals Company).
b) Economic Development
In order to achieve this objective, the government
stresses the development of natural resources that represent
a profit investment for the near future: mineral prospec-
ting, exploitation of the sea, extraction and industrial
processing of gas.
c) Development of Human Resources and Social Welfare
Education and vocational training programmes will
undergo some changes in conformity with the teachings of
Shariaa, the needs of the society, and development require-
ments.
* It is very important to note that the Gulf crisis, August
1990, delayed the implementation of some of the programmes
of this Plan.
102-Saudi Gazette, Local News. The Former Director of Public
Relations, Ministry of Planning. Abdullah Derhally.
October 28, 1989, p. 3.
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In the field of social welfare, projects intended for
children remain a priority. The scope of preventive medicine
and the efficiency of disease detection are to be encouraged.
The private sector will be able to take part in most of these
projects.
Therefore, the government designated 35% of its Fifth
5-Year Development Plan (1990-1995) expenditure to the inten-
sive development of its Human Resources, about US $ 70.2
billion over five years.
d) Al Yamamah Economic Offset Project
Saudi Arabia recently has started negotiation with the
British government to develop an economic project. This
project is called Al-Yamamah, and is targeted to achieve a
joint-venture between Saudi and British companies, mainly
the British Aerospace Company. The project is concerned with
construction, petrochemicals, electronics, the defense
industry, and sales.
The objective of this project is to develop industry
in the designated areas as joint-venture (50/50) between
British and Saudi companies, big and middle-size organisa-
tions, and to sell the output of these industries both in
the local market and in Middle East and Far East countries.
Five companies have been established in Riyadh under this
project and are expected to start the production and sale
of electronic materials by 1993. Negotiations with British
companies are in progress to establish a joint-venture
marketing company(s) for this project's production. The
initial cost of this project is about $ 3.20 billion. The
investment capital is about US $ 20 billion, and it is
assumed that it will open 70,000 job opportunities.103
103- Al-Yamamah Projects Conference between British and Saudi
Businessmen. Okaz Newspaper, the Finance and Economy.
1st June 1989, p. 10.
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10- Business Development in Saudi Arabia and Some Obstacles
Privatisation
We have discussed how the private sector in Saudi Arabia
has undergone development and progress. The private sector
capital today represents about thirty-five per cent (35%)
of the national capital. The government is looking to enroll
the private sector in almost all important government
projects and to provide it with the support and credits it
needs to attract the private sector to share a bigger role
in the Kingdom's development and progress.
The Private Sector Role's in Developmentl"
Privatisation increases economic growth, and lowers
government budgetary deficits. It also promotes economic
efficiency and improves the allocation of resources towards
areas of higher return. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the
private sector also can make a similarly important contribu-
tion to economic growth and development. This role, however,
may have to be somewhat different given the particulars of
Saudi Arabia's economy.
Saudi Arabia's economy is oil dependent. Saudi Arabia
must compensate for oil depletion by developing alternative
sources of economic output, and at the same time further
diversify its economic base and exports. It is the private
sector, with government support, that can most logically
achieve these goals. The private sector's contribution must
be to increase non-oil output and. to diversify Saudi Arabia's
export base.
104-Dr. Wadi Kabli. The Private Sector Role's in Development
Invaluable. Saudi Gazette, Local P.2. 18th April,
1989.
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The private sector during the 1970s was driven by
government expenditures. Given large government expenditures
and contracts, the private sector had its hands full in
fulfilling government contracts, benefiting from the
construction boom and basically profiting from an
artificially booming economy. Rapidly rising domestic income
levels fuelled imports, and stimulated trading and retailing
activities. The private sector was more than pre-occupied
with trading and the production of non-tradeable goods, such
as housing. To a lesser extent the private sector started
to produce imported substitutes, with government subsidies.
But what was missing was the dawn of a competitive private
sector that could produce import substitutes competitively
and eventually compete in the international markets. These
shortcomings of the private sector are understandable. With
a booming domestic economy, there was little incentive,
especially because the real exchange rate of the Saudi Riyal
(currency) appreciated dramatically and as a result the
production of non-tradeables became the profitable thing to
do. There was little incentive to export.
During the 1980s, lower oil revenues have had implications
for the private sector. The private sector, which had
averaged fifteen per cent (15%) growth during the second plan
(1975/ 80) and eight per cent (8%) growth during the third
plan (1980/85), fell to two per cent (2%) during 1985/86 (the
growth rate, however, re-increased to eighteen per cent (18%)
during 1989/90). But over the years the private sector has
become more competitive. It has cut costs. It has become more
efficient, and is beginning to show positive growth. The
focus of private sector activities during the 1980s shifted
from satisfying large government contracts and the production
of non-oil tradeables to a large effort in the production
of import-substitutes. This effort was supported by govern-
ment subsidies and somewhat higher tariffs. Still one gets
the strong feeling that the private sector is hoping for
another oil boom and higher government expenditures to fuel
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future expansion and to increase profit margins. The private
sector has still to take the next step, to compete in the
world market place and to diversify the Saudi economic base
and exports.
In the 1990s, the private sector ought to be so competi-
tive and efficient that it could compete in the world market
place. However, the government has re-emphasised the neces-
sity for the private sector to participate strongly and
competitively in the development of the Kingdom. It is only
through this kind of development that its contribution to
the Saudi economy can increase.
In the Kingdom the role of the private sector is
absolutely necessary for the following reasons:
- economic and export diversification.
- economic growth.
- sufficient job opportunities for its increasingly
educated citizens.
Obstacles that Privatisation Faces in Saudi Arabia
The Privatisation idea in Saudi Arabia has not been
crystallised yet. Any rush towards privatisation may lead
to negative results in both private and government sectors.
Saudi society has special economic, social, cultural, and
population systems. We must take these factors into consid-
eration before making privatisation decisions. It is very
early to rush towards privatisation in Saudi Arabia. There
are many obstacles facing the private sector such as:105
Lack of qualified management and technicians.
105- Dr. Nawal Al-Qabalan. A Survey and Meetings About
Privatisation Conducted By Al-Yamamah Magazine, 31st
May, 1989, pp. 16-20
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• Lack of good feasibility studies and data on investment
opportunities.
• Private sector activities so far are a reflection of
the public activities, for example, construction and
services contracts.
• The Saudi Arabian population is not high enough to
justify the involvement of the private sector in many
services such as providing electricity to small
villages with a very small population.
• The educational system in Saudi Arabia does not provide
enough qualified young Saudis.
Privatisation must not be seen as transferring
government cooperation to the private sector. The objectives
of privatisation are :1°6
a) to improve production efficiency,
b) to achieve more investment opportunities,
c) and to increase the growth of domestic production and
income.
Therefore, competition, qualified personnel, good
management practices, good policies and work methods,
effective government policy and procedures, and active and
free money markets and supply are very important to achieve
those objectives. The Kingdom is not ready yet to rush
towards privatisation, it has to be done gradually.
Furthermore, the private sector does not encourage Saudi
labour to join either because they lack sufficient
qualifications or because the foreign labour costs less. To
make privatisation successful, Saudi labour must join the
private sector workforce (see Chapter II, Workforce). This
106- Dr. Naser Al-Qaoud. Ibid.
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will reduce unemployment and improve the Saudi labour income
and experience. However, the government must develop a policy
and a strategy to achieve effective and efficient
saudiisation ( saudiising the workforce) if it hopes to make
a balance in the market manpower supply and demand. The Saudi
private sector's most important concern is the projects that
provide a quick and high return. It does not undertake
industrial projects with long range investment such as
production of heavy equipment and engines. Therefore, the
government took the responsibility of these heavy industries.
However, when the government recruited Saudi labour for these
industries it did not make a strong effort to select the most
qualified personnel. Today if the private sector is to take
over these industries, their present workforce has to be
changed, trained or re-trained, or re-positioned. It is quite
costly for the private sector to run those industries without
the governments establishing a new strategy and support to
guarantee effective and efficient Saudi manpower in those
industries.
Privatisation in Saudi Arabia cannot be successful
without developing an investment and business data base. We
lack information about both future national projects and
present government industrial corporations. In addition,
analysis of the present government industrial cooperation
may result in the need to develop their systems, manpower,
strategies, and policies to make them profitable and
competent, rather than selling them to the private sec-
tor. .107
107- Wahhib Bin Zager. Ibid.
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The Needs of Successful Privatisation
In addition to the workforce problems facing Saudi
Arabia today and maybe for the 2000s, the following points
were also discussed at the Saudi Businessmen's conference
in 1989.108
The fourth Saudi Businessmen's Conference that took
place in Jeddah between 29 - 31 May 1989 was significant in
that it coincided with the onset of the Fifth Five-Year
National Development Plan (1990-1995). Attendance by the
cream of the Kingdom's business community, public officials,
economists and academics was at an all-time high.
Among the many issues of the conference was the satel-
lite linkup with London to announce the launch of two
projects under the Al-Yamamah Economic Development Project.
The deliberations also covered some of the issues which were
not discussed in the Dammam conference held in 1983, Riyadh
in 1985, and Abha in 1987. A group of 57 British businessmen,
officials of Arab and Islamic federations and councils, and
commercial counsellors of a number of countries, attended
the meeting.
For the first time, many questions hitherto unanswered
were raised, and frank replies were given in a genuinely
creative and congenial atmosphere. To most of the young
entrepreneurs and first-time participants, the conference
provided a forum of on-going dialogue for a productive,
prosperous, and well planned tomorrow.
In brief, the participants resolved to improve the
structure of the private sector, increase its role in the
development of the national workforce, promote local and
108- The Businessmen Fourth Conference, Jeddah 29-31 May
1989. Al-Yamamah, Okaz, Iqraa and Saudi Gazette New.
31 May, 1st and 2nd, and 7th June 1989.
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foreign investment, and privatise public sector establish-
ments. Recommendations under the four resolutions were
equally wide-ranging. They included the amalgamation of small
and medium-sized businesses, the expansion of joint stock
companies, the creation of specialised marketing companies,
the institution of medium and long-term credits for projects
with feasibility studies, investment as well as incentives
for internal tourism, the setting up of national insurance
companies, and support for local advertising agencies to
ensure their share in the international market.
The participants agreed that improved support for the
private sector was vital. As for redefining the role of the
private sector so as to absorb the national workforce, it
was stressed that the educational policy and technical
vocational and secondary education should meet the qualita-
tive demand for manpower. Intensive on-the-job training was
emphasised. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry was asked
to update their training programmes. National concerns were
asked to come out with their own plans for workforce
development. Labour and population studies, compilation
statistics, and facts and figures were sought. Local
companies were urged to provide jobs for Saudis and arrange
for their training and education.
The third resolution, involving increased private sector
participation in local investments so as to diversify the
Kingdom's production base, urged participants to create an
advanced financial market with a view to attracting more
savings and deposits, both from individuals and business
houses, and banks. The setting up of specialised financial
institutions to link the Kingdom's banking system with the
financial market, and the creation of a stock market were
recommended. Investment of surpluses with private and
financial sectors, not only in the Kingdom but also in the
Arabian Gulf, was envisaged. In this respect, the need for
relevant data on local investment opportunities was
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underscored. Tax exemptions for fuller participation in the
investment activity were desired. The establishment of free
zones for attracting international capital and also for the
transfer of technology was discussed. The free zones are to
be duty free, with no tax or customs duties, and to be
secured against political interference or interruption. In
this regard, businessmen were asked to participate in the
economic development programmes.
Privatisation, the fourth resolution, was the subject
that attracted the attention of all participants. It was
recommended that a planning body assess the situation and
sets priorities for privatisation. Joint stock companies were
suggested as the model to achieve the ends of a step-by-step
move in this direction. A thorough study of the investment
market and an equally thorough evaluation of the same was
urged. Participants desired that both the officials and
private sector should cooperate and coordinate in locating
what could be transferred profitably to the private sector,
and deciding which of the projects should be taken on a
priority basis. Linked with this aspect of transfer was the
suggestion that employees of such projects should be
encouraged to purchase the respective shares.
Panels, discussing the Saudi workforce issue, were
unanimous in their opinion that it was essential that all
positions should be manned by Saudi citizens. The officials
noted that, of late, the private sector was concentrating
on citizens more than ever before.
The pertinent question was how efficiently and profitab-
ly public sector projects could be transferred to the private
sector. It was noted that there was a need for privatisation
and that the government was ready to adopt such policies that
would facilitate the transfer. Businessmen were assured that
privatisation was part and parcel of the Kingdom' s plans and
policies. Businessmen indicated that Saudia (Saudi Arabian
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Airlines Company), Petromin and Saudi Telecom, among other
public sector projects, were suitable for transfer.
Panelists were unanimous in their view that profitability
alone was the best judge. In their opinion, profitability
and efficiency go together and that this very equation will
greatly contribute to keeping costs competitive.
It was pointed out that privatisation depended specifi-
cally on the private sector's financial, administrative and
organisational potential. Officials rightly pointed out that
the infrastructure already provided by the government was
sufficient for profitable and efficient utilisation by the
private sector. Most officials, however, said the private
sector's role was not up to expectations. They said a
desirable business atmosphere already existed and that more
facilities were in the pipeline.
The creation of free zones in different parts of the
Kingdom, stock markets, specialised financial institutions,
and insurance companies was urged. The officials disclosed
that the establishment of all these entities was under active
consideration. They asked businessmen to open more joint
stock companies and investment houses. As regards the
amalgamation of smaller and medium size units, a few
businessmen were of the view that it could lead to near-
monopoly situations. Steps to forestall the cover-up in
trade practices were urged. The officials said a law would
be soon introduced, and fines and penalties would be imposed
on violators.
The conference also discussed the deposits of Saudis
abroad. Bankers said there was no way to influence depositors
to bring back their capital. The simplification of the legal
framework for the private sector was urged. In the business-
men's view, performance would improve with such simplifica-
tion. Others suggested minor adjustments in order to boost
performance. Interesting facts and figures were disclosed
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during the deliberations. For example, SABIC will reduce the
prices of its products for local manufacturers. It will also
buy most of its requirements from the local market. Some
businessmen, while acknowledging the step, said this would
mean savings of ten per cent to twenty per cent (10-20%).
SABIC's combined fertilizer unit, with a production capacity
of 1.2 million tons of urea, will start production by the
first quarter of 1990. SABIC's Jubail Steel Complex's
expansion will be completed in two years' time. The naphtha
cracking units at Jubail and Yanbu will start production by
the year end.
Other points of interest:
- Participants were assured that if public stock
companies were found to be economically viable,
they would be permitted.
- One official announced that some Saudi companies
engaged in contracting have now moved over to
maintenance work.
- The Kingdom will have its first missile engineer-
ing facility and aluminum smelting project as a
result of the launch of the Al-Yamamah Economic
Offset Programme, an offshoot of the Al-Yamamah
Project.
- The liquidity of Saudi Arabian banks was much
better than in the past. Bankers said that reces-
sion had been overcome, and that the number of
credit recipients and the amount of credits had
been on the increase for quite some time.
- Sixty per cent (60%) of the major economic activi-
ty was managed by the public sector; the private
sector's establishments were large under
individual ownership rather than being joint stock
companies.
- Partnership companies constitute around one per
cent (1%) of the total, but they have one-third
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of the total capital wealth.
- The government plans to set up a higher council
for internal tourism.
- A project is under way to combat dumping. As for
commercial fraud and counterfeit and fake products
on the market, the private sector will have the
full support from the government to overcome this.
Stock Market
It sounds as though the government wishes to get the
private sector enrolled in its economic activities and
investment, but only under its rules and limitations. For
instance, although the Businessmen's Fourth Conference
strongly recommended the establishment of a local stock
market, and many of the government officials agreed, the
Minister of Finance and Economy has been trying to avoid
this recommendation.
Minister of Finance and National Economy Muhammad Aba Al-Khail
used the word "Harraj" - the local equivalent of auction to
describe the stock exchange, also known as the bourse. It is
precisely the word that adequately defines the meaning of stock
exchange. The minister has the right to hold his opinion against
establishment of a stockmarket in the country. He may have his
own reasons for caution. The main concern may be the desire to
protect small shareholders against adventurous speculators. But
the stock market is not confined to buying and selling stocks.
It is also a place where all kinds of bonds issued by
governments and companies are exchanged. The stock exchange is
known to promote the growth of large financial firms. So long
as privatisation is the objective, laying down rules fora stock
exchange would facilitate the growth of the private sector.
What alternative to the stock market is there in our
country after joint stock companies have grown in number and
the exchange of stock has become a normal practice. The
alternative cannot be restricting stock exchange to banks as
it is the case now. Some bankers may use that in their own
interest. In fact, a lot is being said about an odd routine and
the lengthy time involved in the process of transferring stocks
from the seller to the buyer.
In the past, the procedure was completed quickly at the
company's premises by recording the transaction in its ledger
in the presence of the two parties. Wahib Binzagr, a renowned
businessmen, believes the stock exchange does not mean the place
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where the stocks are offered for sale. It means the method and
the rules that systematise the process of exchanging stocks and
their transfer from one person to another under due protection
of law. The absence of a place with the name "stock exchange"
written on its front door does not mean that no stock exchange
may be created. According to Binzagr, a stock exchange can be
formed at any place where the buyer and seller meet. Names and
buildings are not essential.
What we really need is not the place but rather the rules that
make the exchange free of difficulties and exploitation.109
Saudi Investments Abroad
The private sector has invested over US $ 50 billion
abroad. In addition, the Kingdom' s commercial banks also have
invested over US $ 140 billion abroad. 110
 Also, the govern-
ment has had investment abroad for more than US $ 80
billion. 111
 Such investment may provide profits to the
investors, but some effects on the national economy are:
1. a lack of investment in local market and a waste
of opportunities for growth,
2. it delays privatisation, and government expendi-
tures stay high,
3. the money invested abroad is under more risk, as
in the crash of a stock market, than if it is
invested locally in the Kingdom.
Between 1985 and 1989 businessmen reinvested US $ 16
billion locally. 112 The return on these investments will
accelerate the Kingdom's development process in terms of
setting up productive industrial projects which will serve
109-Mohammed Omar Al-Amudi, Stock Exchange, Saudi Gazette.
1st November 1989, p. 4.
110-Okaz Newspaper, The Financial And Economy Page. 23 July
1989, p. 9.
111- Al-Yamamah Magazine. A Report about Industrialisation
at the Kingdom. 16 June 1989, p. 21.
112- Ibid.
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the interests of investors and citizens.
However, there are obstacles facing the investment in
the Kingdom. Some obstacles are:113
1. Investment in Saudi Arabia is limited to just a
few projects and businesses.
2. Revenue from investments in the Kingdom is less
than from abroad.
3. The market in the Kingdom is small and does not
attract high investment.
4. Production and manufacturing in the Kingdom are
expensive due to the lack of local qualified
manpower, high manpower cost, and the expense or
unavailability of raw material.
5. Saudi businessmen lack good investment experi-
ence.
6. Lack of accurate local market and economic data
and feasibility studies.
7. Lack of specialised and qualified investment
companies.
8. Lack of an efficient investment policy and control
system.
113. Dr, Wadi Kabli. Money Invested Abroad Must Encouraged
to Return To the Kingdom. Al-Yamamah Magazine, 31st
May, 1989.
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Future Business in Saudi Arabia 114
The growth and development in Saudi Arabia during the
first 4 Five-Year Development Plans (1970 through 1989) is
nothing short of phenomenal, but this does not mean that it
is now easy to conduct business in the country. There are
many key issues that must be recognised and dealt with by
business in the near future. A partial list is as follows:
o There are likely to be surprises politically in
Saudi Arabia, but the overall political risk will
remain relatively unchanged.
o Companies involved directly or indirectly with
government contracts are likely to continue to
suffer payment delays, but there is no risk of
default.
o The Saudi economy will become more protectionist.
o There will be increasing pressure from the gr.vern-
ment to reduce the numbers of foreigners in the
Kingdom and to increase the employment of Saudis.
o There will be a growing need for careful and
subtle public affairs programmes by major interna-
tional companies.
o There will be a strong demand, or insistence, to
offset investment in the Kingdom by companies
bidding for major defense and capit 1 equipment
contracts.
o The relationship between the government bure ucra-
cy and the private and semi-government will become
more difficult, with dem ndsf r the increased use
of Arabic in government business and more detailed
controls of foreign business.
114- T.S. Eliot. The iddle East Corporate Surviv 1 And
Growth To The 1990s. usiness International S.A.
Geneva, Switzerl nd. 1985, pp. 110-112.
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Trading opportunities exist in Saudi Arabia in sustain-
ing operating and maintenance contracts, in environmental
control technologies, in defense and security equipment
(though it must be recalled that most defense deals "are made
in heaven" at a high political level) , and in manpower
training and general educational development. They also exist
in medical equipment, health care products and pharmaceuti-
cal, foodstuffs, and consumer durables and consumer electron-
ics, though the latter market tends to be saturated at
present. It is essential to have a Saudi partner.
Substantial opportunities exist for licensing technology
and selling know-how, especially in petroleum, gas and
petrochemicals, and related industries. Opportunities also
exist in solar energy research and desalination technology,
though Saudi Arabia has probably as high a level of practical
desalination experience as any country in the world. The same
could be said of telecommunications. Young telecommunications
engineers are happy to work in the Kingdom, because they find
themselves in the forefront of technology. Clearly, a
reliable Saudi partner is essentia1. 115 Foreign investment
in Saudi Arabia is being discouraged in low technology and
general service applications, but encouraged for high
technology applications. It is essential to have a Saudi
joint investor.
 .116
There is no practical alternative for foreign companies
wishing to do serious business in Saudi Arabia except to
establish a permanent presence in the Kingdom. The costs of
establishing such a presence are coming down, but the
difficulties in getting family visas are tending to become
115- T.S. Eliot. The Middle East Corporate Survival And
Growth To The 1990s. Business International S.A.
Geneva, Switzerland. 1985, pp. 110-112.
116- Ibid.
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greater. 117
Perhaps one of the best ways to get a "feeling" about
the business environment in Saudi Arabia is to read some of
what been said. The following are some excerpts from comments
made by executives doing business in Saudi Arabia:118
We expect some major changes at the top of our political
leadership within the next few years. These changes may make
world headlines, but they will not affect either the Saudi
business climate or our willingness, rather, our need, to sell
our oil.
- A French Businessman
We have committed several hundred million dollars to back up
our belief in the future of Saudi Arabia.
- A Senior Executive of Major US Oil Company
I have enormous personal faith in the future of Saudi Arabia,
but I must confess to be having great difficulty convincing my
board of directors at home of the long-term potential of this
market.
- An European Managing Director of a High Technology
Joint-venture Construction Company.
How can the Saudis expect foreign companies to invest in the
Kingdom when they the Saudis have difficulty in persuading their
own people to invest at home?
- A Senior Executive of a US Company with major interest
in the Kingdom.
We had an offset requirement in Korea. The component
manufactured there was of such a high quality and produced at
117- Burnt Norton. The Middle East Corporate Survival And
Growth To The 1990s. Business International, Geneva,
Switzerland. 1985, pp. 110-112.
118- Ibid.
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so low a cost that we decided to set up a complete manufacturing
operation in Korea. I cannot see us doing that in Saudi Arabia
for a few years yet.
- An Executive Vice President of a major US Co.
The government remains the motor of the economy, and it is
nonsense to think that the private sector could ever match it.
The first instinct of the private sector is profit, the second
is survival. And to survive without losing their profits, many
private sector Saudi businessmen invest their money outside the
Kingdom. If the Saudi government really wants to mobilise the
Saudi private sector, it has got to get the money moving in the
domestic economy. Maybe the government would be better advised
to introduce taxation or exchange controls or eliminate
subsidies to keep the money in the country and to encourage
local investment and encourage people to earn money in the
country.
- An European Banker
In a large country like Saudi Arabia, a logical next step is
to encourage development and stimulate business in the smaller
centres away from the three major cities (Jeddah, Riyadh, and
Dammam). But for the Saudi government, this is a minefield.
There is a real fear in the Kingdom that if the government gives
too much economic power to the remoter areas of the country,
such a move would encourage tribalism. The government has spent
the last 20 years or so trying to stamp out tribalism and has
no wish to encourage its reemergence.
- An European Manager in Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is our biggest market in the Middle East, and we
are nervous of longer-term political trends. We hear rumbles
from discontented technocrats, we hear stories from Saudis about
likely succession difficulties, we are told that the Shiaa* of
Qatif are still very unhappy. We consider the risk, and then
we forget it, as there is nothing that we can do about it.
- An Executive Vice President of US Multinational
* Shiaas of Qatif are a support group close to Iran's
government. They represent the opposite of the Sunaa. The
majority of Saudis are Sunaa (Sunaa and Shiaas are Muslim
groups with different and conflicting beliefs).
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If the Saudis do decide to build an industry behind permanent
high-tariff protective barriers, this industry will be high cost
and inefficient and unlikely to attract most foreign investors.
- A Prominent International Banker
This country is fine for an achievement-oriented executive but
terrible for his wife and quite impossible for his teenage
children.
- An European Executive in Saudi Arabia
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SUMARY
Since 1970 Saudi Arabia has been working on a series
of intensive development programmes. The main goal of the
programmes is to provide for the economic and social well-
being of the Saudi people without affecting the Islamic and
social culture. To accomplish this development the Kingdom
has established Five Year Plans to achieve its goals. The
plans will extend up to the year 2000.
The major goals of the first four Five-Year Plans,
between 1970-1990, were mainly to develop the infrastructure
and economy, particularly industrial, export, and gross
domestic production (GDP). The Government spent over $ 500
billion on these development goals. Oil revenue was the major
source of income, averaging nearly ninety per cent (90%);
with GDP development and the increase in other revenue
sources, it now represents about sixty per cent (60%) of
total GDP revenues. The government has also encouraged the
private and share-holding sectors. They have provided
investment credit, both long and short-term, without
interest. Between 1970 and 1990, the investment credits
reached a high of $ 64 billion. The supply of money also
increased about seventy times. Currency in circulation, and
the banking business, grew at an average annual rate of
twenty-five per cent (25%). Today the Kingdom has two major
industrial complexes, many joint-venture corporations, and
many other different industries in food, fertilizer, gas,
polymer, and plastics. In addition to industries, there has
been a huge development in the agricultural sector.
The development of Saudi Arabia has extended to almost
all aspects of life, including: public works, housing, roads,
ports, social care, healthcare, education, transportation,
communication, and the general standard of living. The Saudi
government has realised the need to develop further its
national human resources. Therefore the current plan for
1990-1995 has given more attention to social development,
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including education, training, health, culture and social
welfare.
Saudi Arabia developed its infrastructure so fast that
it now needs to slow down a little and shift the development
emphasis. There is a great need to develop Saudi national
manpower and work with the younger generation so that they
can become confident in handling industrial and technological
advances. The private sector, which represents forty per cent
(40%) of the GDP and more than sixty per cent (60%) of the
workforce, has not adequately shared in the responsibility
of developing the society and communities. Nearly eighty-five
per cent (85%) of the private sector workforce is comprised
of foreigners, and as yet the private sector has not played
a vital role in developing Saudis to join the workforce.
The government is trying to implement privatisation in
many of its productive sectors, such as basic industries and
transportation, but there are obstacles. Some of the major
obstacles are government control, cultural effects, the
Kingdom's small population, inadequate educational and
vocational systems, lack of sound feasibility studies and
data, and a lack of qualified managers and technicians. Many
of these obstacles have created the need to invest abroad.
The private sector's overseas investment is now over $ 140
billion. The market in Saudi Arabia is still too small or
inadequate to accommodate so many economic projects and such
huge investment.
In spite of many problems, there are many advantages
in investing in Saudi Arabia. There is political stability,
no risk of default on payments, and more opportunities in
smaller communities (villages) that have not yet developed
sufficiently. Saudi Arabia needs to improve its business,
government organisations, and management and leadership, as
well as to develop and qualify Saudi manpower. It also needs
to reduce the high cost of inefficiency, and reduce the
government control bureaucracy.
CHAPTER XV-
TZEN.72EW CtF LXTERATI.M]E.
176
177
IV. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to review the major
Saudi and international literature about Saudi Arabian
management and organisations in both the public and private
sectors. This review only covers the years 1960 to 1991, and
is divided into two sections: 1960-1971 and 1971-1991. The
private sector will be excluded from the first section
because there were no published studies during the period
that related to the objectives of this dissertation. In
addition, this chapter will review some of the comparative
management literature and cross cultural studies concerning
the Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia.
Since 1971 major industrial development and modern-
isation have been taking place in Saudi Arabia as was
demonstrated in the previous chapter. There is a need to
review the literature published prior to that year to see
how much the characteristics and context of management and
organisations in the country have changed, but very few
investigations of the subject area exist.
The most intensive study available was done by Dr.
Ibrahim Al-Awaji in 1971*.
* In it he surveyed and interviewed 271 top officials,
who represented nine per cent (9%) of the total senior
officials at that time. This investigation also covered
19 central "headquarters" organisations, that repre-
sented sixty-three per cent (63%) of the Saudi central
organisations in 1970. Dr. Al-Awaji's work also dis-
cussed findings of the few local studies published
between 1962 to 1969. These included the Ford Founda-
tion team who surveyed some public organisations in
Saudi Arabia in 1965 for the purpose of reorganisation.
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I. MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS AND ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT
BEFORE 1971
A— MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Senior officials and top management in the public sector
generally did not possess a high level of formal education.
Yet it was usually adequate to handle the simple assignments
demanded of them at that time. 1 Most of these officials were
either relatives of the Royal family, or from well-estab-
lished families or tribes.
Prior to the development of the present bureaucratic
structure, top administrators were hand-picked individuals
chosen on their personal connection with and loyalty to the
King and his aides. Even though some of them may have come
originally from a rural or tribal background, they had,
before entering the service, lived in an urban community
where they received a certain degree of education sufficient
for handling their simple assignments at that time.
Consequently, the government service was almost exclusively
dominated by a small group of influential officials.
However, the expansion of the bureaucracy and the increase
of the educational output within certain social groups have
resulted in a new element in the top echelon of the bureau-
cracy. Hence, while previously the criterion was personal
connection with the centre of political power, now the trend
has become a combination of that and of certain educational
attainments. Nevertheless, because the sons and associates
of members of the traditional officialdom are privileged and
hence, are relatively more educated than the bulk of the
social structure, they have become the centre of the
bureaucratic leadership.2
The ages of senior officials in that period varied from
32 to 59, depending on their organisational level. Many of
them were young employees; the average age was 35. This was
due to the fast expansion of government organisations between
1961 and 1971, and to the shortage of Saudi labour.3
1- Al-Awaji, Ibrahim. Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi
Arabia. (Ph.D. Thesis) University of Virginia, USA.,
1971, p. 169.
2- Ibid., pp. 169-170.
3- Ibid., p. 171.
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Middle and top management in the public sector were
influenced by their perceptions of how the society expected
them to behave in their relationships with their families,
relatives, and intimate groups. This influence affected the
definition of their roles, management practices, formal
rules, informal relations, job satisfaction.4
Below is a summary of Dr. Al-Awaji's major findings:5
1. Government employees generally served their
personal-interest, even at the expense of the
interests of the public.
2. Government jobs, especially management positions,
enjoyed privileges because the individuals who
held them were highly respected by the public.
Citizens also feared public officials and admin-
istrators, and that played a role in their
manifestations of respect.
3. Favouring a relative was a recognised social duty,
and officials were expected to comply with
relatives' requests.
4. Obligations to families, relatives, and friends
were stronger than obligations to organisations.
Officials, therefore, might alter their decisions
if these conflicted with their personal inter-
ests.
5. Job dissatisfaction was high among middle manage-
ment, especially the young, because of the gener-
al discontent with the total administrative
environment and practices. Dissatisfaction was
high due to the dual moral standards they encoun-
tered in their daily activities, ambitions they
could not fulfill in their careers, and boredom
because of the routine nature of their jobs.
6. Generally, the prevailing attitude among Saudi
management towards formal rules was informal and
4- Ibid., p. 180.
5- Ibid., pp. 181-204.
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normative. For instance, the interaction between
a superior and a subordinate followed the tradi-
tional Arab pattern of the father-son relation-
ship. This attitude, characterised almost without
exception by the submission of the subordinate to
the will of the superior. It was applied in the
informal direct contacts with employees in other
divisions, especially if those contacts would
benefit the employee in some aspect of his job.
Decisions were often made based on informal
contacts rather than on a formal decision-making
process. Yet internal regulations designed to
control the organisation's activities were
considered of high importance. Rules, for in-
stance, were considered essential because they
could be a safeguard against corruption. In other
words, a formal appreciation for rules and regula-
tions existed, but an informal attitude for making
decisions or contacting subordinates from other
divisions usually took precedence.
7. Because of the development in the educational
system in Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and the
lack of development in the private sector on the
other, government jobs became the most favoured
type of employment among Saudis. This was recog-
nised by the leadership and resulted in overstaf-
fing in most government organisations, particu-
larly in administrative areas. The situation was
characterised by layers of routine jobs and
superfluous bureaucratic activities. This made
administrative development more difficult espe-
cially in procedures, planning and supervision,
that in turn caused dysfunctions in the efficiency
and effectiveness of public administration. All
this, besides, was compounded by the lack of
qualified personnel and the absence of a system
of comprehensive planning.
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B- ORGANISATION CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTEXT BEFORE 1971
Very few, limited, investigations examined Saudi Arabian
organisations without looking in depth into organisational
context, structure, strategy, and problems of development.
The Institute of Public Administration (established late in
1961) has done some work in this area, but mainly to resolve
specific problems or evaluate certain limited parts of some
government organisations. The Institute's studies do not give
a full picture of most government organisations. The former
Arabian American Oil Company, now Saudi-ARAMCO, has also
published a few articles about Saudi organisation, but they
provided only a broad overview mainly for public relations
purposes. So, the study conducted by Dr. Al-Awaji will again
be referred to because it is the most detailed and compre-
hensive for that period.
1- Cultural Environment Impact on Government Organisa-
tion6
1.1 Overlapping
Divisions within Saudi government organisations
overlapped in their personnel and financial policies.
Administrative regulations also overlapped, though
there was some development.
1.2 Centralisation
Administrative activities in government organisa-
tions developed and became a complex, sizeable, central
structure after 1950. The centralisation of authority
was in the hands of a few top officials situated in
Riyadh or Jeddah and extended through the whole coun-
try. An agency in another province, for example, could
not promote one of its employees to a middle management
level or approve a business travel request without
6 - Al-Awaji, Ibrahim. 1971, pp. 206-230.
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going through the central authority.
The relation between ministries and other central organis-
ations and field agencies is generally characterised by an
excessive centralisation of authority, except in situations
where the personality factor is involved. In both personnel
and financial matters, little authority is delegated to the
people at the local level. Consequently, by and large,
decisions in minor issues (i.e., appointing an out-cadre
employee or purchasing parts for a broken machine, and so
on) may usually await approvals from central agencies for
weeks or months, and in some cases a year, due to the
difficulties in transportation and communication and/or the
complicated and slow procedures at the central administra-
tion. Not only does such a system result in a delay of the
activities in the field, but also in unjustifiable amounts
of routine work at the central levels. People travel
hundreds of miles from their localities to the capital to
follow up routine issues. This is manifested by the familiar
scenes of crowds at the doors and desks of the adminis-
trators in the central agencies. The negative effect of such
centralisation on bureaucratic performance is realised by
many officials.7
To illustrate the excessive centralisation, a
person could bypass the governor of his province and
report directly to the Minister of the Interior, who
is the superior of the governor. Sometimes a report
could be given directly to the King. 8 People tended to
bypass officials who had direct supervision or input,
but not final approval, to get their transactions done
quickly.
All transactions must receive the approval and signature of
at least three to four administrative officers, in addition
to several other signatures of routine auditors. It appears
that the concept of accountability is not known or else ig-
nored. 9
Furthermore, Dr. Al-Awaji found that the problems
caused by centralisation were compounded by a lack of
7 - Ibid.,
	 p. 208.
8- Ibid.,	 p. 209.
9- Ibid.,	 p. 210.
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delegation of authority. 10
1.3 Lack of Qualified Personnel
The lack of qualified, trained personnel at all
levels was, and still is, a problem in Saudi Arabia.
Only a few employees in government organisations were
professionally qualified, and that caused frequent
recruiting of other nationalities. To combat this
problem the Saudi government established the Institute
of Public Administration (IPA) in 1961 to improve its
personnel at all levels. The IPA was supposed to cover
the training needs of the 1970s. Overall, the training
provided was not sufficient, particularly for lower
level public employees.11
1.4 Over-staffing
The public sector, even today, is considered the
preferred employment by Saudi nationals.
As a result of developments in the educational system, anew
kind of unemployment problem is in the making. Not only is
the increase in the number of educated people not paralleled
by similar increase in employment opportunities outside
government agencies, but also a government job itself is
highly desirable to young graduates because it is a
promising channel for higher social mobility and economic
well-being. Furthermore, within the bureaucratic context,
top officials competitively try to augment their power
position by increasing the number of their subordinates
regardless of the actual needs of their tasks. The growing
complexity of bureaucratic activities provides officials
with ready rationalisation for the proliferation of divi-
sions and departments as a means to provide new public
services for which the demand is widely expressed. Because
the prevalence of such attitudes is supplemented by the lack
of any substantial improvement in the quantity and quality
of the economic activities of the private sector, a
government job has become the main target for the
unemployed.14
10_ Ibid.,	 p. 212.
11_ Ibid.,
	 p. 219.
12 - Ibid.,
	 p. 221.
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1.5 Lack of Organisation Manuals
Clear definitions of the duties of employees in
the government sector were not available. 13 Later in
1970 the Institute of Public Administration, together
with the Civil Service Bureau, developed some organisa-
tional manuals for a few organisations, but they were
not updated nor did they cover most duties and func-
tions. Even those who had organisation manuals between
1965-1970 complained that they were ineffective, or not
comprehensive. This problem caused inconsistency
between job titles and the nature of responsibilities,
and irrelevancy to the activities.14
2- The Impact of Cultural Environment on Government
Employees' Behaviour
2.1 The Immateriality of Time
Over-staffing and a low value placed on time
created an environment where many government employees
did not work hard, and were not punctual. They
exhibited high absenteeism, and wasted time mainly in
personal relationships and personal activities during
working hours. There was no adequate motivation to
induce employees to modify their ineffective
utilisation of time. There was also insufficient
internal supervision within the organisations.15
2.2 The Personality Factor and Administrative Behaviour
The senior family member's personality, that is,
the father's, is the single most influential factor in
developing an individual's behaviour and personality
in Saudi Arabia. So, the behaviour of an organisation's
members revolves around the personality of their
superiors; they behave in a normative way.
13-Ibid., p. 213.
14-Ibid., p. 216.
15-Ibid., pp. 223-224.
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Personality is a central factor in the dynamics of the
administrative behaviour in Saudi Arabia. In essence, this
originated in the family structure where things are deter-
mined by, and revolve around, the personality of the father,
who is the superior head of the organisation. With the
development of a formal administrative bureaucracy, such a
normative pattern has been embodied into its behaviour as
a basic element. Consequently, the activities of an
organisation usually revolve around one or few personali-
ties. Hence, the development of the centralised patterns can
be attributed to the influence of the role of personality
in the social structure. But on the other hand, centra-
lisation of the authority in few hands has, in turn,
reinforced and institutionalised the personality pattern.
Thus, certain personalities in the organisation become the
centre of a mixture of official and social (clique)
activities inside and outside the organisation itself. As
a result, like the son-father relationship, an individual's
initiative, earning, organisational and social status, and
career advancement depend, to i,a large extent, on his
association with his superiors."
2.3 Formalism
Government employees in Saudi Arabia were very
formal in applying laws, regulations and standards, but
only when this coincided with their interest. Also,
formality was strictly applied when it would change the
situation to the better in an official's personal
interest. However, there was a great discrepancy
between formal rules and actual practices related to
promotions and recruitment.-7
2.4 Social Relations
Social relations were, and still are, deeply
reflected in the behaviour of government employees'.
Objective considerations were, and still are, of a
secondary importance in determining the selection of
employees and in assuring the necessary cooperation
16-Ibid., pp. 225-226.
17-Ibid., pp. 226-227.
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within the organisation.18
It is common to see many friends and relatives of top
officials working in their ministries, departments, or
divisions. Therefore, identification of public offices with
the private properties of officials heading them is subcon-
sciously accepted. Hence, official and social obligations
and motivations interlace in shaping the administrative
behaviour.
Another commonplace phenomenon is that one or two personal-
ities attract a social clique composed of relatives and
friends, many of whom may work in the same organisation. A
clique's activities may extend to friends, many of whom may
work in the same organisation. A clique's activities may
extend from personal interaction and cooperation in the
inter or intra-departmental arena to social gatherings in
the evening mainly to play cards, gossip, and exchange views
on different personal and official problems.
The extent to which social connections interplay with
official behaviour is also reflected in the extent of
cooperation among colleagues. Personal relationship based
on either social or regional grounds is more likely to
motivate strong colleagueship and esprit de corps among
employees.1
2.5 Nepotism and Favouritism
Nepotism and personal favouritism are considered
by officials as a social duty, and they feel they
should serve the interests of their relatives; these
are the most important factors in employee selection.
Favouritism and personal connections (called "Wasttah"
in Arabic, and involving either the official himself
or seeking favourable decisions through one of his
favoured persons) were, and remain, a normative and
dynamic force in the daily activities of government
officials 20
II. MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS AND ORGANISATION CONTEXT
SINCE 1971
The following section presents the major characteristics
18-Ibid., p. 228.
19-Ibid., pp. 229-230.
20-Ibid., pp. 231-233.
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and context of both private and government sectors since
1971. There is not much to say about the Saudi private sector
except perhaps some additions to what was presented in
Chapter III.
Research in this area is scanty, but some minor studies
have covered small samples of senior executives or a single
firm or corporation in the sector. These investigations did
not survey all the important functions and skills of manage-
ment. In addition, no studies that compared the private
sector's management and organisations with the government
sector exist. Neither do any that compare Saudi management
practices with those of other nationalities working in the
Kingdom.
The research at hand works towards ameliorating this
situation by examining both private and government organisa-
tions, and particularly those that have a direct impact on
business or industry. Attention will be given in this study
to comparisons between Saudi management and Westerners who
work in the Kingdom.
A- MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS SINCE 1971
1- Management Characteristics in the Government Sector
Since 1971
1.1 Nepotism, Favouritism and Collectivism
Though Saudi Arabia has undergone intensive
development in the field of management, nepotism has
remained a strong characteristic. An official's main
concern at work is often the desire to take care of his
interests, his family, and his friends. He is expected
to provide them with benefits and services through the
privileges of his position. A high sense of collectiv-
ism (dependency) is respected and supported by many
officials; this comes from the societal traditions and
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norms. 21
Furthermore, favouritism and personal connections
(wasttah) play a strong role in Saudi society and
business. Saudi officials are influenced by this trend
and spend much of their time dealing with it.22
1.2 The Open Door Policy and Hospitality
Saudi managers consider hospitality, and that
means welcoming any visitor to their office, whenever,
a very important and dynamic practice. This policy
could be an effective management tool if conducted
according to a timetable, particularly in dealing with
subordinates. Yet, it is unrestricted and wastes
considerable amounts of time. Lengthy social interac-
tion also occurs at meetings, both with people from the
company as well as guests. These activities, that are
expected by Saudi managers and considered part of good
manners, are viewed as positive and beneficial, and so
remain a strong characteristic of Saudi management.23
1.3 Loyalty
Saudi public sector managers put loyalty above
performance. A relationship between a superior and
subordinates based on loyalty creates difficulties. It
decreases the independence of the subordinates and
increases pressure on the manager. It makes e1oees
too loyal to make any decision without the approval or
direction of their boss. Employees also become over
- Malaika, Abdulaziz. Time Management in Saudi Business,
(MBA research, California Coast University, Santa Ana,
USA., 1987.) This research, which was published in book
form in 1991 (see references), compared Westerners
working in the Kingdom with Saudis, and dealt mainly
with characteristics and factors affecting time values
and time management.
22-Ibid., p. 59.
23-Ibid., p.57.
21
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dependent on their superior's directions, and they take
no action, fearing it might upset him.24
1.4 Confrontation and Handling Conflicts
Saudi employees are expected to be loyal by their
superiors and adherence to the practice is rewarded
with favouritism. Saudi managers dislike confrontation,
and even minor disagreement may be considered impolite
and a challenge though a critical evaluation might
resolve a conflict. 25 Most decisions are made in
isolation, away from subordinates, because of the
dislike of confrontation. In addition, feedback must
be presented when requested, but very gently or it
could be considered as trying to make the boss lose
face.26
1.5 Saudi Management Style
The Saudi management style has a personal orienta-
tion. The Saudi executive likes the practice of the
personal approach and the development of very strong
personal relations with his employees. In addition,
personal connections and ties are important for him to
get things done. This style leads to, or increases,
informality. Meantime, formality is reserved for
critical situations or when the personal interests of
management are not served. This interpersonal style is
another manifestation of the high preference for
loyalty, collectivism, nepotism and dependency.27
1.6 Delegation and the Top-man Syndrome
Delegation in Saudi government organisations is.
24- Ibid., pp. 63 - 64.
25-Farid A. Muna. The Arab Executive, St. Martins Press,
New York, USA., 1980. p. 118.
26-Malaika., p. 65.
27- Ibid., p. 80.
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low. This is mainly because of Saudi traditions, for
example, family reliance on its senior members to be
in charge of everything. In addition, collectivism,
loyalty, fear of delegation itself, and a high depen-
dency on superiors are major causes of low delega-
tion. 28 Delegation is also rare because of poorly
qualified personne1.29
Due to centralisation, and specifically because
senior officials like to control their activities and
dislike delegating authority, the top-man syndrome
remains a strong characteristic of Saudi management.
The public and clients are obliged go to the top man
to get their routine work done expeditiously, or they
will be delayed by the long, normal process. 30 There
is no doubt that effective delegation could resolve the
top-man syndrome, save time, and improve both efficien-
cy and effectiveness.
1.7 Decision-Making
Generally, decisions are of three types: opera-
tional (daily), tactical, and strategic. Operational,
daily decisions in Saudi government organisations tend
to be based on management's own judgement, seventy-five
per cent (75%) with some involvement of senior staff.
However, once the decision is made it becomes final.31
In tactical decisions Saudi management tend to consult
their colleagues but independently make the final
28-Ibid., p. 80.
29-Abdulwahab, M.A. Decision-Making in Saudi Arabia,
Institute of Public Administration, Riyadh, 1979, pp.
134-135. (Research done in 1977 to study the decision-
making practices by managers in some government organi-
sations. It used a sample of 76 senior and middle
managers.)
30-Malaika., p. 79.
31-Abdulwahab., p. 79.
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decision, seventy-four per cent (74%). Strategic deci-
sions are based on consultations, but the final selec-
tion is in the hands of top officials, seventy-six per
cent (76%)."
Decisions, therefore, tend to be dependent on the
top executive's direction, especially those decisions
of strategic and tactical type.33
Most decision-making in government organisations
is inflexible and made with little team involvement.
This is due to the high dependency, lack of qualified
personnel, interpersonal style, and so on. It is the
result of the non-supportive government organisation
systems, old and inflexible policies, conflicting
procedures and regulations. Also, it is due to poor
coordination among organisations and departments, and
to changing instructions too frequently. Therefore,
centralisation is high, responsibilities are not tied
to authority, and resources (financial) are limited and
tied to central approval. In addition, information is
either obsolete or not available (and that reduces the
development of alternatives), and management is too
busy with routine work that leaves little time for
thinking. Implementation of decisions also faces many
obstacles, for example, employee resistance to accept
the decision, that some managers attribute to the
negative attitude of subordinates.34
In addition, subordinates lack adequate commitment
to implement decisions. Also, there is overlapping
among organisations and departments as well as a lack
of effective communications, for example, the outgoing
and incoming mail system. Moreover, poor time manage-
ment and the heavy bureaucracy epitomised by the large
amount of paper work contribute to the low level of
32-Ibid., p. 76.
33-Ibid., pp. 114-115.
34-Ibid., pp. 124-125.
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performance.35
Following up the implementation of decisions
involves some difficulties, for example, lack of
effective control systems and feedback, overlapping
that causes difficulty in identifying responsibilities,
and lack of qualified personne1.36
Finally, most managers make decisions based on
their experience and by learning through errors rather
than using a scientific and analytical methodology.
They also lack decision-making and problem-solving
techniques and training.37
2- Management Characteristics in the Private Sector
Since 1971
There is very little research on the private sector.
This section will highlight what has been written so far,
though it covers only a small amount of information gathered
from a small sample. Some views that contribute information
on the private sector were quoted briefly in the last pages
• of Chapter III of this study.
Farid A. Muna's Study
Farid A. Muna's work examined management characteris-
tics and organisation context as a major part of his
Ph.D. at the London Business School, 1979. He later
published his findings in a book entitled "The Arab
Executive," in 1980. His work surveyed and interviewed
fifty-two senior Arab executives in industry, manufac-
turing, and trade in six Arab countries. Of the fifty-
two participants ten were from Saudi Arabia.
Some of his findings describe traits common among
most of Saudi management, and though Arab executives
35 - Ibid.,	 p. 125.
36 - Ibid.,	 p. 126.
37 - Ibid.,	 p. 131.
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share many similarities, it does not necessarily mean
that Saudis uniformly conform to Muna's generalisa-
tions. Furthermore, his work did not include a non-Arab
comparative management study. Yet Muna's study is the
first of its kind after 1971. It is also a good refer-
ence for foreigners who want concise, general knowledge
about Arab executives before engaging in business with
them. The sample he surveyed, however, is rather
limited as well as being somewhat heterogenous.
Muna's findings were38:
1. Joint decision-making (or a participative leader-
ship style) is unlikely to be widely adopted by
Arab management, even for decisions that are best
suited for this style. The major reasons for this
are:
- Subordinates might view it as a sign of
weakness on the part of the executive. They
expect to be consulted, but not to make the
final decision.
- Arab executives prefer and feel more at ease
with the consultative decision-making style.
Arab executives and subordinates tend to
dislike teamwork. In addition, Arab execu-
tives employ only a low level of delegation.
2. Conflict-resolution and problem-solving tech-
niques that rely on open confrontation, such as
T-Groups or Managerial Grid, are unlikely to
succeed in Arab organisations. Most Arabs are very
sensitive to criticism, open confrontation,
directness, and frankness, especially when in
front of a group. Deference to authority, face-
saving, honour, pride and loyalty, prove serious
obstacles to open confrontation.
3. Personnel selection or promotion based only on
38
- Farid A. Muna. The Arab Executive, 1980.
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efficiency or achievement may frequently be
violated in view of the importance in the Arab
world of nepotism, loyalty, and personal connec-
tions.
4. Impersonal and formal systems or styles are at a
great disadvantage in an organisational and
societal environment that is more person-oriented
than task or role-oriented. The paternalistic
nature of the Arab management also discourages the
formal and impersonal.
5. Certain quantitative management systems or deci-
sion-making techniques, such as operational
research, that rely on stable or advanced infra-
structures, are often not viable. The business,
economic, and governmental infrastructures are
often non-existent, or not well developed yet.
Accurate information and data are scarce, govern-
mental laws and regulations are unstable (changing
at short notice), and governmental red tape is
widespread. Executives often rely on intuition,
'gut feelings', or connections to get things done.
Some Western managerial practices may not only be
inapplicable, but might even be harmful if applied
without adaptation to Arab environments. This would
apply particularly to those managerial practices that
deal with the personal aspects of management (points
1 to 4 previously.)
In his recommendations, Muna saw that Arab executives need
training programmes that are developed and adapted to their
environment. He saw at least five managerial skills essential
for developing Arab executives. These skills are:
Conceptual skills
Conceptual skills are required to encourage the execu-
tive to see the 'whole picture' in terms of its detail.
Conceptual skills would lead to improved corporate
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policies and strategies that are in keeping with the
Arab environment.
- Delegation
By more frequent use of delegation the executive can:
(a) save time, (b) train employees, (c) utilise employ-
ee's existing skills and resources, and (d) motivate
employees.
- Conflict management
Training can help the executive change his attitudes,
as well as his employees' expectations regarding
'reasonable and constructive' opposition.
- Management of time
The management of time in the Arab business world is
as much involved with the management of the social-
relations problem as of one's working hours. Time is
precious, but it has many competing factors that
constrain and complicate its management. Skills must
be learned to deal with both aspects of this prob2em.
- Change-agent skills
Arab executives have a vital role in changing their
societies. They are considered agents of change. Skills
appropriate to this role would include skills of
introducing change, managing resistance to change, and
understanding the process of change and its conse-
quences.
B- flit. CHARACTERISTICS OF GOVERNMENT ORGANISATION,
THEIR CONTEXT AND THE IMPACT OF SOCIETY, SINCE 1971
1) There are two major studies on this subject:
a) A published study conducted by Professor Shaker
Asfor, 39 who works as a senior tutor and organi-
sational development specialist at the Institute
of Public Administration in Riyadh. He is also a
part-time tutor at King Saud University.
39 - Asfor, M. Shaker. Assol Al-Tanzim Wa-Alassalyb (Organ-
isational foundations and methods), Dar Al-Shoroq,
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 1985, pp. 544-558.
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b) A published MBA comparative study by the author
of this dissertation that was based on a survey
and interviews conducted between 1985-1987. 4° The
research objectives were to analyse time value and
utilisation in Saudi organisations and business,
and to discover the impacts and obstacles to time
value and time management. In addition, it
intended to find how both Westerners and Saudis
deal with those impacts.
a)	 The main points of Professor Asfor's study are:
1. Most of governmental organisations' policies and
regulations are obsolete and ineffective.
2. Some government organisations lack development of
their procedures, work process, and control
systems. This, of course, has resulted in delays.
3. Centralisation is very high in some government
organisations. Delegation is not applicable,
especially for agencies or branches in different
regions, and that delays work at all levels.
4. Coordination in government organisations is poor,
particularly among those which depend on each
other's activities.
5. Overlapping among different government organisa-
tions is another obstacle. This is due to the
rapid expansion between 1972 and 1986.
6. The underemployment problem is well known in Saudi
government organisations due to the recruitment
of unqualified personnel and to over-recruitment.
7. There is an imbalance of workforce distribution
among departments and organisations, such as an
organisation that needs 5,000 employees gets
4,000, while one that needs 4,000 gets 5,000.
8. There is low productivity and poor performance due
to lack of qualified people, lack of training and
40
- Malaika., p. 60.
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development, and lack of appropriate education.
9. There is a waste of many qualified and specific
labour capabilities due to the demotivation that
is caused by putting employees in the wrong
positions.
10. Many government employees are busy with private
work for their relatives or for their personal
interests. So they give their work tasks only
second priority or insufficient attention and
time.
11. Bribery, exploitation of personal connections
(wasttah), and favouritism, have considerable
negative effects on performance and productivity
in government organisations.
12. Most senior officials cannot get further promo-
tion. In addition, they have reached their highest
salary level. This demotivates them and causes
dissatisfaction, that in turn affects performance.
13. Over the years some government agencies have tried
to separate from their central organisation and
establish a separate administration with financial
support. Those that have succeeded have caused
duplication of work, overlapping functions, and
over-staffing.
14. There is a general lack of qualified Saudi na-
tional labour.
15. Financial incentives are considered very important
and many organisations compete with each other.
This has caused experienced employees to transfer
from one agency to another, affecting the perfor-
mance of those organisations that have lost
qualified personnel.
16. There is an excess of needless committees and
meetings. This impacts negatively on management's
time and priorities.
17. There is a marked lack of effective filing sys-
tems. There is also too much paperwork and too
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many documents.
18. Some support departments try to take charge and
control higher-level ones. This creates conflict,
over-staffing, and misdirected work.
19. Almost all Saudi and many Arab employees in Saudi
organisations lack both punctuality and good
attendance. In addition, there is a waste of work
time in personal and unproductive activities.
No recommendations were offered by Professor Asfor on
the basis of his study.
b)	 The main findings from this author's study are:41
1. There is an excess of social gatherings and
socialising activities at work, and over hospita-
ble social relations with visitors or friends from
other organisations.
2. Formalisation is very low, and is followed only
in crisis and conflict situations, and for
achieving personal interests. In addition,
personal interaction and informal contacts are
unnecessarily high.
3. There is a general lack of organisational manuals,
and those existing are usually not updated.
4. Government organisations lack good planning,
especially strategic planning. This is because
of a lack of qualified management.
5. The educational and training systems are incon-
sistent with market requirements and work needs.
Graduates are far away from the practical nature
and reality of the work environment.
6. The expansion of government organisations between
1972-1986 required a huge recruitment from over-
seas and the Middle East. This has resulted in a
multi-national work environment with employees
41
- Malaika., pp. 68-119.
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from different cultural backgrounds. It has also
caused some cross-cultural conflict and ineffec-
tive communication among employees.
The author of this dissertation concluded that the time
utilisation problem in Saudi business is due to cultural,
social, organisational and personal factors. 42 Without
developing and changing the social systems of Saudi Arabia,
no major improvement in the direction of modernisation is
likely to occur. In addition, organisational policies must
be developed, and personnel and management must be trained
with an emphasis on the value of time and the importance of
performance and productivity. This development and change
must cover all institutions, education, families, manpower,
and government policies.
2- Organisation Characteristics in the Private Sector
Since 1971
There is a severe shortage of studies and research in
this area, especially comparative studies. The followings
are overviews of the relevant works.
a) Dr. Mohammed F. Kurashi finished his dissertation in
1984 at Claremont Graduate School, USA. Kurashi's
research was a descriptive study of the social respon-
sibility of the multinational corporations (MNCs)
operating in Saudi Arabia. These MNCs are industrial,
commercial, or construction companies. They are either
Saudi private sector, joint ventures with foreign
firms, or Saudi government foreign joint ventures.
Kurashi sent questionnaires to 201 Saudi corpora-
tions and to 509 foreign MNCs. The Saudi corporations
were selected on the basis of having many foreign
managers, and therefore were regarded as multina-
42 - Ibid.
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tional. Kurashi defined an MNC as a firm operating
through ownership or management, or both, in more than
one country. With reference to Saudi Arabia this term
includes all firms working in the Kingdom whose home
office is abroad, and corporations that are partially
owned by Saudi citizens or the government, but jointly
managed by foreign firms or managers. In addition, it
includes corporations that are wholly owned by Saudis
but managed by non-Saudis. The research describes the
effect and impact of Saudi society on both Saudi and
non-Saudi management. The following is a summary of
Kurashi's work.43
The Hypotheses and Results of Kurashi Study
Ten basic research hypotheses were tested, each
consisted of one or more propositions.
1. Saudis are more in agreement than non-Saudis that
MNCs are more concerned with their self-interest
rather than the interest of Saudi society.
2. Saudis are more in agreement than non-Saudis that
MNCs have a negative impact on Saudi society.
3. Saudis are in higher agreement than non-Saudis
that MNCs should provide medical care and housing
for their employees.
4. Saudis are more in agreement than non-Saudis that
MNCs should contribute in the area of training,
research and education.
5. Saudis are in higher agreement than non-Saudis
that Saudi nationals should hold key managerial
positions in MNCs.
6. Saudis are in higher agreement than non-Saudis
that MNCs should provide non-profit organisations
43
- Dahlan, Ahmed Hassan. Politics, Administration and
Development in Saudi Arabia, (Edited articles and
summaries of several works and research). Amana Corpo-
ration, Brentwood, MD, USA., 1990, pp. 261-277.
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with financial support and technical and admin-
istrative assistance.
7. Saudis are in higher agreement than non-Saudis
that MNCs need to follow written guidelines and
to have their long-term plans concerning their
role in Saudi Arabia.
8. Saudis have different expectations from non-Saudis
of the social responsibilities of MNCs.
9. Saudis are in higher agreement than non-Saudis
that MNCs should cooperate with government
agencies and Saudi companies in activities other
than their defined ones.
10. Saudis are in higher agreement than non-Saudis
that MNCs should contribute to introducing Saudi
culture to their non-Saudi employees and workers.
In summary, Kurashi found that six of his hypotheses
(hypotheses nos. 1,2,3,7,9, and 10) were supported and four
partially supported. Of 34 statements, eighty-two per cent
(82%) showed significant differences between Saudis and non-
Saudis. For Saudis, the level of education and the percentage
of Saudi employees or managers in the organisation were most
often found to correlate with the attitude statements. For
non-Saudis, those who had worked longer in the Kingdom tended
more often to hold views similar to Saudis.
Theory and observation suggested that MNCs have had an
impact on a broad variety of aspects of Saudi life. Kurashi
asked his Saudi respondents if this were so in a question-
naire given to them only in Arabic. The following are some
findings.
Most Saudis felt that MNCs have no effect on the
following six aspects: family ties, marriage, the
role of the Saudi housewife, the application of
Islamic law, humanitarian organisations, and
consumer protection.
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- Most Saudis, fifty per cent to seventy-three per
cent (50-73%), felt that MNCs have a positive
impact on the following five aspects: development
of technical skills, development of managerial
skills, research and development, employment in
the private sector, and Saudi economic policies.
- Most Saudis attributed negative effects to MNCs
in relation to the following: working women,
ethics in the work environment, housing, and
environmental protection.
- Most Saudis viewed the size of the foreign
workforce in Saudi Arabia negatively.
Discussion of the Study
In summarising the results of his study and interviews
with Saudi government officials, businessmen, teachers,
school children and citizens, Kurashi made several additional
interesting points:
1. Differences in his study between Saudis and non-
Saudis were greatest where statements were made
suggesting that corporate social responsibility
should go beyond the work-place.
2. Wholly-owned Saudi companies were not more con-
cerned about their social responsibility than
other MNCs and usually less so.
3. There was little concern by MNCs to train Saudis
for management positions, human resource develop-
ment and saudiisation. This was due partly to cost
and partly because foreign managers do not relish
their replacement by Saudis, that is the eventual
result of training. This, of course, is contrary
to self-interest.
4. Most MNCs played a small part in supporting
humanitarian, social, cultural and educational
organisations, but this was not due solely to
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their attitudes and policy.
5. The media in Saudi Arabia endorse and foster the
point of view that humanitarian organisations
should approach individual businessmen or banks
for funding, not MNCs or business. This may, in
part, explain the reluctance to ask MNCs for
charity donations or funding for research pro-
jects.
6. Kurashi believes that MNCs, especially through the
increase of foreign labour they have brought into
the country, have had a much greater impact on
life in the Kingdom than the results of his
empirical study would show. Also, many statistics
show a rise in several types of social problems
such as drug and alcohol use, theft, adultery,
rape, prostitution and traffic violations, as well
as an increase in sexual disease. Most of these
crimes are attributable to foreigners, although
some are committed by Saudis. Many experts agree
that these crimes were almost unknown in the Saudi
Arabia of 50 years ago. Then it was a
conservative, religious society with few foreign-
ers; the population lived mostly in small towns
and villages.
7. Saudi government officials seem to agree that MNCs
are doing little toward fulfilling socially
responsible roles, but they disagree on what the
scope of those roles should be. For instance, the
Minister of Planning thought MNCs' responsibi-
lities should be limited to economic activities,
whereas the Vice President of the Saudi Arabian
Basic Industry Corporation (SABIC) thought roles
should be broader. Others interviewed were divided
in their opinions.
Kurashi's Recommendations
Kurashi made several recommendations regarding the role
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of MNCs in Saudi society that is consistent with the goals
of Saudi development plans and that would serve the Saudi
national interest. The recommendations were based on the
results of his study and interviews. A few are included
below:
1. Saudi board directors need to set and implement
policies regarding MNCs' social responsibilities.
It should not be left to largely indifferent, non-
Saudi managers.
2. The need for studies on the social, economic and
political impact of MNCs, and on the current laws
that regulate MNCs, is paramount.
3. Saudi businessmen need to have more confidence in
hiring nationals and developing promotion progra-
mmes for them.
4. Government agencies need to become more efficient
in dealing with MNCs. Kurashi suggests opening up
a special MNC department within the Ministry of
Commerce, separate from the Department of Compa-
nies, since MNCs have special needs that most
companies do not. Governmental agencies should
establish clear guidelines for the role of MNCs
in Saudi society.
5. Officials in the Ministry of Social Affairs should
hold conferences for people who work for non-
profit organisations and teach them how to solicit
funds from business firms. Government officials
should approach businesses and encourage them to
contribute.
6. The goals of saudiisation of managerial positions
and reduction of foreign labour in the Kingdom
need to be implemented.
7. Community centres to introduce foreigners to Saudi
culture and society should be established in urban
areas.
8. MNCs should get involved in organisations that may
indirectly help their workers. These might include
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the Saudi national organisations that help free
prisoners or pay for medical care for traffic
victims. They should get involved with media
projects that help improve the image of Saudi
Arabia abroad.
9. The international schools in Saudi Arabia should
establish better programmes to introduce Arabic
language and Saudi culture to their students.
10. The various Saudi Chambers of Commerce should
become involved in conducting research on MNCs and
make the results of their studies available to the
public. They should establish "charity funds" to
which businessmen can contribute, and do more
about promoting the image of Saudi Arabia.
11. Foreign commercial attaches should be more con-
cerned with motivating MNCs to be socially re-
sponsible and influencing them to promote abetter
relationship between their home countries and
Saudi Arabia.
Kurashi's work and recommendations are concerned with
improving relationships among MNCs and government agencies,
Saudi workers and foreign labour, and Saudi communities.
However, this work gives a good background on the LINCs, their
role, impact, and effects in Saudi Arabia.
b) Dr. Farid Muna in his book, The Arab Executive,44
mentioned some social pressures on Arab executives and
their businesses. These pressures were related to
private businesses, industry, commerce and production.
Most of these pressures have been mentioned above
under management characteristics in the private sector
such as low value of time, top-man syndrome, social
visits at work, nepotism and favouritism. Also, these
pressures were considered general among Arab execu-
tives. The executives that participated in Muna's work
44_ Farid Muna. The Arab Executive, 1980.
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came from several Arab countries besides Saudi Arabia.
Though the sample of Saudis was not big enough to
generalise overall about Saudi Arabia, it is worth
mentioning some common pressures all Arab executives
faced. The following presents those pressures.
Socio-cultural pressures:
1. Lack of industrial mentality
Arab societies have a lack of industrial discipline,
a lack of organisation (especially delegation), and a
lack of professional attitudes toward business.
2. Restrictions on women
Women are restricted from working in many jobs and
areas. They are also restricted in joining in company
social activities, though they are on the payroll.
3. Individualistic approach to work
There is a strong preference to work alone rather than
in a team; executives tend to take sole credit for good
deeds, and to pass the blame onto others, or to uncon-
trollable circumstances, when things go wrong.
4. Marketing constraints
Social values and norms restrict certain types of
advertising or marketing. You cannot advertise certain
women's garments and articles, or do door-to-door
selling.
C. AN OVERVIEW OF HOW SAUDI CULTURE AFFECTS SAUDI MANAGE-
MENT VERSUS WESTERN MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND PHILOSOPHY
A study conducted by John W. Martyr45 dealt with the
Arab countries of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Its main
45
- Martyr, John W. Cultural Discontinuities and the
Transfer of Management Philosophy and Practices, MPhil
Dissertation. Brunel University, England, 1985.
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objective was to find out how extensive is the transfer of
the Western (mainly British) way of life, education and
management techniques to the Gulf countries and Arab
managers. The findings were as follows:
1. Management theory and practice is more culture-
bound than is realised. In practice, some aspects
of it are not applicable to Arab culture though
others are.
2. Western management education reflects the nature
of contemporary Western culture. Only certain
aspects are easily transferable or appropriate to
Arab societies and the socio-economic environment.
3. Cultural discontinuities are considered to be
prime factors affecting knowledge, skills, prac-
tices, and transferability.
4. Western educational or training institutions
rarely attempt to relate their courses to the
needs of Arabs.
5. Arabs feel that they must be very careful about
what they accept of Western ideas, practices, and
life. They are anxious to retain their values and
do not want Western contact and technology to
affect their religious and cultural beliefs.
6. Though the Arab countries have much in common,
they are different countries, and hence their sub-
cultures may have to be considered separately when
examining the problem of transferability.
Some examples Martyr used in his work were:
1. The considerable differences between the laws of
Britain and the Arab countries. As evinced in the
main text, the laws of the two areas have sub-
stantially different origins and as such are
observable sources of discontinuities. The laws
of Britain (a Western sub-culture) for instance,
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are reflected in many areas of British management:
industrial relations, trade unionism, personnel
management, and company . regulations. Thus
differing legal systems alone can account for a
wide range of management subjects that fall into
the non-transferable zones. British trade unionism
and the laws surrounding it is a product of
British culture, that has no counterpart in the
Arab World. It is a qualitative subject, highly
influenced by culture, and effectively culture-
bound.
2. Arab views of management, as compared with those
held in Western countries, tend towards the
extended family system. Thus the hierarchical
structures of Western management organisations
often fit uneasily into contemporary Arab culture.
Much of Western practice involves delegation at
all levels. Thus the implementation of British
(and other Western) management philosophies and
practices involving delegation of authority is
very difficult to achieve in Arab countries.
3. The role of women in society is another source of
discontinuity. The legislation and customs
surrounding their employment in Western societies
do not have the same application in the Arab
countries.
The examples used show that the differences affect the
transferability of large areas of British (and Western)
management philosophies and practices to the Arabs.
III. A NOTE ON THE COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT LITERATURE
In addition to looking at the literature on both Arab
management and the Saudi economic context we have also
considered the more general writing on comparative management
and/or cross-cultural studies.
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The major contributors to the cross-cultural study of
management attitudes and values are Theodore Weinshall
(Weinshall, 1977) and Andre Laurent (Laurent, 1986). 46
Although separated by more than a decade these two scholars
have place and method in common. Both, that is, have used
the French business school INSEAD at Fontainbleau outside
Paris as a source of multi-national executive samples and
have administered attitude-value-role perception question-
naires to groups of managers from a variety of countries,
not all of them European, who were attending INSEAD courses.
Fascinating though these studies are, in neither case are
there samples from Saudi Arabia or indeed any other Arab
country.
This, however, is not true of the celebrated work of
the Dutch management professor Geert Hofstede. 47 As is well
known Hofstede in his earlier role as a personnel manager
at IBM administered work-attitude questionnaires to a large
number of employees from a variety of countries including
some Arab ones. These questionnaire responses were then in
turn used to identify 4 major cross-cultural dimensions, viz.
- different degrees of tolerance for power distance.
(i.e., differences of power between organisational
members)
- individualism v. collectivism
- masculinity v. femininity
- degree of tolerance for ambiguity (or uncertainty
avoidance)
and the numerous countries/areas in the study were then
plotted in terms of these four dimensions (Hofstede, 1980).
46
- Weinshall, T(ed). Culture and Management, Penguin,
Harmondsworth/Middlesex), 1977.
Laurent, Andre. The Cross-Cultural Puzzle of Interna-
tional Human Resource Management, Human Resource
Management, Spring 1986, vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 92-102.
47
- Hofstede, Geert. Culture Consequences, Sage Publica-
tions, Beverley Hills, London, 1980.
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While this is a famous and much discussed study our
feeling is that it will not be central to a study of
management in Saudi Arabia for the following reasons:
- First, it does not disaggregate the various Arab
countries, so that we do not have data for Saudi
Arabia as such.
- Second, and perhaps more importantly, the "Arab
countries" do not for the most part have a
conspicuous place on the four dimensions (with one
exception). Thus for uncertainty avoidance they
are in 27th position out of 53 countries (where
the 1st position indicates strong uncertainty
avoidance). Similarly the Arab countries are in
27th position out of 53 countries on the
individualism-collectivism dimension (where the
1st position indicates strong individualism). And
the Arab countries are in position 23 out of 53
countries in the masculinity - femininity scale
(where the 1st position indicated strong mascu-
linity). Thus far the Hofstede dimensions do not
strongly differentiate "the Arab countries" from
other nations/cultures. Whatever it is that may
be different-interesting about Arab management is
not captured in this study. Only on the fourth
dimension of power distance are the "Arab coun-
tries" distinguished by their rank of 7 out of 53
countries, indicating a high level acceptance of
power differences between organisational members.
This finding is accepted, and indeed finds
corroboration in our study in the form of the Arab
(Saudi) concern with rank, status, and formal
authority.
- There is a third consideration which makes us
reluctant to use the Hofstede dimension for our
own study. This is that while there has never been
an empirical challenge toHofstede's findings some
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mystery surrounds the progress from the attitude
survey data to the four dimensions listed above.
While no methodological impropriety is suggested
here, the lack of clarity really impedes
replication in any subsequent study.
Finally, my supervisor Peter Lawrence is himself a major
contributor to the comparative management research
literature, principally in the form of research monographs
on particular countries that he has studied. At the time of
writing (1992) Lawrence's published work concentrates on
various European countries, and his only published study on
a non-European country concerns not an Arab state but Israel!
While Peter Lawrence has indicated that he does not
think it appropriate that his publications in the field of
Comparative Management should be referenced here, it goes
without saying that I have benefitted from a reading thereof,
and ideas from this source are reflected in my questionnaire
and interview schedule.
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SUMMARY
A comparative management and/or cross-cultural liter-
ature regarding Saudi Arabia is scarcely available, neither
internationally nor locally. However, there are a few studies
concerning Arab countries, though these tend to be very
general and do not provide specific data for Saudi Arabia
as such. In addition, since 1971 there have been very few
non-comparative studies of management and organisation of
the government sector in Saudi Arabia. There have been almost
none for the private sectors of industry and commerce. Still,
from the literature some characteristics of government
officials did emerge:
1- They were self-oriented, serving their personal inter-
ests first.
2- They practiced nepotism and favouritism, favouring
relatives and friends even if it were detrimental to
performance and productivity.
3- They were very informal in their relationships with
colleagues and subordinates.
4- Holding a government position was considered a privi-
lege and was a source of social recognition.
5- Their attitude was very formal and impersonal when it
was necessary to engage in activities or make decisions
that were against their personal interests.
6- The value they placed on time and time management was
low and there was excessive socialising in the work-
place.
7- Government organisations were highly centralised and
overlapped in their areas of responsibility.
8- Government organisations were over-staffed but lacked
qualified personnel and had poor organisational manu-
als.
Between 1971 and 1989 there was some improvement, but not
much. The characteristics of managers in both government and
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non-government sectors were much same as before 1971:
1. Nepotism, favouritism, collectivism, the top-man
syndrome, and self-orientation were still strong
characteristics of Saudi management.
2. Saudi managers viewed loyalty as more important than
performance.
3. Saudi managers disliked confrontation, criticism,
handling conflict, and were still individualistic in
decision-making practices.
4. Saudi managers still maintained an open-door policy,
encouraged social relationships and hospitality.
5. Saudi managers continued placing a low value on time
and teamwork.
6. Organisations in the government sector had ineffective
policies and regulations, and very complex and often
conflicting policies and procedures.
7. Government organisations were still centralised, lacked
coordination, and overlapped in duties and functions.
8. Government organisation still suffered from an imbal-
ance of workforce distribution and from poorly quali-
fied personnel, that in turn contributed to low produc-
tivity and performance.
9. Self-interest was still prevalent among government
employees.
10. The highest level of dissatisfaction was among middle
and senior management.
11. Government organisations lacked effective communication
and filing systems, and had poor operating manuals.
12. Government organisation suffered from poor planning,
had poor punctuality and attendance from their employ-
ees, and there was very little attempt made to develop
their Saudi workforce.
The private sector was affected by many of the same
characteristics and social effects as the government sector.
Industry and the private sector lacked an industrial
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mentality, discipline, and a professional attitude towards
business.
In addition, almost all multinational, joint venture,
and Saudi corporations that have many non-Saudi managers or
are run by expatriates were found to have practically no
interest in sharing responsibility in developing Saudi
society, the community, and its national labour.
The disjunction between the Saudi culture and the
expatriates' value systems has been a prime factor affecting
the transfer of knowledge, skills, and practices . There tends
to be an improvement when the theories and practices are
adapted to fit Saudi culture, or do not conflict with Saudi
religious values and beliefs. Saudi management and organisa-
tions continually try to adapt and use new technology and
techniques without affecting their value system.
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V. FINDINGS RELATED TO MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS
Introduction
This chapter presents the research findings regarding
the characteristics of the participating Saudi and Western
managers, who work in Saudi Arabia in both government and
non-government organisations. Data about the participants'
age, background, and so on, is available in Appendix A. The
findings relating to organisational context and societal
effects are covered in Chapters VI and VII.
Some of the findings presented here are similar to those
discussed in the review of literature, Chapter IV. On the
other hand the material in that chapter did not include any
studies that compared Saudi and Western managers, or
government and non-government organisations, and was mainly
descriptive. Furthermore, it did not provide any correlation
of the findings with relationships or effects. For example,
the relationship of an authoritarian style and the person's
position, age, size of company, and so on. The present
research does try to address some of these relationships.
In addition, the findings here highlight those management
characteristics in Saudi Arabian business that have changed,
remained unchanged, improved, or even retrogressed since
1971. This chapter is interrelated with the information and
findings in Chapters VI and VII.
Notes:
1) The terms "Saudi" and/or "Western" managers, as used
in this chapter and the following ones, refer to those
senior managers working in Saudi Arabia who participat-
ed in this research.
2) The formulation "Q-a number-a number, a letter, e.g.,
Q10-2, C" or variations thereon, means: question number
10, questionnaire 2, section C.
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A. FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY
"Formality" in management refers to the use of formal
organisational power and authority to gain compliance with
formal rules and established procedures.* The use of
formality in the management process is necessary,
particularly in areas related to setting objectives,
planning, strategy and policy formulation. However, the level
of formality used depends on the function, and
responsibilities. It also depends on the maturity of both
the people and the organisation, as well as on the specifics
of the situation.1
The literature concerning Saudi managers indicates that
a high degree of formality is applied mainly in activities
that have an impact on their decisions, their department's
interests, personal interests and in conflict or crisis
situations. This study concurs with the literature but shows
in more depth that formality is frequently used in conflict
and crisis situations with more emphasis on the importance
of authority for the manager. In addition, it shows that
informality is often used to keep personnel as happy as
possible with more emphasis on personal favours.
a-1 The Use of Formality
1.1 The Use of High Formality in Budget Crisis Situations
Budgeting is a major function of management. Budget
development and formulation is important because it defines
departments' needs for functioning and carrying out objec-
tives. If a department is allocated less than its actual
* (Authority is the right to use power. It is authority that
gives a manager the right to give direction, discharge
duties, and so on.)
1- Hersey and Blanchard. Management of Organisational
Behaviour, Prentice-Hall Inc., London, UK., 1982. p.
114.
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needs or plans genuinely require, it would not be able to
function or carry out its tasks successfully.
A crisis is defined as "a situation that has reached
a critical phase." 2
 Good planning that anticipates crises
can reduce risk for an organisation. 3
 Crisis situations in
Saudi Arabian business are frequent because of poor or
inadequate strategic planning (this point will be covered
in greater detail in Chapter VI).
Particular problems are caused by budget cuts and so
the current research focused on this critical situation.
Holding open discussions to resolve budget cuts imposed from
"above" is considered inappropriate in the Saudi management
environment. Managers, therefore, put their arguments and
justifications in writing. Thus, the consequences of budget
decisions are referred to higher management or the board of
directors.
Responses to Q1-2 , a (Appendix C) showed that sixty-nine
per cent (69%) of the participating managers prefer to put
their arguments to restore their budget in writing. The
results are indicated in Table 10.
(Con't.)
2- Steven Fink, Crisis Management. American Management
Association, New York, USA., 1986, p. 15.
3-Ibid., pp. 23-24.
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Table 10
FORMALITY/INFORMALITY IN BUDGET CRISIS
Item *
Saudis Westerners
Valid %
Frequency % Frequency %
Choice:	 a) 20 17.5 3 11.5 16
b) 79 69.3 18 69.3 69
c) 10 8.8 5 19.2 11
d) 5 4.4 4
114 100 26 100 100
* Key:
a) use personal relationship and speak informally,
b) write a report that shows the consequences of the
budget cut,
c) either a or b,
d) take what was given.
The Cross-Tabulation Results
The question of formality can be illuminated further
by presenting the results of some of the cross-tabulations
performed on the data.
The cross-tabulation analysis for use of formality in
budget crisis situations indicates the following:
O The highest use of formality fifty-nine per cent
(59%) is practiced among the largest
organisations, "2900 employees or more."
O But the second-highest use namely fifteen per cent
(15%), is in the smallest organisations, "500-800
employees".
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O Use of formality is higher though not dramatically
higher, in seventy-one per cent (71%) of the
• government organisations than in the non-
government organisations, sixty-six per cent
(66%).
O It is felt that using informality, keep writing
a report as last option, to restore a budget cut
would not have a major impact on the outcome. Only
twenty-six per cent (26%) agreed that it would
effect the outcome (Q15-2, a vs. Q1-2, a).
1.2 The Use of High Formality in Conflict
Conflict is the result of differences, not the cause
of difference. 4 For instance, a group of people may have
different goals or opinions. If they cannot negotiate over
their goal differences constructively then they would have
conflict that may be harmful.
Many participants agreed that in conflict situations
they try to resolve the conflict through constructive
discussion (Table 25). Most of them admitted later that they
had to take it to higher management (Table 11). This shows
that either they could not informally or constructively
resolve the conflict, or they believed it should be higher
management's responsibility. Thus, some answers showed that
the use of constructive discussion to resolve conflicts was
a normative (subjective) response. (The term "normative" is
used to describe a response that probably did not reflect
the respondents' true feelings, but was given due to social
values, norms, or for other intangible reasons).
4
- Marc Robert. Managing Conflict, Learning Concept, Univer-
sity Associates, San Diego, CA, USA., 1985, p. 12.
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Table 11
FORMALITY/RESOLVING CONFLICT THROUGH TOP MANAGEMENT
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always/most
of times
46 50 48 54
Sometimes * 42 42 42 29
Seldom/Never 10 8 8 17
No Answer 2 2
100% 100 100 100 100
"Sometimes" does not mean that the use of formal-
ity is excluded but that it depends on the situa-
tion, the people, or the conflict itself.
In addition, Table 11 shows that conflict resolution
through formality, or using higher management, is slightly
less in government organisations than non-government.
The Cross-Tabulation Results
The cross-tabulation analysis for using formality in
resolving conflicts shows the following:
0	 Use of formality is at high fifty-nine per cent
(59%) among executives in the 45-49 year age
range. This is mainly the general-manager and
director level.
The second highest group at forty-nine per cent
(49%) is executives in the 40-44 and 50-59 year
age range. This is mainly presidents of
organisations, general managers, directors, and
assistant general managers.
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1.3 The Use of High Formality in Getting Staff to Raise
Output Levels
Sometimes there is a need for staff to get some urgent
or extra work done, even though they are occupied by other
important tasks. Here, the manager should reprioritise or
redistribute the work load among his personnel.
Most Saudi and Western managers who participated in this
research use a high degree of formality to push their
subordinates to raise output even though their subordinates
may be very busy with other important work. There is some
difference between the two groups, but their use of formality
is frequent. The responses to Q10-2, c, are shown in table
12.
Table 12
USE OF FORMALITY FOR GETTING STAFF TO RAISE OUTPUT
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
High 84.2 69.2 84 72
Medium 10.5 19.3 11 12
(50/50)
Little 5.3 11.5 5 16
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 12 indicates that Saudi managers, followed by
Western managers to a lesser degree, use formality and
authority to push their subordinates to do more work than
they would usually be asked to do.
This frequent use of formality to get staff to raise output
nmms that management is authoritarian, using its formal
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authority to get work done* 5 . Authority is the ability to
get others to do things, accept orders, and so on, using the
formal authority an organisation has attached to a
position. 6 Some managers use authority to tell their
subordinates what to do and how to do it. The authoritarian
who pushes his staff to work by using his authority, is using
a transactional, charismatic leadership style. 7 As table
12 shows, eighty-four per cent (84%) of Saudi managers use
their formal authority to get staff to work. By comparison
some sixty-nine per cent (69%) of Western managers are also
authoritarian in this sense. This contrast suggests that this
authority-formality penchant is a distinguishing features
of Saudi management.
The same respondents were also asked if they would
discuss their work load and pressures with their superior,
and try to get their tasks reprioritised. An average of
eighty per cent (80%) of both groups agreed that most of the
time they had the opportunity to do this (Q9-2, c).
The Cross-Tabulation Results
The cross-tabulation analysis for using an authoritarian
style to raise staff output shows the following:
- Use of this authoritarian style is one hundred per cent
(100%) among directors-general and deputy directors-
generals.
* (Authoritarian means: favouring a concentration of power.
Amanager makes decisions, tells, what to do and how, without
involvement or participation of his followers.)
5-Hersey and Blanchard, 1982.
6-John Blake and Peter Lawrence. The a b c of Management,
Cassell Educational Ltd., London, UK., 1989, p. 11.
7-Kenneth Clark and Miriam Clark. Measures of Leadership,
Leadership Library of America, Inc., New Jersey, USA.,
1990, p. 86.
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Eighty-seven per cent (87%) among vice presidents.
Eighty-two per cent (82%) among department general
managers and directors.
- Seventy-eight per cent (78%) among board chairmen and
assistant ministers.
- Among all other organisation levels the authoritarian
style averages seventy per cent (70%).
1.4 The Importance of Authority
Authority is important because it gives the right to
use direction and take action; directing, coordinating, and
controlling the activities of an organisation towards its
goals. Formal authority is passed downward and divided among
personnel. In addition, employees should have a greater role
in decision-making and more autonomy. 8 Yet, sources of
authority and influence are not limited to formal organisa-
tional authority. They can be intellectual, interpersonal
skills, connections, expertise, and information.9
Seventy-three per cent (73%) of Saudi managers believe
that their formal position is the most important source of
authority and power. Fifty per cent (50%) of Western managers
believe this too, but not as much as Saudis. Table 13
indicates this (Q17-2, b).
8-Herbert Chruden and Arthur Sherman. Managing Human
Resources, South Western Publishing Co., Ohio, USA.,
1984, p. 52.
9-John W. Hunt. Managing People at Work, McGraw-Hill Co.,
London, UK., 1986, p. 71.
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Table 13
THE IMPORTANCE OF POSITION AS A MAJOR SOURCE OF POWER
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
High import-
ance
72.8 50 72 64
Medium 9.7 30.8 9 20
(50/50)
Little 10.5 11.5 11 12
No answer 7 7.7 8 4
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 13 shows that seventy-three per cent (73%) of the
Saudi managers consider their position the most important
source of power; this is again authoritarian in the sense
used here. As we will see later, positions and promotion are
the most important and highest priorities at work for Saudi
managers. A democratic or transformational leader does not
gain his power through the formal authority of his position
alone. He gains his power and influence through sharing his
leadership responsibility with his subordinates by involving
them in the planning and execution of tasks. He also utilises
his skills, intelligence, expertise, and so on. 10 Table 13
again shows that the importance of authority as a major
source of power among government administrators, and that
it is slightly less so in non-government organisations.
An authoritarian style of management can be appropriate
in crisis situations. This is similar to the situation of
a military commander during a crisis who has to use his power
and authority to command his soldiers. But most crises in
management are short term situations. Authoritarian
leadership should not be the method for the long term.
Management should rather concentrate instead on developing
their personnel to increase their qualifications and maturity.
1O_ Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard, 1982, p. 86.
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1.5 The Use of High Formality in Decision-Making
In decision-making both Saudi and Western managers tend
to use an authoritarian, individualistic style. An average
of eighty per cent (80%) of both groups showed that they are
authoritarian in their decision making and in using the
authority of their position to force implementation of their
decisions.
The findings of our study show that the use of an
authoritarian style is higher than was indicated in the
reviewed literature. The issue of decision making, still,
will be discussed further in section (B).
a-2 The Use of Informality
2-1 The Use of Informality to Identify and Resolve Problems
1.1 Job-Related Problems
Most Saudi and Western managers encourage their staff
to tell them about problems in their jobs and other
difficulties. This was indicated in the response to Q7-2,
c. Table 14 shows the results.
Table 14
INFORMALITY TO ENCOURAGE STAFF TO TALK ABOUT JOB
RELATED PROBLEMS
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Strongly
agree/agree
82 81 80 78
Disagree/
strongly
disagree
16 19 18 22
No Answer 2 0 2 0
100% 100 100 100 100
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1.2 Personal Problems at Work
The majority of Saudi and Western managers try to help
their staff in handling personal problems. They try to make
their employees feel comfortable enough to talk freely about
their problems. Western managers showed more personal concern
than Saudi managers. Table 15 shows the results of Q6-2, c.
Table 15
INFORMALITY TO ENCOURAGE STAFF TO TALK ABOUT PERSONAL
PROBLEMS
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Strongly
agree/agree
72 88 74 73
Disagree/
strongly
disagree
28 12 26 27
100% 100 100 100 100
The Cross-tabulation Results
0 Although the use of informality to resolve job and
personnel problems is high, teamwork, cooperation
and consultation are low, and conflict is high (Q6
and 7, 2, c vs. Q20 and 47, 2, a also Table 22).
This shows that informality is used for personal
concerns,	 but not necessarily for task
achievement.
The manager's age makes a difference. Of the
managers who strongly agreed that they should
encourage staff to talk about personal problems,
forty-nine (49%) are more than 45 years old. The
older the executive, the more personal concern
there seems to be.
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1.3 Handling Performance Problems
Most Saudi and Western managers are informal in handling
subordinate's performance problems. They think it would be
better to give their subordinates the freedom to resolve
problems negatively affecting their performance and work.
They also do not like to give warnings about performance,
and do not lecture their employees on how to perform better.
Warnings are viewed as a threat. These views stem from the
societal system where it is thought that it is impatient,
or unfair, for a manager to take a formal action to correct
behaviour. Western managers' actions are also impacted by
this societal system. Table 16 represents these attitudes.
It shows the results of Q8-2, c.
Table 16
HANDLING PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Give them
freedom in
resolving
their prob-
lems
27 15 20 11
Instruct them
to work
better
13 8 8 15
Warn them to
work better
8 0 5 10
Help them to
resolve
their prob-
lems and
work better
52 77 67 64
100% 100 100 100 100
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2-2 Informality and Providing Personal Favours and Welfare
2.1 Personal Favours*
Slightly less than half of the Saudi and more than half
of the Western managers did not agree that they should
satisfy their personnel by doing them personal favours. Table
17 represents the results of Q12-2, c.
Table 17
PROVIDING PERSONAL FAVOURS TO SUBORDINATES
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
High 26 19 24 28
Between 28 16 31 12
(50/50)
Low or Never 44 61 42 60
No answer 2 4 3 0
100% 100 100 100 100
2.2 Personal Welfare vs. Department Welfare
The result of Table 17 does not, however, mean that many
managers participating in this research preferred their work
and departments over the welfare of their employees, and thus
did not want to encourage their staff to ask for personal
favours such as recruiting relatives, giving merit, promotion
and/or salary increases, or not questioning absenteeism.
* (Favours or favouritism means: help to a relative or
friend for example as by giving them a job on the basis
of the relationship. This also can be called nepotism.
230
Sixty-three per cent (63%) of Saudis and thirty-one per cent
(31%) of Western managers put the welfare of their personnel
above the welfare of their departments. This could be due
to the social system effects, or to a belief that a happy
staff is a better- performing staff. This is also a serious
indication of a 1,9 leadership style. The 1,9 leader shows
a minimum concern for productivity coupled with a maximum
concern for people. With this style, a manager's primary
attention is placed on good feelings among colleagues and
subordinates, even at the expense of achieving results.11
Table 18 shows the results of Q19-2, c.
Table 18
DEPARTMENT WELFARE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN PERSONNEL WELFARE
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Strongly
agree! agree
35 65 35 13
Disagree/
strongly
disagree
63 31 62 87
No Answer 2 4 3 0
100% 100 100 100 100
As table 18 indicates, it seems an anomaly that about
two thirds of these (1,9) managers are from non-government,
profit-generating, companies, and eighty-seven per cent (87%)
are from government organisations but where generating
revenue is among their important objectives and priorities.
1 1 - Blake and Mouton. The Managerial Grid, Gulf Publishing
Co., Houston, USA., 1985.
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In summary, most Saudi and Western managers use
formality in: crisis, work pressure, and decision-making.
On the other hand sixty-three per cent (63%) of Saudis and
thirty-one per cent (31%) of Westerners use informality for
supporting personal welfare or providing staff with favours.
One should perhaps add that this discriminating finding
shares the limitation of conventional labels of the 'formal'
and 'informal' kind.
B. DECISION-MAKING
Effective managers share their leadership
responsibilities with their followers by involving them in
their tasks. They use a non-directive, democratic style,
which stresses the concern for human relationships as well
as achievement. The democratic style assures that the power
of leaders is granted at least in part by the group they are
to lead and that people can be self-directed (theory Y). 12
On the other hand the authoritarian style is often based on
the assumption that the power of leaders is derived from the
position they occupy and that people are innately lazy and
unreliable (theory X). 13 However, according to Hersey and
Blanchard there are four major situational leadership styles.
Those situations are:14
a) Low maturity of followers where the leader becomes more
authoritarian (telling and directing),
b) Low to moderate maturity (people who are unable but
willing) where the leader becomes directive but also
supportive. It is in this situation that the leader
makes decisions and sets directions, but helps his
followers to understand them.
12-Hersey and Blanchard, 1982, pp. 85-86.
13-Ibid.
14-Ibid., pp. 152-156.
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c) Participating is another style for moderate to high-
moderate maturity employees on organisational members
(people who are able but unwilling until they
participate in the decision-making and become confident
and motivated to do the task); and,
d) Delegating which is for high maturity (where people are
both able and willing to take responsibility).
Telling and selling are authoritarian styles while
participating and delegating are democratic ones.
A leadership style can be clearly identified by looking
at the way a manager makes his decisions. Decisions may be
both short and long term. They are to resolve problems, and
to balance present means and future results regarding, for
instance, the organisation's mission, goals, and plans.15
Decision-making must involve all possible talents,
feedback, and commitment. Decision-making requires a fair
level of technical, human, and conceptual skill. The higher
the decision maker's level, the more conceptual skills he
or she needs. This is essential if he is involved in
corporate planning where he needs to see the whole picture
of the company's future.16
Against the background of this Hersey and Blanchard
typology, it can be said that Saudi managers do not like
participative decision-making. They use consultation but
mostly with their colleagues, not their subordinates. The
previous literature showed that consultation among Saudi
managers was high. This research shows that when it comes
to non-operational decisions, such as setting objectives and
plans, consultation is low.
15_ Ibid., pp. 228-229.
Peter Drucker. The Practice of Management, Pan Book
Inc., London, UK., 1988, p. 113.
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Western managers who are assumed to be high in involving
subordinates in their decision-making, are also found in fact
to be highly individualistic ( i .e . non-consultative ) in their
decision-making.
1- Decision-Making for Objectives and Planning
Both Saudi, ninety-four per cent (94%) and Western,
eighty-one per cent (81%), managers are highly individual-
istic in decision-making in relation to objectives and
planning. Tables 19 and 20 show the results of Q4 and 13 -
2, a and c.
Table 19
INDIVIDUALISTIC DECISION-MAKING FOR OBJECTIVES AND PLANS
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
merit %
Non-Govern-
merit %
Very high/
high
94 81 91 88
Low/very low 6 19 9 12
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 19 also indicates that the individualistic
decision-making in both government and non-government
organisations is high.
2- Authoritarian Decision-Making
The authoritarian style in decision-making among Saudis is
clear according to answers to Q13-2, c; as indicated in table
20.
234
Table 20
HIGH AUTHORITARIAN STYLE IN DECISION-MAKING
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Very high/
high
69 53 96 62
Low/very low 26 42 3 30
No answer 5 5 1 8
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 20 shows the authoritarian management style in
non-government organisations is less than in government
organisations, yet it is still high.
Those who are not authoritarian in their decision-making
in the non-government organisations (Table 20) are not
necessarily team players. They may be 1,1 leaders in terms,
of the Blake and Mouton typology (a minimum concern for both
productivity and people). 17
 (Section "D" will indicate that
teamwork in fact has a low value.)
3- Decision-Making through Delegation
In day-to-day operations there are many decisions that
must be made without going to higher management. Those
decisions usually impact on daily operations and
productivity, for example, getting spare parts as quickly
as possible, or approving overtime. A large number of Saudi
and a third of Western managers do not give their
subordinates or line managers adequate authority to make
operational decisions. This behaviour not only affects line
17 _
 Blake and Mouton, 1985.
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management's tasks and responsibilities, but also restricts
opportunities to train and help them develop.
Delegation is low in Saudi Arabia. But delegating
operational decisions is not as low as delegation for setting
objectives and for planning decisions. Table 21 shows this.
Table 21
GIVING LINE MANAGEMENT CHANCES FOR MAKING OPERATIONAL
DECISIONS
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Very tied/
tied
50 35 42 55
Little tied/ 49 61 57 41
Not tied
No answer 1 4 1 4
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 21 shows that sixty-one per cent (61%) of Western
managers give more chances to their line managers for making
decisions related to operations. Only forty-nine per cent
(49%) of the Saudis do the same. Also, non-government
organisations are slightly better than government ones in
this respect. (Delegation will be further discussed under
section C).
The Results of Cross-Tabulation
The cross tabulation analysis for managers delegating
operational decision opportunities shows that age makes a
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difference. The highest percentage, fifty-five per cent
(55%), who give their line managers opportunities to make
operational decisions are executives 45-49 years old. These
executives are also mainly in the state-owned corporations,
for instance, oil industry.
4- Consultation
Consultation in the Arab world, and specifically in
Saudi Arabia, is low, although consultation is strongly
recommended in Islamic teachings. In addition to exchanging
opinions and getting feedback, it is a method of involving
and showing respect for others. Usually, consultation in
Saudi Arabian business involves the leader presenting ideas
and inviting questions. This is what Hersey and Blanchard
describe as the third level of authoritarian behaviour.18
The highest level is when a leader makes decisions and
announces them. The second level is when a leader presents
tentative decisions that are subject to change. The higher
the authoritarian level, in general the less effective the
leader is.
Consultation among the Saudi managers who participated
in this research is lower than is suggested in the reviewed
literature, F. Muna ' s work (1980). Consultation among Western
managers is significantly lower than for their Saudi
counterparts, though they require more consultation due to
their lack of knowledge of the Saudi environment. When we
relate the findings of tables 19 and 20, to table 22, the
results show that consultation by the managers who
participated in this research falls into the third level of
the authoritarian style as defined by Hersey and Blanchard.
Hersey and Blanchard, 1982, pp. 23-24.
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Table 22
PERCEPTION OF A NEED FOR CONSULTATION
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Strongly
agree! agree
41 23 33 35
Disagree/
strongly
disagree
58 77 66 65
No Answer 1 0 1 0
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 22 also shows that consultation is low in both
government and non-government organisations. In addition,
the results in table 22 support the previous findings that
most Saudi (ninety-four per cent, 94%) and Western (eighty-
one per cent, 81%), managers are individualistic in their
decision-making. Later, in Chapter VI, we will see that some
decisions made by Saudi management are impractical and
therefore are considered one of the major causes of problems
in Saudi corporations. This is a strong sign of lack of
participative, involvement-oriented, decision-making.
The Cross-Tabulation Results
The cross-tabulation analysis for consultation and
decision-making style shows the following:
O Of those who prefer the individualistic decision
making style, eighty-six per cent (86%) believe
that their most important source of power and
authority is their formal position (Q3-2, c).
O In the same group, seventy-seven per cent (77%)
believe that it would take too long for
subordinates to make operational decisions.
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Therefore they make decisions themselves and
announce them. This means that delegation is not
practiced by this group.
0 In addition, sixty-five per cent (65%) said that
their companies are centralised, but five per cent
(5%) said that centralisation is done only when
necessary (Q19-2, b).
0 The age of the managerial group makes a
difference. The individualistic, authoritarian
style is found to be highest at seventy-seven per
cent (77%) among executives 50-59 years old. The
second highest at seventy-four per cent (74%) is
among executives 40-45 years old. The lowest
fifty-five per cent (55%) falls in two groups, 30-
34 and 46-49 years old.
C. DELEGATION
Effective managers delegate part of their tasks. The
more democratic the manager, the more autonomy he gives his
followers for making decisions, planning, and being
responsible for their own tasks. For instance; a 9,9 manager
who is balanced uses a team approach, and encourages
participation and involvement. He delegates and gets people
involved in tasks, and encourages or stimulates
participation. 19
Delegation does not mean that the manager is not
accountable for the results of the tasks he has delegated.
Therefore, there must be trust as well as guidance and
supervision. Delegation relieves the manager of routine and
less critical task, and frees him or her for the more
important work of planning, organising, motivating, and
controlling. It extends his capacity to manage, and reduces
19 _ 
Blake and Mouton, 1985.
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delays in decision-making (as long as the needed authority
is delegated as well). In addition, it allows decisions to
be taken at the level where the relevant details are known,
and develops staff's capacity to take responsibility. 20
Managers usually delegate routine and repetitive tasks,
specialist tasks, and parts of their planning, organising,
supervising, and decision-making tasks. This is necessary
to involve or encourage involvement and share
responsibility. 21
Effective managers delegate often. Delegation helps them
to concentrate on strategy rather than operations. They
delegate operational decision-making and give their attention
to strategic decision-making that includes:22
O Definition of the scope of the organisation's
activities.
O Matching the organisation's activities to the
environment.
O Planning the activities of the organisation in
line with available resources.
O Allocating resources within the organisation.
O Planning the long-term development of the
organisation.
O Defining the total objectives of the organisation.
O Assessing the needs for change in the structure
of the organisation to allow for changes in
strategy.
20_ Michael Armstrong. How To Be an Even Better Manager,
Biddies Limited, Guildford, UK., 1988, pp. 118-120.
21-Ibid.
22-John Blake and Peter Lawrence. The a b c of Management,
Cassell, London, UK., 1989, pp. 35-36.
240
We have seen so far that fifty per cent (50%) of Saudi
executives do not delegate their tasks. They are ninety-four
per cent (94%) individualistic in making decisions (Table
19) and are highly authoritarian (Table 20). Western
executives fall within the same range. In addition, both
groups were asked about their delegation of supervising,
organising, planning, and controlling tasks (Q10-2, b).
The literature reviewed showed that delegation among
Saudi executives was low. The previous studies only looked
at delegation with respect to making decisions and not to
the broader spectrum of task delegation that this research
covers.
Table 23 shows that about half of the Saudi and Western
executives delegate, mainly their supervising and organising
andorganisational tasks. Delegating planning and controlling
tasks are at the low end of the scale (that is, are less
likely to be delegated). The delegation of organisational
tasks, which averages twenty-six per cent (26%) between the
two groups, is probably a skewed figure. The organisational
task should include staffing and other needs, but many
executives marked this because they delegate their day-to-day
organising tasks to secretaries or office managers. In
addition, level of delegation tends to be same in government
and non-government organisations.
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Table 23
AREA(S) OF DELEGATION
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Delegate
supervision
51 46 45 58
Delegate
organisation
23 31 27 28
Delegate 14 8 18 5
Planning
Delegate 12 15 10 9
Controlling
100% 100 100 100 100
Though the delegation of supervising tasks, as table
23 shows, averaged forty-eight per cent (48%) between the
two groups, this is low. It must be higher because 'we know
that' effective executives delegate most of their supervising
tasks to middle managers or line managers.
Delegating planning is nearly at the bottom for both
groups. Question no. 9-2, a, asked the participants their
opinion about the involvement level of middle management in
planning. Table 24 shows the results.
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Table 24
INVOLVEMENT OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT IN PLANNING
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
High/most are
involved
42 54 44 43
Only few/or
none is
involved
57 46 55 57
No answer 1 0 1 0
100 100 100 100
-
Table 24 also shows that middle management in planning
in both government and non-government organisation is low.
The Cross-Tabulation Results
The cross-tabulation analysis for middle-management
involvement in planning shows that organisational size makes
a difference in the level of involvement. The results are
as follows:
O Organisations with 500-800 employees had fourteen
per cent (14%) involvement of middle management
in planning.
O Organisations with 1100-1400 employees had twenty-
five per cent (25%) involvement of middle manage-
ment in planning.
O Organisations with 1400-2000 employees had forty-
two per cent (42%) involvement of middle manage-
ment in planning.
O Organisations with more than 2000 employees had
forty-nine per cent (49%) involvement of middle
management in planning.
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o Organisation with 800-1100 employees had the
highest percentage, with fifty per cent (50%)
involvement of middle management in planning.
D. COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
Cooperation in an organisation means that there is
effective communication, persuasion, coordination, mutual
understanding, team building, and cohesion. It further means
that there is the ability to handle conflict and manage
crisis.
To be effective managers must have a high level of
interpersonal skills. This will help them to handle stress
and conflict effectively, inculcate cooperation, negotiate
constructively, delegate efficiently, and encourage partici-
pation. They also need to discuss and listen effectively,
and understand what drives their subordinates. 23 These
skills also help managers in building effective teams.
Managers need to maintain cohesion within their group and
create a dynamic group attitude. They must believe that
people are open, truthful, committed (or motivated to become
committed), have a good feeling and should be able to express
those feelings freely. 24
Without cooperation in the group and organisation, there
will be an increase in stress, frustration, and conflict,
and cohesion will disappear. Stress and conflict are not
necessarily bad signs since management can handle them well.
Conflict, as we have said, is the result of differences, not
the cause of the difference. Blind agreement on everything
would be unnatural and enervating. Disagreement should come
23 _ TomLupton. Management and The Social Sciences, Penguin
Books, Ltd., Middlesex, UK., 1983, pp. 14-17.
24_ Michael Armstrong, 1988, pp. 121-138.
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out into the open where the manager can explore the issues
and resolve the conflict.
Conflict resolution is based mainly on cooperation, the
facilitation of constructive and honest discussion, and on
effective negotiation. 25
Half of the participants in this research believe that
conflict should be resolved through honest, open, and
constructive discussion. The result of identifying and
analysing cooperation and conflict handling, shows that
conflict within the participating organisations is very high.
This indicates that many responses regarding constructive
and effective conflict resolution were normative.
1- Cooperation and Teamwork
Both Saudi and Western managers were asked "What is the
most important value at your work?" (Q20-2, a) The result
with respect to teamwork is as follows:
O Saudis: eight per cent (8%) believed that teamwork
was the most important value at their work.
O Westerners: fifteen per cent (15%) believed that
teamwork was the most important value.
Teamwork clearly has little perceived value in Saudi
organisations.
2- Handling Conflict
The participants were asked how management should handle
conflict (Q30-2, a). The results are shown in table 25.
25 - Michael Armstrong, 1988, pp. 57-60.
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Table 25
HANDLING CONFLICT
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
- Constructive
discussion
55 61 66 29
- Negotiation 1 4 1 2
- Call a third
party
4 4 2 7
- Set policy 20 23 14 38
- Restructure
departments
3 4 4 18
- Separate
conflicting
parties by
a coordina-
tor posi-
tion
5 0 2 2
- Satisfy
parties'
needs
1 0 1 2
- Set new
objectives
or stand-
ards
6 4 5 2
- No answer 5 0 5 0
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 25 shows that the non-government organisations
are low in resolving conflict effectively and/or informally.
In addition, it shows that using discussion to resolve
conflict in government organisations was rated high (fifty-
eight per cent (58%) average). This is likely to be a
normative answer since:
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- Confrontation is disliked in Saudi Arabia.26
Confrontation is to meet face to face, confronting
facts and challenges (see also section "E")
- Negotiation, which really goes hand in hand with
discussion, was only two per cent (2%). Setting
a policy to resolve conflict was the first choice
for managers in non-government organisations and
the second choice for managers in government ones.
However, negotiation in the majority of Saudi
organisations is mostly done through formality,
using for instance, letters, as was discussed in
section A.
3- Cooperation in Organisations
The participants were asked to rate the following (Q47-
2, a) :
"Management in my company is very cooperative; we seldom
have conflict". The results are shown in table 26.
Table 26
COOPERATION IS HIGH, CONFLICT IS LOW
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always/most
of time
47 35 54 21
Sometimes/
little
51 65 46 77
No Answer 2 0 0 2
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 26 shows that an average of fifty-eight per cent
26
- Abdulaziz M. Malaika. Time Management In Saudi Arabian
Business, Dar Al-Alem Printing, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
1991, p. 98.
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(58%) of the participants believe that cooperation in their
companies is low and conflict is high. It further indicates
that cooperation is low in the non-government organisation,
and is not high enough in the government ones.
4- Cooperation among Management
The participants were also asked if they agreed that
management in their organisation is cooperative and whether
managers understood each other well (Q29-2, a). The responses
are given in table 27.
Table 27
COOPERATION AMONG MANAGEMENT IS HIGH
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always/most
of time
79 69 81 64
Sometimes/
little/
never
12 27 10 32
No Answer 9 4 9 4
100% 100 100 100 100
The positive response in this table also appears
normative. The participants may have felt they were under
observation through the survey and did not want to give a
bad impression of themselves, or they felt that cooperation
was the way it should be, not necessarily what was happen-
ing. Yet, table 27 shows that cooperation among managers in
the non-governmentorganisations is less than among managers
in government ones.
Other responses to the survey probably show what was
happening within the organisations more accurately. As seen
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in sections (D), 1 through 3, conflict was high, cooperation
low, and a very low value was placed on teamwork. Section
(A) also showed that resolving conflict was accomplished
primarily with high formality. The following, Section 5, also
shows that there is a much conflict in the organisations
observed, although cooperation received a somewhat higher
rating. .
5- Conflict at Work
The participants were asked to rate how often conflict
at work occurs. The results are represented in table 28 (Q33-
2, a).
Table 28
THE OCCURRENCE OF CONFLICT AT WORK
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always/very
often/often
64 81 59 88
Seldom/never 36 19 41 12
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 28 further shows that conflict in the government
organisations is high, but is higher in the non-government
ones.
In summary, the responses in 1 through 5 clearly show
the following:
When questioned about cooperation as between
individuals, managers' responses were again normative.
When the questions related to the organisation, most
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responses were negative. The low value placed on
teamwork, the emphasis on setting policies to resolve
conflicts, are strong indicators that there is a high
level of conflict among the Saudi and Western managers,
and in their organisations.
The Cross-Tabulation Results
The cross-tabulation analysis for conflict at work shows
the following relationships:
O Conflict is the highest, eighty per cent (80%) ,
in organisations with 1700-2000 employees.
O The second highest level of conflict, seventy-five
per cent (75%) , is in organisations with over 2000
employees.
O The third highest level of conflict, seventy per
cent (70%) , is in organisations with 500-800
employees.
O Conflict is significantly higher in non-government
organisations (59% vs. 88%) .
The high level of conflict reported in organisations
with 500-800 employees seems an anomaly. Small organisations
should have less conflict since discussion, negotiation, and
openness should be easier. Managers in the small organisa-
tion can meet and talk more frequently, with less organisa-
tional structures and barriers.
The higher level of conflict in non-government organisa-
tions also seems strange. Non-government organisations are
profit based, and should have less office politics and less
bureaucracy. Conflict is high because of using formal methods
to resolve conflict, individualistic decision making, low
levels of delegation and participation, and little
consultation and cooperation.
27
- Malaika, A.M. 1991, p 126-127.•
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E. CONFRONTATION AND CRITICISM
Confrontation and constructive criticism are very
important to bring change and adjustments into work and life.
Constructive criticism and confrontation also provide an
ongoing basis to discuss differences, uncover disagreement,
and resolve conflict.
Feedback is indeed supported by Islamic teachings. If
the other side does not listen to the feedback that can
effect the whole group, then confrontation becomes important
and constructive criticism must be put into practice. People
are not only influenced by their religious beliefs but by
societal values and norms as well. A particular behaviour
maybe supported in religious teaching, for instance, placing
value on time, but some social attitudes impact on time
value. Consequently, the value placed on time becomes less.
Thus, even though the society knows that time is important,
it does not try to change those attitudes that impact on time
utilisation. 27 Confrontation and criticism are among the
kinds of behaviour which Saudi society does not encourage
from early childhood. A dislike of confrontation and
criticism is strong among many Saudi families and tribes.
This dislike stems from an almost absolute respect for
elders. It is deemed improper to criticise their behaviour,
even when they are wrong. 23 This dislike was very strong
before 1970. Education and social development, particularly
throughout the 1980s, have softened the intensity of the
dislike for criticism and confrontation.
The Saudi managers who p rticipated in the rese. rch were
found to be moderate in t eir use of confrontation and
criticism. This mid-level rating should probably be lower
Muna, Farid A. The AL.. .. Executive, St. Martins Press,
New York, USA., 1980, p. 65.
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because many of the answers appear to be normative. This has
occurred because the respondents know that Islam teaches that
confrontation and criticism are acceptable, and modern
management techniques use them as well. The Saudi managers
do not want to give a poor impression of themselves', or
appear not to embrace modern techniques. Western managers,
coming from societies that openly use confrontation and
criticism, showed some courage in the interviews when they
said they rarely practiced criticism because they found that
it hurt Saudi, and Arab, feelings. Although moderated, the
dislike of confrontation and criticism is still strong in
the Kingdom.
The dislike of confrontation and criticism is behind
the high level of conflict in Saudi management and organisa-
tions. Conflict happens frequently because colleagues do not
want to discuss differences and are not receptive to criti-
cism. Nearly half of the participants refused or were
hesitant to explain their actions at work (Table 32) .
Tables 29 to 34 show the results of respondents' answers
to questions related to confrontation, criticism, feedback,
and supporting subordinates ideas and suggestions.
Table 29
ENCOURAGING PERSONNEL TO GIVE FEEDBACK AND IDEAS
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Strongly
agree! agree
76 77 82 59
Disagree/
strongly
disagree
23 23 17 41
No Answer 1 0 1 0
100% 100 100 100 100
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Table 29 reflects answers to Q41-2, c. It shows that
encouraging personnel to give feedback is lower in the non-
government organisations. Although government organisations
are higher in this respect, supporting personnel for their
feedback tends to be low. This is indicated in table 30.
Table 30
SUPPORT STAFF FOR THEIR FEEDBACK AND IDEAS
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always/
most of time
56 34 55 42
Sometimes/
never
41 62 43 55
No Answer 3 4 2 3
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 30 reflects answers to Q15-2, c. It shows that
supporting personnel for their feedback is somehow low in
both government and non-government organisation.
In summary, although an average of seventy-seven per
cent (77%) of Western and Saudi managers encourage their
subordinates to give feedback and ideas, only fifty per cent
(50%) of them said they would support their subordinates in
this respect.
While encouragement and support of personnel to give
feedback is moderate, the willingness to listen to criticism
should not be higher. Table 31 shows the results in this
concern (Q16-2, c).
253
Table 31
WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO CRITICISM
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Strongly
agree/agree
67 57 75 45
Strongly
disagree/
disagree
30 39 22 51
No Answer 3 4 3 4
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 31 shows that the willingness to listen to
criticism is moderate in the non-government organisations
and somehow higher in the government ones, which supports
the results of tables 29 and 30. However, the participants
were asked about their willingness to listen to criticism
about themselves and their actions. The results were fairly
high among the Saudi managers, but again this is likely to
be a normative response. Listening to criticism by the Saudi
managers does not necessarily mean taking any action to make
adjustments. It means giving people a chance to verbalise
their feelings and feel better. On the other side, thirty-
nine per cent (39%) of the Western managers, who are supposed
to be more open to criticism because of their home cultural
environment and experience, surprisingly indicated reluc-
tance to listen to criticism. During the interviews, a few
of the Western managers said they thought that their Saudi
colleagues and subordinates were not in a position to
criticise their Western colleagues behaviour and actions,
so they saw no advantage in allowing them to do so.
The following tables, 32 to 34 explore further openness
to criticism and management's willingness to explain its
action.
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Table 32
REFUSAL TO EXPLAIN ACTIONS
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Strongly
agree/agree
45 50 40 66
Strongly
disagree/
disagree
54 46 59 30
No Answer 1 4 1 4
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 32 reflects answers to Q20-2, c. It shows that
about half of the participants agreed that they refuse to
explain their actions at work. However, the non-government
organisation managers refused to explain their actions more
often than did the government sector managers.
Table 33
THE MANAGER CRITICISING POOR WORK OF HIS UNIT
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always/most
of time
95 92 88 78
Sometimes/
never
4 4 11 18
No Answer 1 4 1 4
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 33 reflects answers to Q17-2, c. The participants
were asked if they criticised poor work in their units. The
responses were very high in this area, and in both government
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and non-government organisations.
However, these results are contrasted with those for
using confrontation and criticism to improve subordinate
performance (Table 16), and show that criticism in this
respect was rated very low.
Table 34
THE MANAGER CRITICISING POOR WORK OF OTHER UNITS
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always/most
of time
65 58 45 43
Sometimes/
never
34 38 54 53
No Answer 1 4 1 4
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 34 reflects answers to Q18-2, c. The participants
were asked if they criticised poor work in other units.
Although the results were moderate, indication of criticism
was lower than the results in Table 33. This is mainly
because the criticism was related to units other than their
own.
To summarise, Saudi managers tend to be slightly higher
than their Western counterparts in accepting criticism and
confrontation, even though this is contrary to societal
values and norms. This is due either to normative responses
from Saudi managers that pushed their positive rating higher,
or equally plausibly to the Western managers trying to adjust
to Saudi society and avoid the clashes that criticism would
cause. Confrontation and criticism in Saudi Arabian
management have become more prevalent since 1970, but
conflict has increased too. This increased conflict is due
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to the fast business expansion, and because criticism is not
constructive enough. This area, still, needs further
research.
The Cross-Tabulation Results
The cross-tabulation analysis concerning confrontation
and criticism shows the following:
0 Encouraging subordinates to give feedback and
ideas are: highest among e%ecutives aged 45-49
years old at sixty-four per cent (64%),
second highest among executives aged 35-39 years
old at fifty per cent (50%),
third highest among executives aged 50-59 years
old at thirty-four per cent 34%) , and
lowest among executives aged 40-44 years old at
fourteen per cent (14%) .
0  Encouraging subordinates to give feedback and
ideas are: highest in industrial government
organisations such as the oil industry, eighty-
five per cent 85%
second	 highest	 in	 business
	
government
organisations, such as national airlines, seventy-
eight per cent 78%) , and
lowest in non-government organisations fifty-
eight per cent (58%) -
0 Managers who think that management must be cooper-
ative and understanding (Q29-2, a) criticise the
poor work of their units much more than the
others. They represent seventy-one per cent (71%)
of the whole group.
0 Managers who t ink that they should not explain
their actions represent seventy-five per cent
(75%) of the group that gives a low rating to
cooperation among managers.
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lack technical skills. Without sufficient technical skills
he or she cannot fully perform major management functions,
such as planning and problem solving. The manager must
improve his skills, practices, and keep updating his knowl-
edge and attitudes.
The participants were asked to view themselves and their
counterparts. For instance, Saudi participants were asked
how they would view both Saudi and Western managers. Question
nos. 18 and 19-2, a, asked the participants about their views
regarding obsolescence in management skills and knowledge,
and the adequacy of social and cultural knowledge. The
responses are as follows:
1. Ninety per cent (90%) of Saudis viewed themselves
as obsolescent (for instance, lacking, or out of
date) in both technical skills and management
skills and knowledge.
2. Sixty-two per cent (62%) of Westerners viewed
their Saudi colleagues as obsolescent in both
technical skills and management skills and knowl-
edge.
	
3.	 Saudis viewed Westerners as obsolescent in:
a) Social and cultural knowledge, forty-three
per cent
b) Technical skills and management knowledge and
skills, forty per cent (40%).
	
4.	 Westerners viewed themselves as obsolescent in:
a) Social and cultural knowledge, forty-six per
cent (46%);
b) Technical skills and management skills and
knowledge, four per cent (4%).
Items 1 and 2 show that there is much perception of
deficiency among Saudi managers in both technical skills and
management skills and knowledge. Items 3a and 4a show that
Saudi managers view Western managers as inadequate regarding
their knowledge of Saudi Arabian society and culture. This
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conforms to the view that there is a need for Western
managers to improve their knowledge and gain a better
orientation to the Saudi culture. Dr. Kurashis' work in the
reviewed literature also showed there was a strong need to
familiarise non-Saudis, particularly Westerners, with Saudi
culture.3°
Only four per cent (4%) of the Western managers viewed
themselves as obsolescent or lacking in technical skills and
managerial skills and knowledge, while forty per cent (40%)
of the Saudis viewed them as deficient in these areas. It
seems that some Western managers in Saudi Arabia have become
out of date in their technical and management skills and
knowledge. This is mainly among those managers who have been
in the Kingdom for several years. During their tenure, they
have not had opportunities to attend conferences and semi-
nars.
In Saudi Arabia it is rare to send an expatriate on a
course, whether it is conducted locally or abroad. Addition-
ally, most Western managers who participated in this research
have dual roles. A Western manager may have been hired as
an engineer, for example, but he is probably operatiffg as
a section or division head as well. The selection of these
managers was based on technical knowledge and background with
little consideration given to managerial experience or
skills.
The Saudi managers who participated in the research have
developed their view of Western manager obsolescence partly
based on the Westerners' lack of cultural knowledge. This
lack showed Western managers to be ineffective in handling
activities that required human skills. Consequently, the
- Dahlan, Hassan A. Politics, Administration and Develop-
ment in Saudi Arabia. Amana Corp., Brentwood, MD, USA.,
1990, p. 274.
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Saudis thought that the Western managers lacked management
knowledge and skill in a more general way.
G. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF BOTH WESTERN AND SAUDI MANAGERS
AS VIEWED BY THE PARTICIPANTS
The following are the views of both Western and Saudi
managers who participated in this research. They are evalua-
tions and opinions regarding both groups of managers, their
attitudes, and work preferences. The results are compiled
from answers to Q12 to 17, 39, and 40-2, a. The responses
show that Western managers are active, high in their
efficiency, and hardworking. It also shows that the important
things for them at work are their tasks and work performance.
The high rating in these characteristics shows there is not
a lack of technical skills, managerial skills or knowledge
as perceived by the Saudi managers.
1-	 Westerners
1.1	 Many Saudis	 viewed	 Western managers
	 as	 hard-
working and active. Those who did not respond said
that they lacked direct experience with Westerners
at their work.
Hard-working 31.6%
Active* 25.4%
Competitive 13.2%
Achievers 13.2%
Open minded 6.1%
Persistent** 3.5%
Socialising*** 2.6%
Social club type 2.6%
Lazy 1.8%
100.0%
(Active means energetic and proactive.)
(Persistence means not giving up easily; trying hard
to get things done.)
(Socialising means spending time in social activities
not related to work.)
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1.2	 Many Western managers viewed themselves as active
and hard-working too.
Active 38.4%
Hard-working 23.0%
Competitive 12.0%
Open minded 7.6%
Achievers 3.8%
Persistent 3.8%
Lazy 3.8%
Socialising 3.8%
Social club type 3.8%
100.0%
The above results indicate that few Westerners
were not satisfied with their achievement, or there
were some obstacles that prevented them from achieving
what they wanted.
1.3	 Saudis thought that high priorities at work for
Westerners were:
Task 50.0%
Performance 29.0%
Rewards* 14.0%
Training 2.6%
Relationships 2.6%
Promotion 0.9%
Position** 0.9%
100.0%
* Rewards = incentives. This is a reasonable percentage.
Any expatriate that leaves his home country and works
abroad has expectations and goals. Rewards are one of
them.
** Western managers who thought that getting a position
was the most important thing at work probably thought
so because they were authoritarian, as was indicated
in section (B). A priority for position would not be
for higher salary alone, since they would have chosen
rewards instead. Choosing position might be to give
them enough authority to help them do their jobs.
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1.4 Western managers ranked their priorities at work
as:
Performance	 30.8%
Tasks	 27.0%
Rewards	 19.2%
Positions	 11.6%
Training	 3.8%
Relationships	 3.8%
Promotion	 3.8%
100.0%
Although half of the Saudis viewed tasks as the
most important thing for the Western managers, most of
the Western managers did not agree. Yet, Western
managers were low with respect to relationships and
socialising, and high with respect to tasks and
performance. They can justifiably be called task
oriented (9,1) but not the social club type (1,9).31
1.5 Saudis viewed Western managers as better than
Saudi managers in:
Efficiency*	 30.7%
Punctuality
	 24.6%
Time Management 	 13.1%
Effectiveness**	 11.4%
Teamwork	 5.3%
Meetings	 3.5%
Supervision	 3.5%
Delegation	 3.5%
Interpersonal skills 3.5%
Socialising	 0.9%
100.0%
* Efficiency means: a measure of the level of output
achieved compared to the level of input consumed.
** Effectiveness is concerned with outputs. The more
successfully an activity conducted, the higher the
degree of effectiveness achieved.
31
- Blake and Mouton. The Managerial Grid, 1985.
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It seems that Western managers were rated low in
their concern for teamwork, supervision, and interper-
sonal or human skills. The Saudi perception in the
above supports the view that most Westerners were
highly task oriented (9,1) and much less concerned with
relationships. In addition, the low rate of delegation
indicates that Westerners appear to prefer the authori-
tarian style in management.*
1.6 Western managers viewed themselves as better than
the Saudi managers in:
Efficiency
	
38.4%
Punctuality
	
38.4%
Effectiveness	 11.6%
Teamwork	 7.7%
Time Management	 3.9%
Supervision	 0.0%
Delegation	 0.0%
Meetings	 0.0%
Interpersonal skills 0.0%
Socialising	 0.0%
100.0%
The results of the above, 4 and 5, are almost the
same as 6, except that Western managers rated them-
selves very low in effective meetings and time
management (meetings and time management are discussed
in the next chapter). This was a result of the low
value Saudi society places on time. The results
reinforce the perception that Western managers show low
concern for relationships (1,9), and high concern for
their tasks (9,1). They did not like to delegate their
tasks, and did not like socialising at work.32
1.9 means: a minimum concern for production coupled
with a maximum concern for people. 9.1 means: a maximum
concern for production coupled with a minimum concern
for peop1e.3J
32-Ibid.
33-Ibid.
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The Western managers did not rate themselves
better than the Saudis in supervision because they
lacked cultural knowledge. This shortcoming also made
them think that they were not better in interpersonal
skills. They confirmed that because of their lack of
knowledge of the culture, they could not use their
interpersonal skills effectively. This also affected
their supervision and delegation levels. Not speaking
Arabic further caused ineffective communication and
misunderstanding. (This is supported in the next analy-
sis Q-2.5 which shows that Saudi managers are viewed
as better than Western managers in supervision and
delegation.)
The negative responses to delegation also show
that Western managers are individualistic at work,
especially in activities that require subordinate
participation. Western managers were also rated low in
teamwork.
In summary, most of the Western managers were
found to be strongly task oriented, authoritarian in
style, and individualistic in most of their tasks and
activities.
1.7 Work Preference. Saudis viewed Westerners work's
preference as follows:
Technical jobs 66.7%
Craft jobs 14.9%
Management jobs 7.9%
Manual jobs 7.9%
Office jobs 2.6%
100.0%
Saudis thought that most Westerners do not prefer
managerial jobs in Saudi Arabia.
1.8 Work Preference. Western participants viewed
themselves as preferring the following types of
jobs:
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Technical jobs
Management jobs
Manual jobs
Craft jobs
Office jobs
38.0%
31.0%
19.0%
8.0%
4.0%
100.0%
2- Saudis
2.1 Western managers viewed Saudi managers as lazy and
socialising far too much at work.
Lazy	 30.8%
Socialising	 19.2%
Social club type
	 11.6%
Active	 11.6%
Competitive	 7.7%
Hard-working	 7.7%
Achievers	 3.8%
Persistent	 3.8%
Open minded	 3.8%
100.0%
2.2 Saudi managers viewed themselves as:
Over socialising	 35.1%
Social club type	 26.3%
Active	 10.5%
Hard working	 9.6%
Lazy	 7.0%
Competitive	 6.2%
Persistent	 2.6%
Open minded	 1.8%
Achievers	 0.9%
100.0%
The above results were personal views of Western
executives working in Saudi Arabia who viewed many of
Saudi managers as lazy and unproductive. When the
Saudis responded to the same questions about them-
selves, laziness was rated fifth on the list. Though
most of the Saudis did not rate themselves as lazy,
they did admit that they were not achievers and did not
work hard enough. They also admitted that they were
very high, sixty-one point four per cent (61.4%) in
social activities (1,9) and not greatly concerned with
266
productivity.34
2.3 Western participants thought that the high priori-
ties for Saudi managers at work were:
Position	 57.7%
Promotion
	 19.3%
Reward	 11.5%
Relationships	 11.5%
100.0%
2.4 Saudi managers thought that their priorities at
work were:
Position	 36.0%
Promotion	 20.0%
Relationships	 16.7%
Tasks	 11.4%
Reward	 7.9%
Performance	 6.2%
Training	 1.8% 
100.0%
There is not much difference for the priorities
of Saudis as viewed by the two groups, except that
Saudis gave some importance to tasks, performance, and
training. It seems that position was the most important
thing for a third of the Saudi managers, possibly for
gaining authority and power. Promotion and rewards were
also rated highly. This could be because the Saudi
managers, like others, want a better income and im-
proved living standards. Relationships for Saudis
(concern) were rated high for two major reasons:
relationships in Saudi Arabia are a principle method
of getting promotions through the organisation
hierarchy (see next chapter), and a reflection of Saudi
cultural practices.
2.5 Western participants viewed Saudi managers as
better than themselves in:
34 - Blake and Mouton, 1985.
2.6
Socialising
Supervision
Delegation
Efficiency
Team-work
Interpersonal skills
Saudi	 managers	 viewed
61.5%
11.6%
11.6%
7.7%
3.8%
3.8%
better
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than
100.0%
themselves
Western managers in:
Socialising 59.6%
Efficiency 8.8%
Effectiveness 8.0%
Supervision 7.0%
Team-work 6.2%
Time Management 4.4%
Interpersonal skills 2.6%
Meetings 1.8%
Delegation 0.8%
Punctuality 0.8%
100.0%
There is again a lot of similarity between the
views of two groups, except that eight per cent (8%)
of the Saudis felt they were more effective. This is
probably again because of cultural reasons, where
language is a barrier for the Western manager. The same
holds true for the Western managers who felt Saudis
were better in supervision and efficiency, where
language is a critical tool. Some Western managers have
Saudi counterparts who have been educated abroad and
have gained a Western orientation. Those managers
generally rated their colleagues better in supervision
and delegation. This situation, however, is limited
to a few observations.
Socialising was given a very high rating by both
groups. This concurs with earlier views in this sub-
section (1 and 2) that many Saudi managers were lazy,
unproductive, and did not work hard.
2.7 Work Preference. Western participants viewed the
Saudis as preferring the following type of work:
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Management jobs	 69.2%
Office jobs	 23.1%
Technical jobs	 7.7%
100.0%
2.8 Work Preference. Saudis viewed themselves as
preferring the following type of work:
Management jobs	 64.9%
Office jobs	 18.4%
Technical jobs	 14.0%
Craft jobs	 1.8
Manual jobs	 0.9%
100.0%
Again, there is a high correlation between the views
of the two groups. Management jobs are preferred by most
Saudis; Technical jobs were given slightly a higher rating
by the Saudis speaking for themselves. Craft and manual jobs
simply are not preferred in Saudi Arabia, and this is
reflected in the figures.
H. NEEDS FOR IMPROVEMENT AMONG SAUDI MANAGEMENT
An open-ended question was asked concerning the areas
where Saudi management needs to improve. The responses were
cumulative, where a participant could agree on more than one
statement. The question was:
What does Saudi management need to improve? (Q3-2, b)
The responses were:
1. Saudi management needs to be open, honest, and
clear (response by twenty-two per cent (22%) of
Saudis, thirty-eight per cent (38%) of
Westerners).
2. Saudi management needs to understand policies,
their effects and necessity (thirty-one per cent
(31%) Saudis).
3. Saudi management needs to understand the impor-
tance of objectives especially for long term
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success (thirty-one per cent (31%) Saudis).
4. Saudi managers are not punctual and not committed
to hard work (fifty-seven per cent (57%) Saudis,
forty-six per cent (46%) Westerners).
5. Saudi management needs to increase its commitment
and loyalty to the organisation (fifty-seven per
cent (57%) Saudis, sixty-nine per cent (69%)
Westerners).
6. Saudi management is not participative. Their
instructions, goals, and relationships are not
clear and not understood (twenty-two per cent
(22%) Saudis).
7. Top management is over centralised and individual-
istic (twenty-one per cent (21%) Saudis, thirty-
five per cent (35%) Westerners).
8. Management needs to be impersonal, and to stop
engaging in favouritism and personal relationships
(thirty-nine per cent (39%) Saudis, forty-six per
cent (46%) Westerners).
9. Saudi management needs training and development
(seventy-nine per cent (79%) Saudis, ninety-two
per cent (92%) Westerners), mainly in decision
making and planning (sixty-one per cent (61%)
Saudis, fifty-eight per cent (58%) Westerners).
10. Saudi managers need to be open with each other,
exchange ideas and opinions, and meet more fre-
quently to learn from each other's experiences
(fifty-three per cent (53%) Saudis).
11. Saudi management should avoid personal relation-
ships at work and be more task oriented (thirty-
five per cent (35%) Saudis, sixty-two per cent
(62%) Westerners).
12. Saudi managers must become professional, they
should develop themselves through professional
training and reading (thirty-nine per cent (39%)
Saudis, thirty-five per cent (35%) Westerners).
13. Saudi management needs to improve its time utili-
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sation and to appreciate hard work (twenty-five
per cent (25%) Saudis, twenty-seven per cent (27%)
Westerners).
14. Saudi managers need to be objective and less
emotional (twenty-six per cent (26%) Saudis,
forty-six per cent (46%) Westerners).
15. Saudi managers need to have better interpersonal
skills (seventeen per cent (17%) Saudis).
16. Saudi managers need more experience (eleven per
cent (11%) Saudis).
17. Saudi management must stop exploiting connections
and using blatant favouritism (seventeen per cent
(17%) Saudis).
18. Saudi management needs to be flexible and partici-
pative (fifteen per cent (LW Saudis, nineteen
per cent (19%) Westerners).
19. Saudi managers need to be more cooperative and use
teamwork (thirty-five per cent (35%) Westerners).
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SUMMARY
Most Saudi managers lack effective management and
leadership characteristics and skills. In addition, many
Western managers working in Saudi Arabia are affected by
their Saudi colleagues and by the Saudi culture. Therefore,
they do not engage in effective management practices or
display the attitudes that might be expected of them. Thus,
for instance:
1- The majority of both Saudis and Westerners rank
high in the use of formality in budget crises
(sixty-nine per cent (69%) both), conflict
resolution (forty-eight per cent (48%) average),
and getting subordinates to raise their output
(eighty per cent (80%) average). Also, positional
authority is very important as a source of power
for most of the Saudis, seventy-three per cent
(73%). Decision-making, mainly with regard to
objectives and planning, is very formal as well;
and almost all Saudis, ninety-four per cent (94%),
and most Westerners, eighty-one per cent (81%),
are individualistic in their decision making. They
are authoritarian, and only forty-one per cent
(41%) of Saudis and twenty-three per cent (23%)
of Westerners use consultation. Also, delegation
is limited to delegation of supervisory tasks
(fifty per cent (50%) average). Delegation of
planning, controlling, and organisation is low
( nineteen per cent (19%) average), and involvement
of middle management in planning is only fifty per
cent (50%).
There was no significant difference between government
and non-government organisations in the above, except
that the authoritarian style is thirty per cent (30%)
more common in government organisations. However, the
272
individualistic style indecision-making for objectives
and planning is high in both sectors. Furthermore, the
more senior the manager, the more authoritarian he
tends to be. Organisations of middle size have more
middle-management involvement in decision-making, fifty
per cent (50%).
2- The use of informality is applied frequently to
correct subordinates' low performance, for
instance, absenteeism, where giving direct orders
to improve performance is rarely used, and
warnings are avoided. Also, the use of informality
to encourage staff to talk about work and personal
problems is high, but does not necessarily lead
to improvement. It is rather a show of concern.
Yet, many Saudi managers, sixty-three per cent
(63%), believe that the welfare of their personnel
is more important than the efficiency of their
department, while only a third of Westerners,
thirty-one per cent (31%), feel the same. This
shows a low task orientation. It is worth
mentioning that this concern is twenty-five per
cent (25%) higher among the managers of non-
government organisations than among those in
government organisation. However, the older the
manager, the more concern he is likely to display.
3- Saudi managers are too concerned with personal
relationships at work, while almost all Western
managers place a low value on personal
relationships. An average of sixty per cent (60%)
of the Saudi managers admit that they provide
personal favours to their subordinates, and that
the welfare of their subordinates is more
important than that of their departments. The
same group feel that socialising at work is
important and therefore relationships have a high
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priority, following position and promotion.
Sixty-five per cent (65%) of Western managers
believe that the department's welfare is more important
than their subordinates' welfare while the other
thirty-five per cent (35%) believe the opposite.
4- Cooperation among both groups tends to be
reasonable when related to non-major and/or
organisational functions change. Teamwork is very
low. Confrontation and criticism are not tolerated
and though many managers listen to criticism, they
do not modify their decisions as a result. Also,
about half of both groups do not like to explain
their actions. Therefore, conflict is high; an
average of sixty-seven per cent (67%) of both
groups indicated that there is a high conflict
level at their work. Although conflict tended to
be resolved constructively, half of the
participants would take it formally to higher
management.
Conflict is higher in middle size corporations.
There is a significant difference between government
and non-government organisations regarding conflict,
the former reporting a thirty-one per cent (31%) higher
level.
5- Lack of up to date management knowledge among
Saudi managers is high. Almost all of them lack
comprehensive management skills, ninety per cent
(90%). Also, many lack the technical skills
related to their business areas. About half of the
Western managers lack social and cultural
knowledge relating to Saudi Arabia. This lack
causes them to be ineffective when trying to apply
their management and technical expertise. Because
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of the cultural difference, Westerners should
concentrate on adapting their skills effectively
to Saudi Arabian society.
6- Characteristics of most Saudi managers are that
they tend to over socialise, are very personally
oriented, put a high importance on social
relationships, and many of them are considered
lazy, sixty-eight per cent (68%). They put a high
priority on position, promotion, relationships and
rewards, eighty-one per cent (81%). Task and
performance are of very low priority. In addition,
almost all Saudi managers prefer to work in
management and administrative jobs, eighty-six per
cent (86%). But because of their high interest in
relationships and the fact that they are Arabs
they are somewhat better than Westerners at
supervision and in human skills effectiveness.
Westerners, on the other hand, are highly task-
oriented, hard-working, and better than Saudis in
efficiency, punctuality, and time management, eighty-
three per cent (83%). The same group is relatively low
in both interpersonal skills practices and relation-
ships.
7- There is a great need for training and development
of Saudi management to improve their attitudes and
performance. Furthermore, Saudi managers have to
realise that they need to be more flexible,
objective, and not so emotional, and to work
harder for self improvement.
CHAPTER "NTDE
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VI. FINDINGS RELATED TO THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT
Introduction
This chapter presents the findings of this research that
relate to the organisational context of both Saudi government
agencies ( including revenue-generating and/or production)
and non-governmental organisations. The following presents
a short description of the organisational context.
ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT
An organisation usually functions as a system. There
are several interrelated components or sub-systems, interact-
ingtogether. 1 The management system provides the framework
for coordinating and directing employees' performance towards
the objectives. This of course is supported by the other
components. For example, process, methods, and techniques.
Robert Lee and Peter Lawrence (1984) wrote a useful
description of this system, the following being a summary
of their analysis:2
An organisation's system is made up of several sub-
systems, and the sub-systems have a great influence on the
whole. The business organisation and its mission, objectives,
and major goals, with its leadership at the top, is the main
system. The mission, objectives, and goals are divided into
sub-systems, for example, marketing and production. The sub-
systems function to achieve the objectives through further
1- Herbert Chruden and Arthur Sherman. Managing Human
Resources, South Western Publishing Co., Ohio, USA.,
1984. p. 49.
2
-Robert Lee and Peter Lawrence. Organisational Behaviour,
Politics At Work, Hutchinson, London, UK., 1985, pp.
31-35.
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subdivisions, for instance, sections, and individual employ-
ees. Yet for the business organisation to achieve its goals,
these have to be realistic. Goals have to consider the
effects of both the internal sub-systems and the environment
as well. For example, what are the average local wages, tax,
and the available materials, and so on.
To cope effectively with the internal environment,
management needs ongoing and accurate information to help
in making realistic decisions, setting objective goals, and
formulating plans. There are many environmental features that
have effects on the organisation, and contribute to or impact
on its goals. Among these are the economy in which the
company is placed, the technology, laws it has to comply
with, institutions it deals with, competitors, and trade
unions.
There are many mechanisms for monitoring changes in the
environment, both external and internal. They tell us that
we must have methods for linking sub-systems so that they
will work together, and respond to change within the organi-
sation's internal environment effectively as well. This
system/sub-system concept, to be a successful one, needs the
organisation's departments to be integrated, in the sense
of working together and making decisions and plans. In
addition, it calls for the organisation to integrate within
its local environment, that is, to conform to laws, social
values, and political demands. These external effects on the
organisation will be further discussed in Chapter VII.
In summary, management has to consider the effects of
interrelationships within the organisation and at both system
and sub-system level in decision making and planning.
The following presents the analysis and findings related
to the organisation's internal context and functions, for
example, mission, objectives, planning, causes of problems
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and inter-departmental friction. It also covers employee
appraisal, rewards, promotion, budget systems, and organisa-
tional boundaries. Before presenting each group of findings
there will be a summary or introduction indicating the
importance of the topic and the findings covered. For
instance, the importance of objectives and goals is indicated
before presenting the findings related to the organisational
objectives and goals.
A. THE MISSION STATEMENT, OBJECTIVES, AND GOALS
The Mission Statement
At the total company level the mission statement is a
description of the nature of the company's business. The
correct mission statement can be used as a motivating agent,
to help management to see the opportunities, and to stretch
their vision. Once people are thinking on the right lines
it becomes less easy to overlook the obvious. Many
improvements in the way a particular company is run are so
often obvious but only after they are pointed out.3
The concept of a mission statement goes further. Once
the overall company objectives are set, it is desirable to
examine the purpose of each subsidiary company or depart-
ment, and to set objectives in a similar way for each (see
"objectives" below). Also, organisational effectiveness is
not determined by its management, objectives, and planning
alone. It is determined as well by all the things that
result in interactive and interrelated activities.4
The Objectives
Objectives here are the statements of planning purpose
developed within any kind of business plan. They are
established within the framework of a planning process, and
they normally evolve from tentative and vague ideas to more
specific declarations of purpose. Objectives, also, are
always present in a planning process though they are
sometimes unconsciously established.5
3- David Hussey. Introducing Corporate Planning, Pergamon
Press, Oxford, UK., 1985, pp. 33-34.
4- Ibid., p. 41.
5- Ibid., p. 34.
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Objectives are something to aim at, although they should be
regarded as a map grid reference rather than as a target at
the rifle range . 6
Peter prucker (1988) stresses that there is not just
one objective for a company. To search for this is like the
vain quest for the philosopher ' s stone, which turns lead into
gold. There are many objectives, and these should be
formulated so as to cover the key areas of the company. He
says that the primary component of objectives for business
organisations is the profit target (both short and long
term) .7
In addition, there are other objectives of at least
equal importance, and concentration on profit to the exclu-
sion of all other factors is likely to be harmful to the
company. In this David Hussey, 1985, mentioned that Drucker
differs from Argenti, who believes that there is only one
objective - profit, defined as a formula that includes both
growth and return to shareholders.8
Goals
The objectives discussed so far are all long term. The
next family of objectives is goals, which stretch over the
whole time span of the planning period, and are often related
to a specified date within that time span.
Goals are quantified objectives that provide a unit of
measurement, from which the chief executive can confirm that
his strategies have been carried out. This means that they
6- Ibid., p. 35.
7- Peter F. Drucker. The Practice of Management, Pan Book
Inc., London, UK., 1988, p. 32.
8_ David Hussey, 1985, p. 36.
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can only be set after strategy has been decided.9
The mission statement and the objectives are the map
grid references that show the corporate aim and target. In
addition, the goals are the landmarks and milestones which
mark the selected path the company is to take to reach the
reference point. What form should these corporate landmarks
take? The principle is that there should be quantitative
targets for every important part of company operations. There
should be as many goals as it is practical to develop. The
only constraint is that it must be possible to measure
results so that progress can be judged. There is little point
in putting a number on something that the company either has
no intention of measuring or finds impossible to measure.
The preferred targets are those against which results can
be compared, and they can be worthwhile if the costs of the
exercise are not too high relative to the benefits.10
Findings Related to Mission, Objectives, and Goals
Many Saudi corporations, both governmental and non-
governmental lack clear, defined, and understood mission
statements, objectives and goals. This was found through
answering Q2-2, a. The results are as follows:
1- Fifty-eight per cent (58%) of the participants from
non-governmental organisations, and fifty-one per cent
(51%) of those from governmental organisations
confirmed that the lack of clear, defined, and under-
stood mission, objectives and goals are major causes
of problems in their work. Both responses give a grand
total of fifty-four per cent (54%).
Lack of clear mission, and so on, as shown above (1)
9- Ibid., p. 37.
10- Ibid., p. 13.
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can be because:
1.1 It is hard for Saudi governmental corporations to
identify their objectives, because their goals are
difficult to measure. It is especially difficult
for public service organisations to specify
quantitative goals.
1.2 The fast development the Kingdom has been undergo-
ing, and the government's emphasis on meeting
public demands and needs, has caused objectives
to be changed rapidly.
Yet, fifty-eight per cent (58%) of the non-governmental
corporations should have no excuse for not having a
clear mission and well-defined objectives.
2- This lack of a clear mission, lies behind many problems
at the surveyed organisations. For instance, twenty-
three per cent (23%) of the participants believe that
their departmental objectives and goals should not
necessarily be consistent with their organisational
mission. This, still, reflects their lack of under-
standing of the nature and functions of their business.
Of these, eighteen per cent (18%) were from
governmental and twenty-eight per cent (28%) from non-
governmental organisations (Q22-2, a).
In addition, fifty per cent (50%) of the partic-
ipants both Saudi and Western, in government and non-
government, did not agree that decisions at their work
are made based on the importance of objectives and
goals (Q6-2, a).
So far, the non-governmental corporations appear to
suffer from a greater lack of clear organisational
objectives and goals, and consistency among their
departments, than the governmental organisations. This
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is due to the lack of qualified Saudi management.*
It is also because expatriates in management positions,
mainly in the private sector, do not try hard to define
their companies long-term objectives.** Most expatri-
ates do not look at the long term because they do not
stay in the Kingdom long, or because they are paid for
short-term goals such as net profit.
This problem, a lack of clear mission and under-
standing of objectives at both governmental and non-
governmental levels, is not because the leaders of
those corporations do not support their management in
setting objectives. Leadership support was found to be
high. According to fifty-eight per cent (58%) of the
participants the problem arises in many of these corpo-
rations because leadership or senior management:
- do not have a vision of the future of their
corporations.
- do not understand well-enough the nature and
purpose of their corporations.
- are not able to communicate those objectives and
visions effectively.
To find out if the organisational leadership supports
management in setting objectives, goals, and plans, the
following questions were asked to the participants:
* Governmental organisations usually have better
qualified Saudi management than the non-governmental
organisations. This is due to the preference for
government jobs among Saudi graduates during the period
from 1970-1984 (see Chapter V).
** Expatriate managers in the private sector are much more
numerous than Saudis.
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4- To what extent and at what level are you involved in
setting your departmental objectives? (Q23-2, a)
An average of eighty-six per cent (86%) of both
groups, Saudis and Westerners, said "very much" and/or
"much". This indicates that management has a high level
input in setting objectives for their departments.
5- Do you think the leader(s) at work support managers in
setting their departmental objectives and plans? (Q24-
2, a)
An average of seventy-eight per cent (78%) of both
groups said "yes", "always" or "most of the time".
Sixteen per cent (16%) said "yes", "sometimes", and six
per cent (6%) said "little" or "none".
6- Do you have flexibility in setting your department's
objectives and plans? (Q28-2, a)
An average of ninety-one per cent (91%) of both groups
said "very high" or "enough", and nine per cent (9%)
"little" or "none".
7- Then we sought to explore the question: what makes the
mission and objectives unclear? Is it the lack of
effective communication of those visions, plans, or the
lack of understanding of the corporation's purpose or
business nature as well.
The participants were asked again if they believed
that the mission must be clear to everyone, especially
management, and whether management must value this
mission. The responses were very positive: ninety-four
per cent (94%) agreed strongly (Q27-2, a).
The participants were asked again if their organi-
sation's mission was derived from their organisation's
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beliefs. Eighty per cent (80%), average of both groups
agreed, saying "always" or "most of the time".
The indications from 1 to 7, suggest that the lack of
a clear and understood mission and objectives is the result
of a lack of effective and qualified leadership. This means
that some leaders fail to see the whole picture of their
corporation. In addition, it has to do with the lack of
leadership's vision and understanding of their corporation
and its purpose. It is also, because they do not communicate
their objectives effectively, and/or do not direct their
systems and sub-systems towards those objectives. This
confirms the interpretation canvassed in the previous
chapter, that most Saudi executives are not as task oriented
as one might think.
B. PLANNING
Planning is a major management task where managers must
think about where their company is going and what it will
be doing in the years ahead.
This method of management, corporate long-termplanning, is
not a technique. It is a complete way of running a business.
Under it, the future implications of every decision are
evaluated prior to implementation. Standards of performance
are set up beyond the time horison of the annual budget. The
company clearly defines what it is trying to achieve. A
continual study is made of the environment in which the
company operates so that the changing patterns are seen in
advance and incorporated into the company's decision
process. There is no magic in this, so corporate planning
cannot guarantee that the company will never again be
affected by adverse circumstances: just as when we walk on
a crowded city street we cannot always avoid being jostled
and bumped - but that is no excuse for walking with our eyes
shut! Corporate planning is a way of keeping the companies
eyes open. 11
Planning provides an effective way of controlling a
David Hussey, 1985, p. 1.
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business. By providing a realistic model of future results,
it becomes possible to adjust strategies to keep the company
on target. It assures that resources are not wasted and that
they become available as required. Of course corporate
planning will never help a company reach targets that are
unrealistic, badly thought out, or that are the result of
purely wishful thinking.
The first principle for good planning is to consider
any normal cycle of events that is pertinent to the business.
But it is a fact that the shorter the period studied, the
more accurately the company is likely to be able to forecast
future events. This leads to the second principle: that
companies should not plan for a period longer than that which
fits the business they are in. While it might be realistic
for a forestry enterprise to plan for 29 years ahead, it is
unlikely to be a useful period for an organisation in the
theatre business. The third principle is that no company
should be dogmatic about the period, but should make sure
it chooses a period that fits its business. Most companies
seem to opt for a three, five or seven year period. The most
appropriate period for many businesses is five years, because
a lesser period usually lacks perspective. A five year plan
should be revised and updated once a year (or more frequent-
ly), and at every revision an additional year added. The
plans must be flexible, and the company must be prepared to
reconsider the whole of its strategy if events show this to
be necessary. 12
Findings Related to Planning
The previous section showed that many Saudi corporations
lack a clear mission and objectives. Without having a clear
andwell-communicated objectives, planning will be incomplete
and may take the company in the wrong direction. It was also
12_ Ibid., pp. 3-5.
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pointed out in Chapter V that fifty-five per cent (55%) of
middle managers in Saudi corporations are not involved in
planning activities (Table 24) . In addition, about eighty-two
per cent (82%) of senior managers are individualistic in
their decision-making (Table 19), which of course includes
planning as well.
However, some responses to questions related to planning
were clearly normative (in the sense of seeking to make a
good impression), while others indicated weaknesses in
planning. The following represents these responses:
1- An average of fifty-four per cent (54%) of both groups
confirmed that a lack of clear mission, objectives, and
planning is the major cause of problems at work (Q2-2,
a).
2- In addition, an average of forty-one per cent (41%)
from both groups, 32% of government, and 58% of non-
government organisations) said that the decisions and
plans made are not practical, and are therefore the
second-highest cause of problems at work (Q2-2, a).
3- Furthermore a fourteen per cent (14%) average of both
groups, said that there is not enough commitment to the
plans made, mainly in the preparation of budgets or the
disbursement of approved funds for operating and imple-
menting plans (Q16-2, b).
4- The participants said, (Q7-2, a) that their organisa-
tion's plans are based on the mission, and thus they
have along term-planning validity; ninety-one per cent
(91%) governmental, seventy-eight per cent (78%) non-
governmental. Though their answers were doubtless
normative as 1 to 3 above show, it appears that they
are unable to make good plans, especially for the long
term, because there is a lack of clear vision, mission,
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and objectives.
5- Also, the participants were asked if their companies'
plans were strategic, and/or flexible (Q8-2, a). A
seventy-five per cent (75%) average of both groups in
the governmental corporations said "yes", and fifty-
eight per cent (58%) of the non-governmental sample
said "yes".
These results (3 and 4 previously) show that the
participants tended to respond somewhat normatively,
because the questions represented a direct criticism
of their organisations.
C. STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE
Based on developed goals, and after implementing short-
term plans, for example, one year, a company should develop
a concept of personnel standards. This concept is to measure
the performance of its management and certain other employees
such as line supervisors and salesmen. Some companies used
the "management by objective" technique for performance
measurement. 13 Standards of performance are really a
logical development of the concept of goals. They motivate
employees whose performance will influence the company's
success or failure. In addition, they provide a management
tool to evaluate, promote, and reward good performance (or
correct bad performance), and they provide an early warning
when things go wrong. The standards must be established for
key areas, be realistic, and be related to job descriptions.
Findings Related to Standards of Performance
Many of the Saudi organisations that participated in
13 - Ibid., pp. 36-37.
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this study do not use management by objectives, nor do they
have standards of performance based on key areas and goals.
However, many of them have job description questionnaires,
but their JDQs are either unrealistic or not accurate. What
those organisations usually use is an annual employee eval-
uation based on a generic feedback system or last-minute
memory that is built on personal consideration rather than
achievements. In addition, most of those employees who had
an annual evaluation did not know about their evaluation
until they were asked to initial the results confirming what
their superior thought of their performance. In most
governmental and non-governmental corporations, the superior
can fill in the annual evaluation form without discussing
it with his subordinates. It is considered confidential, and
is therefore sent directly to the personnel department or
to top management.
The participants were asked if they had job descriptions
or similar documents in their organisations (Q7-2, b). The
answers were "Yes" in seventy-four per cent (74%) of the
governmental, and "Yes" in seventy-six per cent (76%) of the
non-governmental organisations.
Respondents were asked if they had an appraisal system
or standards of performance (Q8-2, b). The answers were
"Yes", for sixty-nine per cent (69%) of the governmental,
and "Yes" for sixty-six per cent (66%) of the non-govern-
mental organisations.
The following are some of the respondents' comments
regarding their JDQs and appraisal systems.
1- Job Descriptions, an average seventy-five per cent
(75%) responses:
- Are available only for management and the most impor-
tant jobs, 28% of responses.
- Are too numerical and too structured (32%).
- Are not updated as needed, or are not accurate (24%).
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In summary, eighty-four per cent (84%) of both groups,
governmental and private sector, whose organisations had job
descriptions observed that they were not as effective as they
should be.
2- Appraisal or Standards of Performance (an average of
sixty-seven per cent (67%) responses):
- Appraisal is conducted once a year, which has little
effect on performance or improvement, sixty-four per
cent (64%).
- It is not related to a training scheme or does not
reflect training needs, thirty per cent (30%).
- In addition, thirty-one Saudi participants and four
Westerners (36% average of those who have appraisals)
said:
- The appraisal system in their companies is not
practical and not objective.
- The appraisal is usually based on relationships.
- The appraisal does not reflect a need for improve-
ment.
- The appraisal does not reflect training needs, and
does not lead to action(s) required to improve
performance.
Although about two-thirds of the participants had job
descriptions and standards of performance in their companies,
almost all of them agreed that they are not effective,
realistic, and do not reflect needs for improvement.
D. POLICY, STRUCTURE, POWER, AND AUTHORITY AND RESPONSI-
BILITY
d-1 Policy
Effective organisations develop their policies to
support their strategy and objectives. These policies do not
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Findings Related to Policies
1- Sixty per cent (60%) of the Saudis, and forty-two per
cent (42%) of the Westerners believe that decisions at
their work are made based on the regulations, not the
objectives and goals; 58% governmental, 70% non-govern-
mental organisations, (Q6-2, a). This means that they
make decisions based on regulations, policies, for
instance, what to do in a specific situation rather
than on constructive discussion and team effort.
2- As we have seen in Chapter V, in conflict situations,
mainly between or among departments, the second most
common solution the participants chose was setting a
policy to resolve the conflict (22%). Thus, policy is
thought to be used for control (Table 25).
3- Policies and rules are to be strictly applied at work,
as claimed by a ninety-six per cent (96%) average of
both groups in both sectors.
The involvement of middle management in decision making
in the participating organisations is less than fifty per
cent (50%), Chapter V. In addition, policies in those
organisations are formulated by senior management with little
teamwork or involvement of middle management. These policies
are mainly for the purposes of control, rather than to give
direction. Most of these policies are not accurate, updated,
or flexible. This is a true picture of most organisations
that participated in the present research. Exceptions are
Saudi Arabian Oil Company (ARAMCO) and Saudi Arabian
Marketing and Refinery Company (SAMAREC), who have developed
their policies to be flexible and accurate, thus supporting
their objectives (four per cent (4%) of the participating
organisations).
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d-2 Structure, Power and Authority
d-2.1 Structure
An essential element of any formal organisation is
the structure through which its activities are directed
towards the desired goals. This structure helps to determine
the activities of each department. These activities become
the duties of the employees assigned to each job. In most
enterprises, the formal structure is organised and depicted
by means of organisation charts and/or manuals. Power and
bureaucratic forces that may develop within an organisation,
however, can cause the enterprise to operate somewhat
differently from the way that these charts and manuals
show.17
A major function of the organisational structure is
to establish the responsibility and authority of each
employee. The structure also establishes the channels through
which this responsibility is assigned downward to personnel
at each lower level within the structure. To perform their
respective jobs, employees must be given authority commensu-
rate with their responsibility. Conversely, they must be held
responsible for exercising this authority properly. Respon-
sibility is divided and reassigned from the board of execu-
tives, the chief executive officer, and senior management,
down to employees at the lowest level. In addition, authority
is given simultaneously with responsibility, so subordinates
can take actions to accomplish tasks and objectives. Through
the process of delegation, formal authority commensurate with
the requirements of the task is passed downward. This gives
employees autonomy and allows them to assume a greater role
18in decision making.
Thus, a formal organisation's structure establishes
the channels through which authority is formally delegated
17- Herbert Chruden and Arthur Sherman, 1984. p. 52.
18- Ibid., p. 52.
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and performance is controlled. This is called the "chain of
command". Still, an organisation's effectiveness requires
some flexibility in order to develop a more democratic work
environment where either the chain of command becomes
simplified or employees can work around it for specific
reasons. This can encourage and speed communication and
improve efficiency.19
Findings Related to Structure
Many Saudi organisations overlap in their functions,
responsibilities, and positions. They have either a very
large and complex structure, or an ineffective one (see
Chapter IV).
1. The participants were asked what the major source of
problems at their work was (Q2-2, a). The answers were:
- Organisational structure, in forty-one per cent
(41%) of the governmental, and sixty per cent
(60%) in non-governmental organisations, is not
effective (as viewed by 40% of the Saudis, and 62%
of the Westerners).
- Communication is not clear, or is conflicting, in
forty-eight per cent (48%) of government, and
seventy per cent (70%) non-government (as viewed
by 51% Saudis, and 42% Westerners).
Further comments on the structure of Saudi organisa-
tions are presented in the discussion of organisations'
boundaries in section (E).
2. Delegation is low. Most of the Saudis and Westerners
do not delegate parts of their planning and controlling
tasks, and few delegate organising. The organising task
19 - Ibid., p. 53.
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that was delegated was mainly responsibility for
administrative and secretarial work. Half of the
participants stated that they delegate supervising,
which is an operational task that should be delegated
often (Table 23) .
d-2.2 Power and Authority
Power is the capacity of effecting other peoples'
behaviour with or without their consent. It is a personal
attribute and an interpersonal result. Authority is applied
to subordinates to control their behaviour in using organisa-
tional resources, for instance, salaries and rewards. It is
a positional power that lacks effect unless subordinates
recognise it .2°
A manager can acquire authority through his position
and/or the organisation' s support, but to acquire the power
he needs to demonstrate effective use of leadership or
personal characteristics, for instance, charisma, interper-
sonal skills, connections, access to powerful people,
intellectual skills ( a capacity to diagnose and solve prob-
lems) , and so on. In addition, if he is responsible for a
department that others depend on to achieve their objectives,
then he or his department acquire power over them. 21
However, authority is a very important source of the Western
managers participated in this work.
Chapter V showed that Saudi managers were high
authoritarian and individualistic in decision making. In
addition, it showed that most Saudi managers lacked interper-
sonal skills, intellectual effectiveness, and used relation-
ships rather than systems frequently. The highly authoritar-
20-John W. Hunt. Managing People at Work, McGraw-Hill Co.,
London, UK., 1986. p. 69.
21 - Ibid. , 1986, pp. 71-74.
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ian style did not necessarily mean that the Saudi managers
were task oriented. It was an authoritarian style for
maintaining self-esteem and fulfilling personal interests.
The high use of personal relationships was due to social
obligations and social values, not necessarily concern for
others. The use of formality was very high when an issue went
against their personal interest, or when it threatened their
position and authority.
Chapter V also showed that seventy-three per cent (73%)
of Saudi managers considered their positions the most impor-
tant source of their power. This also applied to fifty per
cent (50%) of the Western managers, to the point where they
also showed that without a good or strong position, they
would be powerless to accomplish the objectives. The
Westerners were more task oriented ( Chapter V) , and therefore
considered authority to be very important. Yet, most of
Western managers were not long term oriented, or at least
only for the period of doing the business in Saudi Arabia
on a contract basis, for instance, 2-4 years.
Findings Related to Authority and Power
1- Authority vs. Productivity
1.1 For many Saudi participants' the number one
priority at work is position (as viewed by thirty-
six per cent (36%) Saudis, and fifty-eight per
cent (58%) by Westerners). This is followed by
promotion (twenty per cent (20%) Saudis, nineteen
per cent (19%) Westerners), see Chapter V.
1.2 Socialising at-work is a strong characteristic of
most Saudi management (as viewed by 59.6% of the
Saudis and 61.5% of the Westerners), see Chapter
V.
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1.3 Responsibility is not well defined either because
of a lack of job descriptions or because those
JDQs are not accurate or adequate (see section C,
previously).
2- Authority and Centralisation
Another source of power in Saudi organisations is
centralisation. Centralisation is high in almost all
Saudi organisations. The following tables represent the
responses to Q18 and 19 - 2, b.
Table 35
CENTRALISATION IN SAUDI ORGANISATIONS
Item
Saudis Westerners
Valid %
Frequency % Frequency %
Very central-
ised
95 83.3 23 88.6 86
Little 15 13.2 1 3.8 12
Not central-
ised
1 0.9 1 3.8 2
No answer 3 2.6 1 3.8
114 100 26 100 100
Note: Through cross-tabulation data analysis showed that
ninety-three per cent (93%) of the participants from
government organisations said that organisations in
Saudi Arabia are "very centralised", and eighty-eight
per cent (88%) of non-government organisations said
the same.
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Table 36
CENTRALISATION IN MY COMPANY
Item
Saudis Westerners
Valid %
Frequency % Frequency %
Most of time/
high
65 57 20 77 62
Only if
necessary
27 23.7 3 11.5 22
Not central-
ised
19 16.7 3 11.5 16
No answer 3 2.6
114 100 26 100 100
Table 36 shows that centralisation in the participating
corporations is high.
E. THE COMPATIBILITY OF ORGANISATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND
FUNCTIONS
Organisational boundaries fix a limit on functions,
departments, and areas of responsibility. Thus rather than
conflicting, they support each other in accomplishing goals.
Boundaries refer to the interface between the organisation
and its environment and the interface between the parts
making up the system. It may be important to focus on those
boundaries, especially the internal ones, to see what ex-
change (inputs and outputs) are being made across the
boundary line. 22
Unfortunately, there are not sufficient studies that
discuss organisational boundaries in Saudi Arabia.
22_ John Blake and Peter Lawrence. The a b c of Management,
Cassell Educational Ltd., London, UK., 1989. p. 18.
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Findings Related to Organisational Boundaries and the
Compatibility of Functions
e-1 Organisational Boundaries
An open-ended question was addressed to the participants
asking them how good were their organisational boundaries,
whether they had any difficulties in maintaining them, and
if yes, what were the causes (Q20-2, b). Only 100 Saudi
executives out of 114, responded to this question, while one
hundred per cent (100%) of the Westerners did (40 corpora-
tions out of 52). The followings are summaries of some of
the responses.
Saudis:
1. ARAMCO (Saudi Arabian American Oil Company, government)
is considered the number one oil-producing company in
the world, (1990-1992). It was established over 5
decades ago on an industrial basis with long-term
objectives. It has therefore enjoyed continuous posi-
tive development. It was based on American industrial
experience and expertise. Therefore, its boundaries
have been frequently modified to meet the internal and
external dimensions, for example, Saudi government
policies, and international oil business changes and
demands (12 responses).
This view was shared by most participants from
ARAMCO, eighty-three percent (83%). Seventeen per cent
(17%) of the Saudi participants from ARAMCO, however,
said that job descriptions are not developed as fre-
quently as they should be. They are developed every 4-5
years, while there is a need to develop them probably
every 2-3 years. They said that this happens because
the personnel function is extremely busy, since ARAMCO
has over 43,000 employees.
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2. SAMAREC (Saudi Arabian Marketing and Refinery Company,
government) also has dynamic and efficient organisa-
tional boundaries, (20 responses). Still, SAMAREC was
established recently in (1987), with many different
sites and operations. It is trying to make its organi-
sational boundaries as effective as possible. Partici-
pants from SAMAREC said that their company's boundaries
are not good enough. Yet, the company is still develop-
ing them.
3. Two large non-governmental holding corporations, 4%
responses, with many companies or branches reporting
to them have developed a system whereby every company
of theirs established its own structure, strategies,
policies, systems, and boundaries. Yet, those companies
have to coordinate with headquarters. Their organisa-
tional boundaries seem to be working successfully.
4. One participant from a major joint-venture bank (non-
governmental) said that operations and activities are
based on well-defined objectives. They manage their
business based on management by objectives. Therefore,
their organisational boundaries are continually devel-
oping. However, they have some overlapping in their job
descriptions because some jobs are somewhat generic.
Their JDQs need further review and development. In
addition, they also have some overlapping among their
departments' activities, but this is considered a
positive effect. For instance, sometimes one department
has to do the job of another because the former was not
active enough or was too slow.
The above represent positive Saudi views about 'a
few organisations that have good organisational bound-
aries, on the whole 37% of the total responses or 13%
of total companies who responded to this question.
( The following responses, number 5 to 18, are
cumulative.)
300
5. Forty participants (40%) said that their organisations'
strategies, policies, and rules are obsolete and need
development. They need boundaries that improve the
integration of their departments' activities within the
whole of the organisation's environment, and to meet
future challenges successfully. This lack of boundary
development impacts on both efficiency and effective-
ness, as seventy-five per cent (75%) of the same group
indicated.
6. Nine participants (9%) said that too much authority is
given. Authority should be adequate to responsibilities
not in excess of them.
7. Fifteen per cent (15%) said that control, follow-up,
and coordination systems, are not adequately developed
in their companies. Without this development they are
not and cannot be sure how effective their boundaries
are, and how well the various departments are perform-
ing their functions. Also, sixty-seven per cent (67%)
of the same group said that some managers have more
authority than they need, while others have less.
8. Thirty-seven per cent (37%) of the participants showed
that there were many complexities among the organisa-
tional boundaries, for instance, unclear rules,
authority, and responsibility. They said they needed
boundaries that fix or underline those functions so
that no one exceeds their limit, and no department
extends its authority over others.
9. Three per cent (3%) said that in their companies some
boundaries are old or too rigid, such that a manager
may need quick action to keep production going, but
because of strong chains of command, or excessively
rigid procedures, some tasks are delayed.
301
10. The organisational structure is either too large and
complex or too old and conflicting. Thus, there is
overlapping, misunderstanding of roles and responsi-
bilities, and conflicting relationships among depart-
ments, 31% responses.
11. Senior management makes some decisions that conflict
and do not support, or comply with, the organisational
boundaries, (91%).
12. There are no job descriptions, or, if there are any,
they are not specific and/or accurate. This causes
overlapping in responsibilities, tasks, functions, and
is misleading for subordinates as well, (15%).
13. The external local environment impacts on our organi-
sational boundaries, especially the societal ones. The
social environment in Saudi Arabia extends its impact
on the whole organisation, (6%).
14. Organisational boundaries could be identifiable and
good but there is a lack of manuals that provide those
boundaries in clear and well-defined language, (12%).
15. A lack of teamwork and cohesiveness, besides the
individualistic approach among management, impacts on
the effective implementation of organisational bound-
aries, (6%).
16. Our management experience and knowledge is not adequate
to help us create and develop effective boundaries,
(9%).
17. Saudi subordinates do not try to read and understand
our organisational boundaries, though it would help
them in understanding their authority, functions, and
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responsibilities, (6%).
18. There is an overlapping among departments, though we
have good boundaries. This is due to overemphasising
the short-term profit objective. For instance, if there
is a department not performing its tasks well, another
department does them to avoid delaying the work and
losing profit, (3%).
Westerners (one-hundred per cent (100%) responses, with some
cumulative answers):
1. Our organisational boundaries are reasonably good at
ARAMCO, as mentioned by twelve per cent (12%) of the
participants.
2. Our boundaries change very fast because of the fast
expansion in our business in Saudi Arabia, but they
tend to work fairly successfully, four per cent (4%),
(a bank executive).
3. Management is not committed to or does not stick to
rules, functions, and responsibilities. Also, managers
do not follow the organisational structure or chain of
command. There is a big misunderstanding of organisa-
tional relationships, structure, authority, and rules,
(19%).
4- The functions, duties, responsibilities, and authority
are not clear, (27%).
5. Boundaries are blurred in some departments, and mixed
up as well, (23%).
6. Many functional areas do not have explicit policies and
procedures, (19%).
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7. The senior management is not keen on developing organi-
sational structure. This makes it difficult to under-
stand relationships among departments and executives,
(8%).
8. Job descriptions are not available, (12%).
9. Job descriptions are not developed and/or accurate,
(19%).
10. Organisational boundaries are not related well enough
to our work environment, (27%).
11. Our boundaries do not respond to our organisation's
needs, but to individual needs and interests, (12%).
12. Management perception of the importance of the organis-
ational boundaries is not good enough, i.e., some of
our companies/branches have better boundaries, and
other have blurred ones. It is due to a lack of skills,
knowledge, and experience among some managers. The
interaction with senior management, to work together
and learn from each other to develop boundaries, could
help a great deal in that respect. Yet, many of them
are not qualified (4% "a corporate executive manager
and consultant").
13. Members of the board of directors are not qualified
enough to understand the importance and needs of
organisational boundaries, (4%).
14. Change in the board of directors is too frequent, which
causes too much change in direction and, of course,
boundaries as well, (4%).
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e-2 Interdepartmental Functions Compatibility
The participants were asked how they would describe
their companies' interdepartmental functions, including the
question, are they compatible? Table 37 represents the
results of Q9-2, b.
Table 37
COMPATIBILITY OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL FUNCTIONS
Item
Saudis Westerners
Valid %
Frequency % Frequency %
- Compatible 26 22.8 1 3.8 19
- Fairly corn-
patible
24 21 2 7.7 18.5
- There is
some con-
flict but it
is usually
resolved.
22 19.3 6 23 20
= 57.5
- There is
some con-
flict, but
not fre-
quently
24 21 12 46.2 26
- Slightly
compatible
15 13 3 11.6 13
- Not compa-
tible
3 2.9 2 7.7 3.5
= 42.5
114 100 26 100 100
The results shown in table 37 show that 42.5% of the
participants agreed that there is some conflict in their
interdepartmentalfunctions,varyingbetweenmediumandhigh.
However, through cross-tabulation, it was clear that sixty-
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two per cent (62%) of the non-government organisations had
incompatible interdepartmental functions. In addition, the
incompatibility in the government organisations was forty-six
per cent (46%). Still, if we exclude two government organ-
isations that have established modern industrial systems and
long-term objectives, ARAMCO and SAMAREC , the incompatibility
or conflicting interdepartmental functions indicated among
the responses of government organisations increases to
seventy-six per cent (76%). Chapter VII will present further
insights on this incompatibility theme. Thus, the incompati-
bility in government organisations is somewhat high, but is
higher in the non-government organisations.
In summary, there is a major lack of effective and
efficient organisational boundaries, and a lack of integra-
tion among departments and organisational components. This
lack of good boundaries and departmental integration or
compatibility causes interdepartmental conflict, as well as
an ineffective structure and work environment.
F. THE BUDGETING SYSTEM
There are two major kinds of organisations that partici-
pated in this work, government and non-government. However,
the government organisations include semi-government. Semi-
government organisation are either owned by the government
but established on an industrial and production for profit
basis, or partially owned by the public but depend to a high
extent on government support and direction. The second kind
are the non-government organisations which are private
corporations and companies (see Appendix B):
1. Governmental organisations that are one hundred per
cent (100%) dependent on government financial support,
for example, the Ministries of Transportation, Communi-
cations, and Trade. Some of them are not required to
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make any profit, but to generate some revenue through
charging fees, which was strongly encouraged.
2. Semi-governmental organisations make some revenue and
profit that at least cover their operational needs.
Financial support for long term investment for those
organisations is provided through government funds or
credits. Examples of these organisations are ARAMCO,
SAMAREC, SAUDIA Airlines and SABIC.
3. Private organisations (where some of them are share-
holding). They are not dependent on governmental
support, but the government provides them with invest-
ment protection and/or opportunities. Those organisa-
tions are required to make enough profit or to generate
enough revenue to run their business and satisfy share-
holders, for instance, banks, electricity companies,
and the private service/commercial companies.
We have seen in this chapter, section A and B, that an
average of 60% of the participating organisations, both
government and non-government, lack a clear mission, objec-
tives and goals. In addition, they lack good strategic
planning for both the long and short term, and they are not
industrially oriented. These problems are common character-
istics of these organisations. These deficiencies make it
difficult for most of the participating organisations to
develop their budgeting systems. However, the following gives
an idea about the budgeting systems of the three organisa-
tional categories. The material is drawn from the answers
to Q12 to 16-2, a.
Findings Related to Budgeting Systems
f-1 The budgeting systems in governmental organisations
that were fully dependent on government support (31
responses).
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1.1 Budgeting Systems
Thirty-one responses (100% of participants from
those organisations) showed that the budgeting
system and preparation is based on the concept
'you get the amount you spent last year, or maybe
less'. However, sometimes, where there is need for
a larger budget, perhaps for additional workers,
or the replacement of office machines, the Minis-
try of Finance has to approve the funds based on
several proposals and discussions. Those budget
proposals are reviewed by the company's financial
committee or senior executives first, and then
submitted to another small committee in the
Ministry of Finance. If the proposals are approved
by the former committee, they have to go to a
higher committee, where the Minister of Finance
or his deputy is the chairman, for review and
final approval or modification.
1.2 Budgeting Efficiency and Effectiveness
Thirty-nine per cent (39%) of the organisations
of the first category (government) said that their
budgeting system is effective and efficient. On
other hand, twenty-nine per cent (29%) said that
it is not adequately effective and/or efficient,
and thirty-two per cent (32%) said it is not
effective and/or efficient at all. Clearly it is
not out of the question for organisations that are
fully dependent on government support to have a
strict, controlled, and yet ineffectual budgeting
system.
1.3 Budgeting Obstacles
Unclear objectives do not constitute an obstacle
to budgeting in governmental organisations. This
is mainly because their characteristic objectives,
providing public services, are well known and have
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been established for a long time. There are,
however, some budgeting obstacles in government
organisations (11 responses, 35%), and these are:
- Too many procedures (73% of the responses).
- Overly strict policy (55% of the responses).
f-2 The budgeting systems of semi-government organisations
that are partially dependent on governmental support.
2.1 Budgeting systems
Thirty responses, seventy-five per cent (75%)
showed that the budgeting system and preparation
in the above organisations is based on both
operating and manpower needs. Another thirteen per
cent (13%) said that they were based on the
departments' functions in relation to objectives
and plans. Another group, ten per cent (10%), said
they were based on a zero-budget basis, where they
had to look into goals for the next year and
identify what they really needed to achieve those
goals. This principle is a cost-cutting, think-
through the-real-needs antidote to the convention
of taking last year's budget and adding on a bit
for inflation and a bit for good measure to con-
struct the coming year's budget. 23 Finally, two
per cent (2%) said that they were based on last
year's expenditure.
2.2 Budgeting Efficiency and Effectiveness
Twenty per cent (20%) of the respondents said that
their budgeting system was effective, and fifteen
per cent (15%) said it was efficient. Thirty-six
per cent (36%) said that it was somewhat effective
[50/50], and fourteen per cent (14%) said it was
23
- John Blake and Peter Lawrence, 1989, P. 133.
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somewhat efficient. Finally, fifteen per cent
(15%) said it is neither effective nor efficient.
In summary, fifty-three per cent 53% of the semi-
governmental organisations said they had effective and
efficient budgeting systems, eighteen per cent (18%)
varied between medium and low effectiveness and effi-
ciency, and twenty-nine . per cent (29%) had ineffective
and inefficient budgeting systems.
2.3 Budgeting Obstacles
The following are responses concert-1111g the bud-
geting obstacles the participants have in their
organisations (only 32 responses of 40):
Unclear objectives (17% of 32 responses).
- Not enough commitment towards plans (54%).
- Non-supportive organisational systems (29%).
F-3 The budgeting systems in the private and share-holding,
organisations (64 responses out of 69, 93%) .
3.1 Budgeting Systems
Twenty-eight per cent (28%) said that their bud-
geting systems and preparation are based on operational
and workforce needs. Twenty-six per cent (26%) said
that they are based on their department functions, and
twenty-two per cent (22%) are based on last year's
expenditure. Twenty-four per cent (24%) of these
participating organisations used a zero-based budgeting
system, which is more of a profit-directed system. Al-
though seventy per cent (70%) of the participating
organisation prime objective is profit, their budget
systems tend to be traditional or tied to operational
than investment needs.
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3.2 Budgeting Efficiency and Effectiveness
Twenty per cent (20%) said that their budgeting
system was effective and efficient. In addition,
twenty-eight per cent (28%) said that it was
somewhat effective, and thirteen per cent (13%)
said it was somewhat efficient. On the other side,
twenty-two per cent (22%) said it was not effec-
tive or efficient enough, and seventeen per cent
(17%) said it was ineffective and inefficient.
3.3 Budgeting Obstacles
Nineteen per cent (19%) said they do not have any
budgeting obstacles. But other participants men-
tioned the following obstacles:
a. Unclear objectives (26%).
b. Not enough commitment to plans (23%).
c. Non-supportive organisational systems
(16%).
d. Strict budgeting policy (13%).
e. Too many procedures (3%).
In summary, the budgeting systems in most of the
non-governmental organisations do not correlate highly
with the organisations' business, which is profit,
since there are limits or constraints on investment and
development needs. In addition, there are some obsta-
cles, mainly unclear objectives and goals, and lack of
commitment to implement plans.
G. EMPLOYEE RECRUITMENT, PROMOTION, REWARDS, TRAINING
SYSTEMS, AND SATISFACTION
This section and the following one try to describe the
effects of recruitment, promotion, and rewards systems on
employee satisfaction and motivation. It also identifies
those system applications in Saudi organisations and their
impact on subordinates' commitment and performance. Before
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presenting the findings on these systems, the following
highlights the importance of workforce planning, effective
recruitment and promotion, and so on, for motivation, job
satisfaction, and better performance.
Workforce planning is used to balance the cost between
the utilisation of plant and workforce, to determine recruit-
ment needs, to establish training needs, and figure out and
identify labour needs. Efficient labour planning is based
on defining the organisational objectives, and depends on
how soundly the organisation has considered and planned its
corporate strategy and integrated the objectives of its
component departments . 24
Good labour planning, accurate job descriptions, clear
rules and responsibilities, defined duties, effective re-
cruitment, promotion, and reward systems, play a great role
in job satisfaction and performance. In addition, they assist
in developing training needs and schemes.
Recruitment and promotion systems provide opportunities
to employees to improve their performance, and to try to
satisfy their ego and self-actualisation. For instance,
Maslow identified several motivational needs and their
relationship to the work place. Ego needs such as self-
esteem, power, recognition, and so on, can be met through
job achievement and promotion. Self-actualisation needs such
as development, creativity, and so on, can be met through
autonomy, achievement, and promotion. 25 Of course, those
two motivational needs exist among other needs, for instance,
social, security, and physical.
In addition, Herzberg, identified two other major
factors for job satisfaction: motivation, and hygiene. The
24- Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard. 1982, pp. 75-76.
25- Ibid., pp. 102-105.
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motivation factors are about the job itself, for example,
challenging work, increased responsibility, growth and
development, and so on. The hygiene factors are about the
work environment, such as policies, supervision, interperson-
al relation, money, and so on. Hygiene factors effect an
individual's willingness to increase their capacity and
ability, while motivators encourage the individual to work
to superior performance and willingness to grow in a mature
way. The interrelationships between both factors are very
strong. For instance, poor supervision, can impact on motiva-
tion for growth.26
Findings Related to Recruitment, Promotion, Rewards, and
Training
1- Recruitment, Promotion, and Rewards
1.1 Most of the Saudi organisations that participated
in this study lack long-term objectives. This lack
makes it difficult for them to identify their
future labour requirements, especially to meet any
possible change in demand. This lack also does not
help those organisations forecast labour demand
and supply that is related to both the short and
long terms. Also, there is overlapping (as men-
tioned in the review of literature in Chapter IV,
and this chapter) such as lack of labour planning
as showed clearly through the lack of job descrip-
tions, defined responsibilities and authority.
Our review of the previous literature also showed that
Saudi organisations lack both labour planning and
qualified personnel, mainly in supervisory, management
and technical jobs. However, lack of labour planning
and development at all levels tend to be a strong
26- Ibid., pp. 122-124.
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characteristic of most Saudi organisations. Labour
planning and development are the responsibility of
management, and can only be achieved effectively and
efficiently if the manager is sufficiently qualified.
In summary, because Saudi organisations lack
qualified management, they cannot improve their labour
recruitment, promotion, rewards, and training systems.
Therefore, motivation and satisfaction (this section,
G) and discipline and punctuality (next section, H) at
almost all employee levels are low.
2.2 The following further highlights some major weak-
nesses in the promotion, rewards, recruitment and
training of Saudi nationals in the surveyed
organisations. The results of tables 38, 39 and
40 are related to Q11 and 11, and 42 - 2, a.
Table 38
MERIT INCREASE IS FOR GOOD PERFORMANCE
Item
Saudis Westerners
Valid %
Frequency % Frequency %
Most of the
time
49 43 12 46.1 44
Sometimes 22 19.3 9 34.6 22
Minimally ap-
plicable
39 34.2 5 19.3 31
Not appli-
cable
4 3.5 3
.
114
-
100 26 100 100
Fifty-three per cent (53%) said that merit increase
sometimes and/or seldom is paid for good performance.
Still, thirty-eight per cent (38%) of organisations
that give merit increases to reward good performance
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are governmental, and 54% are non-government.
Table 39
PROMOTION IS BASED ON PERFORMANCE, SKILLS, AND ATTI-
TUDES
Item
Saudis Westerners
Valid %
Frequency % Frequency %
Most of times 52 45.6 15 57.7 48
Sometimes 22 19.3 6 23 20
Little appli-
cable
39 34.2 5 19.3 31.3
Not appli-
cable
1 0.9 0.7
114 100 26	 ,104 ii	 100	 )
Thirty-five per cent (35%) of Saudis said that good
performance as a requirement for promotion is rarely
or not applicable. However, the cross-tabulation data
analysis shows that only forty-two per cent (42%) from
governmental organisations said that promotion is based
on good performance, and 58% from non-government said
the same.
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Table 40
RECRUITMENT OR PROMOTION TO HIGHER LEVEL IS BASED ON:*
Item:
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Efficiency 12 12 12 14
Discipline/
Punctual-
ity
7 9 7 10
Effectiveness 6 11 7 8
Interpersonal
skills 4 4 5 4
Social rela-
tions 12 12 13 10
Family
support 8 3 8 12
High educa-
tion 13 14 13 12
Hard work 14 14 9 5
Never say no 4 1 4 5
Relations
with exec-
utives 12 9 12 11
Professional
skills 4 10 5 6
High achieve-
ment 2 1 3 2
Persistency 2 0 2 1
100% 100 100 100 100
* The percentage was taken according to the four
highest rankings on statements. For instance, if
someone rated a statement as 13 (highest), another
one as 12, a third one as 11, and a fourth one as 10,
they are included in the average percentage.
Summary of table 40
Recruitment and/or promotion to higher levels or
positions in the government organisations requires or
is based on:
First: high education and social relationships
followed by relationships with executives, and
efficiency.
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- Second: hard work followed by family support.
- Third:discipline/punctuality, and effectiveness.
- Fourth: Interpersonal, and professional skills
followed by obeying orders blindly (never say no) .
- Fifth: high achievement followed by persistency.
Thus, fifty-one per cent (51%) believed that
connections, social relationships, family support, and
high education (as privilege), are the most important
elements in recruitment and promotion.
In addition, forty-five per cent (45%) believed
that hard work, efficiency, effectiveness, discipline,
punctuality, high achievement, professionalism, and
persistence, are the most important elements in re-
cruitment and promotion.
Finally, four per cent (4%) believed that blind
obedience of orders is the most important element.
Recruitment and/or promotion to higher levels or
position in the non-governmental organisations requires
or is based on:
- First: efficiency is the most important element
in recruitment and/or promotion.
- Second: high education and family support.
- Third: relationships with executives.
- Fourth: social relationships, and discipline/
punctuality.
- Fifth: hard work, and obeying orders blindly.
- Sixth: effectiveness followed by professional
skills.
- Seventh: interpersonal skills.
- Eight: high achievement followed by persistency.
Thus, fifty per cent (50%) believed that effi-
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ciency, discipline, effectiveness, hard work, profes-
sional skills, high achievement, and persistence are
the most important elements in promotion and recruit-
ment.
In addition, forty-five per cent (45%) believed
that family support, high education, relations with
executives and social relationships (connections), are
the most important elements in promotion.
Finally, five per cent (5%) saw blind obedience
to orders as the most important element in promotion.
3- Training
Job satisfaction and motivation are not solely based
on good labour planning, efficient and effective re-
cruitment, promotion, and rewards systems. Effective
supervision, training and development to make the
employees confident and qualified, are also important
for improving performance and bringing job satisfac-
tion.27
The participants were asked an open-ended question
about training and development. The question was: How
good is employee training and development in Saudi
Arabia, and/or in your company, including management
training? (Q6-2, b) The answers were cumulative, where
a participant could check one or more items.
3-1 Saudis
1.1 The available training for the non-governmental corpo-
rations is not sufficient, (24%).
27- Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard. 1982, pp. 76-77.
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1.2 The non-governmental sector does not encourage or
support training programmes, and/or does not train
subordinates, (4%).
1.3 Training for all subordinate levels and specialties in
the Kingdom is minimal or inadequate, (20%).
1.4 Most training courses in the Kingdom, mainly for
management, are irrelevant to the Saudi work environ-
ment, (2%).
1.5 liltDst training programmes in the Kingdom are irrelevant
to the Saudi social system, (16%).
1.6 Training course contents are irrelevant to work needs,
they are theoretical not practical, (5%).
1.7 There is a lack of management conferences and seminars,
(16%).
1.8 Technical conferences and seminars in the Kingdom are
very few and too theoretical, (24%).
1.9 Training courses for operations and maintenance servic-
es in the Kingdom are and few and very limited in
scope, t24%).
1.10 Training and development of leadership skills in the
Kingdom are very limited, (24%).
1.11 There is a shortage of management training, (12%).
1.12 Participation (attending) in international conferences
and seminars is low, (12%).
1.13 Short training courses are not available or are too few
in number, (20%).
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1.14 The available management training, specifically in the
Institute of Public Administration, is too formal and
does not encourage creativity, (16%).
1.15 There is no professional management in-company training
in the Kingdom, (8%) .
1.16 Management training in the Kingdom does not assist in
dealing with change and handling stress effectively,
(28%).
1.17 All manpower in Saudi Arabia needs training, regardless
of their positions or level, (28%) .
1.18 The available training in the Kingdom has no effect on
subordinates' behaviour or attitudes, (28%).
1.19 There is no organisational development training in the
Kingdom, (24%).
1.20 On the job training is very limited and insufficient,
(12%).
1.21 Saudi trainers are not sufficiently qualified, (20%).
1.22 Expatriate trainers lack knowledge about Saudi culture
and are therefore ineffective, (20%).
1.23 Private training centres and companies that have their
headquarters out of the Kingdom or conduct their
courses out of the Kingdom charge too much, (28%).
1.24 Senior managers are not interested in or do not support
the training and development of their workforce, (20%) .
A few organisations (8 out of 52), mainly semi-govern-
ment that are either revenue-generating or industrially
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oriented, place a high value on training, for instance,
ARAMCO, Saudia Airlines, SAMAREC, as well as few commercial
banks. They train their workforce using both internal and
external training sources.
3-2 Westerners
Almost all participating Western managers said that
their companies do not train them or put them on
training courses. They are considered qualified and
come to the Kingdom to work, not to spend time on
training courses. They are paid to work, not to be
trained. Thus, they do not get a good orientation to
their organisational systems or to Saudi culture. In
addition, seventy-seven per cent (77%) of them said
that management training for expatriates is not avail-
able or not provided in the Kingdom.
The following are the views of the few Westerners who are
either lucky and had some training in Saudi Arabia through
their companies, or observed the effects of training on their
colleagues.
Management training in Saudi Arabia needs to be devel-
oped to suit the Saudi culture, (10%).
Training programmes in the Kingdom are not effective;
we could not see their results or improvement in the
Saudis' attitudes and behaviour, (13%).
Thus, training in Saudi Arabia is considered inadequate.
Management training is insufficient, not effective, and to
some extent irrelevant. Leadership and organisation-develop-
ment training is not available or is insufficient and has
a limited effect. Therefore, most Saudi employees including
managers, lack both skills and confidence, which in turn
impacts negatively on their performance and capabilities.
This increases frustration and job dissatisfaction.
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Labour's Capabilities and Skills vs. Decision Making
Another question addressed to the participants was to
identify if they take into consideration the capabilities
and skills of their organisation's workforce during the
decision-making process. Could those decisions be carried
out by subordinates successfully? (Q6-4-2, a) The results
are shown in table 41 as follows:
Table 41
DECISION-MAKING CONSIDERS CAPABILITIES OF WORKFORCE
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Agree 42 62 41 23
Do not agree 58 38 59 77
100% 100 100 100 100
Table no. 41 shows that:
- Saudi management does not consider their workforce's
capabilities and skills in carrying out the decisions
they make, fifty-eight per cent (58%) responses.
- Westerners are somewhat better than Saudis in this
respect.
- Non-governmental organisations do not consider the
importance of knowing their employees' capabilities
and its impact on carrying out the decisions they
make, (77%).
- Governmental organisations are slightly better than
non-governmental in this respect.
In summary, part of the frustration and job dissatisfac-
tion in many Saudi corporations is due to decisions made with
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no concern for workforce capabilities and skills. Coupled
with this fact is the lack of training and of effective
recruitment, promotion, and reward systems. This lack
strongly decreases motivation and increases dissatisfaction.
H. PUNCTUALITY AND DISCIPLINE
Findings Related to Punctuality and Discipline
Punctuality and discipline as a basic requirement for
promotion were rated low in both governmental and non-
governmental corporations. Other requirements that are less
important were rated higher, for instance, relationships
(Table 40).
In addition, responses to Q11-1 - 2, b, showed that
absenteeism is high in Saudi organisations (Table 42). Lack
of punctuality and discipline (commitment) are due not only
to job dissatisfaction and poor motivation, but also because
of the absence of an attendance policy, good supervision,
and are due to the social customs as well. Table 43 shows
the responses regarding the causes of absenteeism. Table 44
also shows positions/levels of absenteeism. In addition Table
45 shows absenteeism broken down by nationality (Q11-2 and
11-3 - 2, b).
Table 42
ABSENTEEISM IN SAUDI CORPORATIONS
Do you have an
absenteeism
problem
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Yes 73 62 77 64
No 17 30 13 26
No answer 10 8 10 10
100% 100 100 100 100
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Table 42 shows that absenteeism was seen as a problem
by an average of seventy-seven per cent (77%) of the respon-
dents in governmental organisations, and sixty-four per cent
(64%) in non-governmental organisations.
Table 43
CAUSES OF ABSENTEEISM*
Causes
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Culture/ 58 61 60 54
Social
Lack of pro-
fession-
alism
9 0 6 5
Psychological 6 0 4 2
Attendance 16 20 18 22
Policy is
not good
Lack of
supervision
11 19 12 17
100% 100 100 100 100
* The previous literature showed that absenteeism was
mainly due to the impact of Saudi society and culture,
followed by a lack of supervision. But the findings
here suggest that the lack of a good attendance policy
is the second major cause of absenteeism, followed by
lack of supervision. However, the causes of absenteeism
in both government and non-government organisation have
almost the same weight.
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Table 44
MAJOR SOURCES OF ABSENTEEISM BY WORK TYPE AMONG SAUDIS AND
WESTERNERS FROM GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS
(93% PARTICIPANTS)*
Level/
Position
Saudis
% *
Western-
ers % *
Govern-
ment %*
Non-Govern-
ment % *
Management 22 26 20 22
Supervisors 47 48 48 38
Technicians 22 17 19 20
Professionals 13 13 12 10
Clerical 61	 ' 43 54 i	 44
* The results are cumulative answers, where a respondent
could choose more than one answer.
According to table 44 administrators and supervi-
sors in both government and non-government organisa-
tions had the highest absentee rates (average 50%),
followed by managers (average 22%), and technicians and
professionals (average 16%).
Table 45
SOURCE OF ABSENTEEISM BY NATIONALITY/ALL LEVELS (ACCORDING
TO GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS) (93% PARTICIPANTS)*
Item
Saudis
% *
Western-
ers % *
Govern-
ment %*
Non-Govern-
ment % *
Saudi 79 67 75 51
Other Arab 22 33 18 28
Western 4 8 5 2
Far East 6 17 5 11
* The results are cumulative answers, where a respondent
could choose more than one answer.
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Table 45 indicates that absenteeism among Saudi
workers in both government and non-government
organisations is high. It represents an average of
seventy per cent (70%) of the overall absenteeism. This
is followed by other Arabs, who represent an average
of twenty-five per cent (25%). Other nationalities
represent only five per cent (5%) of the average.
Absenteeism among Saudis in the non-government
organisations is somewhat less than the government.
This is because Saudi nationals represent a smaller
segment of their labour force, about fifteen per cent
(15%), yet it is still high.
I. ORGANISATIONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Effective communication is essential. Unclear communica-
tion regarding objectives, goals, plans, decisions, and so
on, may direct the organisational resources in the wrong
direction. Successful managers and leaders know how to
communicate their vision, objectives, and plans, effectively.
The findings in Chapter V, showed that there is a great need
to develop communication systems in Saudi organisations.
Still, the following are also related to the organisations'
communication systems and highlight additional factors that
impact on those systems.
Findings Related to Organisational Communication Systems
1- Lack of Effective Communications
We have seen, in Sections A and B in this chapter, that
there is a great problem of communicating objectives and
plans effectively in sixty per cent (60%) of the
participating organisations. This lack of effective
communication is not only because the objectives and plans
are not well defined or clear. It is also because of the high
formality those organisations use, the low involvement of
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middle management in planning and decision making, and the
decisions made on an individualistic basis, with no feedback
or consultation.
Conflicting and unclear communications are the fourth
major cause of problems in both governmental and non-govern-
mental organisations. This is shown by responses to Q2-3 -2,
a.
- Fifty-one per cent (51%) of the Saudi and forty-two
per cent (42%) of the Western participants said that
unclear/conflicting communication is a major reason
behind many problems at work (48% governmental, and
70% non-governmental organisations).
- Also, lack of clear, valid and reliable data is
another major cause of problems in sixty-seven per
cent (67%) of the government, and seventy-four per
cent (74%) of the non-government organisations (as
viewed by 68% of the Saudis, and 73% of the
Westerners).
2- Meetings
Meetings may also be part of the problem. The previous
literature showed that meetings and committees consume nearly
a third of the Saudi executives' time. Everyday executives
attend at least one meeting or committee. But the question
of the effectiveness and productivity of those meetings has
not yet been examined.
Some participants come to many meetings because they
do not want to be left out, and others because they are
called, even though those meetings may be irrelevant to them.
This study does not try to investigate those issues. It
examines rather the total organisation of the meetings in
relation to clear or well-understood meeting objectives.
Tables 46 and 47 represent the results of Q34 to 37 - 2, a.
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Table 46
IN-COMPANY MEETINGS' OBJECTIVES ARE CLEAR
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
merit %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always 24 4 21 14
Most of times 26 31 32 20
Sometimes/
little
50 65 47 66
Never
100% 100	 1 100 100 100
Table 46 shows that an average of sixty-four per cent
(64%), (57 Saudis and 17 Westerners, of 140 participants)
said that the objectives of the meetings they attended were
not clear. This lack of clear objectives of internal meetings
is higher in the non-government organisations.
How well were those meetings organised? Answers to this
question also showed the relationships between the unclear
objectives of the meetings and the way they were organised,
for instance, agenda, schedule, and so on.
Table 47
IN-COMPANY MEETINGS ARE ORGANISED
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always 20 4 23 6
Most of times 28 19 32 13
Sometimes/
little
52 77 45 81
Never
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 47 shows that an average forty-five per cent (45%)
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of governmental organisation and eighty-one per cent (81%)
of non-governmental organisations internal meetings were
poorly organised. The difference is high and represents a
significant weakness in the private corporations' meetings.
Most of the private corporations' internal meetings tended
to be based on crises and/or resolving difficulties and
problems that were raised due to lack of planning and clear
objectives.
Meetings attended by individuals from outside the
company were a little better organised, and their objectives
were more clear than the internal ones, as tables 48 and 49
show.
Table 48
OBJECTIVES OF MEETINGS ATTENDED BY INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE
THE ORGANISATION ARE CLEAR
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always 21 11 20 17
Most of times 54 65 53 40
Sometimes/
little
25 24 27 43
Never
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 48 shows that the non-government organisations,
more than the government ones, suffer from a lack of clear
objectives in meetings attended outside their place of work.
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Table 49
ORGANISATION OF MEETINGS ATTENDED BY INDIVIDUALS FROM
OUTSIDE THE COMPANY
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always organ-
ised
27 11 30 7
Most of times 45 50 46 40
Sometimes/
little
28 39 24 53
Never organ-
ised
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 49 also shows that the non-government
organisations lack organised meetings outside their work
place, significantly more than government.
In summary, meeting's objectives and organisation were
not satisfactory in governmental corporations and were even
less satisfactory in non-governmental organisations. This
was partially due to the more general lack of effective
communication in Saudi organisations.
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SUMMARY
An average of sixty per cent (60%) of the Saudi
corporations in our survey, both government and non-
government, lack clear, defined, and well-understood mis-
sions, objectives, and goals. They also lack strategic, long-
term, and practical plans and decisions. These deficiencies
are considered the first major cause of problems and
therefore are behind half of these corporations' problems.
In addition, about half of these corporations are not
consistent between their mission statements and the individu-
al departmental objectives. This lack of consistency
increases to sixty-seven per cent (67%) if the few semi-
government industrial organisations are excluded (ARAMCO,
SAMAREC, and SAUDIA Airlines). This lack of consistency
causes many problems in these organisations, including
incompatibility among their objectives and functions.
In addition, about half of the Saudi corporations lack
effective methods to measure their performance. They lack
standards of performance, effective company and personnel
appraisal systems, and effective job descriptions. Also,
policies in almost all Saudi organisations are not accurate,
effective, or supportive of the achievement of objectives.
They are used to control activities and are formulated by
senior management alone, or with minimal involvement of
middle management. Furthermore, organisational structures
in forty per cent (40%) of the Saudi organisations are not
effective and this is considered a second major source of
problems.
Authority is the major source of power for half of the
managers in Saudi corporations. Those managers use authority
to centralise their tasks, and also to influence others.
Centralisation and the overuse of authority is high in Saudi
organisations and delegation is low. Furthermore, organisa-
tional boundaries in about eighty per cent (80%) of the Saudi
organisations are blurred, ineffective, or not accurate. What
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is more, management does not support and often is not
familiar with departmental boundaries. In addition, many
senior managers are not qualified enough to develop effective
and efficient boundaries for their corporations. Therefore,
there is conflict in sixty-seven per cent (67%) of the Saudi
organisations. This conflict is high among departments in
relation to functions. Thus, conflict is considered the third
major source of problems. In addition, there is a lack of
effective communication systems in more than half of the
participating organisations, which is considered the fourth
major source of problems. Moreover, poor organisation and
unclear objectives in meetings is a common sign of Saudi
organisations, and is an extreme weakness in the non-
governmental sector.
The budgeting system in sixty per cent (60%) of the non-
governmental organisations is not as effective as it should
be. There is some lack of commitment towards plans with
regard to budget preparation and approval.
Recruitment, promotion, and reward systems in about half
of the Saudi organisations are not effective. The most
important elements in recruitment and promotion are personal
relationships and connections. Efficiency and performance
are of secondary importance with regard to promotion, rewards
and recruitment. In addition, most of Saudi organisations
lack effective labour planning. Furthermore, punctuality and
attendance is low in all Saudi organisations, and absenteeism
is high.
Training and workforce development is poor in almost
all Saudi organisations, and there is lack of effective
management training as well. This lack of training and
workforce development at all organisational levels has a
significant impact on organisational progress. Besides, it
has a great impact on subordinates' motivation, job satisfac-
tion, commitment, and performance.
CHAPTER VII
FINDINGS RELATED TO SOCIETAL
EFFECTS, AND INTERVIEWS
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VII. FINDINGS RELATED TO SOCIETAL EFFECTS, AND INTERVIEWS
Introduction
This chapter presents some of those dimensions that have
direct effects on business and organisations in Saudi Arabia.
It concentrates on the Saudi social and cultural environment
with an overview of the what effects of other dimensions'
might be. In addition, it presents the results of the major
interviews conducted with the participants.
This chapter is divided into two major sections:
I- Effects of the environment on Saudi organisations.
These include:
A- The organisational culture and values.
B- The effected social relationships' on personnel
and organisations.
C- The effects of Saudi culture on business, and
business improvement needs.
D- Saudi Arabia features that could enhance business.
E- The Saudi Arabian educational system in relation
to industrial and market needs.
II- Interviews conducted with the participants. These
interviews highlight Saudi management characteristics,
the Saudi organisation context and systems, and the
effects of the Saudi social system and government.
I. EFFECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENT ON SAUDI ORGANISATIONS
There are several dimensions that have a major effect( s)
on organisations. Some of these are local, and others
international. For instance the political system, government
regulations, and the society' s values, are part of the local
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dimensions. Participation in an overseas joint-venture,
technology, and the knowledge of business competition, are
an international dimension.
A. THE ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE AND VALUES
Although all organisations exist in societies that, in
turn, have their culture effects on them, these organisations
also have their own "culture". Organisational culture is made
up of its leadership's values, its employees' norms and
attitudes, and its system of interaction with the society
in which it lives in. In summary, organisational culture is
mainly a reflection of its values and attitudes.
We need to understand an organisation' s culture because
it helps to describe the emphasis it puts on doing what it
considers the right things. It also helps to describe the
value it puts on quality and the managerial operating styles,
and the means it develops to achieve its goals.
Corporate culture is important because it sets limits on
what companies can and cannot do. Thus the nature of the
culture will be important, perhaps decisive, for the way
companies overcome difficulties, survive mergers or
takeovers, diversify, make a success of acquisitions, and
implement strategic policy change.1
In addition, every organisation has values. Some of
those values were developed by its leadership, such as
customer satisfaction. Some are also brought from within the
society in which it lives, for example, social and religious
values. Values allow us to define what is good/bad,
right/wrong, and lay the foundation for our attitudes. In
addition, the values of an organisation are part of its
motivational system; for example, if an organisation values
1- Robert Lee and Peter Lawrence. Organization Behaviour,
Politics At Work. Hutchinson, London, UK., 1985. p.
109.
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democracy and participation, then its people will be more
cooperative and dynamic.2
a-1 Organisational Culture vs. Mission
1. The participants were asked if their organisational
mission was derived from its belief. The responses were
highly positive among Saudis and much less among
Westerners. In addition, the results are more positive
among the government organisations than among the non-
government ones (Q46-2, a). The results are shown in
table 50.
Table 50
AN ORGANISATION'S MISSION vs. ITS BELIEFS
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Our mission
is derived
from our
beliefs:
Always 31.5 23 37 25
Most of
times
53.5 34.6 53 42
Sub. total = 85 57.6 90 67
Sometimes 11.2 38 7 30
Little 2.8 4.4 2 3
Never
Sub. total = 14 42.4 9 33
No answer 1 1
100% 100 100 100 100
2- R. Bruce McAfee and Paul J. Champagne. Organisational
Behaviour, West Publishing Co., New York, USA., 1988.
p. 27.
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2. The participants were also asked to rate how important
it was for an organisation to develop norms/values that
could contribute to the accomplishment of its mission
(Q25-2, a). The results were highly positive among both
Saudis and Westerners as shown in table 51.
Table 51
VALUE'S CONTRIBUTION TO ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ME MISSION
IS IMPORTANT
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Strongly
agree! agree
84 77 85 67
Disagree/
strongly
disagree
14 23 13 33
No answer 2 2
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 51 also shows that value's contribution to
accomplishment of the mission is less significant in non-
government organisations. This could be due to the lack of
long-term objectives in most of the private corporations.
3. So far, tables 50 and 51 show that about eighty per
cent (80%) of the Saudis, and sixty per cent (60%) of
the Western participants agreed on the importance of
organisation's culture and the necessity of its values
to help accomplishing the mission successfully. Yet
when they were asked, whether their organisation's
culture helped in achieving its mission successfully,
the replies were somewhat negative. Table 52 shows the
replies to Q26-2, a. It significantly shows that more
than two-thirds of the participants from the non-
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government organisations indicated that Saudi
organisational culture does not help in accomplishing
the mission, and about half of the participants of the
government organisations said the same.
Table 52
SAUDI ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Does it help
achieving
the mission?
Yes, all or-
ganisations
12 0 11 7
Yes, most or-
ganisations
27 27 34 9
Only at a few
organisations
33 38 31 45
Not good
enough
23 27 20 33
Not at all 5 4 3 3
No answer 4 1 3
100% 100 100 100 100
4. The participants were further asked if they thought
they could achieve their organisational mission without
having a consistent and supportive organisational
culture (Q21-2, a).
Fourteen per cent (14%) of the Saudi participants,
and twenty-three per cent (23%) of Westerners believed
that a firm cannot achieve its mission when the culture
is not supportive or is conflicting. An average of ten
per cent (10%) said that the organisation' s culture can
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be changed with regard to its mission. The former
answer is positive, but it requires a long period and
intensive workforce development to change an
organisation's culture.
In summary, twenty-six per cent (26%) of the
participants were agreed that an organisation's culture is
important in supporting the achievement of its mission and
goal. The majority, seventy-four per cent (74%), showed a
short-term oriented style. They thought that the culture
could be forced to accommodate the mission, and that the
plans could take care of the achievement, though the culture
was not supportive. In addition, they thought that personnel
rewards and incentives could resolve any culture impact on
achieving the mission. The following represents both groups'
responses:
4.1 Fourteen per cent (14%) of Saudis and 23% of Westerners
said the mission could not be achieved if the culture
was not supportive or was conflicting.
4.2 Fourteen per cent (14%) of Saudis and 7% of Westerners
said the organisation's culture regarding the mission
could be changed.
4.3 Thirty-two per cent (32%) of Saudis and 23% of
Westerners said the culture could be forced towards the
mission.
4.4 Fifteen per cent (15%) of Saudis and 23% of Westerners
said that objectives and plans must lead to achievement
of the mission, even though the culture may run counter
to the organisational goals.
4.5 Five per cent (5%) of Saudis and 7% of Westerners said
that organisational culture usually has no effect on
achievement of the mission.
4.6 Twenty per cent (20%) of Saudis and 17% of Westerners
said that satisfying employees' needs, such as salary,
would take care of achieving the mission, even though
the culture might be 'hostile'.
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About sixty-three per cent (63%) of the Westerners
thought that; the culture of their organisations could
be 'forced towards achieving the mission', or personnel
could be given more incentives to achieve the mission
despite the culture's impact. This is a typical short-
term task-oriented style. In addition, about sixty-
seven per cent (67%) of Saudis questioned shared the
same view or style.
a-2 Organisational Values
1.	 Organisational Values Effect on Business
The participants were asked how much their organisation-
al values effect their business (Q45-2, a). The responses
are shown in Table 53.
Table 53
ORGANISATIONAL VALUES EFFECT ON ORGANISATION'S BUSINESS
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
r
Very much/
much
65 73 92 64
Little/very
little
35 27 8 37
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 53 shows that governmental organisations realised
the effects of values on their business more than the non-
governmental organisations. A third of 'non-government'
managers did not agree that values necessarily contribute
to the accomplishment of the mission (Table 51) and/or have
effects on their business (Table 52). However, few Saudis
changed their evaluation regarding the effects of values on
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the organisation that reduced the non-importance of values
by nineteen per cent (19%). However, the low consideration
toward the importance of values in the non-government
organisations could be due to the participants dissatis-
faction with those values, or because they did not see any
values at their work that had real or major effects on their
business. In addition, it could be because they are
short-term-profit oriented.
In summary, about two-third of the Saudi organisations
were seen as not having a positive culture that supported
achieving their mission.
Saudi Arabia is a traditional society. This means that
the family and personal ties and relationships have great
effects on its social value system. This extends to business
and organisations in the Kingdom. For instance, an organisa-
tion may develop its own culture and values, but the society
it lives in and the people it hires bring their culture and
values with them into the organisation. This causes the
organisation to adjust its culture, values, objectives, and
so on, to fit into that society. However, there are some
values, traditions, or social norms and YIbits that the
organisation cannot influence or change.
The following represents results of the findings on the
impact of Saudi culture on organisations.
2.	 The Strongest Value(s) at Work
It was found that Islamic beliefs and teachings contain
strong values that effect Saudi organisations. This is
followed by placing a high value on good services and
productivity. The participants were asked what the most
important value at work was. They were given seven major
values to rate according to their importance. Table 54
represents the results (Q2-2, a).
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Table 54
IMPORTANCE AND KINDS OF VALUES AT WORK
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
- Religious
beliefs
38.6 11.5 31 27
- Good work
norm,	 i.e.
14.8 11.5 16 10
, honesty
- Good
services
15.8 3.9 14 12.5
-High produc-
tivity
14.8 53.8 20 40.5
- Team work 7.2 15.4 10 7.5
- Employees
welfare
0.9 1
- Good rela-
tionships
at work
7.9 3.9 8 2.5
100% 100 100 100 100
The above results indicate the following:
2.1 Saudis:
- Thirty-nine per cent (39%) Saudis place high value
on religious beliefs. They said that Islam has all
the necessary values and teachings to enhance and
improve business and performance.
- Good work norms, such as honesty and sincerity,
followed by good service, such as customer satis-
faction, and followed by high productivity, for
example, hardworking, were given the second
highest values (average 15%).
- The third highest values were good relationships
at work (8%).
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2.1 Westerners:
- The highest value at work was high productivity,
for instance, being hardworking (54%). This
indication supports the author's previous findings
that most Westerners are highly short-term, task
oriented.
- The second highest value at work rated by (15%)
of Westerners is teamwork. However, this is
clearly a reflection of a Western approach or
belief; the teamwork value is not given more than
(7%) by the Saudis.
- Religious beliefs and good norms are rated (11.5%)
each. It is possible that the Westerners give this
rate to religious beliefs because Christianity,
like Islam, calls for values that improve work and
performance. Another possibility is that evalua-
tion was a reflection of the Saudi Islamic cul-
ture, that has some influence on them at their
work.
B. THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS ON PERSONNEL AND
ORGANISATIONS
Social relationships in Saudi Arabia have a strong
influence on management's activities. This is shown in the
following:
1- Social Relationships: Effects on Subordinates
As shown previously, social relationships in Saudi
Arabia have a great impact on management, recruitment,
promotion, decision making, and so on. In some respect,
employees feel that they are members of one big family at
work. This generalisation yet, should not be misinterpreted.
For example, the research has shown that teamwork is not much
valued, participative decision-making is not supported, and
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confrontation is disliked. It means that people at work
interact like members of a traditional or extended family,
where the grandfather or father (the leader) must be obeyed.
These relationships are based on seniority, respect, power
and authority, and thus the dependency or collectivism is
high. The member (employee) who does not follow the rules
or the leader's direction must be corrected or leave the
family.
The participants were asked to rate the social relation-
ships at work in regard to making a subordinate feel as a
family member (Q41-2, a). The responses are represented in
table 55.
Table 55
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AT WORK MARE PEOPLE FEEL LIKE ONE
BIG FAMILY
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Strongly agree 84 50 80 73
/agree
Disagree/
strongly
disagree
16 50 20 27
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 55 shows that the family concept has a high value
3 perceived by eighty-four per cent (84%) of the Saudi
erticipants and fifty per cent (50%) of Westerners. This
.:oncept is high in both government and non-government
organisations.
The participants were also asked if they agreed that
Saudi executives should invite co-workers to their homes for
dinner/social gatherings to enhance their office relation-
ships. The results are in table 56 (Q44-2, a).
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Table 56
SOCIAL GATHERING HELPS THE SAUDI EXECUTIVE
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Always/most of
times
45 15 42 75
Sometimes 38 46 35 8
(50/50)
Little/never 17 39 23 17
100% 100 100 100 100
Table 56 shows that social gatherings as a means to help
executives in improving their business is high where forty-
five per cent (45%) of the Saudi participants agreed with
or practiced such social gatherings besides another thirty-
eight per cent (38%) who sometimes practices this.
The cross-tabulation data analysis also indicates that
an average of sixty-four per cent (64%) of the participants
agreed that many Saudi executives arrange social gatherings
for improving their business. This was also concurred by an
average of twenty-eight per cent (28%), of the Western
participants.
2- Time Value and Social Relationships
As mentioned in Chapter V, and in the review of
literature, Chapter IV, the value placed on time by both
Saudi society and most Saudi managers is rather low. The
participants were also asked if they agreed that social
interaction was very important even though it takes time.
Most of both Saudi and Westerners managers agreed (Q43-2,
a) .
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Table 57
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AT WORK ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN TIME
Item
Saudis
%
Western-
ers %
Govern-
ment %
Non-Govern-
ment %
Strongly agree 85 85 80 92
/agree
Disagree/
strongly
disagree
15 15 20 8
100% 100 100 100 100
Tables 55, 56, and 57 show that most Saudi and Western
managers in the private or non-government organisations
believe that social relationships and gatherings are very
important for making progress in Saudi Arabian business. This
is also high in government organisations.
3.	 Social Impact on Time Values
3.1 Time Management vs. Social Effects
The impact of social relationships on the value placed
on time was further investigated through an open-ended
question, (Q21-2, c). The question asked was:
Do you find any difficulties in managing your time at
work? And outside work? What are the causes?
Almost every Saudi manager said that they had diffi-
culties in managing or utilising their time efficiently at
work (88% Saudis). In addition, thirty-eight per cent (38%)
of Westerners expressed the same problem. The causes showed
are among the following:
Social interactions and gatherings at work, family
calls, social obligations, hospitality, and the
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low value placed on time by Saudi society.
- The "open-door" policy: Saudi managers keep an
open door for the public and/or employees, and
almost anyone can drop in without an appointment.
This policy is either under the manager's control,
where he might assign two or three hours for those
visits, or out of control, especially if he is in
a job that frequently deals with the public.
- The "top-man syndrome": clients of many Saudi
enterprises insist on dealing only with the very
head of the organisation. Though this type of
interaction often wastes part of the executive's
time, he has to deal with such visits diplomati-
cally to avoid being considered impolite.
- Ineffective meetings and committees, in which
executives may be called to participate without
an advance agenda. This also wastes part of the
executive's time, since not all these meetings are
truly important. Some meetings can be avoided or
attended by a delegate. But many require personal
attendance. In addition, there are committees that
waste much time either because they have too many
members or no concrete topic of discussion.
For additional information about the ineffective meet-
ings, see last chapter, Section I, and Tables 46 to 49.
3.2 Managing Time Outside Work
The participants, 71% of the Saudis, and 100% of the
Westerners, did not agree that they had difficulties in
managing their time out of work. However, few Saudis said
that:
- they have to take work home with them (10%).
- They sometimes have to leave their offices late,
which impacts on their personal lives (15%).
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A deputy minister commented that a person at a
senior level has to consider that part of his free
and personal time is neither his own nor his
family's. He has to give part of his personal life
and time to his job if he wants to make progress
and serve his country (1%).
In addition, another three senior officials (3%)
felt that their lives, since they are in their present
posts, belong to the community.
4- Cultural Impact on Attendance and Punctuality
The Saudi culture and social system are impacting
negatively on employees' attendance. Fifty-eight per
cent (58%) of Saudis and sixty-one per cent (61%) of
Westerners felt that attitudes attributable to the
local culture were the major reason for absenteeism
among Saudi employees (see Tables 43 to 45).
C.	 EFFECTS OF SAUDI CULTURE ON BUSINESS
The responses presented in Chapter V discussed Saudi
management needs for improvement, section H. The following
shows the participants' responses concerning what they
believe Saudi business needs to improve. These responses are
cumulative; for example, a participant may mention or agree
on more than a single statement.
Requirements for Improvement of Saudi Business
An open-ended question was addressed to the participants
about what Saudi business needed to improve (Q2-2, b). The
following represents their responses:
Saudis' Views ( a participant may have responded to more
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than one item; 95 out of 114 participants responded):
1- More value needs to be placed on time (18 responses out
of 95).
2- There is a need to change social values and norms that
impact negatively on business development, such as
social relationships, and the dislike of craft and
manual jobs (6 responses).
3- The Saudi workforce's loyalty is based upon personal
interests, family, and relationships. This loyalty
should be to the organisation (9 responses).
4- There is a high incidence of favouritism, using connec-
tions, and waste of resources for satisfying personal
wants and relationships (18 responses).
5- Reduce personal and social relationships at work (6
responses).
6- There is a high level of collectivism and dependency,
for example, subordinates are too dependent on their
supervisor's direction (5 responses).
7- There is a great need to increase employees' disci-
pline. Punctuality and hard work are low (16 respons-
es).
8- We need to value hard work and increase productivity
(6 responses).
9- There is a major lack of efficiency and performance
standards (11 responses).
10- There is a lack of efficiency among Saudi employees and
management (7 responses).
11- There is a lack of commitment among management towards
objectives and tasks (5 responses).
12- Management need to be open to confrontation and criti-
cism (4 responses).
13- Leadership or senior management at most organisations
need development (10 responses).
14- Teamwork and participative decision-making are to be
valued and supported (10 responses).
15- Develop the application of management-by-objective in
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Saudi companies, thus measuring performance frequently
on a short-term basis, for example, every six months
(2 responses).
16- Saudi management needs to be more objective, not so
emotional (5 responses).
17- Members of the Board of Directors need to be enthusias-
tic, have more expertise, and broad thinking (3 re-
sponses).
18- Employees' training and development are deficient;
there must be more (26 responses).
19- Wages and incentives in the private sector need to
increase or to become fair (9 responses).
20- Saudi companies need to recruit the right persons in
the right jobs (the right qualifications), especially
for management positions. Recruitment and promotion
through connections (wasttah) must stopped, and selec-
tion processes and procedures must be improved (26
responses).
21- There is a great lack of standards of performance,
evaluation and measurement (10 responses).
22- There is a lack of good or effective motivation,
promotion, and reward systems; good performance is not
well appreciated (11 responses).
23- There should be more support or encouragement for
initiative and creativity (2 responses).
24- Organisational functions and activities should be
better organised (7 responses).
25- There is a lack of clear and well-defined objectives,
goals, and plans. In addition, plans are not practical
and goals are not reasonable (10 responses).
26- There is a lack of organisational policies, regula-
tions, procedures, and boundaries. Though some organis-
ations have policies and boundaries that often do not
meet the needs of rapidly expanding businesses, or they
do not support progress (17 responses).
7 - There is lack of organisational manuals (5 responses).
- Bureaucracy, red tape, and centralisation, are high.
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Those things hinder business progress in the Kingdom
(24 responses).
29- There is a great need to develop both employees and
companies to be professional and specialised (12
responses).
30- Saudi companies need to develop their coordination,
communication, follow-up, and monitoring systems (5
responses).
31- Reduce committees (2 responses).
32- Reduce the high level of recruiting foreigners (3
responses).
33- There should be frequent local conferences between
businessmen and government agencies to discuss business
development needs (5 responses).
34- Government regulations and procedures are not flexible
and do not support business needs and change (14 re-
sponses).
35- We need to become long-term oriented; we lack strategic
planning and long-term plans (12 responses).
36- The Kingdom needs to develop facilities that provide
information and that effectively help business needs.
This is important especially in conducting feasibility
studies, project evaluation, and planning (7 respons-
es).
37- Improve government support to Saudi business and
marketing strategies (3 responses).
38- We need more studies in marketing, consumer behaviour,
competition, and advertising (3 responses).
39- There is a need to change the direction of business
from small, family businesses to a share-holding
companies (5 responses).
40- Private companies in the Kingdom are very short-term
oriented; they are looking for fast profit rather than
long-term good investments (5 responses).
41- Reduce the import and implementation of some technology
and of Western ideologies that have bad effect on the
Saudi Arabian value system (2 responses).
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Westerner's Views (24 respondent (92%), cumulative respons-
es):
1- There is lack of good discipline and punctuality among
Saudi employees (5 responses out of 24).
2- Saudi business needs to place value on hardwork (3
responses).
3- Saudi business needs more efficiency (3 responses).
4- Saudi business needs to place value on time (2 respons-
es).
5- There is a strong need for manpower development and
training (5 responses).
6- Leadership in Saudi business needs development (4
responses).
7- Members of boards of directors need training, to be
more open minded, and to have more or better experience
(3 responses).
8- Business needs long-term and strategic planning (8
responses).
9- There is a lack of clear objectives and goals (5
responses).
10- There is a lack of teamwork (4 responses).
11- Meetings have to be effective (2 responses).
12- Office politics must be reduced (1 response).
13- Reduce bureaucracy and centralisation (5 responses).
14- There is a great lack of organisational boundaries and
policies (5 responses).
15- There is a strong need for career planning, job de-
scriptions, performance appraisal, and effective
organisational structure (4 responses).
16- Saudi companies need effective and efficient financial
and budgeting system (5 responses).
17- Business in Saudi Arabia needs information and statis-
tical bases (7 responses).
18- Business progress in the Kingdom needs frequent market
studies and research (2 responses).
19- Business progress in Saudi Arabia needs more feasibili-
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ty studies; no investment decisions should be made on
gut feelings (6 responses) .
20- For foreign managers to run business effectively in the
Kingdom they need to understand the Saudi social system
(6 responses) .
D. FEATURES OF THE SAUDI ENVIRONMENT THAT COULD ENHANCE
BUSINESS
The following discusses the features of the Saudi
Arabian environment that have the potential to enhance
business in that country (104 Saudis, 91%), and 26 Westerners
(100%) responded). Included are the responses of both Saudi
and Western managers (Q4-2, b). The features are:
1- Saudi nationals are very loyal to their country
(5 Saudis out of 104).
2- Social relationships are good; they promote a
friendly work atmosphere (9 Saudis out of 104, and
3 Westerners out of 26).
3- Islamic teachings help progress, for instance,
fairness, justice, and honesty (15 Saudis).
4- There is stability at the political level, and
security (7 Saudis).
5- There is no tax system, besides Zakat (2.5% per
year on invested capital according to Islam),
which encourages investment (4 Saudis).
6- There is good job security (7 Saudis).
7- Many, or an increasing number, of young Saudis who
graduate from technical schools and universities
have good potential for local employment (3 Sau-
dis).
3- The large number of young people in Saudi Arabia
60% of whose population are under 26 years old.
(3 Saudis).
9- Saudi nationals have good manners and civil
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behaviour (3 Westerners).
10- Saudi Arabia is trying hard to modernise (1
Westerner).
11- The Saudi government supports private sector
business and provides long term credits (free of
interest) for construction, farming, industrial
and major public projects, (5 Saudis).
12- The Saudi government encourages large-scale
investment (3 Saudis).
13- The Saudi government provides great support for
education and technical training; education is
free at all levels (11 Saudis).
14- Saudi youths are keen to learn (2 Westerners).
15- There is a good transportation system, in the form
of roads and railways. This helps business and
supports services (2 Saudis).
16- Resources in the Kingdom (raw materials, capital,
and so on), are sufficiently available, which
promotes industrial and business progress (16
Saudis, 10 Westerners).
17- Saudi Arabia is open enough for international
trade; it is almost a free market (10 Saudis).
18- New technology is available in the Kingdom for
almost all projects and businesses (6 Saudis, 2
Westerners).
19- There is wide cooperation with international
organisations and expertise, that helps learning,
provides experience, and allows effective use of
technology (7 Saudis).
20- There are good banking, support, and financial
systems (4 Saudis).
It should be added that while we have included all these
points since they are relevant and were genuinely raised by
members on the survey samples, in many cases the numbers
making these assertions were quite small.
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E.	 SAUDI ARABIA EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
The participants were asked how good they felt the
educational system in Saudi Arabia to be in relation to busi-
ness needs (Q5-2, b). The following represents the responses
of 103 Saudi and 5 Western executives. Twenty-one Westerners
(81%) did not answer, saying it was difficult for them to
make any judgement about a system they did not know well
enough.
1- Twenty-one per cent (21%) of the Saudis said: education
in the Kingdom does not encourage or direct technical
skills development at an early stage, such as at
elementary school level. Developing basic technical
skills, for example, painting and carpentry skills, at
an early age, for example, 8-12, would help change work
preferences among Saudis and resolve the dislike of
craft and manual jobs.
2- Thirty-seven per cent (37%) of the Saudis said: educa-
tion at all levels, grammar school, high school, and
university, is too theoretical. Practice and appli-
cation in workshops of what was given in the classrooms
is rare. Students, therefore, quickly forget what they
have learned. They use only their hearing and seeing
in their learning; they do not use the other senses.
In addition, the teaching system does not encourage
learning without being heavily dependent on teachers.
3- Forty-two per cent (42%) of Saudis said: coordination
among schools, colleges, and universities on the one
hand, and industry on the other, is low. The labour
market's needs are not met by what educational insti-
tutes teach. Most of the graduates' specialties are not
in high demand. For instance the labour market may need
electricians, and computer engineers, while most grad-
uates are from business administration and history.
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Education's programmes and activities must be directed
toward the country's development and business needs.
It must be long-term oriented, and avoid focusing only
on satisfying the wishes of students and their parents.
4- Nineteen per cent (19%) of the Westerners said: Saudi
youths are very eager to learn, but they lack practical
skills. When they were given tasks that they should
have practiced during their engineering and technical
studies, they could not do them well. It seems they did
not have enough practical training.
II. INTERVIEWS
Forty-one Saudis out of 114, and fifteen Westerners out
of 26 were interviewed. The following represents only the
interviews that have significant results, provide additional
data to the research findings and/or support findings. The
following summarises the interviews with 37 Saudi and 13
Western executives.
1- Saudis from Government Organisations
1.1 A Director General Manager from a state-owned manufac-
turing company said in the interview:
Many senior managers in my organisation were
promoted to their positions rapidly. They did not have
enough experience to understand all the functions of
the organisation's overall objectives. They did not
have adequate technical or conceptual knowledge and
expertise. As a reaction to this, they lack confidence.
Those senior managers favour working with the staff
they know well and therefore they try to promote these
friends as a favour or to be closer to them. Most
promotions to management levels are not based on good
qualifications, experiences, training, and job knowl-
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edge.
Cooperation among those who graduated and joined
the workforce in the middle 1970s and later is higher
than among older graduates. For instance, those who are
between 28 to 44 years old, are more cooperative
despite their organisational levels than those who are
older. The older managers tend to be stubborn and
uncooperative.
We have saudiised about 60% of our workforce. But
instead of saudiising a position, for example, a
supervisor post, with a graduate who should have
undergone training and career progression for six
years, the position is saudiised with a graduate after
only 4 years on the job. This means that the position
is held by a person who is under-qualified. This type
of scenario has resulted in some problems such as low
productivity, 'immaturity' in decision-making, and so
on.
1.2 An Assistant Deputy Minister:
Most of our work problems are due to misunder-
standing organisational boundaries, policies and
regulations. For instance, the chain of command is
often by-passed, some assignments go to departments
whose functions are irrelevant to the tasks. In addi-
tion, there is no compatibility among some department
functions, such that interdepartmental functions do not
support each other. This problem is not limited to
departments within one organisation, but among several
agencies that should support each other as well.
Also, many of our senior officials are not objec-
tive, they are person-oriented, and therefore much of
their directions are not clear or easily understood.
Their directions or orders are frequently not related
to the organisation's goals. Most senior officials are
very centralised and individualistic in their decision
making.
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We have tried to apply criticism and be open, but
this has not been helpful at all. It created more
conflict and constrains sensitivity to other's opin-
ions. Confrontation does not work.
In most Saudi Arabian organisations, we need more
open-minded, impersonal, and highly-skilled leadership
that can develop and encourage modern management
practices.
1.3 An Assistant Director General:
My door is always open for everyone because my job
is to help and assist people (this person's job
involved meeting and assisting people as a civil duty) .
I also help my friends, for instance, follow up their
papers and get their transactions done (but his job did
not, of course, require him to do this).
1.4 A President of a Government Training Institute:
Saudi government regulations delay work progress,
consume and waste a lot of time, and impact negatively
on some decision-making. Most of the government's
policies and regulations are to control activities, not
to support, guide, and improve them. Unfortunately, the
policies' primary concern is the budget and financial
system and operations; policies for staff development
are neglected or not given adequate importance.
I believe that organisational boundaries, poli-
cies, and regulations are to enhance business, there-
fore, we (at my work) have developed good policies and
clear boundaries. This helps everyone understand their
responsibilities, and gives our senior management
enough time to handle more important tasks than super-
vision and guidance. However, organisational change is
generally resisted by many Saudi executives. They do
not want any change that reduces their authority and
number of subordinates. On the other hand, they do not
mind change related to technology, work processes, and
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so on.
We need leadership development in all organi-
sations and corporations. We need effective leaders who
develop leadership in their own organisations as well.
I believe that a successful organisation is a result
of successful leadership.
Our research centres and universities are not
involved enough in studying our social and business'
developmental needs. In addition, businessmen do not
encourage or support local universities' research and
studies. We need a national executives' committee that
encourages or enforces cooperation among industries,
universities, and research centres.
1.5 A Deputy Minister:
Not all organisational policies and boundaries can
be applied effectively because some top officials
impact on the whole system, functions, boundaries, and
so on. This impact can be very negative if those
officials are 'too personal' and put their personal
interests first. Managers in Saudi Arabia need to
understand their organisations' functions and their
responsibilities. They should also give more attention
to constructive relationships that lead to commitment
and improve performance. They also should keep open
communication with subordinates to exchange opinions
and improve motivation. In summary, management should
become more objective.
Also, most organisations lack policies, regula-
tions, procedures, and manuals. In addition, those
organisations that have policies and manuals do not put
enough emphasis on making subordinates read and under-
stand them.
Education in the Kingdom does not reflect the
labour market's needs. Also, the education is too
theoretical.
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Resistance to change in the Kingdom specifically
organisational and structure change, is very strong.
I believe that resistance would be much less if execu-
tives discussed their ideas, and the purposes of the
change, with employees in an atmosphere of openness and
trust. This would help subordinates feel they are
having an impact on the process.
In the Kingdom you might be able to change the
method of work, type of equipment, and so on, but there
are some situations where whatever change you make
would not work. This is because the people either lack
sufficient knowledge and skills or they do not want to
understand the need for change. In other words, some-
times the people for whose benefit the change is
addressed are incapable of understanding how the
effects of that change would help them.
My time at work and home is influenced by my job
and duties. For instance, I have to allocate two hours
daily, for instance, from 10:00 to 12:00 AM, for
meeting the public. This portion of my time is used to
deal with the top man syndrome, favouritism, personal
interests, and personal compliance. I could not ignore
this practice, though I am very busy and have many
responsibilities; it is essential in the Kingdom. I
have delegated many of my tasks but I also have to be
in touch, before, during, and after the delegation.
This is important because the results are still my
responsibility. Committees and meetings also consume
my time as well. Therefore, I find that I must take
some work home with me and work evenings especially
since there are some tasks that need intensive think-
ing. Sometimes I have had to take two suitcases full
of files and papers that needed to be reviewed, or
required my comments or instructions. I have to get
them ready to be sent out of my office next day. These
tasks and responsibilities impact on my personal life
and family, but I have to keep on since there is no
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other alternative.
1.6 An Assistant Deputy Minister:
The education system in Saudi Arabia is ineffec-
tive. It concentrates on theory (hearing and reading)
and neglects the application or practice of science.
The education system does not encourage the
students to value hard work, commitment, good disci-
pline, and punctuality. It does not encourage students
to be independent in learning; instead it emphasises
dependency on receiving knowledge from instructors.
Also, it is not helpful in changing work preference
towards technical and craft jobs. For instance, there
are no simulation facilities or small workshops for
elementary and intermediate schools where the children
and teenagers can develop their interest in craft work
and enhance their basic technical learning. We need an
education system that develops initiative, and helps
students to be confident. Also, that helps in changing
the social values towards an effective, industrially
oriented system, for example, a system that places high
value on time. Once we develop our educational system,
we can claim that young Saudi nationals must be given
the opportunities to work in the expatriate's posi-
tions, especially in the private sector where Saudi
nationals represent only fifteen per cent (15%) of the
workforce.
Many Saudi government organisations have noticed
an ongoing expansion of their duties and responsibili-
ties. This fast expansion has caused a rapid change in
those organisations' policies, strategies, and bound-
aries. Sometimes there is an overlapping among some
departments' functions. In others there are some func-
tions that are not handled efficiently because it is
not clear whose duties they are. Saudi management needs
to be open to feedback and the exchange of opinions
with colleagues and subordinates.
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Industry in the Kingdom needs to develop industri-
al policies and strategies. It also needs long-term
investment plans, data bases, and flexible procedures
that are defined and clear. In addition, the Kingdom
needs industrial research centre(s) and support, for
example, market information/data. Industry in the
Kingdom needs development in several areas, such as
standards and quality assurance. In addition, there is
a need for more local business conferences, and
meetings with the participation of businessmen, indus-
trial and trade officials, members from chambers of
commerce and research centres.
1.7 An Assistant Director, Finance:
Saudi managers are not objective, for example,
decision-making is affected by personal and family
interests. On the other hand, Western managers are very
task oriented. In addition, the preferences for certain
jobs and positions for Saudis are very interrelated
with their social system and family values, for exam-
ple, Saudis prefer management and administrative jobs
to technical and craft-related positions.
Finally, some people think that centralisation in
Saudi Arabia is too high; it is not too high. What
gives it this appearance is the excess of paper work
in government organisations.
1.8 A Director, Finance:
Planning in the Kingdom is neither flexible nor
strategic. All plans in government organisations are
short-term, though they may not look alike; they are
for two or three years maximum. Saudi managers need
planning skills and to develop a data base; they do not
recognise how important information is in the planning
and decision making processes.
Saudi workers lack commitment and loyalty to their
work and organisations. They are lazy, rely on senior
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relatives to help them to make progress, for instance,
promotion, and they are not task oriented.
1.9 A Vice President:
Centralisation is too high in all government
agencies. It should be reduced, and more authority and
autonomy should be given to subordinates. Executives
do not delegate most of their tasks; they like control,
red tape, and hold all or most authority in their
hands. These practices: centralisation, control and
dislike of delegation, besides the plethora of ineffec-
tive procedures, cause a high degree of bureaucracy in
government organisations. Also, the top-man syndrome
and the low value placed on time cause a significant
wastage of time. Furthermore, "wasttah" (personal
connections and favouritism) is a strong characteristic
of Saudi society and business. It is used in recruit-
ment, promotion, and getting things done. It is a big
problem in Saudi society.
1.10 A General Manager, Training:
To improve business and develop industrialisation
in the Kingdom we need directed and intensive social
and cultural development. Schools, parents, supervi-
sors, and so on, have to work together to improve
individuals' capabilities to be industrially oriented.
In addition, the education system and programmes have
to be effective and directed towards industrial and
labour-market's needs. Also, we do not distinguish
corporate culture from the society's culture; they are
interrelated. Therefore, without developing Saudi
culture any good corporate culture would not be very
effective.
1.11 An Assistant General Manager:
The Saudi government wants to privatise some of
its organisations. Privatisation of those corporations
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could be successful if the government would change them
to public ownership and sell their Shares. For in-
stance, the telephone and railway could be changed into
entirely private corporations that would offer shares
for the public. This would make them more productive,
effective and efficient. Since those organisations are
tied to government regulations and policies, and
strongly supported by the government or dependent on
government protection and support, they will not become
profit-oriented. In addition, because they are govern-
ment organisations, favouritism, social relationships,
and social ties, have a strong influence and impact on
their efficiency. Privatisation would mean a change in
the companies' systems and their removal from the
governmental bureaucracy.
Saudi business needs more market planning, feasi-
bility studies, project evaluation, training and
development. It also requires abetter education system
that would produce the industrial and marketing staff
that is needed. Business in the Kingdom is based on gut
feelings not good research and studies.
Attendance and the work schedule in the Kingdom
do not fit with the social system and the environment.
Why should we use a system of working hours that is
similar to a Western society when our culture and
environment are different. A forty-eight hour work week
with one day off is too much for people who live in a
hot climate, and have a lot of social ties and family
obligations.
1.12 A Department General Manager:
Many private companies try to bypass government
regulations, misunderstand the purpose of those regula-
tions, and try to bribe officials. Unfortunately, there
are some officials who help those companies to achieve
this.
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1.13 A General Manager of a Training Institute:
The skills of many Saudi managers are obsolete.
They even lack basic management knowledge. For in-
stance, during a middle-management course, the partici-
pants (14 people) were asked to draw their sections/di-
visions organisational chart. Few drew them perfectly,
and many had difficulties because they did not know
their division's structure and positions. In addition,
one participant drew a road map that showed the direc-
tion, location, of his department. This shows that
some employees are promoted to higher positions based
on seniority or connection and not on qualifications.
They are also promoted without going through training
and development.
Social relationships and relations with top
officials are a basic element in promotion, besides
obeying orders without discussion or argument.
Most Saudi government organisations lack control-
ling and monitoring systems. They need a system that
helps in monitoring performance efficiently, as well
as efficiency, productivity, punctuality, and atten-
dance, and that helps them in developing policy and
procedures.
Many senior Saudi officials resist organisational
change in structure, policies, and procedures. Unless
the change is initiated by them, they do not cooperate
with outside recommendations, for instance, from a
consultant.
1.14 A Training Director:
Many Saudi graduates achieved their masters
degrees without having any good practical experience.
For instance, holders of bachelor's degree went on to
study for master's degrees without spending 2-4 years
on practical on the job learning. The result is that
there are many Saudi graduates who lack practical
experience and are looking for senior positions just
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because they hold master's degrees. In addition, many
Saudi managers, whether recent or older graduates, stop
reading and working on self development once they are
promoted to a middle-management position.
There is too little training in the Kingdom and
there is a great lack of short courses and conferences.
Unfortunately, training is the first activity that
suffers budget cuts in crisis situations.
1.15 A Director of a Department:
Saudi managers need training in planning, deci-
sion-making, and leadership. Saudi nationals in both
government and non-government organisations need skills
and further specialised development. Saudi subordinates
are collectivist, unproductive, lack punctuality, and
therefore need development and improvement.
Organisational boundaries are not defined or
insisted upon, many executives do not follow these
boundaries. In addition, many Saudi organisations lack
effective structure, clear roles and responsibilities,
and efficient job descriptions.
1.16 A Training General Manager:
Due to lack of an effective educational system in
Saudi Arabia some large organisations have had to spend
much money in training new employees. Most Saudi
workers are not adequately qualified.
Government organisations, when recruiting new
employees, give more consideration to educational
background than to experience or expertise. On the
other hand, when promoting employees they put years of
experience as the most important element in promotion,
though those years might have been just a repetitive
experience with no additional skills or major expertise
gained.
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1.17 A Director of a Department:
Bribes are excessive among senior government
officials. Most government contracts, for example, for
services or construction, cannot be given to a private
company without payment of bribes to senior officials.
Sometimes, bribes are as much as ten per cent (10%) of
the contract's value. There are some committees to
review tender documents and the cost of contracts, and
they are supposed to select the best offer. Yet, they
are influenced by some senior official's power and
recommendation.
Many senior officials want to get rich very
quickly and a major problem is that government organi-
sations do not have good controlling and monitoring
systems. Though an official may be found guilty for
having or accepted a bribe no strong action would be
taken against him. Also, it appears that no action to
correct and control the prevailing attitude will be
developed soon.
2- Saudis from Semi-Government Organisations, industrial
and production. (These organisations are fully owned
by the government or partially owned by the public, but
depend to a high extent on government support) .
2.1 A General Manager of a Department in an Industrial
Company:
Many Saudi managers are promoted rapidly to their
positions without having enough experience and/or
training. This impacts on performance and efficiency.
In addition, management training programmes in
the Kingdom are too theoretical and the appraisal
system is generally conducted subjectively. Yet another
problem is that Saudi. managers often come late to work
in the morning, sometimes 2-3 hours. Those things,
together, make Saudi management ineffective.
The important concern of private companies' is
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quick and short-term profit; they disregard their
social roles and participation in community develop-
ment.
Government and most of semi-government organisa-
tion systems are obsolete. They are ineffective, rigid,
and do not fit the industrial development the country
has been undergoing. In addition, many Saudi senior
managers resist change that would effect organisational
structure, policy, and/or their position and authority.
Furthermore, standardisation is too slow in relation
to the rapid expansion of business and the changes in
technology. However, most of the Saudi managers encour-
age change that is related to technology, for instance,
machines.
Cooperation between Saudi managers and Westerners
is low because their personal relationships are weak.
Saudiising jobs in expatriates' posts is pushed
faster than necessary, putting Saudis into jobs without
sufficient training and experience.
2.2 An Executive Director:
The open-door policy wastes my time. For instance,
some middle managers and supervisors drop into my
office without any advance appointments.In addition,
staff from other departments frequently come to my
office looking for favours (wasttah), and try to use
their connections to help them getting transactions
done faster.
Saudiisation has to be done according to the
minimum qualifications required for positions occupied
by non-Saudis. There are many Saudis who replace
expatriates without meeting those minimum requirements.
This impacts on productivity and performance.
2.3 A General Manager of Public Affairs:
Government directives interrupt our business,
objectives, and planning. Government officials, through
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their control and directions, treat my company as a
public-service department, though it is a huge semi-go-
vernmental industrial company that generates much
revenue, has strong economic influence, and has to work
in an international market that is large and competi-
tive.
Personal ties and relationships at work have a bad
impact on our business progress. The personal contact
relationship (wasttah) results in the recruitment of
the wrong persons, promotion of unqualified individu-
als, and impacts on performance. Using personal con-
tacts is irrelevant to Islam; it is a social influence.
For instance, Islam calls for justice, honesty, hard
work, and so on.
2.4 A General Manager:
I think that Saudi Arabia will face an unemploy-
ment problem among university graduates in the next few
years. For instance, many governmental and non-govern-
mental organisations give a large portion of their
projects and undertakings to contractors. The contrac-
tors hire more than seventy per cent (70%) of their
workforce from abroad. Usually highly skilled jobs are
filled by expatriates from Western countries, and
non-technical and semi-skilled jobs are filled by other
Middle Easterners and people from Far Eastern lands.
This practice is also prevalent in the private sector,
where it prevents large numbers of Saudis from joining
the workforce. Saudis make up only about fifteen per
cent (15%) of the private sector's workforce.
The private companies complain that upon complet-
ing their contracts it would be difficult to terminate
the Saudis' services. Of course, this is not valid
because it could be stipulated that the Saudis are
hired for a specific period, and both sides would be
obliged to sign and agree on the termination of ser-
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vices after contract. This recruiting attitude reduces
the chance of many young Saudis to build their experi-
ence and confidence.
The government has to do something about saudiisa-
tion in the private sector. For instance, setting some
policies and directions, and reducing its support or
stopping industrial credits to those who do not in-
crease the percentage of Saudis in the workforce.
We are trying, in my work, to improve our utilisa-
tion of time, since time is very valuable for us.
However, we have many unnecessary meetings that consume
large chunks of time. Meetings and committees in the
Kingdom are excessive. Most of them are unproductive
or ineffective.
2.5 A Vice President, Distribution:
The productivity of the Saudi national workforce
is very low, at best it is about 40% of what it might
be expected to produce. Saudi employees, generally,
spend their working time socialising, in personal
matters, or come late to work and leave early. Punctu-
ality and productivity are influenced by the Saudi's
attitudes. Saudi culture impacts on people's attitudes,
but there are certain habits and traditions that cannot
be generalised about.
2.6 A Vice President, Finance:
Government financial regulations and procedures
are very rigid and inflexible. They delay and tie most
governmental and semi-governmental organisations'
activities, especially those that generate revenue.
There are many potential opportunities to change or
privatise some government corporations, such as the
telephone and the post. Still, businessmen do not see
this happening anytime in the future because of these
inflexible regulations and procedures.
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2.7 A General Manager, Marketing:
There is a great lack of coordination among
departments not directly involved in marketing, that
nonetheless, have influence on sales,for instance,
production. In the Kingdom, business firms concentrate
on marketing with small attention to quality, after
sales service, support, research or development.
2.8 A Vice President:
Many businesses in Saudi Arabia lack sophisticated
operating methods. For instance, they lack good feasi-
bility studies and long-term planning. Decisions that
are made for operations and/or the short-term, do not
consider their impact on the longer terms. In summary,
there is a lack of a conceptual framework.
Managers in Saudi Arabia need to learn to apply
modern management techniques, for example,organisatio-
nal appraisal or measuring achievement, decision-making
processes, and strategic planning. There is much
centralisation and management is very conservative.
This has produced difficulties and resistance in
negotiating and applying change.
Organisational change in Saudi business is tough
and often perceived as unnecessary. This causes the
organisational matrix not to work effectively, besides
a lack of coordination and effective communication
systems.
Middle managers in many Saudi organisations have
conflict with senior management though both are well
educated. This conflict may be due to senior manage-
ment's conservative style. In addition, because of this
conflict the use of formality becomes high in relations
between these two levels. We can often see a few senior
executives among many in a given company, trying to
hold most of the authority in their hands. In addition,
they are ruling all activities the way they like. This
increases conflict. Furthermore, senior managers resist
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organisational change. This is because they want to
protect their position, authority, and control.
3- Saudis from Private and Share-Holding Corporations
(non-government)
3.1 A Training Director:
Training for the private sector in the Kingdom is
minimal and growing very slowly. There is a great need
for training in finance, accounting, marketing, adver-
tising and sales. Also, there is a need for training
in: public affairs, administering maintenance and
service contracts, supervision and management. Saudi
Arabia needs to develop and adopt training courses that
fit its environment and business needs. For example
most of the available training courses are developed
abroad and do not fit the Saudi environment.
There are many small businesses that need to be
better organised, to become share-holding companies,
and be developed to become effective and long-term
oriented. Furthermore, there are middle and large-size
businesses influenced by the government's rigid regula-
tions and procedures, for instance, trade regulations,
that delay and impact on those companies activities.
Saudi Arabian business needs a local business and
organisation development and consulting service. Such
services are very rare and limited. Most big firms use
international consultants' service that are not partic-
ularly effective and very costly. Middle and small
firms have no access to this service.
3.2 A Director General of an Industrial Corporation:
There is some resistance to change among middle
and senior management. Resistance to change in Saudi
organisations could be reduced if both senior and
middle management participated in it from the begin-
ning, especially change related to policy, structure,
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and procedures. Some departments or organisations have
made changes that were not effective. This is because
the change was not extended to other units/departments
that had a strong relationship with them. If there is
a change in a department that is very dependent on
another department's support, or their activities are
interrelated, and the change occurs in only the first
one, the change may be useless.
Saudiisation has been carried out very quickly in
some organisations. This has caused stress on senior
management. For instance, saudiising middle and line-
management positions with young Saudis put stress on
senior management because the young employees still
have a lot to learn to become fully qualified.
Favouritism and/or connection (wasttah) , especial-
ly for recruiting unqualified personnel, affects our
performance. We are trying hard to avoid these practic-
es. They waste time and effort, specifically since we
have to meet people who come for wasttah. Therefore,
we try politely to keep those people away.
We try to keep in touch with local industries that
are similar to our business and we have been exchanging
experiences with some firms. Yet, there is a great lack
of exchange of experiences through conferences, meet-
ings, and visits among industrial and commercial
organisations in Saudi Arabia.
3.3 A Vice President, Research and Planning:
Almost all business organisations in Saudi Arabia
do not use good planning procedures. Planning in those
organisations, if there is any, is not strategic and
not dynamic. In addition, there are some firms that
develop short-and mid-terms plans, but do not develop
action plans or a measuring system to measure their
achievement and progress. Furthermore, senior Saudi
management is not open to feedback and most Saudi
executives are not qualified enough to do planning.
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Also, many senior managers do not support ideas or
recommendations for organisational change. This is a
strong symptom when the change is related to structure,
policy and authority.
3.4 An Assistant Director, Administration:
Most Western managers in the Kingdom are not
reliable. They have come to work here for a short
period and their main target is to make money, not to
help achieving long-term plans.
Education in the Kingdom is not much related to
industry and market needs, and is not technically
oriented.
3.5 A President of a Commercial and Service Corporation:
Many Saudi firms are not well organised. They do
not have efficient structures, good systems, and
effective management. Most Saudi managers, are not
long-term oriented, they lack long-term vision, manage-
ment skills, and expertise.
Education in the Kingdom is not effective. It does
not encourage creativity, and makes students very
dependent on collectivism.
In my organisation, that is a share-holding
company, we have developed a dynamic strategy where
every branch has its own board, structure, and plans.
The holding company sets policies and monitors long-
term directions.
I believe that social relationships have great
effects in developing connections with clients and
customers. I spend much my time in such relationships
and therefore put in about 14 hours a day for my
company.
3.6 A Chief Executive Officer of an industrial Company:
Although we have a good organisational structure
and job descriptions, there is some overlapping and a
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degree of lack of cooperation among some departments.
It . appears that this is due to a lack of qualified
Saudi managers and personnel.
We have tried to saudiise our jobs effectively,
but because of the nature of our work most good Saudi
employees do not want to work with us. For instance,
our factory works twenty-four hours, and most of Saudis
do not want to work night shift or during the weekend.
In addition, most of our technical and craft jobs
require qualified personnel, which is difficult to find
among Saudi labour and very costly to train. We have
managed to saudiise fifty per cent (50%) of our
positions, but we have been facing obstacles in
spending, operating and maintaining our factory to its
maximum capacity.
3.7 A President of an Industrial and Services Corporation:
Most of the private sector companies lack
training, mainly management training. I can summarise
the major problems this causes in the private sector
as:
- Lack of knowledge and skills among management and
subordinates.
- Lack of motivation, mainly because the private
sector does not pay good salaries, train
employees, and provide career progress.
Lack of a good selection and recruitment process.
Another problem is that although our corporate
organisational boundaries are clear, the Saudi subordi-
nates do not follow, respect, or try to read or ask
about them. On the other hand, the Western subordinates
understand and follow those boundaries.
We thought to participate in some Saudi government
privatisation projects but we faced several restrict-
ions. Those restrictions were (in those companies that
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could be privatised):
- The government has produced company systems that
are bureaucratic and very rigid. It would take too
long and require very intensive effort to try to
develop them.
- Managers skills at those companies are obsolete,
autocratic, and need to be replaced, which is
against government regulations.
- In addition, workers in those companies need much
training, development, and repositioning. Some
employees are promoted or recruited without
adequate qualifications.
Training in Saudi Arabia is limited though the country
is undergoing intensive industrial development. Many
Saudi youths need intensive training. Also, there is
a great gap between the educational system and the
local industrial needs. Management training is also
limited and there is a lack of leadership training. We,
in the Kingdom, need intensive leadership training and
development that can transform management from being
autocratic and traditional to being participative.
3.8 A President of a Share-Holding Company:
In my company, we believe that each of our sub
companies should develop its own structure, systems,
procedures, and workforce. The policy, strategy, and
directions are given, through discussion and participa-
tive efforts by the holding company. Still, the holding
company monitors some functions, such as financial
control, cash flow, recruitment to management
positions, and budget approval as a central function.
Centralisation of these functions is important to
ensure that all our sub-companies are not over using
the flexibility given to them. I think that there are,
in Saudi Arabia, many small and medium-size companies
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that should be share-holding corporations, but there
are some obstacles. Those include:
Those companies are owned by individuals or
families. They were established two decades or
more ago and they are run well by their owners.
In few years, those owners will go and their sons
or relatives will take over and there will be too
many chiefs and directors. Today those individuals
still do not want to see their businesses become
share-holding companies, though they could keep
a big part of the shares within the family. They
do not realise what may happen to their companies
in few years, upon their death.
Saudi nationals avoid investment in share-holding
corporations that are not highly supported by the
government. They are afraid of losing their money.
This is not due to uncertainty or high risk, but
because there is not enough publicity concerning
businesses.
Saudi nationals in the private sector workforce
represent only 15%. This low percentage is because
saudiisation, which includes training Saudis, is
very costly. Most Saudis, especially recent
graduates, lack the minimum qualifications or job
requirements. In addition, the education in the
Kingdom is too theoretical. It does not provide
practical learning and it is not related to
practicality or market needs. The private sector
should participate in the cost of developing and
training Saudis either through on-the-job training
programmes or other means. In summary, there is
a lack of planning and coordination between
government institutes, chambers of commerce, and
the private sector companies to train, develop,
and recruit Saudis.
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We in the private sector face too much wasted time
because of government bureaucracy. For instance,
following up some transactions for an official's
signature takes several visits to his office. The sad
fact is that these officials are often late or absent.
3.9 A Chief Executive Officer and a Board Chairman:
In Saudi Arabia, specialisation for both subordi-
nates and business firms has not reached a level where
everyone or every company knows what their business,
roles and tasks are. This environment, therefore,
cannot help people to work effectively to achieve
specific objectives. The executives, to run their
companies successfully have to play too many roles and
to be specialised in almost every field. What we really
lack is industrial social development. We also lack an
effective leadership that develops clear directions,
defined responsibilities, and efficient organisations.
Another problem is that Saudi culture does not
encourage organisational change that directs the
organisation towards specialisation. In addition,
peer-group norms and pressure do not support
restructuring of the hierarchy, redistribution of
authority, and development of boundaries that can make
the company more effective and efficient. Moreover,
most of Saudi business organisations are ineffective:
they lack dynamic systems, good boundaries, long term
planning, and qualified management.
In addition, boards of directors in many compa-
nies do not have enough members with knowledge and
expertise in the area of their business. Also, most of
the members are excessively busy with other personal
interests. It is very unusual to see two executives out
of ten work full time at the company of whose board of
directors they are members.
There is a great skills obsolescence among Saudi
executives. This is because:
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- They do not read, update, and improve their knowl-
edge and skills.
They avoid teamwork and that has a great effect
on learning through exchanging experiences and
opinions.
- They deal with many important tasks confidential-
ly, which keeps other managers unaware or lacking
information about the existing situation or what
is coming.
They are centralised and control authority, which
prevents participation and creativity.
3.10 A Director General of a Travel Agency
Saudiisation is very costly because most Saudi
workers and graduates are not qualified enough. We have
been saudiising many of our positions but we have had
to use many resources to train Saudis. However, I think
in about a decade, Saudi nationals will be competitive
because the government is developing and improving its
educational, training, and vocational systems, besides
the training many organisations are providing. I hope
that management and supervisory positions in Saudi
Arabia will be held by Saudis because the Saudis are
a long-term asset. They stay in their country, unlike
the expatriates who will sooner or later leave and take
the experience and knowledge they have gained working
in Saudi Arabia with them. Expatriates, at end of their
contracts, are a lost asset; the Saudis are not.
3.11 A Director General of a Commercial Bank:
Management training in the Kingdom is not suffi-
cient and/or good. Training needs more emphasis and
improvement. In addition, trainers or training insti-
tutes should coordinate with the trainees' superiors.
This lack of coordination and contact causes most of
training courses to be irrelevant to the work needs or
environment.
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There is a lack of constructive and objective
personnel appraisal in many Saudi companies. There
should be more emphasis on appraising for improving
performance, developing subordinates' confidence, and
identifying improvement needs. In addition, the
appraisal system gives the superiors chances to discuss
many other things that can cover work problems and
improve performance. Superiors also can discuss with
subordinates difficulties at work, work ethics, safety,
and so on.
Values in our banking business are very important.
We have developed values that improve our business, for
instance, "customers first". Such values help in
changing our Saudi employees' attitudes, thus they
adapt themselves to a banking business culture. I
believe that there is a great lack of the development
of values that could improve morality, change
attitudes, and make an effective work culture and
environment in Saudi Arabia.
3.12 A Chief Executive Officer:
Most Saudi managers are difficult to work with;
they are not cooperative and dislike teamwork.
Many Saudi employees are not punctual, lack
commitment, and do not place value on time. My col-
leagues and I have had to do work that other
subordinates should have done. This is because many
subordinates lack good discipline and are lazy.
4- Westerners from Government Organisations
4.1 A Chief Engineer, and a General Manager from ARAMCO
stated that (two participants):
Saudi executives at ARAMCO could work successfully
at any American industrial company. This is due
to management development, the work environment,
and the long industrial experience ARAMCO has
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undergone.
- Saudi executives at ARAMCO are flexible in accept-
ing change, practice modern management very well,
and usually welcome changes without major resis-
tance.
- Saudiisation at ARAMCO appears to have been very
effective because it has given attention to both
quality and quantity.
4.2 A Director, Research and Development:
In my company we have a great lack of strategic
planning and direction. My company was established 13
years ago but has still not become fully approved by
the government though we have been providing a very
important public service. We do not know what our
position among government organisations is though we
know that the business we are running is essential for
the public and will exist forever if there is no
replacement. This uncertainty causes us many problems
in planning, development, and assessing workforce
needs.
Saudi business needs to reduce centralisation.
Centralisation in the Kingdom has a strong negative
effect. In addition, there is a great lack of punctual-
ity, discipline, and too much socialising at work.
Saudi Arabia is a growing nation moving towards modern-
isation. Still it needs much management and leadership
development, and manpower training. Also, Saudi society
needs intensive social and cultural development to
absorb modernisation effectively.
4.3 A Director, Personnel Planning:
Saudi managers are essential to the future success
of the country. I do not think that Saudi managers are
obsolescent. However, they need some development, and
what must be found are cultural avenues and methods
that can successfully adopt modern management
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principles and practices at the work site. Of course
there is some conflict among our managers. Personality
differences are usually the basis for clashes, which
are settled shortly after the altercation.
There is a great lack of long-term and strategic
planning at my work, and many functional areas do not
have explicit policies and procedures. Also, there is
a lack of standards and effective rules and regula-
tions. In addition, there has been a drastic budget cut
and reduction of resources, which caused a need for a
major adjustment of departments' goals and plans.
The importance of family, domestic and social
relationships in Saudi Arabia seem to overshadow the
commitment to work. This causes an inordinate amount
of absenteeism and tardiness.
5- Westerners from Semi-Government Organisations
(Only one Western participant, a Vice President from
the above sector was interviewed. The following repre-
sents his comments).
Saudi business culture does not appreciate criti-
cism. I try to use constructive criticism so people can
adopt a positive attitude, but it is very difficult
especially if the other person takes it personally.
Changes in strategies, policies, and structure are
very difficult to make in Saudi Arabian business.
Senior management is very conservative, and it is
almost impossible to convince Saudi executives of the
need for change.
Middle management in my company, which is made up
of mostly young, well-educated Saudis already resents
the stubbornness of senior management. This is because
senior management is very conservative, older, very
much affected by cultural traditions, and is dictatori-
al and very formal.
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The organisational boundaries are blurred in some
sectors. There is no keen interest in developing the
organisational structure, which makes it difficult to
understand the roles and relationships among depart-
ments and executives. In addition, there is a major
perception of the need to update job descriptions and
identify roles, duties, and the responsibilities of
personnel.
There are some difficulties in maintaining the
organisational boundaries we have, and it is difficult
to make the matrix system work. For instance, there
have been some activities that were arbitrarily trans-
ferred from one manager to another without coordination
or a specific reason. If jobs were a well-defined and
had clear responsibilities, duties, and functions, such
things might not have happened.
There is a need to develop a conceptual frame of
thought. For instance, long-term planning needs to be
increased. Operational and daily activities take most
of the executives' time and awareness. Many daily
decisions are made without thinking of their conse-
quences on the future. Unfortunately in Saudi Arabia
most work and thinking is on operations, day-to-day
activities, without enough thought to the future.
Saudi business also needs greater application of
modern management techniques. For example development
of employees' career plans, performance appraisals, and
job descriptions are all generally inadequate.
My time is usually very well managed, which is due
to my Western background and experience. Yet, I find
it difficult sometimes, especially when meeting with
Saudis, to manage my time. I could say that Saudi
Arabian culture is impacting on priorities in my work,
for example, operations become more important than
long-term planning.
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6- Westerners from Non-governmental Organisations
6.1 A Vice President:
Saudi employees, including management, lack effec-
tive education. Education in Saudi Arabia seems to put
the emphasis on theory with little or inadequate
practical learning. Also, training in Saudi Arabia is
weak, ineffective, and insufficient.
Saudi culture has a very strong effect on busi-
ness. If you really want to run a successful business
in Saudi Arabia you must understand the local culture
and value system. In addition, Saudi subordinates are
not only motivated by achieving recognition,
actualisation, and receiving rewards and incentives.
The individual's personal and welfare and prestige are
very important too.
Senior management in Saudi Arabia, mainly Saudis,
do not delegate many of their tasks or much authority.
In addition, almost all management is often more con-
cerned with operations and service activities/tasks
than with priorities and strategic tasks.
6.2 An Executive Corporate Manager and Consultant, who has
been in the Kingdom since 1978:
The oil boom in Saudi Arabia between 1974 and 1985
misled the country's human resources planning and
manpower development. For instance, the fast expansion
of both the government and non-government sectors
demanded a huge increase in manpower. Saudi nationals
could not meet the requirement of that demand. Today,
Saudi nationals do not constitute more than twenty per
cent (20%) of the semi-governmental and non-
governmental organisations' workforce. In addition, the
educational, training, and vocational institutes were
not able to provide adequate qualified graduates. Also,
those institutes were not well developed to meet the
demands of the rapid business and industrial expansion.
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Neither is there a long term national manpower and
human resource development plan. The result is that the
educational institutes do not know what the manpower
demands and requirements for the present and future
are.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Labour and its
affiliated offices are out of contact. They are trying
to force the private sector to recruit Saudis without
coordination and consideration of manpower requirements
and market needs. Saudiisation, therefore, is very
costly; private companies, in particular, have to spend
much effort, time, and money to train Saudis before
replacing expatriates. The Saudi government does not
understand that training Saudis should be a shared cost
and joint venture responsibility.
Since 1986 one of the positive features of Saudi
culture, the relationship between social and economic
welfare, has been disappearing. In other words,
business has become over profit and short-term oriented
rather than economically and socially oriented.
Business organisations in Saudi Arabia are not
fulfilling their social responsibility in developing
the society and community.
The Saudi government has been supporting the
private sector a lot, for example, there is no tax, and
there are many long-term industrial credits. Yet, there
are some difficulties that slowdown our progress, such
as favouritism (wasttah) where we have to recruit some
relative of the government official's, a lot of red
tape, and a plethora of inflexible regulations.
Management in Saudi Arabian business is not
interested in planning, and if they were then there
would be a lot of unnecessary details that would need
to be covered during the process. In addition, there
would be little commitment towards achieving or
supporting the plans. Objectives are not well defined
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and so are badly perceived, which further affects the
process of responsibility and accountability.
Management is not assertive. Managers think that
being in a leadership role means to be dictatorial.
Management training in Saudi Arabia is poor or insuffi-
cient. Still, one of the positive features of Saudi
business is that the decision-making process is some-
what short and effective because of the easy access to
owners or senior executives. I have tried criticism
with Saudi colleagues; most took it personally. I think
criticism hurts Saudis' feelings.
6.4 A General Manager of Joint-Venture Bank:
One of our major causes of problems is the fre-
quent change in direction, for example, the Board of
Directors changes priorities frequently in a short time
and without a good or viable reason. The members of the
Board of Directors are not qualified enough. Some of
them are not trained, and incapable of developing
directions, and organisation boundaries. In addition,
many of them are appointed by the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency (SAMA), and not by the share-holders.
Another example is that upon establishment of the bank
I work for, a board member was appointed by SAMA. That
member was, in the meantime, a member in another bank's
Board of Directors. This practice causes conflict among
the members and brings loyalty into question.
6.5 A General Manager of a Department at a Joint-Venture
Bank:
We in the banking business are doing an interna-
tional job. Therefore I think any Western manager who
works overseas and wants to be effective must have
global management skills. Being an expatriate employee
has taught me to try to understand the culture and
society I live in. I can see how management at my bank,
which is a joint venture, has to deal carefully with
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some conflicting objectives. Those conflicting objec-
tives are mostly due to the difference in value system
between Americans and Saudis. For instance, there are
some objectives here that are considered ineffective
in the banking business in the USA. On the other hand,
we have expanded our branches in the Kingdom without
a proper feasibility study and without conducting
strategic planning. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
demanded this expansion, and the Board of Directors had
to follow that demand. Fortunately, the expansions have
worked well. This has been due to the fast development
in Saudi business, and because people's attitudes have
been changed from trusting only cash to an acceptance
of credit cards, cheques, and banks on general.
Another difficulty we are facing in the Kingdom
is the high level of bureaucracy in both governmental
and non-governmental organisations. This bureaucracy
makes things very slow and constrains flexibility.
6.6 A General Manager of a Commercial Company:
There is a great need of cooperation in the
Kingdom among management, commercial companies, and
government agencies that are involved in trade and
business. Managers within the same company and the same
business or industry have no coordination, exchange of
knowledge, teamwork effort, or cooperation. In addi-
tion, management of commercial companies and the
government agencies do not cooperate to identify each
other's needs, or forge a useful or beneficial rela-
tionship.
6.7 A Director of a Department at a Joint-Venture Bank:
Organisational boundaries at our bank in Saudi
Arabia change frequently because of the fast expansion
in our business. This has resulted in increased needs
for familiarising our employees with those boundaries,
and training them to cope effectively with them. It is
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time consuming, but important. Our organisational
boundaries have tended to work successfully so far.
Feasibility studies in Saudi Arabia need more
attention. There must be an update of data and statis-
tics to help to conduct feasibility studies, and these
unfortunately, are usually not available or are not of
good quality.
Saudi subordinates need more training, especially
on-the-job training. Lack of well-trained personnel has
put management under pressure where managers have to
do tasks that subordinates should. In addition, Saudi
managers need to know how to criticise constructively.
I cannot accept criticism from most of my Saudi
colleagues because they do not know how to criticise
constructively, and many of them are not qualified
enough to criticise my work.
6.8 A Director of a Department:
Senior government officials want to get big bribes
for approving or selecting contracts/tenders private
companies put forward. If the tender does not take
those bribes into consideration it has a poor chance
of being selected. We have applied for many contracts
with the government and were told often that we have
to increase our tenders 5-10%. Those bribes went to
senior officials upon approving our tenders. Some
officials would not mind if the tender was 100% more
than actuality, if they were sure that they would get
their bribe share in advance.
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SUMMARY
Eighty-five per cent (85%) of Saudi managers and 58%
of Westerners, mainly from government organisations, believe
that their organisations' shortcomings are derived from their
beliefs. Also, most of both groups believe that their
organisations' values contribute to the accomplishment of
their mission. Yet, many of these responses are normative
(subjective) because little more than half of governmental
organisations and about two-thirds of non-governmental
organisations do not have a corporate culture that supports
the achievement of their mission. In addition, half of both
organisations lack consistency between their individual
departments' objectives and their organisations' mission.
About seventy-four per cent (74%, average) of both groups
also believe that their organisational culture is not
important for accomplishing the mission. They think that the
culture can be forced towards achieving the mission. In
addition, many Saudi executives resist organisational change
related to structure, boundaries, and policies. But on the
other hand, they support change related to operations,
technology, and work processes and procedures.
The most important values at work for Saudis are
religious, and good service, while for Westerners they are
high productivity and teamwork. Most Westerners therefore
are highly task oriented, while most Saudis are rather
socially oriented.
Eighty-four per cent (84%) of the Saudis and fifty per
cent (50%) of the Westerners believe that social relation-
ships in Saudi organisations have a great effect on superior-
subordinate relations. This means that subordinates behave
as members of an extended family where the leader acts as
the father; and the family members are very dependent on his
direction. This shows in collectivism, and high personal
loyalty. In addition, those social relationships impact on
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the value placed on time. Time value is low in Saudi
organisations as indicated by eighty-five (85%) of both
groups. Also, social visits at work, family affairs, social
obligations, hospitality, the open-door policy, favouritism,
connections, and the top-man syndrome have social effects
and waste a lot of time and resources. Social effects also
extend their impact to punctuality and/or attendance, which
is low among Saudis. In addition, most of the meetings in
the participating organisations are ineffective.
Saudi Arabian business and organisational needs for
improvement and progress are:
1- Management needs to be open to feedback, to change
to a participative decision-making, become long-
term and task oriented, become more impersonal,
and needs more training and skills development.
In addition, Saudi managers need to be more
cooperative, to delegate part of their tasks and
authority, and to develop teamwork. There is also
a great need to develop effective leadership in
Saudi business organisations.
2- The Saudi workforce needs to be trained and
developed to become professional and skilled, to
be committed to tasks, and to be more loyal to the
organisation.
3- Saudi society needs development towards industri-
alisation and efficiency; the significance of
social relationships has to be reduced.
4- Organisational culture, and systems, i,e. bound-
aries, policies, and structure, have to be
improved, with more value placed on productivity,
efficiency, and a reduction of bureaucracy and
centralisation. Saudi organisations, especially
non-government ones need to become long-term
investment oriented.
5- There is a great need to develop an information
and statistical base, in support of government
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regulations, marketing strategy and marketing
studies.
6- The Saudi educational and training systems have
to be developed to respond effectively to business
and market needs; and they also need to be long-
term oriented.
Saudi Arabia has many positive environmental
features, for example, stability and security, much
government support for both public and private sector
organisations, good infrastructure development, and
good material resources. In addition, Saudi Arabia is
open for international trade. It is almost a free
market, and there is a high level of cooperation
between local and international organisations.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Introduction
This thesis has focused on management characteristics
of both Saudi and Western senior managers and executives
working in Saudi Arabia, for example, general managers and
chief executive officers. It surveyed 140 executives and made
a comparative analysis between Saudi and Western managers.
Also, it has focused on both organisational context, and the
Saudi societal effects on the participating managers and
organisations. It surveyed 20 large government and semi-
government Saudi organisations that are involved in business
and industry, or have a great effect on business development.
It also surveyed 32 large private and share-holding corpora-
tions in industry, commerce, banking, construction, and
service. Furthermore, few non-business organisations were
involved in this research because they also have an indirect
effect, for example the Institute of Public Administration,
University of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (King Fahad
University), and King Abdulaziz University.
The average workforce size of the participating organi-
sations is: government, 18.200 employees; semi-government,
20.150; non-government, 2.620.
The average percentage of foreign employees in those organ-
isations is: government, 25%; semi-government, 40%; non-
government, 85%; respectively.
Note: Semi-government organisations refers to both
business and industrial corporations that are
fully owned by the government, and to corporations
that are semi-government, those partially owned
by the public, but dependent on government support
and direction to a high extent.
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In addition, the chapters when the research findings
are reported show that the participating organisations have
given a good coverage of the areas this study tried to
examine. The participating semi-government and non-government
organisations were also among the top one hundred corpora-
tions according to their revenue in the Kingdom in 1990/91.
Literature on management and organisations in Saudi
Arabia was used in the review of literature chapter to show
what has been published so far. Unfortunately there was not
that much to review especially in the way of comparative
studies. The well published and recognised international
literature was also used in the finding's chapters to make
comparisons between effective and ineffective management
characteristics and organisational context and systems.
The following are our conclusions concerning the
development of Saudi Arabia and its society and their
relation to business. This chapter also summarises our
conclusions on the effect of Saudi society on management,
and offers a summary of characteristics of Saudi managers.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA, AN OVERVIEW
Saudi Arabia before 1960 was a traditional society where
tribal and family relationships and ties had a strong roots
and influences. Between 1960 and 1970 these relationships
and ties became slightly less influential. This was due to
the government initiated development, and to some progress
in education and reform of the social system. However, since
1970 the Kingdom has undergone intensive industrialisation
and modernisation. The development is continuing but the
tribal and family relationships and ties still have some
influence on several areas, for example, family business,
the appointment of senior and top-level officials, and on
recruitment systems.
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What is more, business before 1970 was simple, limited
to few family business, a few small craft industries and
commercial undertakings. Farming was also basic and based
on traditional farming processes.
Since 1970, however, Saudi Arabia has been implementing
long-term development plans, each of five years duration,
for industrialisation and modernisation. The high revenue
between 1974 and 1983 helped the Saudi government to achieve
most of the basic infrastructure projects for major cities
and major industries as well. In addition, it facilitated
civil support projects, for instance, transportation, roads,
communication, and an increase of water resources.
Crude oil revenue represented about ninety per cent
(90%) of the Kingdom's income during 1971 - 1983 period. On
the other hand, other gross domestic production (GDP)
represented ten per cent (10%) of the total Kingdom's
revenue. That high increase of income from oil revenue was
mainly due to the oil boom between 1974 and 1983. For
instance, the Saudi government budget in 1973/74 was $6.08
billion; by 1980/81 it had increased to $90.66 billion. This
huge increase in the government budget assisted the Kingdom
to achieve the construction of two of its biggest industrial
complexes, Al-Jubail and Yanbu, rapidly.
Since 1984, and especially with the decrease in oil
prices, the Saudi government tried to increase the Kingdom's
revenue from sources other than crude oil. It has been
providing much support, for example, credits for private
business, industry and services. Today (1993), crude oil
revenue represents about sixty per cent (60%) of the GDP.
The Saudi government has been giving a high priority
to industry and economic development, and the necessary civil
support as well. In addition, Saudi Arabia has been making
some progress in education and social development but not
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in proportion to the role of industrial development. For
instance, most of the development attention has been on
economic and industrial projects followed by civil support
projects and defense. Education and social and human resourc-
es development have been only a third priority, and the
concentration has been on quantity rather than quality.
The development of Saudi Arabia has required the
resources and expertise of international companies. There
has also been a big need for expatriates, foreign subordi-
nates, professionals, technicians, skilled and semi-skilled
labour. The foreign workers have come from over 40 different
countries, including Arab countries, the Far East, Europe,
and the USA. Foreign workers in 1968 numbered 385,000,
constituting thirty-eight per cent (38%) of the total
workforce. Foreign workers together with their families were
about ten per cent (10%) of the total population in the same
period. In 1990/1991 foreign workers numbered about 3.7
million representing sixty-four per cent (64%) of the total
workforce. Together with their families, they represented
more than forty-five per cent (45%) of the total population,
in 1990/91.
Since the beginning of the Kingdom's development plans
in 1970 the Saudi government began to proclaim that it was
vital to develop the society and its human resources but
without changing the value system. It said that social and
cultural systems must remain with no major change. However,
the Saudi government has been allocating about fifteen per
cent (15%) to twenty per cent (20%) of its budget/expenditure
for improving human resources, health, education, and
society. Therefore, there have been some progress in these
areas but not in proportion to the economic and industrial
development. For instance, schools, vocational centres, and
universities, increased rapidly in quantity but not equally
in quality.
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The Saudi government has realised at the end of each
five year development plan that there has been insufficient
progress in the development of social conditions, human
resources, and national labour. The government, therefore,
has been putting emphasis on developing these at the begin-
ning of each new plans. However, in the 1990/95 development
plan the government admitted that there has been insufficient
development in these human and social areas and has therefore
allocated 1/3 of the plans' revenue/expenditure for this
purpose.
As developing the society and human resources usually
takes longer than economic and industrial development the
Saudi government should have given greater priority to these
aspects. Because of the inadequate development in these areas
the following are some major results:
1- Lack of an adequate social value system that can
support the development towards industrialisation and
modernisation.
2- Lack of industrial attitudes among Saudi nationals.
3- Lack of an effective and more qualified younger genera-
tion that could participate in the development of plan-
ning, education, and the society.
4- Lack of effective educational and vocational systems
that could develop programmes relevant to industrial
and business needs.
5- Lack of an effective school culture that could develop
preferences and learning practice regarding technical
and craft jobs.
6- Lack of qualifying and internship programmes that could
provide graduates with basic experience and qualifica-
tions.
7- Lack of an effective national workforce development and
training programme for all jobs.
The Kingdom is still a traditional society though it
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has made considerable progress in its infrastructure,
industry and economy. The country has made progress through
its reliance on huge project expenditure, and use of the
expertise of international companies and of expatriates.
These has also been some input of course from some of its
well-educated and qualified national managers, technicians
and professionals.
The high priority of those international companies and
expatriates is to get their tasks done, a short-term objec-
tive. Sharing responsibility for developing Saudi nationals
and communities has not been a priority for these interna-
tional companies. Also the Saudi government, when it made
contracts or gave assignments to those companies, did not
put emphasis on sharing responsibility in developing Saudi
labour and communities, not even in part.
B. THE SOCIETAL IMPACTS ON MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATIONS
Hypothesis Number 1:
Saudi Arabian society lacks an adequate social and human
resource development for industrialisation and modernisation.
The present social value system, culture, and national labour
attitudes, capabilities and skills, may not be helpful to
maintain the industrial and economic development the Kingdom
has so far achieved.
The findings of this research suggest that social rela-
tionships and ties have a strong influence on both subordi-
nates, mainly Saudis and sometimes expatriates, and on
organisations' performance, in both the government and non-
government sectors. Connections (wasttah), favouritism,
personal relationships, the open-door policy, the top-man
syndrome and collectivism, have a negative effect on produc-
tivity, organisational boundaries, policies, and quality.
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As one example, promotion to higher levels, recruitment, and
rewards are mainly made on the basis of relationships. There
is some concern with hard work, efficiency, and punctuality,
but they are less valued than they should be.
The value placed on time, hard work, punctuality,
efficiency, effectiveness, and professionalism, is regretta-
bly low. The Saudi social value system extends its impact
on the entire organisation, and on the decision-makers as
well. Many decisions are made based on personal interest,
and most Saudi managers are rather individualistic in their
decision making.
Around a third or a little more of the Western managers
in the participating organisations are influenced by the
Saudi social system through their Saudi colleagues and
subordinates. They try to achieve their tasks but without
confronting the effects or attitudes this system entails.
For instance, many of them are also individualistic in their
decision-making, are in the interest of getting their tasks
done they are engage in an informal handling of their
subordinates bad performance. However, the majority of
Western managers avoid criticism and confrontation because
of the prevalence of a strong personal atmosphere and
relationships in their organisations.
Hypothesis Number 2:
Lack of both adequate industrial values in the Saudi
Arabia, and of motivation or emphasis on developing an
effective and efficient organisational culture, have resulted
in an ineffective organisational value system. Therefore,
Saudi organisational culture does little to support the
accomplishment of organisational objectives.
Saudi government organisations do not value hard work
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sufficiently,highproductivity,teamwork,cooperation,long-
term planning, or consultation and feedback. Semi-government
and non-government organisations also do not value enough
these aspects, though with the exception of high productivity
and hard work. In addition, quality improvement, research
and development, effective organisational boundaries and
policies, strategies, and workforce development and training
are not sufficiently emphasised, with a few exceptions.
Contributing activities, for example, cooperation and
teamwork, are generally not adequately supported in all the
participating organisations, again with the partial exception
of those large industrial semi-government organisations
mentioned before. Organisational culture in more than half
of the participating organisations (43% government, 66% non-
government) was strongly affected by the Saudi social value
system. Saudis who work in these organisations have brought
to their work their societal backgrounds, norms and habits.
Instead of adapting these backgrounds to the organisational
environment, they have impacted on it. In addition, little
more than a third of the Western managers in these organisa-
tions are also affected somehow by this Saudi social value
system; it is, after all, the society they live in.
Religious value ( s ) and appropriate norms are considered
the most important value at work by fifty-five per cent (55%)
of the Saudi managers, and twenty-four per cent (24%) of the
Westerners as well. Religion in Saudi Arabia has a strong
influence on politics and society. It is the main force that
directs behaviour and relationships. Yet, every religion
calls for good behaviour and attitudes. Although there are
many good teachings and value placed by Islam on effective
utilisation of time, hard work, cooperation, teamwork,
productivity, and feedback, many Saudis do not apply these
at work.
Production, revenue generating, and even public service
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organisations are not an extension of religious organisa-
tions. They have to follow/respect certain religious and
social values that put directions on what is right and what
is wrong. They also have to follow the legal system of the
society in which they live. Yet, these organisations are not
charitable organisations. They have responsibilities to the
share-holders, and they are accountable for those responsi-
bilities. They also have to compete and survive in a highly
competitive business world. Public organisations are also
accountable. They need to be less bureaucratic and less
centralised. Another example is that nearly a third of Saudi
managers and subordinates, at work, put loyalty to their
families, relatives, and peer groups at the top of their
priorities. Personal relationships and interest are seen as
more important than tasks and performance, for example, the
appointment of an unqualified relative takes priority over
formal task accomplishment.
C. MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS IN SAUDI ARABIA
Hypothesis Number 3:
Obsolescence ( in the sense of a lack of modern knowledge
and skills) among Saudi managers and executives is high.
Almost all of them, ninety per cent (90%) , lack comprehensive
management skills. In addition, sixty per cent (60%) of Saudi
managers lack technical skills related to their business
areas. Many also lack effective leadership characteristics.
Many Western managers and executives working in Saudi Arabia
are affected by their Saudi colleagues and by the Saudi
culture. Therefore, they do not apply effective management
practices or display the attitudes that are expected from
them as an Westerners.
Although the Westerners participating in this research
were about twenty per cent (20%) of the whole sample, it is
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reasonable to use them as a comparison group. What is more,
this research concentrated on senior management levels that
are of course mostly occupied by Saudis, and therefore the
proportion of Western managers participating in the sample
could not be expected to be significantly bigger. However,
the findings do indicate that about half of these Westerners
lack sufficient social and cultural knowledge related to
Saudi Arabia. This lack causes them to be ineffective when
trying to apply their management and technical expertise.
In addition, there were no or insufficient orientation and/or
training programmes that could help them to adapt effectively
to Saudi Arabian environment.
The characteristics of sixty-eight per cent (68%) of
Saudi managers are that they over socialise, are very
personally-oriented, put a high importance on social rela-
tionships, and many are considered lazy. Eighty-one per cent
(81%) of the Saudi participants put a high priority on
position, promotion, relationships and rewards. The most
important things at work for seventy-three per cent (73%)
of them are position, promotion, relationships and rewards.
Task and performance are of very low priority. Also, almost
all Saudi managers eighty-six per cent (86%) , prefer to work
in purely management and administrative jobs, technical jobs
are not preferred. However, because of their high interest
in relationships and their home backgrounds, and the facts
that they speak Arabic, they are somewhat better than
Westerners at supervision.
There is a great lack of training and development for
Saudi management. Also, many Saudi managers do not realise
that they should be more flexible, objective and not so
emotional, and that they have to work harder for self-
improvement.
Eighty-three per cent (83%) of Westerners, on the other
hand, are highly task-oriented, hard-working, and better than
Saudis in matters of efficiency, punctuality, and time
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management. But the same group is low in both interpersonal
skills.
The majority of both Saudis and Westerners rank high
in the use of formality in crisis situations, mainly budget
crises (69% both), conflict resolution (48% average), and
getting subordinates to raise their output (80% average).
In addition, authority was ranked the most important source
of power for seventy-three per cent (73%) of the Saudis and
half of the Westerners. Yet, authority is used mainly to
direct subordinates, not to influence their attitudes.
Decision-making, mainly in objectives and planning, is
very formal as well, and almost all Saudis ninety-four per
cent (94%) and most of the Westerners eighty-one per cent
(81%) are individualistic in their decision-making. They are
authoritarian, and only forty-one per cent (41%) of Saudis
and 23% of Westerners use consultation. Also, delegation is
limited to the delegation of supervisory tasks (50% average) .
Delegation of planning, controlling, and organisation is low,
only 19% on average use delegation for those tasks. The
involvement of middle management in planning is insufficient.
Only fifty per cent (50%) of middle management participate,
somewhat, in planning.
Informality is also used frequently to correct subordi-
nates' low performance, for instance, absenteeism, where
giving direct instruction to improve performance is rarely
applied, and warning subordinates is almost always avoided.
On the other hand, the use of informality to encourage staff
to talk about work and personal problems is high, but does
not necessarily lead to improvement. It is used to show
concern. For instance, about two-thirds of the sample do not
support subordinates in their ideas and suggestions. In
addition, sixty-three per cent (63%) of Saudi managers
believe that the personal welfare of their subordinates is
more important than the efficiency of their department, while
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about one third of Westerners, thirty-one per cent (31%),
feel the same. This indicates a low task orientation among
Saudis and the impact of Saudi society upon Westerners.
Cooperation among both groups tends to be reasonable
when related to non-major change or functions, but it is low
in crisis and conflict situations. Teamwork, in general, is
not a strength. Confrontation and criticism are not tolerated
and though many managers listen to criticism, they do not
modify their decisions as a result. Also, about half of both
groups do not like to explain their actions. Therefore,
conflict is high. An average of 70% of both groups showed
that there is a high conflict level at their work. Although
conflict tended to be resolved constructively, half of the
participants would take it formally to higher management.
In addition, many Saudi managers support change when it is
related to technology, procedures, and work process. Still,
more than third of them resist organisational change espe-
cially in areas that may downgrade their authority.
D. ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT AND SYSTEMS IN SAUDI ARABIA
Hypothesis Number 4:
Lack of effective leadership, quality and direction,
is a strong symptom of Saudi corporations, both government
and non-government. The leadership in those organisations
does not for the most part understand the nature and purpose
of their corporations, nor their business future, and is not
able to communicate their objectives effectively.
Fifty-four per cent (54%) of the participating organisa-
tions, both government and non-government, lack clear,
defined, and well understood missions, objectives, and goals.
This is at the root of many difficulties and conflicts in
these organisations, for instance, incompatibility of
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interdepartmental functions, and considered the first major
cause of problems. In addition, these organisations also lack
good planning and practical decisions or effective decision
making processes. This is considered the second major cause
of problems in these organisations.
Because of these deficiencies forty-three per cent (43%)
of these organisations do not have consistency as between
their organisational objectives and mission statements and
the individual departmental/divisional objectives. This
causes incompatibility among their objectives and functions
and therefore high conflict. This lack of consistency as
becomes higher, seventy-six per cent (76%), if the few semi-
government corporations that do have longer industrial and
business experience are excluded from the sample of partici-
pating organisations, i.e., ARAMCO, SAMAREC, and SAUDIA
Airlines.
Hypothesis Number 5:
Most of Saudi organisations lack effective organisation-
al boundaries, policies, structure, communication systems,
and standards of performance. Furthermore, they lack effec-
tive budgeting, recruitment, promotion, and labour planning
and development systems. Also, they are highly centralised
and authority is overused in their daily activities and
decision making, and they experience a lot of conflict.
About half of the Saudi corporations lack effective
methods to measure their performance. They lack standards
of performance, effective company and personnel appraisal
systems, and effective job descriptions. In addition,
procedures/policies in almost all Saudi organisations are
not accurate, effective, or supportive of the achievement
of objectives. They are used to control activities and they
are formulated by senior management alone, or with little
involvement of middle management. Also, organisational
structures in fifty per cent (50%) average of the participat-
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ing organisations are not effective and this causes conflict,
that in turn is considered the third major cause of problems.
In addition, there is a lack of effective communication
systems in more than half of the participating organisations,
that is considered the fourth major cause of problems.
Authority is the most important source of power for half
of the managers in Saudi corporations. Those managers use
authority to centralise their tasks, and also use it to
enforce/influence decisions. Centralisation is high in about
seventy per cent (70%) average of the participating organisa-
tions. In addition, the overuse of authority is high in about
sixty-four per cent (64%) average of the participating
organisations and delegation in almost all of them is low.
Organisational boundaries in about eighty per cent (80%) of
the Saudi organisations are blurred, ineffective, or not
accurate. Moreover, management does not support or follow
the boundaries, or is not qualified enough to develop them.
Therefore, there is conflict in about half of the Saudi
organisations.
The budgeting system in the government and semi-govern-
ment corporations is largely acceptable. About two thirds
of the participants agreed that it is efficient and effective
to some extent. The major obstacles for budgeting in these
organisations are the tough budgetary policy and excessive
procedures. The budgeting system in about seventy-six per
cent (76%) of the non-goverment organisations is not as
effective as it should be. There is some lack of commitment
towards plans with regard to budget preparation and approval.
Also, the budgeting system is traditional, based on opera-
tional needs and/or expenditures of the previous year.
Furthermore the budgeting system in seventy-six per cent
(76%) of the participating organisations does not support
long-term investment.
Recruitment, promotion, and reward systems in more than
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half of the Saudi organisations are not effective. The most
important elements in recruitment and promotion are rela-
tionships and connections. Efficiency and performance are
of secondary importance with regard to promotion, rewards
and recruitment. Also most of the Saudi organisations lack
effective manpower planning. In addition, punctuality and
attendance is low in all Saudi organisations, and absenteeism
is high. Furthermore, there is a great lack of both effective
and well-organised meetings and poor time management/utilisa-
tion in about two-thirds of the participating organisations.
Training and workforce development is poor in almost
all Saudi organisations, and there is lack of effective
management training in Saudi Arabia in general. This lack
of good training and labour planning at all organisational
levels, side by side with a lack of effective recruitment,
promotion, and reward systems, has a significant impact on
organisational progress, motivation, and on job satisfaction
and performance.
Hypothesis Number 6:
Most of the non-government organisations in Saudi
Arabia, private and share-holding, commercial and industrial,
are short-term oriented. They are not developing long-term
investment, and therefore their major concern is high
productivity or quick profit. They lack strategic planning,
employee development and effective organisational boundaries
and structure. They also lack qualified management and
leadership, though they have some Western managers in key
positions. The participation of these Western managers in
developing Saudi employees is low.
Planning in fifty-eight per cent (58%) of the partici-
pating private organisations is poor and many decisions made
are impractical. For instance, plans are not strategic or
not flexible, and some decisions demand high profit or return
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without the involvement of middle management, workforce
development, and adequate market or feasibility studies.
Almost all Saudi managers and about seventy-seven per cent
(77%) of Westerners retain or control planning functions,
and they do not encourage participation or involvement. In
addition, the same group of the non-government corporations
lack clear and understood objectives and goals. This is due
to a lack of effective leadership. Also, sixty-three per cent
(63%) of them lack consistency as between their organisati-
onal objectives and the individual department/divisional
objectives. Planning in government organisations is slightly
better than in non-government organisations.
Organisational boundaries in an average of ninety per
cent (90%) of the participating corporations are ineffective.
Their boundaries do not support the work objectives, and are
not accurate. In addition, seventy per cent (70%) of them
do not have effective organisational structures and communi-
cation systems, and there is a great lack of delegation.
The budgeting system in seventy-six per cent (76%) of
the non-government and about half of the government corpora-
tions does not support long term investment and/or is only
based on next year's operational needs. In addition, high
productivity is considered the most important value in about
forty-one per cent (41%) of both government and non-govern-
ment corporations, followed by religious beliefs (twenty-
seven per cent, 27%) and good work norms (ten per cent, 10%).
However, about forty-five per cent (45%) of the Western
participants placed a higher value on productivity. Still,
management's primary concern in these organisations is short-
term achievement, and therefore eighty-eight per cent (88%)
of these organisations are centralised. In addition, coopera-
tion in eighty per cent (80%) of the non-government organisa-
tions is low, and conflict in ninety-two per cent (92%) of
them is frequent. However, cooperation in the government
sector is a little better.
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In addition, the non-government corporations' recruit-
ment, promotion, and rewards systems are slightly better than
those of the government and semi-government organisations.
This is because social relationships and ties are slightly
less prominent than in government and semi-government
organisations. Connections, favouritism, and relationships
in the non-government organisations have less influence on
recruitment and promotion, but they still have some impact.
Saudi employees however, do not represent more than fifteen
per cent (15%) of the non-government organisation's work-
force. In addition, training and workforce development in
fourteen per cent (14%) of the non-government corporations
is low or insufficient, and the other eighty-six per cent
(86%) do not have training at all.
Punctuality among Saudis, other Arabs, and workers from
the Far East generally, in both government and non-government
organisations, is not good enough, and absenteeism is high
among both Saudis and other Arabs.
Most of both management and non-management employees
in these corporations are on short-term contracts, for
example, 2-4 years. Their contracts may be extended based
on short term-results. Also, foreign labour in the non-
government corporations represents eighty-five per cent (85%)
of the workforce. This is mainly because the direct cost of
foreign labour is less than that of Saudi labour. Although
the non-Saudi labour may look less expensive, however, it
is not. These foreign employees are indirectly provided by
the Saudi government with considerable support. For instance,
they receive free health care, free equal educational
opportunities for their children, equal civil rights; they
pay no income tax, receive equal benefits from a subsidised
health system, and so on. In addition, upon leaving the
country their experience and learning during their work in
the Kingdom is a lost asset. Thus, the private corporations
do not encourage or support the recruitment of Saudi labour
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because it induces commitment on the corporation side, for
instance, training, as well as higher wages (direct cost)
than what is paid for non-Saudi Arab or Far East labour
(these higher wages are about 100% higher for non-skilled
and semi-skilled labour).
The non-government organisations, mainly private, are
taking good advantage of government support and opportu-
nities. For instance, the government provides long and short-
terms credits that sometimes covers seventy-five per cent
(75%) of the needs of projects in the private sector, and
without any interest. In addition, since 1985, priority
regarding tenders and government contracts has been given
to local companies. This support is almost unlimited and
covers industry, farming and agriculture, fishing projects,
and private hospitals and schools. Also, there is no tax on
private business, and the Saudi government tries to protect
local industries against similar foreign or imported materi-
als by putting higher customs duties on them. However, the
private sector is not sufficiently committed to sharing
responsibility for developing Saudi labour, graduates, human
resources generally, and contributing to the well-being of
the community.
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Background on the Participants
The following is a brief background on the partici-
pants in this research, both Saudi and Western executives
and officials from government, semi-government, share-hold-
ing, and private corporations.
I. Saudis:
1. Job titles and numbers of participants:
Frequency Job titles 
16	 Minister, Deputy Minister, Assistant Deputy
Minister, and Assistant Deputy Governor.
5	 Chairman Board of Directors, President, and
Deputy President.
17	 Chief Executive Officer, Director General,
and Assistant C.E.O.
16	 Senior Vice President, Executive Vice Presi-
dent, and Vice President.
42 General Manager, Executive Director, Depart-
ment's Director, Assistant General Manager,
Assistant Director, Chief Department, Con-
troller, and Assistant Controller.
11	 Executive Manager, and Managers
7	 Others; i.e., General Counsel, Corporate
Research Analyst, and Advisor.
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4. Participants and their major functions:
Frequency	 Functions 
	
10	 Educational and Training.
	
15	 Accounting and Support, i.e.,Purchasing.
	
5	 Consultancy and Research
	
1	 Advertising
	
15	 Sales
	
10	 Administration
	7	 Maintenance
	
10	 Engineering, i.e., Construction.
	
8	 Production
	10	 Public Service
	
6	 Financial Business
	
10	 Industrial Business
	
7	 Trade and Marketing
119
5.	 Participants and their educational level:
Frequency	 Education
	
14	 Doctoral degree
	
25	 Master degree
	
4	 Diploma degree
	
62	 Bachelor degree
	
3	 High School Commercial
	
6	 High School Science
114
6.	 Participants and their recent training courses
average within the last 2 years).
6-1 One r two courses and or seminars.
Management Technical Specialised Other Total
14	 7	 4	 3	 - 28
6-2 More than two courses and or seminars.
Manag m nt Technical Specialised Other Total
5	 1	 0	 2	 = 8
w,
	Participant's English language capability.
Fluent	 Very G d Good Fair Poor None Total
20	 39	 47	 6	 0	 2	 =114
(A Few Participants know French and or German)
423
8.	 Numbers of subordinates directly and indirectly
reporting to the participants.
8-1 70 participants had an average of	 8 immediate
subordinates.
20 participants had an average of 14 immediate
subordinates.
9 participants
	 had an average of 30 immediate
subordinates.
11 participants had an average of 50 immediate
subordinates.
4 participants	 had an average of 80 immediate
subordinates.
8-2 20 participants had an average of 20 indirect
subordinates.
40 participants had an average of 25 indirect
subordinates.
10 participants had an average of 40 indirect
subordinates.
20 participants had an average of 90 indirect
subordinates.
10 participants had an average of 300 indirect
subordinates.
10 participants had an average of 500 indirect
subordinates.
4 participants had an average of 2500 indirect
subordinates.
II. Westerners
1.	 Job titles and numbers of participants:
Frequency	 Job titles 
	
1	 Chief Executive Officer.
	
2	 Vice President.
	
18	 General Manager, Department Chief, Assistant
General	 Manager,	 Director,	 Assistant
Director, and Controller.
	
3
	 Executive Manager, and Managers.
	
2
	 Other, i.e., Advisor or Consultant.
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4. Participants and their major functions.
Frequency	 Functions 
4	 Accounting
5	 Sales
2	 Training and Education
2	 Administration
2	 Consultancy
2	 Personnel
2	 Maintenance
4	 Engineering
3	 Production
26
5.	 Participants and their educational level
Frequency	 Education
3	 Doctoral degree
8	 Master degree
6	 Diploma degree
9	 Bachelor degree
26
6.	 Participants and their recent training courses (within
the last 2 years).
"No one had more than one course."
Management Technical Specialised Other Total
3	 1	 =	 4
7.	 Participant's English language capability.
Fluent	 Very Good Good Fair Poor None Total
19	 7	 =26
8.	 Other language, i,e., French, German, Italian.
French	 German
	 Italian Arabic Total:
Fluent 1
	
Fluent 1
	 2
Very good 2 Very good 4 Good 1
	
7
Good 3	 Good 1	 Good 1
	 5
14
426
9.	 Numbers of subordinates directly and indirectly
reporting to the participants.
Directly: 6 participants had an average of 2 subordinates.
2 participants had an average of 5 subordinates.
5 participants had an average of 9 subordinates.
8 participants had an average of 14 subordinates.
5 participants had an average of 20 subordinates.
Indirectly: 6 participants had an average of 6 subordi-
nates.
4 participants had an average of 20 subordi-
nates.
9 participants had an average of 40 subordi-
nates.
5 participants had an average of 45 subordi-
nates.
2 participants had an average of 70 subordi-
nates.
10. Nationality: the Western participants are from the
following countries:
13 Participants are from USA/American.
8 Participants are from UK/British.
2 Participants are from Germany/German.
2 Participants are from France/French.
1	 Participant is from Italy/Italian.
26
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QUESTIONNAIRE NO.1 
Code No.
1.	 Background Information:
Language:
English: fluent, very good, good, fair, none
Other
Age	 : (Please tick as appropriate).
	
20 - 24	 40 - 44
	
25 - 29
	 45 - 49
	
30 - 34	 50 - 59
	
35 - 39	 60+
Place of Birth:
Nationality:
Education: (Please tick as appropriate.)
Intermediate
High School	 Diploma
Vocational High School	 Master
Commercial High School 	 Doctoral
Bachelor
Other:
Please state the title of your degree:
Training Courses: (Please state the most recent ones,
i.e., within last two years):
2000 - 2300
2300 - 2600
2600 - 2900
2900+
Other:
)
)
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2.	 Company Information (Please write or tick as
appropriate):
Name of Present
Company:
Size of Present Company
appropriate).
500 - 800
800 - 1100
1100- 1400
1400- 1700
1700- 2000
(employees):(Please tick as
(Approximate number
(Approximate no. of
of Saudi employees
non-Saudi employees
Nature of Your Company:
Government
Nature of Your Company's
Public Service
Financial
Industrial
Trade/Marketing
(Please tick as appropriate)
Non-Government
Nationality of your company:
Saudi, Foreign, Joint Venture
Business:
Construction/Engineering
Electrical/Electronic
Educational/Training
Other:
Nature of Your Department's Business:
Accounting/Finance
Advertisement
Sales
Training
Education
Other:
Administration
Personnel
Maintenance
Engineering
Production
Your Job Title: (Please
Director General
Deputy Director
General
Vice President
General Manager
Director
tick as appropriate)
Assistant Director
Manager
Assistant Manager
Consultant
Other:
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To Whom Do You Report (If Applicable):
(Please tick as appropriate)
Minister	 General Manager
Deputy Minister	 Director
Director General	 Assistant Director
Deputy Director
General
Vice President	 Other:
Number	 of	 employees	 directly	 reporting	 to
you: 	
Number of employees indirectly reporting to you:
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QUESTIONNAIRE #2 
Code Number:
Please tick (v), or circle where appropriate (only one
choice). If you asked to rate from, i.e., 6 as most,
5 as next .., and 1 as least, please do not use the
same rating twice.
1.	 A manager who wants to restore his budget which
was drastically cut is best advised to:
a) Use his personal relations and
speak informally.
b) Write a report which shows
the consequences of the cut.
c) Either a or b, depends on the
situation
d) Take what was given.
2.	 Generally, problems at work are caused because of
(please circle appropriate numbers):
Agree Don't Agree
2-1 Lack of clear, good data. 	 4	 3	 2	 1
2-2 Misunderstanding of mission,
	
objectives, and/or plans: 4
	 3	 2	 1
2-3 Conflicting and/or unclear
communications:	 4	 3	 2	 1
2-4 Organisational structure	 4	 3	 2	 1
2-5 The decisions and plans
that are made are not
practical or well developed 4 3
	 2	 1
2-6 Other:
	
4 3	 2	 1
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3. In general, problem solving activity and
decisions should be made close to the problem,
not high up in the organisation.
Always ( )
Most of times ( )
Sometimes ( )
Seldom ( )
Never ( )
4. If there are decisions that will help to achieve
our objectives, I have to make them at once.
Strongly Agree
	 Disagree Strongly disagree
8	 7	 65	 4	 3	 2	 1
5. As long as I believe that my decisions are
correct, then there is no need to consult others.
Strongly Agree	 Disagree Strongly disagree
8	 7	 65	 4	 3	 2	 1
6. Decisions at work are made based on:
6-1 the importance of goals/objectives.
Agree	 Do not Agree
--,
4	 3
	
2	 1
6-2 the availability of resources.
Agree	 Do not Agree
4	 3	 2	 1
6-3 on the policy, and regulations, my company
has.
Agree	 Do not Agree
4	 3	 2	 1
(cont.)
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6-4 the capabilities and skills of employees to
carry out these decisions successfully.
Agree	 Do not Agree
4	 3	 2	 1
Other:
7. Planning at work is based on the organisation's
mission. Therefore, we have long term (5+ years)
plans.
Yes	 (	 )
No	 (	 )
8. My company's plans are both strategic and
flexible.
Very much	 ( )
Much	 ( )
Little	 ( )
None	 ( )
9. Middle management as well as senior management
must be involved in both short and long term
planning.
Yes, both management levels.	 t )
Most of middle and senior management. 	 ( )
Just few of middle management should be
involved with the senior management.	 ( )
Only top (or senior) management.	 ( )
10. Merit increases at work are made to employees so
that performance is rewarded.
Most of times ( ) Little applicable 	 ( )
Sometimes	 ( ) Not applicable	 ( )
11. Promotion at work is based on performance,
skills, attitudes, knowledge, and results.
Most of the time ( ) Little applicable ( )
Sometimes	 ( ) Not applicable	 ( )
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12. Generally, Western colleagues and subordinates
are (please give 9 to the highest, 8 to the
next,and so on):
12-1 Active (
12-2 Competitive (
12-3 Hard-working (
12-4 Achievement -
Oriented	 (
12-5 Persistent
	 (
Other:
12-6 Lazy	 (
12-7 Very sociable	 (
12-8 Social club-type(
12-9 Open-minded	 (
13. Generally, Saudi colleagues and subordinates are
(please give 9 to the highest, 8 to the next, ...
etc., 1 to the lowest.):
13-1 Active	 ( )
13-2 Competitive( )
13-3 Hard-working( )
13-4 Achievement -
Oriented ( )
13-5 Persistent ( )
13-6 Lazy	 ( )
13-7 Very sociable 	 ( )
13-8 Social club-type( )
13-9 Open-minded	 ( )
Other:
14. Western colleagues/subordinates consider the
following a as high priority at work (please give
7 to the highest, 6 to the next, and so on):
Tasks ( )
Relationships ( )
Rewards & Incentives(
Performance	 ( )
Position	 ( )
Promotion	 ( )
) Training & development (
Other:
)
15. Saudi colleagues/subordinates consider the
following as high priority at work (please give
7 to the highest, 6 to the next, and so on:
Tasks ( )
Relationships ( )
Rewards & Incentives(
Performance	 ( )
Position	 ( )
Promotion	 ( )
) Training & development
Other:
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16. Western colleagues/subordinates prefer to work at
(pease give 5 to the highest, 4 to the next, and
so on):
Manual jobs ( ) Management work ( )
Craft jobs ( ) Technical jobs ( )
Office work ( ) Other:
17. Saudi colleagues/subordinates prefer to work at
(pease give 5 to the highest, 4 to the next,
etc., 1 to the lowest):
Manual jobs ( ) Management work ( )
Craft jobs ( ) Technical jobs ( )
Office work ( ) Other:
18. Do you think that Western managers are obsolete
(lack up to date knowledge and skills)?
Too much	 ( )
Very much	 ( )
Only on technical knowledge ( )
Only on management knowledge ( )
Only on social and culture knowledge ( )
Very little ( )
None ( )
Other:
19. Do you think that Saudi managers are obsolete?
Too much	 (	 )
Very much
	 (	 )
Only on technical knowledge ( )
Only on management knowledge ( )
Only on social and culture knowledge ( )
Very little
	 (	 )
None	 (	 )
Other:
20. What are the most important values at work?
(please give 7 to the most applicable answer, 6
to the next , and so on):
Religious beliefs ( )
Good work norms, i.e., honesty ( )
Good service ( )
High productivity ( )
Teamwork ( )
Employee	 welfare ( )
Good relationship among the employees.
Other:
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21. Organisational mission must be consistent with
the organisational culture (please give 6 to the
highest, 5 to the next, and so on):
- You cannot achieve the mission when the culture is
not supportive or is conflicting with it. ( )
- You can force the organisational culture towards
the mission. ( )
- You can change the organisational culture towards
the mission. ( )
- Although the organisational culture has some
effects, the organisational objectives and plans
must lead to achieving the mission.( )
- Organisational culture has no effect on
achieving the mission. ( )
- Nevertheless, organisational culture has some
effects, satisfying the needs of the employees,
i.e., salary, will take care of achieving the
mission. (
	 )
22. My departmental objectives/goals are always
consistent with the organisational mission.
Yes	 (	 )
Not necessarily	 ( )
I do not agree	 ( )
23. To what extent and level are you involved in
setting your departmental objectives?
Very high ( )
High enough ( )
Sometimes ( )
Rarely ( )
Not at all ( )
24. Do you think the leader(s) at work support their
managers insetting their departmental objectives
and plans?
Always ( )
Most of the times ( )
Sometimes ( )
Little ( )
Never ( )
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25. An organisation has to develop work norms and
values that contribute to the accomplishment of
its mission.
Strongly Agree Little Disagree Strongly Disagree
10	 9	 8 7	 6 5 4 3	 2 1
26. Generally, work culture at a Saudi organisation
is very helpful and supports achieving the
mission successfully. This is applicable to:
All organisations ( )
Most organisations ( )
Few organisations ( )
Not as good as should be ( )
None ( )
27. An organisation's mission must be clear to every
one, especially to management. Management must
value their company's mission and work towards
it.
Yes, very much ( )
Much ( )
Little ( )
Not necessarily ( )
None ( )
28. I have flexibility in setting my department's
objectives and plans.
Very High
	 Enough	 Little	 None
87	 65	 43	 2 1
29.	 Management
	 must	 be	 very	 cooperative.	 We
understand each other well.
Always ( )
Most of times ( )
Sometimes ( )
Little ( )
None ( )
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30. When conflict occurs at work, management should
try the following (please give 8 to the highest,
7 to the next, and so on):
- Enforce constructive and honest discussion to
identify the causes and resolve the conflict.( )
- Enforce negotiation to resolve the conflict
issues. (	 )
- Call a third party to help solve the problem caused
by the conflict. ( )
- Set a new policy and procedure, after understanding
the conflict causes, so every party knows what to
do if the same conflict occurs again. ( )
- Re-structure the organisation or the department
involved in the conflict to separate the parties
engaged in the conflict. ( )
- Develop a new position, i.e., that of coordinator;
so that it coordinates between parties involved in
the conflict. ( )
- Focus on the needs of the parties rather than the
effects on the company. ( )
- Search for objective standards to judge fairly and
find effective solutions. ( )
- Other:
31. If a manager had a conflict with a colleague and
he knew that he was right, the manager would try
to discuss it constructively, calmly, and do his
best to convince his colleague.
Yes, always ( )
Most of time ( )
Sometimes ( )
Seldom ( )
Never ( )
32. In a conflict situation, if a manager knew that
he was right but his colleague did not accept
that because his needs were different, the
manager would ask him that they take the issue to
higher management.
Always ( )
Most times ( )
Sometimes ( )
Seldom ( )
Never ( )
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33. Conflict happens often at work.
Always Very Often	 Little	 Never
10 9	 8 7	 6 5	 4 3	 2 1
34. The objectives of meetings with
officials/executives or clients from other
agencies are always clear for everyone attending.
Always Most of the times	 Sometimes Never
87	 65	 4	 3	 21
35. The objectives of meetings with
officials/executives from my organisation are
always clear for everyone attending.
Always Most of the times	 Sometimes Never
87	 65
	
4	 3	 21
36. The internal meetings I attend are always well
scheduled and organised in advance.
Always Most of the times	 Sometimes Never
87	 65	 4	 3	 21
37. The external meetings I attend are always well
scheduled and organised in advance.
Always Most of the times 	 Sometimes Never
87	 65
	
43	 21
38. The social relationships in my organisation help
me in accomplishing my task.
Very much ( )
Much	 ( )
Little	 (	 )
None	 ( )
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39. Western management in my company is better than
Saudi management in (please give 10 to the
highest, 9 to the next, and so on):
Efficiency ( ) Time management ( )
Effectiveness ( ) Meetings ( )
Punctuality ( ) Supervision ( )
Team-work ( ) Delegation ( )
Socialising ( ) Interpersonal skills( )
Other:
40. Saudi management in my company is better than
Western management in (please give 10 to the
highest, 9 to the next, and so on):
Efficiency ( ) Time management ( )
Effectiveness ( ) Meetings ( )
Punctuality ( ) Supervision ( )
Team-work ( ) Delegation ( )
Socialising ( ) Interpersonal skills( )
Other:
41. I think one of Saudi Arabia's features is social
relationships. It makes people at work feel as
one big family.
Strongly Agree	 Disagree Strongly disagree
8	 7
	
65	 43
	 2	 1
42. In Saudi Arabia, to be recruited and/or promoted
to a higher position, the following is very
important (please give 13 to the highest, 12 to
the next, and so on):
Efficiency	 (
Discipline and
punctuality	 (
Effectiveness	 (
Good interpersonal
skills	 (
Good social re-
lationships at
work	 (
Good family
support	 (
High education	 (
) Hard work	 ( )
Never say no	 ( )
) Good relations with
) executives, out of
office.	 (	 )
Professional skills ( )
) Being a high flyer/
achiever	 ( )
Persistency	 ( )
)
Other: 
	
)
)
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43. For Saudi Arabian businesses, social relation-
ships are very important, even if they take a
good part of work time.
Strongly Agree	 Disagree Strongly disagree
8	 7	 65	 43	 2	 1
44. Sometimes, Saudi executives invite people for
dinner/social gatherings at their houses. They
find this is very helpful for them to make
progress.
Always	 ( )	 Little	 ( )
Most of times ( )	 Never	 ( )
Sometimes	 ( )
45. Organisational values, i.e., customer satisfac-
tion, have a great effect on my business.
Very much	 ( )
Much
	 ( )
Little	 (	 )
Very little	 ( )
46. Organisational mission is usually derived from
the organisation's beliefs. This is the case in
my company.
Always Most of the times Sometimes Little Never
10 9	 8 7
	 65	 43	 21
47. Management in my company is very cooperative. We
seldom have conflicts.
Always Most of the times Sometimes Little Never
10 9	 87	 65	 43	 21
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1- Difficulties caused by the Saudi society that
hinder business are (please give 5 to the
highest, 5 to the next, ... and so on, 1 to the
lowest):
Low time value ( )
Personal relations ( )
Low discipline ( )
High dependency ( )
Family ties ( )
None ( )
Other:
2- What does Saudi business need to improve? Please
give brief answer.
3- What does Saudi management need to improve?
Please give brief answer.
4- What features does Saudi Arabia have that could
enhance business? Please give brief answer.
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5- How good is the educational system in Saudi
Arabia in relation to business? Please make your
answer brief.
6- How good is employee training and development in
Saudi Arabia and/or in your company, including
management training? Please give a brief answer.
7- Do you have in your company Job Description
Questionnaire (JDQ or PDQ)?
Yes (	 )	 No	 (	 )
8- Do you have in your company an appraisal system?
Yes (	 ) No (	 )
If No go to 8-4.
If yes answer 8-1 through 8-3.
8-1 Is it applied to all levels?
8-2 Does	 it	 measure	 skills,	 knowledge,
	
attitudes,	 objectives	 achieved,	 tasks
assigned?
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8-3 What else do you think about the appraisal
(both good and bad)?
8-4 If you do not have an appraisal system in
your company, what else are you using to
measure employee performance?
9- How would you describe the nature of your
company's interdepartmental functions? (Please
tick (LA only one.)
9-1 Always compatible. 	 ( )
9-2 Not very compatible but our interdepartmental
functions achieve fair results. ( )
9-3 We have some incompatibility; conflict
happens but we have good teamwork that
resolves any consequences. ( )
9-4 There is some conflict but the level not too
high.( )
9-5 The interdepartmental functions are not
very compatible. ( )
9-6 The interdepartmental functions are
in conflict. ( )
Other:
10- Do you usually delegate part of your tasks? If
yes, what parts do you delegate?
I delegate my supervising task.	 ( )
I delegate my organising tasks. ( )
I delegate my planning tasks. ( )
I delegate my controlling tasks. ( )
I do not delegate any of my tasks. ( )
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11-
11-1 Do you have an absenteeism problem in your
company?
Yes (
	 ) No (	 )
If yes, what may be the causes?
Cultural and social. 	 ( )
Lack of professionalism and training. ( )
Psychological. ( )
Attendance policy is not good.( )
Supervision not good enough. ( )
11-2 If yes, who are in the majority regarding
absenteeism? (please tick one or more):
Management ( )
Supervisors ( )
Technicians ( )
Professionals ( )
Administrators ( )
Other:
11-3	 If yes, what are their nationalities, i.e.,
Saudis, Westerners, and so on?
Saudi ( )
Western ( )
Far East ( )
Arab ( )
Other:
12- What is the budgeting system in your company?
(please tick only one):
Zero base budget. ( )
Budgeting on operations and manpower needs. ( )
Budgeting on the basis of what you spent last
year (expenditure). ( )
Budgeting on the basis of the department's
functions. ( )
Other:
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13- Do you have to make profits (to cover your
departments cost or even bring money to your
company) in your budget proposal/plan? If yes,
please describe the assumptions and analysis you
are using and the results you have been
achieving.
14- Who is to review and approve your department
budget, and your company's budget as well
(Director General, Ministry of Planning,
(Executives Boards, and so on)?
15-	 How	 effective	 and	 efficient	 is	 your	 company
budgeting system? (please tick one or more unless
they conflict each other):
Very effective	 (	 )
Very efficient	 (	 )
Somewhat effective ( )
Somewhat efficient ( )
Not very effective
and efficient ( )
Not effective ( )
Not efficient ( )
Other:
16- What obstacles are you facing in preparing,
obtaining, and spending your departmental budget?
(please, give 7 to the most
next, and so on):
Unclear objectives.
Not enough commitment
to plans.
Unsupportive system.
Tough policy.
Too many procedures.
Far obstacles.	 (
None
Other:
applicable, 6 as the
(	 )
(	 )
(	 )
(	 )
(	 )
)
(	 )
19- How centralised is company?your
Only when necessary
and important. ( )
At most times. ( )
Not centralised. ( )
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17- In your present job, where does your authority
come from? (please give 7 to the most applicable
answer, 6 as to the next, and so on):
My position ( )
My knowledge ( )
My experiences ( )
My leadership capabilities ( )
My own decisions ( )
My personality ( )
My information ( )
Other:
18- Some articles and texts say that Saudi
organisations are very centralised. Do you see
any centralisation. If yes, to what extent is it
true?
Very much ( )
Much ( )
Little ( )
None ( )
Other:
Other:
20- Organisational boundaries are important to keep
the organisational environment and system(s)
working towards its mission.
20-1 How good are your organisational boundaries?
460
20-2 Do you have any difficulties in maintaining
them?
20-3 If yes, what are the causes?
1. Appointments should be in terms of objective,
performance criteria and tasks only.
Always	 Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
2. Policies and regulations are to improve and
protect the company's interests and property,
therefore, they must be strictly applied.
Strongly Agree	 Strongly disagree
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
3. A manager's authority is strongly supported by
his formal position.
Strongly Agree	 Strongly disagree
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
4. I encourage my people (subordinates) to bring new
ideas or solutions.
Strongly Agree	 Strongly disagree
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
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5. It would take too long for subordinates to make
decisions, so I have to make them and instruct my
people to follow them.
Strongly Agree	 Strongly disagree
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
6. I like to think that subordinates will feel free
to talk to me about their personal problems that
affect their performance.
Strongly Agree	 Strongly disagree
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
7. I know that my subordinates will tell me about
their work problems and difficulties.
Strongly Agree	 Strongly disagree
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
8. If my subordinates personal problems are
conflicting with their tasks and performance, I
will (answer one or more, the one circled as
strongly agree, i.e., 4 is your highest solution,
and so on):
Agree Disagree
8-1 give them freedom in resolving 	 4 3	 2 1
the problems without effecting
the tasks.
8-2 instruct them to do the tasks	 4 3	 2 I
professionally.
8-3 warn them to perform better. 	 4 3	 2 1
8-4 try both, to help them and to
	
4 3
	
2 I
explain to them how important
it is to improve their performance.
8-5 Other:
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9. If I am under pressure and have too many
important tasks to do, I will discuss with higher
management the priority of those tasks and
concentrate only on the most important ones.
Always	 Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
10. If I am under pressure and have too many
important tasks to do, I will push my people to
work, to make more effort to achieve the required
tasks.
Always
	
Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
11. Work progress in my unit depends on meeting
deadlines.
Always	 Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
12. I do my best to satisfy my people, therefore, I
do them some personal favours.
Always	 Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
13. When my people are suggesting too many things, I
do what I think should be done, even though they
may have some new ideas.
Always	 Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
14. A manager in setting his department's objectives
and plans must make sure to consider changes and
developments that could happen to his work as
part of those plans.
Always
	 Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
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15. As head of my section/department, I try to back-
up my people for their efforts or ideas even
though it may not satisfy others.
Always	 Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
16. I am willing to listen to criticism about
myself/my actions and try to see the viewpoint of
others to make the necessary changes.
Always	 Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
17. I criticise poor work in my unit.
Always	 Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
18. I criticise the poor work of other units.
Always	 Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
19. The welfare of my unit is more important than the
welfare of my people (subordinates).
Strongly Agree	 Strongly disagree
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
20. I refuse to explain my action.
Always	 Never
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1
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21. Do you find any difficulties in managing your
time,
21.1 At work?
21.2 Outside work?
And what are the cause(s)?
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If you have any comments or suggestions regarding this
research, or additional information, please use a blank
page and put your code number on it.
I very much appreciate the effort, cooperation, and
valuable time you have spent in assisting me in this work.
My best regards.
Yours sincerely,
ABDULAZIZ M. MALAIKA
P.O. Box 3362
Jeddah 21471
Tel: (2) 685-4928
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